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The focus of this thesis is an examination of the theological significance of moments 
of metalepsis within biblical narrative. Metalepsis, as defined by narratologists, is the 
transgression of the normal boundaries between layers of a narrative. Close 
readings of Job 19:23, Mark 13:14, Luke 16:8 and moments within the Deuteronomic 
History illustrate the impact of such diegetic muddles, which are also identified in 
apocalyptic subsummation of the seer, shifts between first and third person narrative 
voice, and anomalous moments of narrative stage management. These biblical 
contaminations of narrative thresholds are highly comparable with instances of 
illusion in visual art, fourth wall breaks in theatre, appeals to the reader in novels and 
classical apostrophes. They confound the logical separation between spatiotemporal 
dimensions, lay bare the paradox inherent in representations of the past in the 
present, and demonstrate the willingness of biblical narrators to include themselves 
within the frame of their own stories. 
Hermeneutically, such instances function as a form of narratological self-
disclosure and enfold the time of the telling of the story into the horizon of the text. 
They model and reveal a fundamental supposition pregnant within much biblical 
narrative – that the world revealed within the text is analogous to or contiguous with 
the world of the narrator and the reader. Thus, every timeframe conceivable to the 
narrator is subsumed into biblical representation of reality. 
Theologically, biblical metalepsis provokes consideration of providence and 
the meaning of history, of the presence of the divine in the process of reception and 
of the significance of the self. These themes emerge in the creedal claims of biblical 
narrators who include themselves within the frame of the text and also assert with 
assurance the promises of God. In these moments authoritative statements and 
confessions of the subjectivity of the narrating self are juxtaposed in a model of self-
involvement that the reader is invited to reciprocate.  
The themes outlined above are explored in dialogue with a number of 
hermeneuticists and theologians including Paul Ricoeur, Søren Kierkegaard and 
Erich Auerbach, whose explorations of time and narrative, of contemporaneity with 
Christ and the tyranny of the biblical world view provide context, counterpoint and 
conceptual background to the notion of readerly self-involvement that is developed 
























“I is reading it hundreds of times,” the BFG said. “And I is still reading it and 
teaching new words to myself. It is the most scrumdiddlyumptious story.”1 
 
 
Mrs. May looked back at her. “Kate,” she said after a moment, “Stories never 
really end. They go on and on and on. It's just that sometimes, at a certain 
point, one stops telling them.”2 
 
 
“Stories are wild creatures,” the monster said. “When you let them loose, who 
knows what havoc they might wreak?”3 
                                            
1
 Roald Dahl and Quentin Blake, The BFG (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Viking Penguin, 1985). 
2
 Mary Norton, The Borrowers (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1953). 
3
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When read, narrative introduces elapsed time into the reader’s present. This creates 
a potential paradox through the convergence of the actual and the possible, and 
through the sudden contiguity of supposedly distinct worlds. The act of reading 
creates a threshold where representations of the past are made present and history 
gains a freight of metamorphic potential in the lives of readers.4 Narrative 
encourages a vision of the meaningfulness of time and it reinterprets sequential 
events with accents of purpose and providence. Narrative is, in itself, a creedal 
claim: it is an assertion of the supremacy of meaning over chronology. 
Theologically then, narrative is central to any human understanding of the 
divine: for the pursuit of transcendence and the search for the numinous demand the 
development of super-chronological themes. Theological narratives stake particular 
claims over Chronos and seek to rescue creatures from the tyranny of time. They 
suggest that space and time are charged with meaning. They collocate the 
transcendent and the immanent, inviting a reader to find eternal significance in both 
the movements present in history and the meaning of history in the present. In a 
Christian, Trinitarian reading of space and time it is of course obvious that history is 
perceived to be meaningful and that stories sort a semblance of sense from the 
otherwise inexorability of sequence. Biblical narrative asserts the presence of a 
singular alpha and omega, who transcends space and time and imbues this 
continuum with significance. Indeed, at the centre of the Christian claim regarding 
the meaningfulness of existence is a God who spoke the universe into being 
(Genesis 1:3), a Son who “said nothing to them without using a parable” (Matthew 
                                            
4
 Given the openness of the biblical narrative to a range of potential readers, I draw no distinction 
between the reader anticipated by the text and readers (whether critical, ecclesiastical or other) who 
identify themselves as addressees.   
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13:34), and a Spirit who “moved men to speak from God” (2 Peter 2:21).5  Given that 
God himself is understood to be a communicative agent first and foremost, and that 
he is consistently represented as a being who uses words and stories to render 
reality meaningful for his creatures, it is unsurprising that biblical narrators pursue 
this same purpose. 
It is my contention that there are a range of remarkable moments in biblical 
narrative in which narratological structures foreground the temporal paradox that is 
inherent within narrative representations of reality. Within the span of biblical 
narrative, incursions and inconsistencies across story-telling thresholds muddle the 
‘now’ of the narrative, the ‘now’ of the narrator and the ‘now’ of the reader. Such 
transgressions disclose the ontological absurdity that is ever present within narrative 
but not always obvious. They juxtapose the finitude of the biblical narrator with 
unconditional claims regarding the transcendent meaning of time and the 
resurrection of the Redeemer as the fulcrum of history. Brief glimpses of overt 
narratological self-reference and intrusion into the primary framework of the story are 
amongst the most interesting and significant of these structures. In these moments 
the subjectivity of the narrating self is made particularly and peculiarly present and 
yet, despite disclosure of their own circumscribed liminality, biblical narrators do not 
seem to dilute the transcendent claim over history that they assert.  
Numerous examples suggest that the claims of biblical narrators are not 
diminished by their expressions of self-involvement, their acknowledgements of 
subjectivity, their confessions of temporality or the way in which they transgress the 
thresholds between apparently distinct narrative worlds. John, for example, notes 
that, “There are also many other things which Jesus did; were every one of them to 
                                            
5
 All biblical quotations, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the Revised Standard Version. 
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be written, I suppose that the world itself could not contain the books that would be 
written” (John 21:25). But he also claims that, “In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God; 
all things were made through him” (John 1:1-3). Evidently, awareness of his own 
limitations as a witness and story-teller does not lessen the claim he wishes to make 
over history. Though unavoidably subjective, and unexpectedly overt about this, 
biblical narrators abide in the overwhelming confidence provoked by their faith. “I 
know that my Redeemer lives,” they say, and, “These [things] are written that you 
may believe.” 
A range of biblical narrators seem to assert that there is no contradiction in 
confessing subjectivity whilst at the same time making absolute truth claims. No 
overt mechanism is offered within the canon to anatomize the process of inspiration 
or to justify how a story-teller, who is an obviously finite expression of space and 
time, can voice that which is spoken as universal truth. This suggests that the self-
involved and contaminated story-telling frames constructed by narrators are an 
incarnational declaration made with confidence under the conviction that God is, at 
the same time, supremely sovereign over the span of history and also personally and 
pneumatically involved in the lives of individual story-tellers, writers, narrators, and 
readers. Thus the claim of scripture to be divinely inspired is not necessarily a 
guarantee of the absolute accuracy of omniscient perspective, but is rather a 
promise that the ‘One’ who hovered over the surface of the deep, who wrought order 
from formless void, and who was involved in the mess of coronations, calamities and 
crucifixion is absolutely capable of breathing life into text and story, narrator and 
reader. Muddling narratological self-involvement invites a readerliness (by which I 
mean a particular manner and mode of reading) that rests on the promise of God’s 
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own self-involvement. Indeed, Rowan Williams suggests that “revelation interrupts 
the uncertainties of history with a summons to absolute knowledge, God’s 
knowledge of and interpretation of himself.”6   
I suggest that the potency of the biblical representation of reality is amplified 
rather than diminished by moments which confess the role of the narrator or which 
muddle narrative levels. This is because such moments embody the subsummation 
of the narrative reality into the divine story, and demand concomitant readerly self-
involvement. By transgressing the normal separation between narrator, narratee and 
narrative these moments produce a loop of logic that binds the reader, with the 
narrator, into a shared model of reality. Confusion between the act of ‘telling’ and 
that which is ‘told’ muddles the sense of time and distance that separates the reader 
from the text, and the absurdity of such anomalies dismantles the normally 
unyielding separation between narratorial and readerly realities. Mutual 
contaminations between the reader’s world and the worlds represented within the 
text invite subjective faith in an absolute God who holds the span of time together 
and fills it with meaning.  
These moments lay bare the inner biblical hermeneutic through which 
narrative voices interpret prior texts and events and facilitate understanding that is at 
the same time compelling and complex, transformative and troubling, self-involving 
and unsettling. Inner biblical hermeneutics are thus an invitation or a doorway into 
the sort of ‘second naiveté’ described by Paul Ricoeur.7 Previously inconceivable 
interpretative implications are generated through the suggestion that God transcends 
                                            
6
 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p.133. 
7 
Paul Ricoeur, “We can…aim at a second naïveté in and through criticism [and] through interpreting 
we can hear again.” The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston MA: Beacon Press, 
1967), p. 351. 
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the divide between the ‘written’ and the ‘read’; that he joins together the otherwise 
discombobulated worlds of the patriarchs, the prophets, the apostles, the church 
fathers, the twenty-first century exegetes and every creature in between, and that 
grace and peace in Christ were no less present for them, and are no less present 
now than they were for Jesus’ contemporary disciples. 
As such, moments that contravene the normal thresholds and frames around 
the worlds within the text are of substantial significance to the sustained 
transmissibility of the text and must be viewed as more than structural infractions or 
editorial anomalies. Indeed, they are amongst the most engaging features of biblical 
narrative, for such paradoxical encroachments model interoperability between 
worlds, challenge the selfhood and stance of the reader, invite appropriation and 
reception, and legitimate a range of interpretative approaches.  
 
2. Metalepsis 
Anomalous or unexpected movements between logically distinct strata of a narrative 
are described by numerous terms including transumption, intrusion, obtrusion, 
asides and frame-breaking. However, it is the term ‘metalepsis’ that has gained most 
traction, especially as a description of moments when a character or voice 
transgresses the threshold between situational worlds that are otherwise distinct.8 
                                            
8
 Richard Hays has used metalepsis in a quite different, more figurative sense, employing the term in 
reference to echoes and allusions in which the New Testament redeploys terms from the Hebrew 
canon and assigns them new Christological meaning. Cf. Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the 
Letters of Paul (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1989). He suggests that metalepsis 
is an echo of the old in a newer text which “places the reader within a field of whispered or unstated 
correspondences” between the two texts (p. 20). Cf. Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the 
Gospels (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2016): “Metalepsis is a literary technique of citing or 
echoing a small bit of a precursor text in such a way that the reader can grasp the echo only by 
recalling or recovering the original context from which the fragmentary echo came.” (p.14). 
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Metalepsis was one of the many rhetorical tools employed by Greek and Roman 
orators and lawyers, and the term originally described instances when a prosecutor 
might seize upon, and object to, a circumstantial aspect of the defendant’s act, 
creating a prosecution case from an apparently inconsequential component of a 
defendant’s narrative.9 Deriving thus from the Greek terms meta and lambesis, 
metalepsis literally means ‘to take beyond’.10 Its application in modern narratology 
was first advanced by Gérard Genette in his 1972 work Narrative Discourse which 
explored narrative thresholds and developed a detailed examination of narrative 
structures. He defined metalepsis as: 
A violation of the separation between syntactically defined levels and a 
deviant referential operation that violates the thresholds of representation and 
involves the beholder in an ontological transgression of universes.11 
 
Genette explored the relationship between the act of narration and the world of the 
story itself. He advanced the suggestion that every narrative fiction contains a 
number of distinct ‘interior worlds’ that are best understood according to the level 
they occupy in relationship to the primary narration. His model suggests that texts 
contain a primary level of ‘diegesis’ in which the characters within a story interact.12 
This layer of primary diegesis contains the thoughts and actions of all the characters 
within the main story. The voice of the narrator within a text inhabits a different 
interior world, located externally to the interactions of the characters of the primary 
diegesis in a layer which Genette defines as the extra-diegetic. If a further story is 
                                            
9
 Malcolm Heath, ‘Metalepsis, paragraphe and the scholia to Hermogenes’, Leeds International 
Classical Studies 2 (2003), pp. 1-91 (p. 3). 
10
 This etymology is disputed but seems most probable. Cf. Marie-Laure Ryan, Avatars of story 
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), p. 206.  
11
 Gerard Genette, Metalepse. De la figure à la fiction (Paris, Seuil, 2004), p. 7. Translation by John 
Pier, ‘Metalepsis’, in Handbook of Narratology, ed. by Peter Hühn, Jan Christoph Meister, John Pier 
and Wolf Schmidt (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014), p. 90. 
12
 Diegesis derives from the Greek διήγησις (narration – cf. Luke 1:1) and is consistently contrasted 
with mimesis μίμησις (imitation). Cf. Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the theory of narrative 
(University of Toronto Press, 2009), p. 18, and Susan Sniader Lanser, The narrative act: Point of view 
in prose fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 166. 
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told or presented by one of the characters within the primary diegesis then this 
separate embedded “story within a story” represents a further diegetic level. This 
level was termed meta-diegesis by Genette, but has since often been relabeled as 
hypo-diegesis.13 The latter relabeling is preferable as it nominally subordinates 
embedded narrative to a level beneath the primary level. This matches typical 
reading experiences, for a reader is often aware that the world represented in the 
embedded tale belongs to and depends on the primary narrative, and that the 
narrator’s own communication to the reader is experienced super-structurally and 
above the primary discourse.14 In addition to the primary, hypo and extra diegetic 
layers, other commentators have since added the notion of a trans-diegetic structure 
which contains any voices that speak across each layer. Further characters, voices 















  Primary diegesis   
    Hypo-diegesis     
 
(Figure 1: A model of embedded narrative levels) 
                                            
13
 Gérard Genette, Narrative discourse revisited (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 84. 
Genette’s approach is reversed by Mieke Bal and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan who both view the 
diegetic level as “subordinate” to the extradiegetic level. Cf. Mieke Bal, ‘Narration et focalisation. Pour 
une théorie des instances du récit’, Poétique. Revue de Théorie et d'Analyse Littéraires Paris 29 
(1977), pp. 21 – 58 (p. 35), and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, ‘Narration: levels and voices’, Narrative 
Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (London: Methuen, 1983), pp. 86-105 (p. 93). 
14
 Cf. Gérard, Genette, Narrative discourse, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 228–29 
and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction p. 92. 
15
 ‘Omni-diegesis’ first appears in Sarah Atkinson’s research on cinema audiences: Sarah Atkinson, 
‘The performative functions of dramatic communities: conceptualizing audience engagement in 
transmedia fiction’, International Journal of Communication 8 (2014), pp 2201-2219 (p. 2211). And 
‘Trans-diegesis’ is first utilised by Catherine Wells, Les métamorphoses narratologiques dans 
Chronique des sept misères et Solibo magnifique: une étude postclassique de Gérard Genette et de 
Patrick Chamoiseau (Queen’s University at Kingston, PhD diss., 2001), p. i. 
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A number of viable approaches to embedded narrative and diegetic frameworks 
have been offered in response to Genette’s model (cf. section 5 below). Marie-Laure 
Ryan’s model of “stacks” and Giovanni Battista Tomassini’s notion of ‘degrees of 
narrative delegation’ are particularly noteworthy approaches.16 Nevertheless a key 
virtue of Genette’s analysis of narrative levels is that it focuses on the “threshold” 
between one spatiotemporal universe and another and the process of 
narration/story-telling as the boundary between these worlds. Later, moderate 
developments by Mieke Bal and William Nelles amongst others have also added 
depth to Genette’s suggestion that the ‘narrating situation’ represented by each level 
includes the implicit time and person of the narrating voices, and that this ‘narratorial 
situation’ is fundamental to explanations of the inter-relation between different 
diegetic levels.17 By definition narrative worlds can only exist through being read, and 
the act of narration is itself therefore an intrinsic aspect of the delineation between 
diegetic thresholds. As a consequence, to be meaningful, narrative theory must not 
look only at the internal mechanisms of a textual world, but also at the vocalising 
context which brings life to the narrative. Genette’s model is therefore particularly 
significant, as his focus on narratological situation acknowledges that the 
interrelation of interior worlds is also simultaneously an interrelation between the 
world within the narrative and the (exterior) world of the reader: for the relationships 
between internal worlds are entirely latent until a narrative is narrated, read or heard. 
Genette’s notion of metalepsis, located as it is within a broader exploration of 
the thresholds between distinct narrative situations, has the potential to generate 
striking and significant consideration regarding the boundaries between reality and 
                                            
16
 Cf. Marie-Laure Ryan, Avatars of story, p. 23 and Giovanni Battista Tomassini, ‘La mise en abyme’, 
in Il racconto nel racconto: analisi teorica dei procedimenti d’inserzione narrative, ed. by Giovanni 
Battista Tomassini (Roma: Bulzoni 1990), pp. 106-112. 
17
 Within his model Genette gives particular attention to the threshold between narrative levels.  
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representation that finds its nexus in narration.18 Genette notes that texts require a 
degree of coherence in the function of their interior worlds and as a consequence 
boundaries between the implied universes of the extra, primary and hypo-diegeses 
normally contain a degree of rigidity. Without this a narrative will rarely achieve any 
semblance of sense, and consequently characters predominantly function only within 
their own situation, as this integrity is crucial for the development of a coherent story. 
Having highlighted the predominantly impermeable boundaries between diegetic 
layers Genette explains why the blurring of thresholds between interior worlds 
necessarily also confuses the relationship between reality and representation: 
The most troubling thing about metalepsis indeed lies in this unacceptable 
and insistent hypothesis that the extra-diegetic is perhaps always diegetic and 
that the narrator and his narratees—you and I—perhaps belong to some 
narrative.19 
 
Genette’s approach is invaluable in that it highlights the intrinsic significance of 
metalepsis beyond the obvious blurring of thresholds between interior worlds. His 
emphasis on the narratorial situation highlights the fact that every transgression 
across diegetic thresholds is at the same time an ontological paradox: for whenever 
a voice or character is allowed to speak or act beyond the confines of their own 
diegetic world, the boundary that separates the ‘represented world’ from the ‘real’ is 
necessarily confused. For Genette this bleeding between worlds reveals the fragility 
of the “shifting sacred frontier between two worlds, the world in which one tells, the 
world of which one tells.”20 Genette implies that in some sense all worlds, including 
the readers’ understanding of their own world, are narrative worlds dependent on 
                                            
18
 Genette notes that the author is either hetero-diegetic (absent from the narrated world), homo-
diegetic (present in the narrated world) or auto-diegetic (identical with the protagonist). These identity 
markers combined with the diegetic level (as explained above) lead to a four part typology of narrative 
stance. This focus has led a number of commentators to suggest that Genette’s work is implicitly 
aspects of a speech act approach. Cf. Richard Shryock, Tales of storytelling: embedded narrative in 
modern French fiction, vol. 206, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 1993). 
19
 Genette, Narrative discourse, p. 236. 
20
  Loc. cit. 
11 
 
and defined by levels of speech and acts of vocalisation, and that moments of 
metalepsis lay bare the fallacy inherent in attempts to divorce representations and 
realities.21 Building upon Genette’s model, others have helpfully explained 
metalepsis as a “confrontation of worlds” (David Lodge); a “short circuit” (Brian 
McHale); a “sudden collapse of the narrative system” (Werner Wolf); a “disruption in 
the fabric of the narrative” (Debra Malina); or a “strange loop” (Douglas Hofstadter).22 
Each of these approaches contribute nuance to understanding of the effect of frame-
breaking, just as notions of transumption, intrusion, obtrusion, and narrative asides 
do. Nevertheless, metalepsis remains the best umbrella term and primary descriptor 
for moments that confuse narrative levels and frames because it is rooted in a useful 
broader model of diegetic layers and narrating situations, it is grounded within the 
Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition and it connects with a wealth of narratological and 
philosophical background.23 Metalepsis (and, by extension, Genette’s model of 
diegesis) is therefore the primary prism through which I will consider and explore 
                                            
21
 On the one hand, as in narrative fiction, a character can appeal directly to a reader, excluding the 
narrator and achieving a depth of pathos otherwise impossible. Conversely, the diegetic intrusion of 
the narrator’s perspective, provenance, theology and voice introduce profound questions for the 
reader about the inspiration of the story or the validity of the narrative. In these metalepses demands 
are placed on the reader – for she becomes aware that she is reading, and any presumption of 
narrative objectivity or authorial authenticity is challenged. Rather than obfuscating the boundaries 
between reader and story, the intervention of explicit narrative presence bifurcates the reader from 
the story. This undermines the reader’s capacity to remain distinct from the text and equally it 
undermines the text’s capacity to speak cogently: for narration or performance necessarily 
contaminates the normal thresholds between layers of representations and reality. 
22
 David Lodge, ‘The modes of modem writing’ in Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern 
Literature (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), p. 240; Brian McHale, Postmodernist fiction, (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2003); Werner Wolf, ‘Narrative and narrativity: A narratological reconceptualization and its 
applicability to the visual arts’ in Word & Image 19, no. 3 (2003), pp. 180-197; Debra Malina, Breaking 
the Frame: Metalepsis and the Construction of the Subject (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University 
Press, 2002), p. 10; Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid (New York: 
Basic Books,1979). 
23
 Quintilian’s comments for example represent an interesting background regarding the ontological 
muddle inherent within metalepsis. He suggests that “it is an intermediate step, as it were, to that 
which is metaphorically expressed, signifying nothing in itself, but affording a passage to something. It 
is a trope that we give the impression of being acquainted with rather than one that we actually ever 
need.” Institutes of Oratory Book 8, Chapter 6.  Harold Bloom similarly suggests, “In a metalepsis, a 
word is substituted metonymically for a word in a previous trope, so that a metalepsis can be called, 
maddeningly but accurately, a metonymy of a metonymy.” Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 102.  
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movements across textual thresholds which compromise the distinction between 
representation and reality via shifts in narratological stance, voice or 
spatiotemporality. 
 
3. Examples in Biblical Narrative 
Moments of direct appeal to the reader or encroachments between diegetic worlds 
may stretch a reader’s cognitive limits and substantially affect the sense of 
connection that she perceives between her own world and the worlds within the 
text.24 When a reader supposes that her own world shares a significant degree of 
correspondence with that portrayed in a narrated world, or if she accepts its veracity 
a priori, these effects may be even more pronounced. Metalepsis therefore carries 
the potential for amplified effect in texts which invite a presumption of 
correspondence between diegetic worlds. This is because moments of inconsistency 
in diegetic frames and transgressions across narrative boundaries draw attention to 
the divide between readerly reality and narrative representation. The effect of 
metalepsis on the believer reading scripture (or the reader believing scripture) may 
therefore be expected to be of particular significance: for contamination between 
logically distinct diegetic layers also encourages a reader to imagine a degree of 
permeability between the interlocking worlds of narration and reception. This sense 
of permeability may precipitate a depth of engagement which seems to be in tension 
with the suspicion provoked by diegetic inconsistency. However both effects can be 
                                            
24
 For any reader, narrator or participant in the hermeneutical process ‘she’ is the pronoun of choice 
throughout this thesis, with ‘he’ reserved only for specific participants whom it would be historically 
anachronistic to refer to as ‘she.’ I am conscious that as a consequence biblical narrators are often 
referred to as ‘he’ with readers being ‘she.’ It is not my intention to imply a gender specific role 
through this nomenclature. 
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understood as facets of the honest, self-involved hermeneutic of which Ricoeur 
spoke:  
Beyond the desert of criticism, we wish to be called again… For the second 
immediacy that we seek and the second naiveté that we await are no longer 
accessible to us anywhere else than in a hermeneutics; we can believe only 
by interpreting.25  
 
Unsurprisingly, presumptions about the coherence and authority of the biblical canon 
have often led to claims of a consistent and rigid narratorial stance and to models 
that downplay the frequency and significance of anomalous adjustments in narrative 
stance. Indeed, Janet Spittle has suggested that “No clear examples of metalepsis 
[in biblical narrative] comparable to the typical examples cited in modern novels 
come immediately to mind.”26 However, I fundamentally disagree with this analysis 
and contend that biblical narrative is replete with moments of metaleptic boundary 
breaking, the range of which is of profound effect upon the reader. I suggest that the 
frequency of metalepsis in biblical narrative produces a range of hermeneutically and 
theologically significant effects. It enhances the transmissibility of truth claims across 
the threshold between the world of the text and the world of the reader; it produces a 
portability of concepts despite the increasingly remote spatiotemporal location of the 
reader in relation to the world within the narrative; it invites readers to participate in 
an omni-diegetic reality that transcends the separation between distinct worlds; it 
destabilises a reader’s sense of her relationship to the story-telling voice and 
provokes a new sense of situatedness. Indeed, it is my claim that metalepsis is one 
of the many features of biblical narrative that allows it to lay claim to the reader’s 
reality and to shape the world of the text’s reception. This extra-textual operability is 
                                            
25
 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 349. 
26
 Janet E. Spittler, ‘“μανθάνεις πρὸς τίνας εἴρηται τὰ εἰρημένα;” Metalepsis in the Apocryphal Acts of 
Andrew’ in Über die Grenze: Metalepse in Text-und Bildmedien des Altertums 39, ed. by Ute E. Eisen 
and Peter von Möllendorff (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), pp. 387–404 (p. 387). 
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of profound theological significance, as Mike Higton illustrates, for example, in a 
Christological context:  
The Gospel depiction of Jesus is not a fiction… Jesus is an insistent presence 
in our world – and our ways of seeing and of negotiating our world can’t but 
be reshaped by that presence.27 
 
In Chapters 3-6 I offer close readings of four very different moments of metalepsis in 
biblical narrative, in Mark 13, Luke 16, across the Deuteronomistic History and in Job 
19. The survey that follows in this section is therefore merely an illustration of the 
frequency of metaleptic moments within biblical narratives and the range of such 
occurrences. Despite the absence of any other similar surveys and the scarcity of 
articles exploring biblical metalepsis, it is my claim that there is a sufficient range of 
diegetic transgressions within biblical narrative to suggest that instances in Job 
19:23, Mark 13:14, Luke 16:8 and within the Deuteronomistic History are part of a 
broader pattern. The following survey suggests that the frequency of occurrences 
justifies closer examination, and supports the claim that metalepsis is a significant 
feature of biblical narrative. There are many more examples than those which I offer, 
and here I have selected a limited range of metalepses that illustrate the most 
interesting range of transgressions within the interrelationships between the role of 
the narrator, the world of the primary diegesis and that of the reader.  
3.1 The destabilising introduction of I, We and Us 
Narrators normally inhabit a consistent relationship with the space-time of their story. 
Indeed Genette explained the relationship as one of the fundamental aspects of 
                                            
27
 Mike Higton, foreword to The Identity of Jesus Christ, Expanded and Updated Edition: The 
Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology, by Hans W. Frei (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock 
Publishers, 2013), p. xviii. 
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narratological typology.28  The narrator does not usually deviate from her stance 
which must either be hetero-diegetic (situated in a different place and time from her 
tale, and therefore absent from the narrated world as a character); homo-diegetic 
(situated within the story as a character or a voice that interacts with other 
characters) or auto-diegetic (operating with an indistinguishable voice to that of the 
protagonist).  
These classifications describe the narrator’s stance apropos the story that she 
narrates. The majority of biblical narrative is recounted from a hetero-diegetic stance, 
as demonstrated in the typical narrative structures found between Genesis and 
Chronicles: 
When Ahab saw Eli'jah, Ahab said to him, "Is it you, you troubler of Israel?" 
And he answered, “I have not troubled Israel; but you have, and your father's 
house, because you have forsaken the commandments of the LORD”… So 
Ahab sent to all the people of Israel, and gathered the prophets together at 
Mount Carmel. (I Kings 18:17-20) 
 
Less commonly biblical narrators adopt a homo-diegetic stance, in which, whilst not 
the protagonist of the story, they themselves appear as witnesses to events, as in 
Luke-Acts: 
And when we had parted from them and set sail, we came by a straight 
course to Cos, and the next day to Rhodes, and from there to Pat'ara. And 
having found a ship crossing to Phoeni'cia, we went aboard, and set sail. 
When we had come in sight of Cyprus, leaving it on the left we sailed to Syria. 
(Acts 21:1-12) 
 
Equally infrequent are occasions when narrators describe their own interactions, and 
as the primary character within the narrative, adopt an auto-diegetic stance. This 
approach is evident in the book of Nehemiah, and in introductions to a number of 
prophetic narratives: 
                                            
28
 This focus has led a number of commentators to suggest that models based on diegetic thresholds  
are implicitly aspects of a speech act approach. Cf. Shryock, Tales of storytelling, p. 33. 
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In the month of Nisan, in the twentieth year of King Ar-ta-xerx'es, when wine 
was before him, I took up the wine and gave it to the king. Now I had not been 
sad in his presence. And the king said to me, "Why is your face sad, seeing 
you are not sick? This is nothing else but sadness of the heart." Then I was 
very much afraid. (Nehemiah 2:1-2.)29 
 
Movement between these stances is unusual in narratives because a consistent 
relationship between the narrative voice and the narration is fundamental to the 
coherence of the narrative.30 An auto-diegetic narrator, for example, would not be 
expected to offer an omniscient comment related to events unfolding within the 
narrative as this would confuse substantially the reader’s sense of perspective 
regarding the narrative framework. Similarly it would be very strange for a hetero-
diegetic narrator to interact with a character, as her location has previously been 
distinct from that of the characters she describes. On occasions when a narrator 
steps outside of her normal mode of narration, such anachronistic movement 
therefore often functions as a significant challenge to a reader’s understanding of the 
layers within the narrative or to her sense of her own relatedness to the narrative.  
Within the corpus of biblical narratives there are a number of examples that 
illustrate precisely the change of stance explained above. Such unexpected 
narratological incursions tangle diegetic planes and complicate the relationship 
between the narrator and the narrative. Some of these instances occur in prescripts 
or postscripts, and only minimally affect the reader’s sense of the relationship 
between the narrator and the narrative. These self-referential inclusions at the 
beginning or end of a text achieve various effects, but primarily the intermingling of 
the world of the story and the story-teller serves as an attempt to validate the 
                                            
29
 Cf. Francois Tolmie, Narratology and Biblical narratives: a practical guide (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf 
and Stock Publishers, 2012), p. 19. 
30
 An exception to this rule is the role of the ‘unreliable narrator’, a style that first drew my attention to 
narratological paradox. Cf. Sebastian Faulks' Engleby, Yann Martel's Life of Pi or Agatha Christie's 
The Murder of Roger Ackroyd. 
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authenticity and honesty of the narrative voice.31 Such statements of introduction or 
conclusion are technically defined as colophons, examples of which include 2 
Maccabees (where the narrative voice intervenes near the beginning of the 
narrative), and John 21 (where a comparable intervention occurs at the end of the 
Gospel): 
All this, which has been set forth by Jason of Cyrene in five volumes, we shall 
attempt to condense into a single book. For considering the flood of numbers 
involved and the difficulty there is for those who wish to enter upon the 
narratives of history because of the mass of material, we have aimed to 
please those who wish to read, to make it easy for those who are inclined to 
memorize, and to profit all readers. (2 Macc. 2:25) 
 
Jesus also did many other things. If they were all written down I suppose the 
whole world could not contain the books that would be written. (John 21:25) 
 
Because scribal addenda found in colophons muddle the relationship between the 
primary diegesis and what would, in a modern publication, be a title page, preface or 
postscript, the effect on the narrative as a whole is limited. Indeed, according to 
Genette such instances are part of a narrative paratext which establishes a “contract 
of reading” and which represent a discursive threshold that he explains as “a zone 
not only of transition but also of transaction: a privileged place of a pragmatics and a 
strategy.”32 Genette sees the movement between narrative stance in an 
epigrammatic introduction as an anticipated aspect of the “original authorial preface”, 
which explains why the narrative that follows deserves to be read. Content such as 
titles, prefaces or notes, “have the capacity to inflect the way we read and interpret a 
                                            
31
 Though this effect is not necessarily achieved, since making a reader suddenly aware that they are 
being told a story may have the effect of ‘laying bare’ the device and increasing their distance from 
the text (see section 5 below). 
32
 Gérard Genette and Marie Maclean, ‘Introduction to the Paratext’, New Literary History 22, no. 2 
(1991), pp. 261-272 (p. 2). Note also that Genette defines as ‘Peritext’ material which appears “within 
the same volume”. 
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narrative” but do not confuse the structure significantly.33 They should therefore not 
be considered metaleptic. 
Conversely, moments that inexplicably, unexpectedly or anachronistically 
introduce the presence of the narrator into the main events within the narrative world 
are much more destabilising. Such incursions create obvious transgressions that 
cannot be explained as redactional discrepancies caused by the juxtaposition of 
colophon and narrative, text and postscript, or title page and story. Jeremiah’s 
dictation to Baruch, which occurs near the middle of the book, is an example of 
precisely such an interruption. It muddles narrative thresholds and brings into focus 
questions of textual provenance:  
Then Jeremiah called Baruch son of Neriah, and Baruch wrote on a scroll at 
Jeremiah’s dictation all the words of the LORD that he had spoken to him. (Jer. 
36:5) 
 
The intrusion here of a description of the process of the textualisation of the narrative 
interrupts the previous sense that the text was a verbatim record of Jeremiah’s 
words, yet still suggests that the world of the narrator is entirely synonymous with 
that of Jeremiah. The description of the dictation therefore creates a paradox, for it is 
clear that the act of writing is being written about, which means that the narrative 
being read is not actually a record of Jeremiah’s words. This confusion is 
compounded by the description of Jehoi'akim’s decision to burn the scroll and of 
Jeremiah’s decision to dictate a second time: 
Then Jeremiah took another scroll and gave it to Baruch the scribe, the son of 
Neri'ah, who wrote on it at the dictation of Jeremiah all the words of the scroll 
which Jehoi'akim king of Judah had burned in the fire; and many similar words 
were added to them. (Jer. 36:32) 
 
                                            
33
 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge introduction to narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 239. 
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For this paradox to be resolved, the reader is left with two equally strange 
possibilities. Either a normally hetero-diegetic voice has here included 
autobiographical detail or else the words in the biblical book of Jeremiah are not the 
dictation written now by Baruch. Thus the involvement of the scribe within the 
primary diegesis profoundly muddles the sense of relatedness between the identity 
of a scribe and that of the narrative voice.34  
Beyond the references to the scribal works of Baruch an array of adjustments 
in narrative stance within the text of Jeremiah produce a significant sense of 
contamination between storytelling thresholds.35 For example the narrative voice 
moves between the first and third person (and consequently from an auto-diegetic to 
a hetero-diegetic narrative stance) in a number of key oracles: 
The LORD said to me in the days of King Josiah, “Have you seen what she 
did, that faithless one, Israel? (Jer. 3.6). 
 
The word of the LORD which came to Jeremiah concerning the drought (Jer. 
14.1). 
 
Furthermore, minor insertions also suggest that there are a number of layers of 
hypo-diegesis within the text, each embedded and demarcated by the faintest of 
thresholds: 
Woe to you, O Moab! The people of Chemosh is undone; for your sons have 
been taken captive, and your daughters into captivity. Yet I will restore the 
fortunes of Moab in the latter days, says the LORD." Thus far is the judgment 
on Moab. Concerning the Ammonites. Thus says the LORD: "Has Israel no 
sons? Has he no heir? (Jer. 48.46 – 49:1). 
 
Jeremiah wrote in a book all the evil that should come upon Babylon, all these 
words that are written concerning Babylon. And Jeremiah said to Serai'ah: 
"When you come to Babylon, see that you read all these words, and… When 
                                            
34
 Cf. Jack R. Lundbom, ‘Baruch, Seraiah, and Expanded Colophons in the Book of Jeremiah’, 
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 11, no. 36 (1986), pp. 89-114. 
35
 Haim Gvaryahu suggests that the book of Jeremiah alone contains more than 40 colophons. Haim 
Gvaryahu, Biblical Colophons: A Source for the “Biography” of Authors, Texts and Books (Leiden: EJ 
Brill, 1975), pp. 42-59. 
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you finish reading this book, bind a stone to it, and cast it into the midst of the 
Euphra'tes, and say, `Thus shall Babylon sink, to rise no more, because of the 
evil that I am bringing upon her.'" Thus far are the words of Jeremiah. 
Zedeki'ah was twenty-one years old when he became king; and he reigned 
eleven years in Jerusalem. (Jer. 51.60 – 52:1). 
 
Inconsistent narratorial stance is a feature of the book of Jeremiah and it provokes a 
range of fairly small interpretative dilemmas for the reader. However, these instances 
accumulate to the point where they destabilise the reader’s sense of whose words 
they are reading and they highlight the competing claims for primacy made by 
YHWH’s, Jeremiah’s and Baruch’s voices, neither one nor the other ever being 
allowed security as principle interlocutor.  
Nevertheless, the prophetic mantle is marked above all else within the 
Hebrew canon through the introductory formula, “Thus says the Lord” (ko ‘amar 
‘adonai), and biblical prophecy is understood to demand a degree of “rhetorical 
ventriloquism.”36 Consequently the movement between the voice of the prophet and 
YHWH is anticipated and the inconsistency in narrative stance does not threaten to 
overwhelm the coherence of the narrative. Readers still feel like they are readers, 
and the narrative still feels like narrative: substantive ontological shift or 
contamination between the reader’s world and the intra-diegetic worlds is therefore 
limited. This situation is best understood as “a temporary breach of illusion that does 
not threaten the basic structure of the narrative universe.”37 The transitions may lay 
bare the illusion of the represented world, and the nature of the narrative voice may 
be confused, but even if its authority is questioned, the role of the reader is 
undisturbed. 
                                            
36
 Cf. Ruth Finnegan, Why do we quote?: the culture and history of quotation (Cambridge: Open Book 
Publishers, 2011), p. 234. 
37
 Ryan, Avatars of story, p. 207.  
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More overt metaleptic strangeness is evident in the transition between the 
hetero-diegetic and homo-diegetic narration in the ‘we passages’ in Luke-Acts. The 
first transition from the third person voice to the first is found in Acts 16: 
And a vision appeared to Paul in the night: a man of Macedo'nia was standing 
beseeching him and saying, "Come over to Macedo'nia and help us." And 
when he had seen the vision, immediately we sought to go on into 
Macedo'nia, concluding that God had called us to preach the gospel to them. 
(Acts 16:9-10) 
 
Other similar transitions are found in 20:4-5 where the narrator, without explanation 
becomes part of Paul’s entourage in Philippi before sailing with him to Troas, and in 
27:1-2 where the narrator becomes a participant in Paul’s voyage towards shipwreck 
in Malta.38 The movement from a hetero- to a homo-diegetic stance has generated 
prodigious comment, with particularly noteworthy recent insights offered by William 
S. Campbell, Hannah M. Cocksworth, Anja Cornils and Ute E. Eisen. Campbell 
explains: 
The shift in grammatical person in these passages presents interpretative 
problems because the narrator does not provide an explanation for the 
change and the reason is not obvious from the narrative context, that is, the 
narrator does not say that at these points he has entered events personally, 
nor does the story itself suggest that this is the case.39 
 
Cocksworth notes that this unexpected movement “changes the voice and point of 
view of the narrator, and consequently the sense of narrative distance felt by the 
implied reader.”40 Cornils’ major suggestion is that metalepsis in ancient literature, 
such as Acts, was a serious technique that was not employed for comic or anti-
illusionistic effects (as is often the case in modern narrative), but rather as a means 
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 Ute E Eisen, ‘Metalepsis in the Gospel of John–Narration Situation and “Beloved Disciple” in New 
Perspective’, in Über die Grenze: Metalepse in Text-und Bildmedien des Altertums 39, ed. by Ute E. 
Eisen and Peter von Möllendorff (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), pp. 318 – 345 (p. 325). 
39
 William S. Campbell, The “We” passages in the Acts of the Apostles: The narrator as narrative 
character (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), p. 1. 
40
 Hannah May Cocksworth, Beginnings, endings, and the narrative unity of Luke and Acts (University 
of Cambridge PhD diss., 2014), p. 22. 
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for increasing the narrator’s authority and intensifying the credibility of the narrative.41 
To this end, she suggests that in Acts the “we” passages serve an exclusively 
rhetorical effect that is intended to enhance the credibility of the account. Ute E. 
Eisen adds to this notion commenting: 
[The first person plural “we” narrative passages] remain incidental because 
they are interrupted by the main third-person-narration… but the effect on the 
reader is tremendous [and] there are still interpreters who read Luke-Acts as 
written by an eyewitness.42 
 
The lack of explanation within Luke-Acts regarding the movement between the 
hetero-diegetic and homo-diegetic narrative stance suggests that the narrative is a 
blend of personal experience and citation of other accounts. Whether this is because 
the narrative is an account that ‘accidently’ mixes these two forms, or whether these 
metalepses are deliberate rhetorical tools intended to increase the persuasive power 
of the text is a moot point. In either case the adjustment in narrative voice is 
noticeable, sudden, unexplained and initially illogical.  
For the sake of this initial survey one final example of a shift in narratorial 
stance from a hetero to homo-diegetic position will suffice. For the overwhelming 
majority of John’s Gospel, and for the rest of the prologue of which this verse is a 
part, the narrative voice in John is hetero-diegetic and speaks dispassionately in the 
third person. Indeed the strongest confessions of faith in the Gospel come from the 
personal testimony of characters in the primary diegesis. For example, Thomas in 
John 20:28, “My Lord and My God”; the man born blind in John 9:38, “Lord, I 
believe”; the woman at the well in John 4:28 “Come and see a man who told me 
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everything I have ever done!”; and Peter in John 6:69, “you are the Holy One of 
God.”  Nevertheless, before any of these confessions, in John 1:14, the narrator 
locates himself as part of a witnessing community.43 
And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we 
have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father. (John 1:14) 
 
Through use of the first person plural pronoun, in this rare instance an otherwise 
omniscient and hetero-diegetic voice is located within the same space-time 
dimensions as the primary diegesis, a movement that confounds the otherwise 
untroubled boundary that keeps the world of the narrative, the world of the narrator 
and that of the narratee remote from one another. This movement achieves 
significant rhetorical effect, for the first person plural “we” invites the reader to situate 
herself with the narrator amongst the community of those who have seen the glory of 
the Word, and to allow her own identity to be immersed in the primary diegesis.44 
In a number of different ways in Jeremiah, Luke-Acts and John, movements 
between a hetero-diegetic and homo-diegetic narrative stance and the shift in 
perspective from “he” and “they” to “I” and “we” demonstrate an inconsistent 
application of narratorial identity. This destabilisation of the normative boundaries 
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 Cf. Herman Ridderbos, ‘The Structure and Scope of the Prologue to the Gospel of John’, Novum 
Testamentum 8 (1966), pp. 180-201. Ridderbos cites John 1:14 as evidence of the role of the narrator 
as eye witness: “It has been correctly pointed out again and again that a change of persons takes 
place here. No longer are ‘those who received Him’ spoken of in the third person, but rather now in 
the first person:  "We beheld Him". (p. 195). For the broader context of John 1:14 see Craig A. 
Evans, Word and Glory: On the exegetical and theological background of John's prologue (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), p. 82. 
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 Cf. Jeffrey Lloyd Staley, The print's first kiss: A rhetorical investigation of the implied reader in the 
Fourth Gospel (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1988). Staley notes that this instance is one 
among many that reveals a rhetorical strategy ensuring that “the implied reader and narratee share so 
much of the same narrative territory” (p. 47). Ridderbos also comments on the significance of shared 
witness: “‘Seeing’ or ‘beholding’ has a very specific significance, and the mention of it corresponds 
with what the evangelist at the close of his book indicates to have been the purpose for all his 
writing… It is with the mention of this incarnation and of this "we" that the evangelist seeks the 
transition to his narrative.” Ridderbos, Structure and Scope, p. 195.  
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between primary and extra-diegesis provokes the reader (to varying degrees in each 
example) toward a reconsideration of her own role.45  
3.2 The Apocalyptic Subsummation of the Seer 
Apocalyptic texts almost universally adopt a first-person mode of narration offering a 
clear point of view and unambiguous extra-diegetic stance, in part because the 
veracity of the vision depends on the authority and authenticity of the seer.46 It is of 
fundamental significance to all biblical apocalypse that the narrated vision is believed 
to have genuinely been seen rather than creatively constructed, and emphatic 
narrative self-authentication helps to legitimise the seer’s identity without his own 
persona becoming a subject of any focus. Ezekiel’s vision is a good example of the 
overt role of the seer, and the natural place of the apocalyptic visionary in the 
foreground of the narrative: 
In the thirtieth year, in the fourth month, on the fifth day of the month, as I was 
among the exiles by the river Chebar, the heavens were opened, and I saw 
visions of God…The Spirit lifted me up and took me away, and I went in 
bitterness in the heat of my spirit, the hand of the LORD being strong upon me. 
(Ezekiel 1:1 and 3:14) 
 
Susan Lanser has suggested overt contextual and narratological identity markers 
help to establish a clear “point of view [that] conditions and codetermines the 
reader’s response in the text,” and I would suggest that this is nowhere more obvious 
than in apocalyptic visions.47 The following examples demonstrate that it is not only 
Ezekiel who typifies the auto-diegetic first-person singular stance that is such a 
significant feature of apocalyptic texts: 
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 A similar effect may be evident in I John 4:9: “In this the love of God was made manifest among 
us,” and 2 Peter 1:16: “we were eyewitnesses of his majesty.”  
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 Cf. James L. Resseguie, Revelation unsealed: A narrative critical approach to John's Apocalypse 
(Leiden: Brill, 1998). 
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Then I Daniel looked, and behold, two others stood, one on this bank of the 
stream and one on that bank of the stream. (Daniel 12:5) 
 
And I, Enoch, I alone saw the likeness of the end of all things. Nor did any 
human being see it, as I saw it. (I Enoch 19:3) 
 
But I, Simon Peter, and Andrew my brother, took our nets and went unto the 
sea: and there was with us Levi the son of Alphaeus. (GosP 15:60) 
 
A great deal has been written about the effects of this style of narration, including the 
recurring observation that the first person singular point of view in apocalyptic 
narrative renders personal and believable that which was previously unbridgeably 
remote. Richard Bauckham has devoted considerable attention to the effects of the 
first-person ‘stereotypical formulae of apocalyptic vision’, and the self-involving 
demands that are placed upon the reader through such formulae have also been 
discussed by Marcus Bockmuehl.48 James Resseguie, focusing particularly upon 
narrative strategy in Revelation, has further suggested that the point of view 
apparent in the text invites the reader to “stand where John stands and to see what 
John sees.”49 This is a theme significantly and articulately developed by David De 
Silva, who also comments on the audience’s obligation to see things John’s way: 
Having opened up this book… its world and its inhabitants rush out into our 
world invading our normal reality. We don’t know quite how to put the two 
worlds together, and we start looking for the beast, or the prostitute, or the 
beast’s mark, or the falling star “Wormwood” in the world around us…. How 
do we make sense of this book living in our world?50 
 
I would not begin to challenge the suggestion that the point of view, and narratorial 
stance represented in apocalyptic visions, condition responses and add authenticity 
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to the narrated visions; nevertheless I would suggest that authentication is not the 
only purpose of the stylised use of the first person voice. The first person stance of 
such narratives is also fundamental to the transmission and reception of the seer’s 
vision. In theory, the seer’s voice within the text ought to operate as the primary 
diegesis. After all it is the John, Enoch or Daniel whom the reader first encounters 
and who appeal directly to their audience through an overt narrative act directed 
toward the reader in their first person testimonies: 
I John, your brother, who share with you in Jesus the tribulation and the 
kingdom and the patient endurance, was on the island called Patmos on 
account of the word of God and the testimony of Jesus. I was in the Spirit on 
the Lord's day, and I heard behind me a loud voice like a trumpet. (Revelation 
1:9-10) 
 
I John am he who heard and saw these things. And when I heard and saw 
them, I fell down to worship at the feet of the angel who showed them to me. 
(Revelation 22:8-9) 
 
The visions of heaven within apocalyptic texts are therefore essentially embedded 
narratives, and the first person perspective is fundamental to grounding the 
apocalyptic visions within the world of the actual that is shared by the visionary 
narrator and the reader. The art of apocalypse, however, is to acknowledge the 
story-teller without allowing them to become the focus of the text, and thereby to 
foreground their vision. Throughout Revelation for example, the visions of heaven 
are so exceptionally vivid, and the world of the seer so remarkably transparent, that 
the reader experiences the hypo-diegetic (embedded) narrative of heaven as the 
primary diegesis and the primary diegetic world of the exiled prophet becomes a 
broadly irrelevant layer of extra-diegesis.  
The reader knows that John “was on the island called Patmos” (1:9) but this 
reality is soon subsumed by the sensory overload depicted in John’s sonorous, 
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luminescent, fragrant vision of heaven.51 The prayers of the saints (5:8), the noise of 
the trumpets (8:7) and the radiance of the New Jerusalem (21:11) wrestle for 
primacy in a depiction of heaven that entirely outshines John’s first-century context. 
The effect of this is to relegate the role of the seer. John’s own context ‘in the spirit’, 
‘on the Lord’s day’, ‘a brother’, ‘on the island of Patmos’ becomes a fragile 
continuum, portrayed with deliberately minimalistic detail and his role becomes 
contiguous with that of the reader, so that it feels as though John inhabits the same 
world as the reader and both are witnessing the startlingly lucid reality of heaven.  
It is not that the role of the seer is entirely removed from the narrative 
framework, to the contrary, apart from the “I, John” of 1:9 and 22:8, the first person 
narrative voice also interrupts the primary diegesis on eighty-five other occasions 
with reference to his own situation. On thirty-nine of these occasions John narrates, 
“I saw,” on twenty-four “I heard,” on eight “I looked.”  John fell three times; was told 
and was in the Spirit twice; marvelled, said, took, turned, went, was given and wept 
once.52 The proliferation of such frequent and overt first person constructions ensure 
that the presence of the seer is felt keenly by the reader of Revelation. Indeed 
Erasmus famously complained that John’s repeated self-inclusion drew attention to 
his own persona rather than that of Christ, and could not therefore, have been 
written by a genuine apostle.53 I draw a quite different conclusion from Erasmus and 
suspect that John’s understanding of the vision he received provoked a profoundly 
altered sense of self-understanding and an awareness of his significance as a story-
teller. It was John’s transformed sense of referentiality rather than unbridled ego 
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which led to the self-referential narrative frame of the apocalypse. This is a process 
Werner Jeanrond has also identified in hermeneutics: 
Textual understanding is now also self-criticism; this is so because in order to 
understand, the reader must open her/ himself to the text. Reading introduces 
me to the imaginative variation of the ego. The metamorphosis of the world in 
play is also the metamorphosis of the ego.54  
 
It is my contention that the overt presence of the first-person seer within apocalyptic 
texts is not ultimately or exclusively an appeal to the reader to believe the authority 
of the seer, for the frequency of intrusion confounds this end. Rather the repeated 
presence of the “I” within the vision invites the reader to see the spatiotemporal 
location they share with the narrator entirely absorbed into the reality of the heavenly 
realm. Indeed the act of apocalyptic narration is an endeavour to persuade readers 
that their own location, like that of the seer’s, is subordinate to the picture of heaven 
within the text. Each narratorial intrusion amplifies the feeling that the narrator’s 
world is an embedded and subsidiary aspect of the envisioned universe, rather than 
the other way round. Apocalyptic narrative routinely inverts the narrative frame, so 
that John, and other apocalyptic seers, seem themselves to be contained within the 
prodigious, vast reality of the heavenly universe, which is itself entirely too colossal, 
vivid and real to be adequately accommodated in an embedded narrative.  
In some sense then in Revelation, diegetic contamination allows the reader to 
feel as though they occupy the same fragile, permeable liminal space as John, a 
reality that is itself absorbed into the fullness of heaven where Jesus sees all, rather 
than the other way round. This inversion of readerliness is exemplified in Jesus’ first 
person address to John:  
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Behold, I am coming soon, bringing my recompense, to repay every one for 
what he has done. I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the 
beginning and the end… I Jesus have sent my angel to you with this 
testimony for the churches. I am the root and the offspring of David, the bright 
morning star.  (Revelation 22:12-16). 
 
This is a masterpiece of diegetic reduction in which multifarious narrative levels are 
collapsed into one framework. The reader does not at first feel as though she is 
reading a written account, narrated by a remote voice, recalling a distant moment of 
profound epiphany remembered, digested and retold. Rather, what is written 
penetrates the layers of telling and hearing and allows the voices of heaven directly 
to address, challenge and comfort readers. Through metaleptic transgressions of 
normal narrative frames the reader feels that it is the world of Patmos, rather than of 
heaven, that is an embedded hypo-diegesis within a larger reality.  
Additionally the “I Jesus... I John” symmetry within the narrative also 
contributes to the metaleptic motion that repositions the reader from a spectator role: 
for the threshold of Jesus' address to the church, and John's address to his readers 
are blended in the interchangeability of their locutionary form. Significantly the 
audience is moved from imagining that they are an extra-diegetic audience (“Blessed 
is he who reads aloud the words of the prophecy, and blessed are those who hear.” 
1:3) to perceiving themselves with John, as spectators of the heavenly reality, 
auditors of its conversations and participants in its promises.55 Because the vision is 
so much more vivid than the frame, the framework that the reader and the narrator 
seem to inhabit has disappeared, and rather like Borro del Casso’s boy escaping 
criticism (4.3 below), the apocalyptic vision reaches directly into the reader’s world. 
The beasts, prostitutes, angels and saints seek to lay hold of the voyeur and drag his 
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world into their own frame. We do not get the sense that John wants us in Patmos 
with him, but that Jesus wants us and John transported into his heavenly reality: 
The Spirit and the Bride say, "Come." And let him who hears say, "Come." 
And let him who is thirsty come, let him who desires take the water of life 
without price. (Revelation 22:17) 
 
 
Apocalypse is essentially a mode of narration whereby the seer’s presence in the 
primary diegesis is obscured by the lucidity of their vision. Equally, what is 
essentially an embedded hypo-diegesis is elevated to the point that the presence of 
the seer disappears and his role as a mediator between the reader and the realities 
of heavenly realm is obscured beneath the vividness of the hypo-diegetic world. 
Apocalyptic visions such as those explored above are masterpieces of metalepsis. 
They place demands upon readers through contaminating normal diegetic 
hierarchies and implying the subsummation of the reader’s reality into the primacy of 
the heavenly.  
3.3 Anomalous Abbreviations in Direct Speech 
In this brief overview a final category of diegetic muddle may be noted in the 
contaminations between the narrative comments and the direct speech of characters 
that seem to occur unintentionally in occasional moments of abbreviation within the 
primary diegesis. Use of dialogue to describe action is a characteristic of much 
narrative within the Hebrew Bible, for the transposition of overt narrative direction 
into direct speech allows plot to develop with a degree of immediacy and a minimum 
of extra-diegetic intervention.56 In such narrative a character’s speech is rarely 
intended to appear naturalistic. However, occasionally in what is purported to be 
direct speech, the narrator includes an anachronistic abbreviation that the character 
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could not, or would not have spoken. These instances may be intended to avoid the 
repetition of direct speech between multiple characters, but through their phrasing 
these moments blur the distinction between the voice of the narrator and the 
characters of whom he talks. The effect of this is to reveal that direct speech within 
the primary diegetic plane is an extension of the extra-diegetic voice and thus, 
momentarily, the captivating spell of the narrative is broken. 
The most obvious example of this narratological intrusion into the direct 
speech of a character is the unusual Hebrew phrase ploni almoni, which occurs only 
three times in the Old Testament and is best translated as “such and such” or “so 
and so.”57 In each of the three biblical examples the phrase rescues the narrative 
from the inclusion of a further repetition or the insertion of unnecessary or unknown 
detail. However, it does not make sense in any of the three circumstances, for in 
each instance the character who is speaking could not have abridged his own 
phrase in such a manner. Consequently in each occurrence ploni almoni reads like 
the intrusion of the extra-diegetic structure into the primary diegetic dialogue. The 
three examples are found in 1 Samuel 21:2, 2 Kings 6:8 and Ruth 4:1.   
And David said to Ahim'elech the priest, "The king has charged me with a 
matter, and said to me, `Let no one know anything of the matter about which I 
send you, and with which I have charged you.' I have made an appointment 
with the young men for such and such a place” (1 Sam 21:2-3). 
 
Once when the king of Syria was warring against Israel, he took counsel with 
his servants, saying, "At such and such a place shall be my camp" (2 Kings 
6:8). 
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And Bo'az went up to the gate and sat down there; and behold, the next of 
kin, of whom Bo'az had spoken, came by. So Bo'az said, "Turn aside, sit 
down here so and so" (Ruth 4:1). 
 
The value of ploni almoni in each narrative is obvious. In 1 Samuel David’s speech 
would require the invention of a destination, in 2 Kings the non-specificity of ‘such 
and such a place’ allows the unnecessary detail of a Syrian king’s conversation to be 
avoided and in Ruth, ‘so and so’ saves the narrator from having to offer or invent a 
previously nameless relative and from repeating the extended and entangled 
description of the relative’s role found a few verses earlier:  
And now it is true that I am a near kinsman, yet there is a kinsman nearer 
than I… if he will do the part of the next of kin for you, well; let him do it; but if 
he is not willing to do the part of the next of kin for you, then, as the LORD 
lives, I will do the part of the next of kin for you. (Ruth 3:12-13) 
 
One further example of an anachronistic abbreviation is evident in the story of 
Joseph and Potiphar’s wife where the narrator, having twice already employed the 
voice of Potiphar’s wife to report a fictitious account of Joseph’s sexual assault, at 
the third time of telling simply says, “things of this sort your slave did to me” (Gen 
39:19). Given that the tale has already been repeated to Potiphar and his servants, 
the narrator has no need in verse 19 to repeat once more the lengthy allegation of 
attempted sexual assault. Potiphar’s wife’s speech is truncated in the same way that 
Boaz, the Syrian king and David’s are, for the sake of narrative momentum. 
 I have found no commentary that pays attention to these anachronisms, and 
this is no surprise given that each example, taken on its own, seems like an isolated 
disturbance of the diegetic surface. Nevertheless, it is interesting that many English 
translations struggle to accommodate these anomalies. Instead translations tend to 
naturalize character’s speech, obscuring the haemorrhage between the narrator and 
characters’ voices, and allowing the characters to say what we expect them to say:  
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David answered Ahimelek the priest, “The king sent me on a mission and said 
to me, ‘No one is to know anything about the mission I am sending you on.’ 
As for my men, I have told them to meet me at a certain place (1 Sam 21:2, 
New International Version). 
 
The king of Aram was at war with Israel. He talked things over with his 
officers. Then he said, “I'm going to set up my camp in a certain place” (2 
Kings 6:8, New Century Translation). 
 
No sooner had Boaz gone up to the gate and sat down there than the next-of-
kin, of whom Boaz had spoken, came passing by. So Boaz said, "Come over, 
friend; sit down here." And he went over and sat down (Ruth 4:1, Revised 
Standard Version). 
 
These endeavours attempt to reduce the ‘strangeness’ of metalepsis and illustrate 
the challenge that such threshold transgressions produce for the reader. In the 
examples above metaleptic abbreviation across diegetic planes helps the narrator to 
avoid a potentially clumsy, unhelpful, tangential and convoluted hypo-diegesis. 
However, the reader’s sense of the apparent omniscience of the narrator is 
disturbed, the validity of the narrative as a representation of reality is confused and 
the legitimacy of the parameters and thresholds around the story-telling voice are 
confounded. If even direct speech can be truncated by the extra-diegetic story-teller, 
and the narrator intrudes to speak through the voice of a character a question is 
provoked: “Who is really telling whom what?” 
 
4. Thresholds between Reality and Representation 
Whilst the previous section examined a brief selection of biblical metalepses, latterly 
a range of publications have collated a profound breadth of transmedial examples of 
metalepsis.58 There are a wide range of boundary breaking movements within and 
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across narrative, poetics and art which may all be metaleptic, and yet each are 
explained through differences in nomenclature and foci according to the diverse 
specialisms and interests of the critics who first employed them rather than any 
irreconcilable meta-critical differences. Thus potentially useful lenses upon the 
paradoxical contamination of layers within a text may be discovered in analysis of a 
number of analogous and overlapping concepts which are sometimes competitors 
with the idea of metalepsis, and are at other times complementary.  
Whilst Genette’s theory and terminology underpin my exploration of narrative 
thresholds within the biblical text, the profound breadth of metaleptic effects may 
also be explained and described through examination of Apostrophe that surfaces in 
the ancient rhetorical traditions, Engaging Apostrophes popularised in Victorian 
novels, movements that Break the Fourth Wall in dramaturgy, and visual illusion in 
art, notably in Trompe-l'œil, surrealism and the modern transgressive movement.59 I 
suggest that narrative apostrophes, dramatic performances that break the fourth wall 
and visual illusions can all be considered metaleptic devices, for each carries the 
capacity to significantly transgress the normative boundaries between reality and 
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represented or narrated levels. Each should be considered auxiliary to the notion of 
metalepsis, for each represents a limited form of frame-breaking, whereas Genette’s 
model of metalepsis refers to any transgression across narrative levels and includes 
a sense of the paradoxical disturbance. Narrative Apostrophe defines only those 
moments when the voice of the narrator or character alters the focus of his or her 
discourse and addresses a different person or object directly with a second person 
pronoun. Engaging Apostrophes are a further subset: those apostrophes aimed 
directly at the audience from a first person narrator. Breaking the Fourth Wall defines 
only those moments in narrative performance when the delineation between the 
narrative act and the audience (the invisible fourth wall of the stage) is momentarily 
dissolved. Visual Illusion applies only to movements between spatial dimensions 
which through a ‘trick of the eye’ destabilises a viewer’s sense of the threshold 
between realities.60 Metalepsis therefore remains the best term to describe the 
overarching boundary breaking paradigm, but, without diminishing Genette’s model 
of the inter-relation of thresholds, the following examples of apostrophes, drama and 
illusion are transmedial indicators of the significance of frame-breaking processes. 
These examples are therefore employed to demonstrate something of the range of 
movements between diegetic levels across a breadth of forms and to illustrate some 
of the effects caused by the contamination or confusion between levels of reality and 
representation. They diverge significantly from the biblical examples that follow and 
illustrate a breadth of the applications and effects of metalepsis and similar devices 
that transgress the threshold between representation and reality.  
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4.1 Greco-Roman Rhetoric 
The origins of deliberate diegetic contamination may be clearly traced in ancient 
texts, where the rhetorical effect of narrative frame-breaking was discussed and 
developed in detail. In classical literature, transgression of the normal boundaries 
between the world of the narrator or characters within the text is most notable when 
the narrator turns aside from the primary discourse and offers exclamatory address 
to an absent character, a being or object beyond the discourse, or even to the 
audience.61 These direct appeals were classified by rhetoricians as apostrophe, from 
the Greek term to ‘turn away from’. This change of stance from discourse about a 
third person (‘he’, ‘she’ or sometimes ‘it’) to address a second person (you) was 
praised by ancient commentators for its capacity to effect a complementary turning 
amongst an audience. Quintilian, for example, suggested that the apostrophe was 
“strangely moving” and that it “invites questions from hearers.”62 Longinus theorised 
similarly that the apostrophe converted the audience from ‘listeners’ to ‘participants’. 
Whilst commenting on a speech of Demosthenes he suggests that through use of 
apostrophe Demosthenes “carries his hearers away with him.”63 Both Quintilian and 
Longinus were thus firm advocates for the use of apostrophe as a rhetorical or 
narrative device, and each (without explaining how they thought this worked) offered 
numerous examples of the evocative and mysterious pathos achieved by this 
device.64 Quintilian classified various forms of apostrophe common at the time and 
explained the figure of speech as follows:  
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Apostrophe [is another trope which] does not affect the sense, but only the 
form of an expression. Whether they arise from change, addition, abstraction, 
or transposition, [such] figures attract the attention of the auditor and do not 
suffer him to grow languid, as he is roused from time to time by some striking 
expression (Institutes Book IX, 2:41-45). 
 
Beyond this analysis (which shows that the apostrophe was a rhetorical trope at risk 
of overuse) there are abundant examples in every genre of Greco-Roman literature. 
Livy, for example, narrating what purports to be a balanced historical account, 
frequently appeals directly to his reader when he offers his own evaluation of events. 
65 In Ab Urbe Condita IX he begins with his typical hetero-diegetic third person 
narrative stance but then turns aside regularly from the primary discourse to address 
the audience directly. This is illustrated by the following contrasting stances: 
In the following year came the Caudine Peace, the notorious sequel of a 
disaster to the Roman arms. Titus Veturius Calvinus and Spurius Postumius 
were consuls. The Samnites had that year for their general Gaius Pontius 
(Book IX, 1.1). 
 
Why do you not compare the fortunes of one man with another, of one 
commander with another? How many Roman generals could I name who 
have never been unfortunate in a single battle! You may run through page 
after page of the lists of magistrates, both consuls and Dictators, and not find 
one with whose valour and fortunes the Roman people have ever for a single 
day had cause to be dissatisfied (Book IX 18.12-13). 
  
Horace’s satires also demonstrate frequent audience-focused apostrophes; for 
example whilst criticising ‘the greedy’ in Sermones 1.1.69-70, the narrator ends his 
diatribe suddenly, and turning to the audience says, “What are you laughing at? 
Change the name and this story is about you.”66 
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As would be expected, given the pedigree of poetry as spoken performance, 
the most frequent examples of apostrophe are found in the works of the poets. This 
is because the received texts of classical and epic poems are, at least in part, 
records of performance rather than hermetically sealed texts.67 In book 16 of the 
Iliad, Homer employs the apostrophe with particular frequency, repeatedly 
addressing Patroclus (who was Achilles’ closest and most tragic friend) emphatically 
and with significant emotion. As his demise draws nearer, the narrative voice turns to 
him with increasing frequency, as though caught up in the emotion of the inevitability 
of Patroclus’ fate.  
[Euphorbus] it was that first hurled his spear at thee, knight Patroclus, yet 
subdued thee not (Book XVI, 812). 
 
Ovid is equally willing to appeal to agents beyond the scope of his story. He often 
calls upon the gods (in Metamorphoses 1.1 for example, “Gods, breathe inspiration 
upon what I have begun… and bring along my continuous poem from the very 
beginning of the universe to my own time”), but only engages his audience directly 
with an apostrophe once, whilst praising the qualities of Arachne.68 Arguing against 
the rights of the pantheon to receive worship, Ovid praises Arachne’s skill and 
artistry in contrast to Minerva’s dependency on her divinity. He appeals to the 
reader’s judgement in the second-person singular (through the imperfect subjunctive 
of sciō, ‘to discern’), writing:  
Whether at first she was winding the rough yarn into a new ball, or working 
the stuff with her fingers, teasing out the clouds of wool, repeatedly, drawing 
them into long equal threads, twirling the slender spindle with practised 
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thumb, or embroidering with her needle, you could see she was taught by 
Pallas (Metamorphoses, Book VI, 22-25).  
 
Commentary on the classical apostrophe is dominated by the works of Elizabeth 
Block.69 She suggests that within this genre the audience are invited to be “primarily 
a feeling, not judging participant.”70 To this end the apostrophe makes sense as a 
personal emotive appeal designed to move and solicit pathos, for it implies that 
characters, audience and narrator all inhabit the same world. Block notes that “at 
certain points the narrator may intrude in the first person, or address characters and 
sometimes even the audience in the second person… almost always expressing and 
demanding a strong response.”71 This conclusion is shared by P.T. Eden, who says, 
“Apostrophes almost always arise from some intenser feeling in the context,” and 
also by Jonathan Culler, “Apostrophes indicate intense involvement in the situation 
described.”72  
Whilst the primary effect achieved in classical apostrophes is the obvious 
emotional engagement generated as a rhetorical effect of the ‘direct address’ and 
the ‘turning aside’, I would suggest that Barbara Johnson’s description of apostrophe 
as a form of ventriloquism is also helpful in analysis of the significant change of 
narratorial stance. Johnson suggests that in apostrophe “the speaker throws voice, 
life, and human form into the addressee… It manipulates the I/thou structure of direct 
address in an indirect, fictionalized way… turning silence into mute 
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responsiveness.”73Johnson’s point is that the apostrophe implies that an absent or 
dead character, inanimate being, force, personification or even audience member 
has the capacity to reply to the address that is made to them. By implication this 
achieves an ontological illusion which binds that which was previously 
representational and that which is real into one cohesive reality. Johnson suggests 
that “the possibility of the latter’s reply… makes objects in the universe potentially 
responsive forces.”74 Without ‘placing words in the dummy’s mouth’, the narrator 
functions as a ventriloquist, animating characters by implication through opening a 
direct conversation with them and, paradoxically, through this fiction bringing them 
into the life of the audience. 
The classical apostrophe in most of the examples cited comes across as the 
genuine outburst of the impassioned story-teller and an expected feature of the 
rhetorical tradition. In the emotive context of a tragic performance, in the hyperbole 
of historical narrative or in the exaggeration of apologetic biography, the purpose of 
the apostrophe was always to stimulate a greater involvement or emotional 
interaction. Classical employment of the apostrophe was common enough and was 
employed in a manner consistent with the pantheon of other rhetorical tools so as 
rarely to generate genuine ontological confusion in the boundaries between the 
telling and the told. The rhetorical deployment of apostrophe was frequently coupled 
with other devices such as personification or prosopopoeia and each of these 
devices was considered by rhetoricians to achieve complementary and similar 
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effects.75 However, even in the most straightforward examples of rhetorical or artistic 
apostrophes a secondary implication may be observed. The change of stance and 
direction of address contaminates the narrative, stage or representational world and 
makes a previously impervious ontological boundary permeable. Consequently, 
characters, objects, divinities and personifications that were explicitly imaginary, 
entirely remote or previously voiceless are afforded an equivalency of status with the 
primary characters within the narrative: they operate on the same plane and with the 
same authority as the orators, demi-gods and heroes.  
The apostrophe in its original world may have been employed to solicit 
pathos, but it also opened an avenue of confusion and contamination in which 
representation and reality, narration and reception, actors and audience were 
frequently muddled.  
4.2 The Reader in the Novel 
Asides to the reader are as common in modern narratives as they were in ancient 
rhetoric, and consequently there are many very well-known examples in novels from 
the eighteenth century onwards. The vast majority of these have been described as 
‘engaging apostrophes,’ which, like the classical counterparts solicit empathy and 
educe earnest engagement with the world of the story’s characters. Significantly for 
the purpose of the novel they also add a degree of realism through the suggestion 
that the narrated situation is part of a shared universe that includes the world of the 
reader. A number of obvious examples of this phenomenon in classic texts of the 
‘western canon’ may be cited: 
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Reader, it is impossible we should know what sort of person thou wilt be; for, 
perhaps, thou may'st be as learned in human nature as Shakespeare himself 
was.76  
 
Reader, I married him. A quiet wedding we had: he and I, the parson and 
clerk, were alone present.77  
 
Your heart would have ached to see the man.78 
  
That is a simple scene, reader. But it is almost certain that you, too, have 
been in love.79 
  
With a single drop of ink for a mirror, the Egyptian sorcerer undertakes to 
reveal to any chance comer far-reaching visions of the past. This is what I 
undertake to do for you, reader. With this drop of ink at the end of my pen, I 
will show you the roomy workshop of Mr. Jonathan Burge, carpenter and 
builder, in the village of Hayslope, as it appeared on the eighteenth of June, in 
the year of our Lord 1799.80 
 
These direct addresses to the reader are the subject of on-going discussion focused 
predominantly on the capacity of such an appeal to engage the reader. 81 Their 
significance has been analysed in great depth by critics who have extended the term 
narrative apostrophe to describe any “anomalous communicative circuit at the level 
of the story and of the reception of the story.”82 One of the most significant analyses 
of the effects of the short circuits within the ‘irresistible invitation of second person 
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apostrophe’ is that of Irene Kacandes whose study makes three very significant 
points about the direction, power and emotional force of apostrophes. Firstly she 
notes that the change of direction intrinsic within the apostrophe “acts as an 
invitation for the audience to change their stance or perception of what is taking 
place.”83 Secondly she suggested that the apostrophe reveals an entanglement of 
animation and power through which the narrator attempts to preserve some authority 
and claim over the received meaning of the text: 
Those who give the word – God, orator, poet or narrator – wield power by 
controlling the other, but they also risk losing control by giving life and voice to 
the other. What they gain by taking that risk is the possibility of provoking 
response, of succeeding to animate, of rousing to action.84 
 
Thirdly, Kacandes suggests that the apostrophe positions the reader as a voyeur 
and witness of the emotional force created in the intimacy of the relationship 
between the narrator and the anonymous listener, who is addressed directly by the 
apostrophe as ‘you.’ This may make the reader consciously complicit in the reception 
of the text by obliging the reader to accept a role as surrogate recipient of the 
narrated message and as steward of the text.  
A number of other commentators on the role and significance of the 
apostrophe also merit attention. Robyn Warhol has suggested apostrophes are one 
of a number of strategies intended to “evoke recognition and identification in the 
person who holds the book and reads, even if the ‘you’ in the text resembles that 
person only slightly, or not at all.”85 This explicit appeal to the reader, regardless of 
the relationship between the actual and ‘presumed reader’, achieves a sense of 
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correspondence between the world of the reader and that presented within the text. 
This sense of overlap or contiguity is achieved through the “short circuited 
communication” of the apostrophe where the distance between the voices of the 
characters in the text and the recipients of the narrative is narrowed. A transcendent 
worldview is implied, in which the fictional characters of the story and the reader of 
the story are equally significant stakeholders.  
Jonathan Culler has usefully explored the manner in which apostrophes 
collapse the distance between the world within and the world beyond the narrative. 
He suggests that the apostrophe “makes its point in troping not on the meaning of a 
word but on the circuit of communication itself.”86 This notion underpins Monika 
Fludernik’s focus on the potential within a second person focused apostrophe to 
alienate the reader from the world of the story.87 Fludernik’s analysis diverges 
significantly from the observations of Warhol and Kacandes. She suggests that, 
whilst on one level an apostrophe is a tool of rhetorical engagement, on another level 
some apostrophes invert the background and the foreground of human 
‘experientiality’, bringing into consciousness the narrator’s distance from the reader’s 
own perception of temporality, and thus revealing the emotional power-imbalance 
between the experience of the narrator and the reader.88 She calls these 
destabilising apostrophes ‘radical narrative apostrophes.’89 Her contention is that the 
                                            
86
 Jonathan D. Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (London: Routledge, 
1981), p. 135. 
87
 Monika Fludernik, ‘Second-person narrative as a test case for narratology: The limits of realism’, 
Style 28, no. 3 (1994), pp. 445-479. 
88
 Fludernik suggests that experientiality and narrativity are interchangeable terms: experientiality 
refers to the ways in which narrative taps into a readers’ sense of their own familiar experiences and 
activates “natural” cognitive parameters. Narrativity is the interpretation of embodied cognitive 
faculties, intentions and action. Monika Fludernik, Towards a ‘natural’ Narratology (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 28. 
89
 Fludernik, Second-person narrative, p. 470. Cf. Rolf Reitan, ‘Theorizing Second-Person Narratives: 
A Backwater Project?’ in Strange Voices in Narrative Fiction, ed. by Per Krogh Hansen, Stefan 
Iversen and Henrik Skov Nielsen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), p.148. 
45 
 
apostrophe addressed to the reader reveals that the text is a part of a 
communication strategy by the narrator that requires complicity from the audience. 
Counterintuitively, this realisation can divorce the reader from the immediacy of the 
narrative and precipitate a previously un-demanded self-consciousness that 
destabilises a reader’s sense of her own role in the narrative and her status as 
recipient.90  
I would suggest that the diverse effects of narrative apostrophes evidence 
their inherent capacity to destabilise the distance between the worlds inside and 
outside the text. By breaking frames between layers or levels of narrative 
apostrophes move the reader beyond naiveté, showing the reader that they are the 
subject of rhetorical artistry whilst also precipitate a new subjective involvement in 
the world of the text. As Kacandes concludes, the apostrophe “elicits the potential 
involvement of anyone who will consider her/himself addressed by the narrator’s 
“you” and invites slippage in the reader’s role.”91  
4.3 Visual Illusion 
Whilst there are more than enough examples of frame-breaking within literary 
traditions and texts, a number of works of art from a broad range of traditions and 
media also usefully illustrate the profound potentiality within any simulacra or 
simulation for confusion between distinct worlds. A range of art works have been 
considered in isolation by a number of different scholars and the examples below 
have all been the subject of some discussion. I have chosen the following pieces that 
epitomise distinct and diverse metaleptic movements and contend that they evidence 
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precisely the variety of provocation and confusion between the interior, surface and 
exterior that is also found in movements across the thresholds of representation and 
reality within texts.92  
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 M.C. Escher,  Drawing Hands, 1948. 
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René  Magritte, The Treachery of Images, 1929. 
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In Diego Velázquez’s, The Maids of Honour (1656) the artist uses mirrors and 
screens and an unexpected self-portrait to invert the spectator’s gaze. “Instead of 
depicting the subject gazing at the artist, Velázquez shows the artist viewing the 
subject.”1 These complexities have made The Maids of Honour one of the most 
frequently analysed compositions in Western art. A number of interpretations seem 
equally possible although Michel Foucault’s suggestion is perhaps the most astute 
and is therefore widely cited. He contends that the composition of the painting 
causes oscillation between the interior, the surface and the exterior of the work.  
The spectacle he is observing is thus doubly invisible: first, because it is not 
represented within the space of the painting, and, second, because it is 
situated precisely in that blind point, in that essential hiding-place into which 
our gaze disappears from ourselves at the moment of our actual looking. We 
could, in effect, guess what it is the painter is looking at if it were possible for 
us to glance for a moment at the canvas he is working on; but all we can see 
of that canvas is its texture, the horizontal and vertical bars of the stretcher, 
and the obliquely rising foot of the easel. Because we can see only that 
reverse side, we do not know who we are, or what we are doing. Are we the 
seen or seeing?2  
 
Foucault’s argument is compelling. Representations involve a degree of creativity, 
invention and discovery which means that they are not replications of reality but 
imaginative departures from that which they represent. The relationship between the 
represented and the representation is characterised by a degree of disruption and a 
feeling of impermanence. Representation both presupposes the orderliness and 
coherence of that which it represents and at the same time compromises and 
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transgresses it, because the representation obscures the subject represented within 
or implied by it.3 As Foucault says about The Maids of Honour: 
Representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its 
images, the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures 
that call it into being. But there, in the midst of this dispersion which it is 
simultaneously grouping to-gether and spreading out before us, indicated 
compellingly from every side, is an essential void: the necessary 
disappearance of that which is its foundation - of the person it resembles and 
the person in whose eyes it is only a resemblance. This very subject - which is 
the same - has been elided. And representation, freed finally from the relation 
that was impeding it, can offer itself as representation in its pure form.4 
  
M.C. Escher’s  Drawing Hands (1948) is one of the most frequently cited artistic 
examples of metalepsis.5 His depiction of one hand drawing another is inherently 
paradoxical, and invites an understanding from the viewer that it depicts an 
ontologically impossible state of affairs. Like the artist in Velázquez’s The Maids of 
Honour, the hands in their strange interaction bring the role of the artist and the 
viewer into focus, and reveal the paradox of depiction; wherein a hand depicts a 
hand, depicting a hand ad infinitum. Notable comment on this ‘strange loop’ is made 
by Douglas Hofstadter who, without using the term metalepsis, suggested in his 
famous exploration of Gödel, Escher, Bach that the paradoxical construct is an 
illustration of the primacy of self-reference. His contention is that within art, 
mathematics, and music, recursion and isomorphic loops produce elevated 
correspondences or “infections” across worlds. Hofstadter suggests that:  
In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages that are 
little miracles of self-reference.6  
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Whilst Velázquez’s work prompts confusion in a number of ways, and Escher’s 
drawings represent the paradoxical possibilities of representation, the works of Pere 
Borrell del Caso offer a much less complicated and more overt frame-breaking 
technique. In Escaping Criticism (1874) and Two Girls Laughing (1880) Borrell del 
Caso offers some of the “best known examples of trompe-l'œil” (deceit of the eye).7 
Trompe-l'œil itself has been employed in art since Greco-Roman murals depicted 
doors or windows intended to extend the sense of space found in a room. Famously 
Baroque interiors frequently employed quadratura as a form of trompe-l'œil to 
optically open up flat ceilings with an illusion of a dome or a view of the sky. Such 
illusions were extended by 18th Century artists such as Charles-Amédée-Philippe 
van Loo who not only painted false windows in his paintings for the Prussian royal 
family but also added characters into these fictive windows, offering the appearance 
of a window and the intrusion of children or visitors where none existed.8 The effect 
of trompe-l'œil was taken further still by Borrell del Caso and other realists who used 
the technique to blur the boundary between ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ space and comment, 
through representation, on the nature of the representation. Borrell del Caso 
suggests overtly that that which is representational contains the capacity to intrude 
into the reality of the viewer’s world.  
Many normal paintings have much depth perspective but do not appear to be 
real. Borrell del Caso’s skill revolves around teasing the viewer into believing 
something is that is not (i.e., by manipulating the viewers’ cues to depth 
perception so that their brain momentarily thinks it is viewing a real object). 
We are tricked into thinking that the boy is actually climbing out of the frame. 
Only the sense of touch allows the viewer to differentiate between the visual 
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illusion and reality. The observer is disarmingly thrilled at eventually 
unmasking the artist’s deception.9 
 
René  Magritte’s The Treachery of Images (1929) is one of a number of surrealist 
images that demonstrate something of the legacy of trompe-l'œil and, in turn, 
contributed to the popularity of self-referentiality in modern art. Magritte prohibits the 
viewer from regarding this particular work as anything other than an image, 
inscribing ‘c’est ne pas une pipe’ under his painting. Magritte commented,  
The famous pipe. How people reproached me for it! And yet, could you stuff 
my pipe? No, it's just a representation, is it not? So if I had written on my 
picture 'This is a pipe', I'd have been lying!10 
  
The overt deconstruction of the image within its own framework confounds the 
viewer’s attempt to contain the image of the pipe as a simplistic representation within 
her own reality and invites a meta-critical sense of perception and representation. By 
reminding viewers that they are not seeing a pipe but a representation of a pipe, 
Magritte continued a theme of substitution and the paradox of representation that 
was present in many of his works. Describing his inspiration for Elective Affinities in 
his lecture “La ligne de vie” (1932) Magritte suggested that he had woken one 
morning in a hotel room and had mistakenly seen an egg in a cage, where in fact 
there was a bird in a cage. This led him to a “sudden realisation of an unexpected 
affinity” between the cage and the egg.11 Georges Roque has commented that: 
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[This] new ‘poetic secret’ is of course no secret for us, but a rhetorical 
procedure known as metalepsis, i.e. the transposition of the antecedent and 
the subsequent; a procedure of which the Surrealists were fond.12 
 
Trompe-l'œil and surrealism are both mentioned fairly often in studies of multi-media 
metalepses. For example, Karin Kukkonen has produced an insightful study into 
metaleptic effects in graphic novels and Werner Wolf has passed comment on 
moments of metalepsis in Donald Duck and both allude to a range of prior 
inspirations implied in these works.13 The expert in this field is undoubtedly Jeff 
Thoss who has published a range of essays considering metalepsis within comics.14 
One of his most detailed essays considers the visual significance of metalepsis in 
the Animal Man series of cartoons by Grant Morrison.15 In these cartoons he notes a 
range of occasions when drawings “violate the story world’s autonomy.”16 Thoss 
draws broad conclusions and suggests that in Animal Man, Grant Morrison: 
Subverts the very idea of representation and renders [our capacity] to tell a 
sign from its referent questionable. Concomitantly, the principle of narration 
and the intelligibility of any story world are endangered too [because] Grant 
Morrison’s tinkering with space… undermines the crucial notion that the space 
of a page can represent the space of the story.17 
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Modern realist sculptures include a further range of compositions that generate 
spatial transgression between a representation and the surrounding reality of the 
viewer. Security Guard (1990) by Duane Hanson, for example was an installation so 
realistic that many viewers didn’t realise the sculpture was ‘the art.’ “Take lunch, you 
want to say with a clap on his shoulder, Go out and get some air. But he won’t 
move.”18 Damien Hirst’s floor based installations go even further in disturbing the 
boundary between representation and reality. Mother and Child (Divided) is one of 
Hirst’s most famous  glass-walled, fromaldehyde filled tank sculptures. Hirst 
encloses the tank in a strong white frame but invites the viewer to walk between the 
halves of the two animals.19 This composition has become archetypal of 
transgressive art.20 He suggests that cutting up the animals and exposing them in 
this way is like creating emotions scientifically.  
What do you do if an animal is symmetrical? You cut it in half, and you can 
see what’s on the inside and outside simultaneously.21 
  
This process somehow conflates the interior of the cow’s life and world with the 
exterior of the viewer’s, commingling distinct worlds and transgressing the normal 
delineation of boundaries. Giovanni Aloi has suggested that this level of proximity 
provokes an uncomfortable closeness that alludes performatively to the vulnerability 
of the viewer even more than it does to the abstract beauty of the internal organs. 
It is the friction between the attraction and revulsion that makes the work 
worthy of attention, Here the temptation to walk between the two halves is 
quite undeniable, so much so that gallery visitors often spontaneously form an 
orderly queue at one end of the piece in order to experience the spectacle of 
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the open animal carcass. From that perspective, from the inside… the animal 
becomes a kind of diorama, displaying an unfamiliar and hidden world.22 
 
The visual confusion and the contamination between worlds identified in all of these 
works demonstrate cogently the effect of paradox and confusion within 
representation. In each case the artist has used visual forms to destabilise the 
boundaries between representation and reality.  I suggest that the challenges to 
conventional boundaries and frames found in these artistic depictions elicit similarly 
confounding, collapsing, distanciating, destabilising and immersing movements that 
are found in the transgressions between one narrative situation and another, and 
therefore it should be expected that moments of instability in the narrative surfaces 
of the biblical text might produce a similar sense of intrusion, proximity and confusion 
which challenge a reader’s sense of the relationship between the narrative world and 
her own. 
4.4 Breaking the Fourth Wall 
Denis Diderot (1713-1784) was a philosopher who wrote a number of sentimental 
plays (with accompanying essays) intended to introduce a degree of naturalism in 
theatre that contrasted with the formulaic conventions of classical tragedy and 
comedy. His ‘serious genre’ spurned the caricatures of lofty characters found in 
tragedy and the mockery of common people found in traditional comedy. Diderot 
instead proposed more realistic characterisation and stage direction and sought to 
present the action of the play as real events so that the audience might feel that they 
were observing through a transparent fourth wall at the front of a proscenium 
stage.23 Since Diderot’s day, lines and directions that allow the narrative on stage to 
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transgress this invisible boundary and to challenge the illusion of realism, have 
therefore been described as breaking the fourth wall.24  
There are a wide range of techniques that transcend this invisible wall, and 
they are found in a very broad range of theatre. A century before Diderot, 
Shakespeare for example, was consistently scripting interactions with the audience 
that muddled the boundary between the representational and the actual. Through 
comic asides to the audience he frequently included acknowledgement of their own 
fictionality in the words of his characters (either tacitly or overtly). Examples include 
Edmund in King Lear, who, when alone on stage, explains to the audience what he 
is soon to do:  
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land. Our father’s love is to the bastard 
Edmund as to th’ legitimate. (Fine word, “legitimate.”) Edmund the base shall 
top th’ legitimate. I grow, I prosper. Now gods, stand up for bastards. (Act I 
scene ii:16) 
 
This soliloquy muddles Edmund’s interior monologue with address to the audience 
and appeal to the gods. It is followed in the same scene by a moment that reminds 
the audience more overtly that they are witnessing the unfolding of a drama. 
Edmund sees his brother enter and says:  
And pat he comes, like the catastrophe of the old comedy. (Act I scene ii:145) 
 
In similar fashion in The Winter’s Tale, Leontes makes a joke of his own role as a 
character within a ‘play.’ Making a pun on his instruction to Mamillius, he exclaims,  
Go play, boy play, thy mother plays (and I play too – but so disgraced a part, 
whose issue will hiss me to my grave: contempt and clamour will be my knell). 
Go play boy play. (Act I Scene ii:186) 
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Whilst most of Shakespeare’s sardonic depiction of narrative thresholds are firmly 
focused on amusing the audience the opposite intent is evident in the fourth wall 
breaks found in Bertolt Brecht’s plays, where breaking the fourth wall is used to 
deliberately ‘alienate’ the audience and deprive them of any illusion of realism. 
Brecht took breaking the fourth wall to a new level of significance in his application of 
the Verfremdungseffekt (alienation or distancing effect) wherein he sought to remind 
audiences of the superficiality and artifice of theatre, and invite them to view their 
own interaction in the drama more critically. Rather than adding amusement to a 
drama, as Shakespearean frame-breaking did, Brecht solicits an introspective 
awareness amongst the audience that they are engaged in an artistic representation 
of existence which demands response rather than enjoyment.25 The Verfremdung 
technique was inspired by a visit to Moscow in 1935 where Brecht saw the work of 
Mei Lan-fang’s Chinese theatre and realised that this stylised and symbolic art form 
“never pretended there was no audience.”26 From 1935 onwards Brecht sought to 
confound the audience’s comfortable association with characters in his drama and 
induce a critical understanding of the distance between audience and characters. He 
described this process as follows: 
A child whose mother remarries, seeing her as wife not just mother, or whose 
teacher is prosecuted, seeing him in relation to criminal law, experiences a V-
effekt.27  
 
                                            
25
 Theatre represents a permanent tension between a ‘neuro-aesthetic’ experience (the pleasure of 
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To achieve this effect Brecht’s characters frequently address the audience in 
theatrical asides designed to estrange them from the narrative unfolding on the 
stage. For example in The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui, Brecht’s narrator addresses 
the audience directly saying:  
Pipe down you boys in the back row! And, lady your hat is in the way!28 
 
Similarly in The Good Person of Szechwan the very last line of the play functions as 
a final aside to the audience, with the Gods saying: 
Now let us go: the search at last is o’er, We have to hurry on! Then give three 
cheers, and one cheer more for the good person of Szechwan!29 
 
Even more significantly, in the stage directions for The Drums in the Night, first 
performed in 1922, Brecht had the auditorium hung with placards on which were 
painted lines from the play, including the recommendation “Don’t gawp so 
romantically!” (Glotzt nicht so romantisch!) This line was a quote taken from a tirade 
in the final scene by the soldier, Kragler (1:176). However, Brecht repositions the line 
to address the audience, suggesting a barbed criticism of the audience’s voyeuristic, 
passive spectatorship and offering them advice regarding how they should perceive 
the unfolding drama. “Glotzt nicht so romantisch” consequently became a Brechtian 
maxim for theater audiences.   
In a range of different ways Brecht sought to constantly remind the audience 
that they were watching a play and refused them the option of accepting the world of 
the characters at face value. The interruptions of Brecht’s characters and the hung 
placards in the auditorium were his way of making the audience aware that they 
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were sitting in a theatre watching a drama about which they were required to think, 
rather than be transported on an emotional wave of sympathy or concern for a 
particular character. L.M. Bogad has summarised the Verfremdung effect as follows:  
By showing the instruments of theater and how they can be manipulative — 
for example, the actor calling out “Cue the angry red spotlight!” before he 
shrieks with rage, or “Time for the gleeful violin” before dancing happily as the 
violinist joins him on stage, or visibly dabbing water on his eyes when he is 
supposed to cry… the audience can be entertained without being 
manipulated.30  
 
Brecht was convinced that the notion of the fourth wall was significant, not just in 
regard to the audience’s experience of the drama on stage, but also to the more 
fundamental struggle between representation and reality. He considered that 
realism, and the notion of the front of the stage as an invisible fourth wall, 
necessarily diminished critical engagement amongst the audience, which in turn 
must obstruct the capacity of representational art to challenge and speak about 
reality. His intention was to speak critically about reality through the socio-political 
commonalities between the unfolding drama on the stage and in the real world. 
These intentions are most evident in his 1940 Messingkauf Dialogues, which script 
“a discussion of the metaleptic implications of the fourth wall” between a dramatist, 
an actor, a philosopher and a worker.31 
DRAMATIST: How is it with the fourth wall? 
PHILOSOPHER: What’s that? 
DRAMATIST: Normally, one acts as if the stage doesn’t have three, but rather 
four walls; the fourth there, where the audience is sitting. This establishes and 
perpetuates the appearance that what is happening on stage is a real event of 
life, and that there is no audience there. To act with the fourth wall means to 
act as though there were no audience present. 
ACTOR: You understand, the audience sees very intimate things, without 
being seen themselves. It’s exactly as if one looks through a keyhole to 
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observe people who have no idea they’re not alone. In reality, we arrange 
everything so that it can be easily seen. This arrangement is simply hidden. 
PHILOSOPHER: Ah, I see, so the audience quietly assumes that they are not 
sitting in the theater, since they are not noticed. They have the illusion that 
they are sitting before a keyhole. If this is so, however, they should wait until 
they are in the cloakroom before they applaud. 
ACTOR: But their applause confirms that the actors have succeeded in acting 
as if no one was there! 
PHILOSOPHER: Do we really need this intricately secretive arrangement 
between the actors and you? 
WORKER: I don’t need it. But maybe the artists need it? 
ACTOR: It is seen as necessary for realistic acting. 
WORKER: I’m for realistic acting. 
PHILOSOPHER: But the fact that one is sitting in a theater, and not before a 
keyhole, is also a reality! How can it be realistic to cover that up? No, we want 
to take down the fourth wall. The agreement is hereby announced. In the 
future, show unashamedly that you have arranged everything so that we can 
see everything best.  
ACTOR: So that means that from now on we’ll officially notice you. We can 
look down at you and even speak with you. 
PHILOSOPHER: Naturally. Whenever it is useful to the demonstration. 
(Werke 22 802–3)32 
 
In works of theatre the physical transgression of the boundary between the narrative 
and the audience can achieve ironic awareness amongst the audience, obliging 
them to judge the events they observe, muddling the distinction between reality and 
dramatic representation, deautomatizing perception and provoking consideration of 
their own role in the transmission and reception of the dramatised narrative.33 
Elements of this range of provocations are evident in part in Shakespeare’s humour; 
in significant measure in Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt and even more overtly in the 
nuanced and confusing model of the fourth wall found in Samuel Beckett’s “failed 
realism.”34 In Waiting for Godot and Eleutheria Beckett presents the stage as a 
space of “complete ontological indeterminacy, reflecting the unstable metaphysics of 
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lived experience.”35 Eleutheria, for example, includes dialogue between Victor, a 
Glazier and scripted roles for a Spectator (who, until the final act is a member of the 
audience), a Prompter and a Voice from a Box (who remains in the audience). These 
characters (particularly the spectator), refuse to accept the play’s entreaties to the 
audience and limit the on-stage characters’ capacity to break the fourth wall. 
Nathaniel Davies summarises this incident as follows: 
Had the spectator accepted the validity of Victor’s argument, the breaking of 
the fourth wall would have been a success—at least from a Brechtian 
perspective—with the audience coming to an ethical realization by drawing 
connections between real life and stage fantasy. As it plays out, Victor is 
rebuffed by an uncomprehending audience, incapable of self-reflection. The 
only conclusion consists in Victor being prodded into telling a “boring” and 
“stupid,” but altogether “not bad” story that finally satisfies the spectator, who 
then leaves the stage (150). The breaking of the fourth wall fails due to the 
spectator’s non-comprehension and unwillingness to give up his demand for a 
“story,” no matter how trivial this story may be.36 
 
Significantly then, the drama on stage has developed into a commentary on the role 
and the capacity of the audience to respond to the drama on stage. The fourth wall is 
broken to demonstrate the significance of the fourth wall. The Spectator character is 
given the role of vocalising the audience’s dissatisfaction with the newly destabilised 
boundaries of the stage, whilst destabilising these boundaries. This scene is the 
dramatic equivalent of Escher’s drawing hands or Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. 
In Waiting for Godot (Act 2) a very different but equally unsettled metaleptic 
transgression of the fourth wall reveals once more Beckett’s complicated sense of 
relationship between the audience and drama. In this scene Vladimir and Estragon 
are alone on stage waiting. Estragon exits the stage left and right, panicking Vladimir 
on each occasion, refusing to explain his destination. Both characters confirm the 
                                            
35
 Davies, “Not a Soul”, p. 88.  
36
 Ibid., p. 96. 
67 
 
rear of the stage to be a solid surface, and contemplate the possibility of escape 
through the fourth wall:  
VLADIMIR: We're surrounded! (Estragon makes a rush towards back.) 
Imbecile! There's no way out there. (He takes Estragon by the arm and drags 
him towards front. Gesture towards front.) There! Not a soul in sight! Off you 
go! Quick! (He pushes Estragon towards auditorium. Estragon recoils in 
horror.) You won't? (He contemplates auditorium.) Well I can understand that. 
Wait till I see. (He reflects.) Your only hope left is to disappear. 
(Act 2, 61-74) 
 
Beckett suggests that the stage is an inescapable space. Even the subtly 
acknowledged presence of the audience as witnesses provides no consolation to the 
claustrophobia and condemnation that the characters experience through the logic of 
their spatial confinement. The self-referentiality of the drama achieves no 
transcendence: the audience are themselves presented as a soulless void, rather 
than as the arbiters of and actors within reality, as is implied in Brechtian alienation. 
As Nathaniel David concludes:  
Instead of breaking down the illusionary ontological barrier between the stage 
and the audience, Beckett arrives at a new function of the fourth wall. He 
subverts the form of this illusion in order to create a night-marish vision of 
lived experience onstage. The reality of the stage comes to reflect the reality 
of lived experience, and the intrusion of the objective reality of the audience 
onto that of the stage comes to resemble the intrusion of a disturbing alternate 
reality—whether that of divine presence or existential void—into one’s normal, 
day-to-day reality. In short, Beckett makes the unstable metaphysical space of 
the stage reflect the unstable metaphysical nature of lived experience. He 
accomplishes this by sabotaging the normal functioning of the traditional 
fourth-wall break, which would otherwise assert the objective, material reality 
of the auditorium as final and unquestionable.37 
 
If Shakespeare’s transgressions across the threshold of the fourth wall serve a 
primarily comic purpose, and Brecht’s seek to assert the primacy and importance of 
the audience’s objective reality, Beckett’s present an indeterminacy, a multi-
directional permeability and an ontological confusion. Beckett uses metaleptic 
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movement between the auditorium and the stage to connect the two spaces, to raise 
questions, to challenge the separation between reality and representation and to 
fuse into one universe the experiences of human existence owned by the audience 
and characters on stage. 
 
5. Metaleptic types 
Having explored a range of examples and illustrations of transgressions across the 
thresholds between representation and reality, consideration of the specifics of 
Genette’s model of metalepsis also merits attention. Since Genette’s work in 1972 a 
plethora of developments and adjustments have been proposed. Some of these 
responses clarify, rather than modify, seeking to expand Genette’s model or develop 
a sense of breadth and range of metalepses. Werner Wolf’s explorations of 
transmedial metalepsis has demonstrated the value of metalepsis as a tool for 
explaining precisely the sorts of non-literary frame-breaking considered above. His 
definition, often cited by others, builds upon Genette’s and suggests that metalepsis 
is ultimately a “paradoxical transgression of, or confusion between (onto)logically 
distinct (sub)worlds and/or levels.”38 Beyond such clarifications the most stimulating 
responses for my study are those which seek to dissect the mechanics of 
metalepsis. To this end I suggest that Marie-Laure Ryan, Monica Fludernik, Jean 
Bessière, William Nelles, Brian McHale, Jean-Marie Schaeffer and John Pier offer 
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the most significant additional contributions, arranged below according to the manner 
in which they taxonomise types of metalepsis. 
5.1 Ontological and Rhetorical Metalepsis 
Amongst the attempts to develop Genette’s model a number of adjustments to the 
structure he posited stand out. William Nelles, for example divides metalepsis into 
three distinct movements. He posits, firstly, that “unmarked” movements within a 
discourse level are a relatively frequent trope akin to metonymy and are an 
anticipated part of the rhetorical process of story-telling. He then divides “distinctly 
marked” movements across unexpected narrative boundaries within a story 
according to their direction: he defines a movement from the surrounding to the 
embedded narrative as intra-metalepsis, and the movement from the embedded 
narrative out into the embedding discourse as extra-metalepsis.39  (An example of 
intra-metalepsis would be noted if Jesus interacted directly with a parabolic character 
and an extra-metalepsis if a parabolic character conversed with a disciple.) Gerald 
Prince has offered a different taxonomy. He suggests that metalepses are noticed 
most when they are “vertical” (i.e. change levels) or “horizontal” (when they 
demonstrate transgressions within one diegetic plane – for example between 
supposedly separate fictional worlds). The latter he defines as perilepsis.40 An 
example of perilepsis would be evident if the ‘Good Samaritan’ crossed embedding 
thresholds to interact with the ‘Good Shepherd’.41 
 These diverse adjustments, and those which classify by ascent and descent 
or by inward and outward direction have led in their fullness to the perception that 
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there is a fundamental difference between moments of metalepsis in which 
characters at one narrative level communicate about characters who inhabit another 
and moments of metalepsis when members of similarly distinct narrative levels 
communicate with each other, or share the same world.42 This distinction suggests a 
fundamental separation between metalepses which involve only paradoxical 
communication, and those which involve paradoxical presence within a narrative 
level. Marie-Laure Ryan has championed this approach and has explained 
metalepsis through the terminology of ‘stacks’ in which illocutionary or ontological 
boundaries separate narratives which are generated at different levels within 
narrative worlds.43 She suggested that these stacked fictional worlds divide the 
cognitive activity of the reader and that “metalepsis is the operation by which 
narrative challenges the structure [and rigid boundaries] of the stack.”44 The 
significance of this model (which has some traction) is that it differentiates strongly 
between ontological metalepses (that suggest interactions between members of 
logically distinct worlds) and rhetorical ones (that precipitate a convergence in 
communication situated in rationally distinct worlds).45 Ryan suggests that the former 
create mutual contamination between two radically distinct worlds such as “real 
versus imaginary” or “normal versus dream.” Rhetorical metalepses however, are a 
‘temporary breach of illusion’ that do not threaten the inherent logic of the narrative 
universe, rather they “open a small window that allows a quick glance across levels, 
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but the window closes after a few sentences, and the operation ends up reasserting 
the existence of boundaries.”46 
Ryan’s developments are useful, especially her recognition that metalepsis 
represents an “attempt to expand the empire of fiction toward the most remote 
worlds within the universe of the imaginatively possible.”47 She notes that when 
metalepsis occurs in disciplines of logic, mathematics, language and science it is 
more subversive, because it renders a concrete universe with stable properties 
entirely impossible.48 She cites the paradox of Epimenides (all Cretans are liars), 
Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as 
examples of strange loops which, when found in rational representations and truth 
systems, are like a “cancer that destroys from within the ambitions of totalitarian 
mathematical systems.”49 
A great deal of Ryan’s analysis is invaluable. Where I diverge from her 
position, however, is on the distinction between a ‘genuine’ (ontological) metalepsis 
and a ‘pseudo-metalepsis’ (rhetorical).50 This notion is useful when talking of 
computer programming, as Ryan does: in this context, a rhetorical metalepsis is 
simply a circular reference within a script, whereas an ontological metalepsis causes 
the memory segment where the paradox is scripted to overwrite itself.51 However, 
there is a fundamental difference between the internal structures of logic languages 
and the narrative processes that depend upon the observer, spectator, audience or 
readers. In the latter media metalepsis is created through illogical movements of an 
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annunciation, symbol or character across a story-telling threshold, yet it is 
inadequate to describe these as merely ‘rhetorical.’ Such moments are rhetorical in 
as far as they are spoken and written, but they are also necessarily ontological or 
‘genuine’ because they undermine the distinction between representation and 
reality.52 This sentiment is expressed by Alice Bell and Jan Alber: 
All instances of metalepsis are physically impossible because in the actual 
world, entities from two different ontological domains cannot interact. For 
instance, a fictional character cannot literally communicate with his or her 
author, and an author cannot step into the fictional world that s/he has 
created… two contradictory states of affairs cannot be true at the same time, 
which means, for example, that the same character cannot exist in two 
ontologically distinct domains simultaneously.53 
 
Bell and Alber’s position is persuasive for it builds upon Genette’s suggestion that 
diegetic layers are themselves necessarily at the same time rhetorical and 
ontological. Genette implies that narrative is itself an essentially paradoxical process, 
which allows distinct worlds to be integrated through the act of narrative. This 
sentiment is explored meaningfully by Monika Fludernik who re-defined metalepsis 
as a “blending” of distinct worlds. Indeed, Fludernik suggests that “Genette’s 
narrative metalepsis is in effect an umbrella term containing an implicit typology that 
integrates Ryan’s distinction.”54 Fludernik’s view, which I share, is that the spectrum 
of metaleptic effects are all ‘genuine’, but make strange loops for different reasons. 
She suggests that whether authorial, ontological or rhetorical each produces a 
fundamental collision between levels of representation and reality. Fludernik 
nevertheless categorises the primary threshold transgression as follows:  
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1. Authorial metalepsis which foreground the ‘inventedness’ of the narrative;  
2. Ontological metalepsis in which a narrator or character descends a 
diegetic level;  
3. Ontological metalepsis  in which a character ascends to a higher narrative 
level;  
4. Rhetorical metalepsis in which words at one diegetic level have operative 
effect at another.55 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that some moments of metalepsis produce no obvious 
ontological crisis, for example it is not necessarily illogical for a narrator, as part of 
her artistry to speak directly to a reader or audience member as though their worlds 
were synonymous. However, even these benign movements reveal the art of story-
telling to be an illogical fusion of temporalities. Metalepsis lays bare the boundaries 
that narrative deigns to cross and reveals reading to be a wonderful absurdity that 
allows horizons to be fused, selves to be metamorphisised and figures, themes and 
meanings to come to life.  
It is valid to note some metalepses create logic loops only between ‘internal’ 
narrative worlds, whilst others create more overt ‘external’ loops of logic between the 
reality within a representation and that beyond it. Nevertheless, any inconsistency 
across a locutionary threshold carries the capacity to unmask the essential paradox 
of narration and readership whereby representations become alive within realities.  
5.2 Past and Present 
Jean Bessière has developed the contention that moments of metalepsis are a 
revelation of the inherently irrational quality of narrative, focusing on the manner in 
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which narrative functions as a representative display of the past in the present.56 In 
his model, metalepsis is paradoxical because fictional narrative is itself, by definition 
a paradoxical “current presentation of the past.”57 When anything disrupts a reader’s 
immersion in the represented past found in a narrative, it is inevitable that attention is 
drawn to the narrative process as a feature of the reception of representation. In his 
discussion Bessière refocuses discussion on Genette’s original claim that metalepsis 
is about the transgression between “the world in which one tells and the world of 
which one tells.”58 Bessière describes the act of presenting the past as actual as a 
“paradoxical decontextualisation.”59 
By virtue of the duality of the decontextualization of the presentation and the 
exteriority of the reader to the literary work… the figuration becomes a 
constitutive paradox.60 
 
Bessière’s approach to metalepsis suggests therefore that far from being 
anachronistic, metalepsis reveals the absurdity inherent with narrative, an idea 
reiterated in a number of studies.61 Monika Fleischman, for example, has considered 
the relationship between narrative and experientiality. She comments that narratives 
“are intrinsically structured with two time frames: the time of the telling of the story 
and the time during which the events of the story are assumed to have taken 
place.”62 Fleischman and Bessière’s models of metalepsis suggest that at any level 
metalepsis is a demonstration of the irrational reconciliation of these time frames. 
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This notion implies that metalepsis is an inevitable feature of narrative, given that the 
act of narration is a collision between logically incompatible temporalities. Douglas 
Estes’ work on the temporal mechanics found within the Fourth Gospel develops this 
notion. He suggests that narratives can only overcome their own temporal limitations 
and restrictions through paradoxical referentiality in which they invite a sense of 
trans-world significance:  
One of the most critical restrictions on narrative is its temporality; narratives 
cannot overcome their innate temporal limitations and instead must discover 
and implement a variety of temporal mechanics that allow for the fullness of 
truth in time.63 
 
This idea is also found in the work of David Herman who examined the rhetorical 
function of metalepsis and suggested persuasively that the distinct worlds within 
diegetic layers often need to reference each other to make sense to the reader, but 
these conflations actually destroy the temporal rigidity of the narrative “now”.64 
Herman goes on to explain that metalepsis “plays with the narrative levels in order to 
question the borderline between reality and fiction, compelling us to question the real 
and the now.”65 
There is value in understanding metalepsis as a primarily temporal 
phenomenon. The thresholds between extra, primary and hypo-diegetic levels exist 
because stories are told in the present and therefore when the tense or 
spatiotemporal dimensions and characteristics of one mimetic representation of 
reality intersects or abuts another, the irrationality of remembering or representing 
the prior in the present becomes apparent. Narrative is always only one honest 
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narratorial disclosure away from a collision of realities in a moment when the time of 
the telling and the time of the told irrationally occupy an overtly conterminal narrative 
location. The strangeness of metalepsis is thus, at least in part, an overt 
demonstration of the implicit irrationality of representing one reality within another. 
5.3 Cause and Effect 
One further approach for consideration is found in studies that classify metalepses 
according to the narrative consequences of the device, typically noted as 
‘destabilising’, ‘disruptive’ and ‘troubling.’ Debra Malina, for example, is not unusual 
in her analysis of the “mutinous nature [of metalepsis] as a narrative device that 
disrupts narrative structure.”66 Such insight is further developed in some studies that 
attend to the cognitive effects of metalepsis and the reason metaleptic 
transgressions unsettle the relationship between the reader and the text. Foremost 
amongst these may be Jean-Marie Schaeffer’s evaluation, which suggests that 
metalepsis functions as an ‘emblem’ of the inherently bifurcating mental operation 
undertaken in any narrative immersion.67 In a sense, Schaeffer claims, all narrative 
reception produces oscillation between immersion and distance, for readers are 
bound to their own present as well as the present that is made present in the 
narrative. Metalepsis inhibits any simple interpretation of the representative reality of 
the narrative world as a sub-world of the reader’s own situation. According to Werner 
Wolf, this is because: 
Somewhere in the back of our minds we at the same time maintain a residual 
rational awareness of our true situation and the representational nature of [a 
narrative], which prevents us from attempting to enter the represented world… 
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metalepsis represents a paradoxical impossible violation of the borders of the 
fictional world and our own.”68  
 
The trajectory established by Schaeffer and Wolf is of philosophical consequence, 
for it suggests that the effects of metalepsis are born out of the tensions intrinsic to 
narrative and to art as objects that are at the same time real and yet also 
representative. Texts transfer and translate states of affairs from one distinct world 
into another – and this means that they necessarily confuse the representation and 
actuality that they seek to represent.  
The ontological and psychological effects achieved in moments of metalepsis 
are afforded a wide array of causes. Douglas Hofstader, for example, offers useful 
insight into the mechanisms by which every presentation of reality within our own 
reality must function to an extent as a “strange loop.” This is similar to the idea of 
Werner Wolf regarding “recurrent folds” that short circuit representation and reality.69 
Regardless of the precise language, understanding of the strangeness of recurrence 
and the inherent oddity created by destabilising representations contributes 
significant depth to the notion that metalepsis may be simultaneously immersive and 
distanciating: for these movements are not opposites, they are both consequences 
of the narrative process wherein the recasting of reality creates cognitive dissonance 
for the reader.70 It is a distinct possibility that in the moment when the rigidity of the 
narrating threshold is transgressed the reader feels simultaneously that her own 
reality and that represented in story-world become contiguous or overlapping, whilst 
also developing a new awareness of her readerliness. The strange loop created in 
the merger of thresholds may therefore simultaneously obligate a sense of 
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relatedness that emotionally engages the reader whilst equally creating a logical 
prohibition against wholesale immersion. 
The process of potentially simultaneous engagement and distanciation may 
be caused by the collapse of the illusion of a narrative’s claim to represent reality 
implicit in the contamination of temporalities and the blending of distinct worlds that 
occurs through metalepsis. This is essentially ‘laying bare the device’, a technique 
first described by Russian formalists (initially Victor Shklovsky) and latterly described 
by John Pier.71  Essentially when any artistic device within narrative becomes 
noticeable, its perception highlights the artificial nature of the narrative which is 
revealed as a constructed ‘form’ (the text) which contains, but is not synonymous 
with ‘material’ (the events).72 Pier contends that it is the overtness of the metaleptic 
paradox that challenges any previously naïve sense of narrative as a cogent and 
innocent presentation of reality. This is also McHale’s contention when he describes 
metalepsis as “the foregrounding of violations of ontological boundaries.”73  
This introduces the possibility that within a moment of metalepsis the cause of 
the ‘strange loop’ and the effect (a ‘strange loop’) may, potentially, be the same 
thing: for the act of reading (or of narrating) removes the distinction between 
representation and reality. It is the sheer strangeness of the tension between 
representative acts and reality that produces diegetic, ontological and illocutionary 
thresholds, the contamination of which produces sheer strangeness in the tension 
between the representative act and reality in which it is ‘laid bare.’ In other words, 
foregrounding the strangeness of narrative thresholds increases self-consciousness 
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of the boundary between narrative and reality, and causes the reader to wonder 
what reality even is “apart from its narration.”74 
 
6. Synopsis 
Metalepsis is a narrative strategy that challenges the hermeneutical process and 
muddles the threshold between reality and representation. Metaleptic movements 
allow words and phrases to have meaning and effect within apparently distinct 
interior narrative worlds and externally, in the world of the reader, which ought to 
remain logically separate and ontologically remote. Metalepsis facilitates an 
interoperability of characters, concepts and claims and transcends the normal 
thresholds that separate a stage and an audience, an artwork and a viewer or a 
narrative and its reader. It contains the capacity to confuse previous presumptions 
about the level of correspondence between elements of the textual world and the 
reader’s world. Metaleptic moments within narrative are effectively calculated errors 
that lay bare the process through which reading moves readers, through 
consideration of another’s world, into a review of their own, thus giving life to words 
and concepts within the reader’s own reality. Such occurrences within a narrative 
reveal the capacity inherent within a text to provoke readerly response and solicit 
self-involvement. The paradoxical contamination inherent within metalepsis 
necessarily magnifies the obligations that a text places upon a reader and/or the 
readerly effort required of them. When the primary diegesis and the universe of the 
characters within a narrative remain distinct and separable from the world of the 
reader, the narrative demands very little save its reading. Conversely, the narrative 
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demands much more of the reader when it includes logic loops, self-referentiality 
between extra-diegetic and primary-diegetic worlds and transgressions between the 
world within the narrative and the world beyond. These devices place obligations 
upon readers to involve their own worlds within a co-ordinated, contaminated and 
coherent whole, or else to work harder than normal to disentangle the thresholds and 
distance the narrator and the narration from the narrated and the narratee. 
Metalepsis lays bare the ontological transgression that is embryonic in all reading 
through the illusion of representation whereby that which is represented is translated 
into the world of the other. As John Pier suggests, 
With metalepsis, it is the reader’s belief, not disbelief that is suspended, 
setting up a reading contract based not on verisimilitude, but on a shared 
knowledge of illusion.75 
 
In such moments of constative absurdity, metalepsis achieves performative force 
and demands a degree of self-awareness from the reader. Contaminations across 
the diegetic thresholds invite a highly self-involving “second naiveté” wherein the 
reader moves beyond accepting the illusion of representation toward a sense of the 
ontological inevitability of the shared universe that envelops both text and reader.76 
I have already outlined in this chapter Genette’s use of the term metalepsis, 
introduced a range of metaleptic movements within biblical narrative and illustrated 
the range of effects caused by such movements in a breadth of literary, dramatic and 
artistic forms. Transmedial studies illustrate the potential for profound effect upon the 
reader and even a cursory analysis establishes that these transgressions across 
story-telling thresholds are not infrequent across the full range of biblical narratives. 
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This introduction establishes that metalepsis ought to be anticipated as a useful lens 
through which to illuminate the hermeneutical and theological consequences of 
transgression between narrative levels in the biblical text. Whilst in the last five years 
the total number of studies of metalepsis within the biblical narrative have grown, 
consideration of the interplay between representation and reality within the universe 
of biblical narrative is rarely explored. The hermeneutical implications and theological 
significance of the logic loops and short circuits created by metalepsis within the 
Bible are therefore the focus of this thesis.  
Chapter 2 examines a range of approaches to biblical frame-breaking. First a 
number of approaches and applications explored by biblical scholars are examined. 
In addition a range of background concepts in the works of Erich Auerbach, Søren 
Kierkegaard and Paul Ricoeur are introduced for consideration in later theological 
and hermeneutical considerations. Auerbach’s approach to realism and figuralism 
introduces questions regarding the tyranny of the biblical text. Kierkegaard’s 
hermeneutics of transformation and his quest for interpretations that allow 
‘contemporaneity with Christ’ are of particular resonance. Finally, Ricoeur’s models 
of metaphor and self-hood and his analysis of the relationship between time and 
narrative are introduced. The language and conceptual frameworks developed by 
Auerbach, Kierkegaard and Ricoeur establish them as fundamental dialogue 
partners for subsequent discussions. 
Chapters 3-6 develop close reading of four particular moments of metalepsis 
within the biblical narrative and add detail to the suggestion that transgressions 
across story-telling thresholds invite convergence between the world of the text and 
the world of the reader in the act of reading. The parenthetical appeal to the reader 
in Mark 13:14, “Let the Reader understand,” is the first textual focus. The second is 
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the paradoxical humour of Job 19:23, wherein the author of the theodicy, bringing his 
own artistry into focus, transcribes Job’s lament: “Oh, that my words were recorded.” 
Chapter Five considers the confusion about which master it is who praises the 
dishonest steward in Luke 16:8a, which, at the ambiguous edge of a brief parable 
records that, “The master commended the dishonest manager because he had acted 
shrewdly.” Chapter Six explores the self-involved intervention of the narrator found 
throughout the Deuteronomistic History wherein the narrator notes that a 
phenomenon persists “To this day.” In each of these readings explanations for the 
‘strangeness’ of the narrative are developed in relation to metalepsis. I suggest that 
the inclusion of the narrator or the reader within the frame of the text; evidence of 
self-referential narratological humour; intentional confusion between narrative levels 
and the acknowledgement of the subjective stance of the narrator are best explained 
as components of an interior hermeneutic within biblical narrative that is founded on 
the presumption of God’s omni-diegetic constancy and is geared towards self-
involved reception. 
  In Chapter 7 I develop theological conclusions, stemming from the 
observation that metalepsis, as well as producing a range of effects beyond the text, 
also reveals a profound inner-biblical hermeneutic behind the text. This discovery 
provokes important consideration regarding the nature of biblical narrative, the 
theological significance of self-involvement and God’s own self-involvement in 
human story. The final chapter starts from the following inferences and explores the 
significance of these in regard to a theology of the self and the church.  
1. Inner-biblical diegetic frame-breaking derives from the conviction that God is 
omni-diegetic and that time has no right to separate the past of the text from 
the present of the reader: for God is recalcitrantly transcendent. The 
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frequency of metalepsis within biblical narrative suggests that this belief is 
fundamental to the truth claims within biblical narrative, which are ultimately 
less about history than about God’s unfailing presence across and within 
narrated history, its telling and future reception. Through the confusion of 
boundaries and frames, biblical narrative keeps one eye on its own reception 
under the conviction that God’s character assures a future which is as 
meaningful as the past narrated events. As God is unchanging, and the world 
is an unfolding continuum, biblical narrative presupposes a consistency 
between previous, present and future revelation. 
2. The purpose of biblical narrative is not therefore ultimately about rendering 
sequence accurately, but about representing its meaning plainly, or even, 
revealing it plainly to be meaningful. Through the self-involved faith 
statements of narrators who describe their own day, who highlight key 
moments for their readers, who joke about their own artistry and muddle inner 
and extra-biblical audiences, biblical narrative lays claim to the future. The 
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, of Bethlehem, Gethsemane and Golgotha 
is also God of every reader’s present: not just because of what has been done 
in history, but because of the providence that extends throughout the 
hermeneutical cycle. When God is found by a reader in the narrative-history of 
the biblical text, his existence ceases to be an exclusively historical 
phenomenon because his presence becomes present for the reader. It is not 
that the reader somehow enters the time-frame of the narrative, becoming 
contemporary with Peter or Paul, but that God reveals himself to be always 
becoming contemporary in the lives of his creatures. The full freight of 
Salvation History (Heilsgeschichte) encourages conviction that God’s 
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presence may be known in the reader’s present. It results in a narrative 
replete with confidence in God’s character despite the complexity of time. His 
agency in the past also necessarily assures his presence in the future, no 
matter how far outside the frame of the narrative. 
3. The supreme sovereignty of God over the span of history covers even the 
subjectivity and limitations of readers and narrators. Indeed the liminal 
narrator, who locates her/himself on both sides of diegetic boundaries, is able 
to declare God’s grace and mercy with confidence because of his human 
condition, the limit of his horizon and the confusion caused by his entangled 
self-involvement, not despite it. Subjectivity and self-involvement do not 
preclude revelatory speech, rather they are legitimated in the self-referentiality 
of the absolute. God, in defining himself as “I am who I am” declares that in 
relation to his unchangeable character, the subjective self is a legitimate 
participant in the process of revelation. YHWH’s self and Moses’ self, Jesus’ 
self and John’s self all share in the revelatory process. It would thus be 
surprising if narrators sought to hide their own ‘selves’ or presumed that 
lordship over diegetic boundaries was their own. To the contrary the location 
of the self within the continuum into which God speaks and invites response is 
a fundamental aspect of creatureliness and a sacramental gift. The voice, the 
perspective and the stance of the story-teller are therefore not subjects of 
embarrassment. 
I will particularly focus these explorations of theological consequence in response to 
Auerbach’s provocative consideration of textual totalitarianism and the recursion of 
history; Kierkegaard’s quest for ‘absolute contemporaneity’ and Ricoeur’s model of 
narrative identity (though Rowan Williams is also of particular significance). I will use 
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these dialogue partners to explain the significance of the overt self-involving 
demands, the reckless disregard for normative ontological and locutionary 
boundaries and the frequently inconsistent approach to temporality and 
transcendence found in biblical narrative. I contend that in moments of biblical 
metalepsis notions of narrative tyranny, hermeneutical authenticity and human 
identity converge: for the biblical narrator transgresses diegetic thresholds to amplify 
transmissibility and shape the reality of the reader. Biblical metalepsis is a creedal 
declaration of the immutable transcendence of providence, the triumph of meaning 
over chronology and the unfailing urgency of ‘now’.  
Metaleptic moments afford evidence of an inner-biblical hermeneutic that may 
be best understood in relation to ideas of tyranny, transcendence and 
contemporaneity. Synthesis of these ideas helps to explain the significance of 
readerly self-involvement that is demanded by the collapse of inner-biblical frames. 
Furthermore it yields provocative theological considerations regarding reality, 
representation, the role of the narrator, the boundaries around the self and the 
involvement of God in the muddle of human discourse. 
All that follows in this thesis is therefore a movement from observation 
regarding a range of biblical metalepses, through the suggestion that metalepsis is 
an essential rather than auxiliary feature of the narrative, towards consideration of 
the hermeneutical significance of such moments, assessment of the theological 
implications and development of a theological anthropology. This thesis is not an 
attempt to reinvent a first-level hermeneutic or suggest a ‘new way’ of reading 
biblical narrative, nor is it an attempt to assert theological conclusions on the basis of 
minor textual anomalies. I am interested in the sense that moments of metalepsis 
illustrate a consistent theological conviction, shared by many biblical narrators, 
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that the normal boundaries between their own world and the story worlds of which 
they told were entirely permeable. This belief is not held because of the narrators’ 
location as infallible observers, but because of God’s consistent and sustained 
presence in the story world, their own world and the world of their anticipated reader. 
The self-involved voices of biblical narrators are therefore figures who, through the 
loops of logic and metaleptic muddles they create, open the reader to new 









Within the field of Biblical Studies there are a very limited number of works that 
employ the notion of metalepsis to explain exegetical or hermeneutical problems. 
Nevertheless this number is increasing, and moreover, since this work was started 
the number of useful studies has continued growing. Notable consideration regarding 
moments of frame-breaking are found in formative works by Robert Alter, Meir 
Sternberg, Shimon Bar-Efrat and Jerome Walsh. Whilst using divergent language, 
Alter, Sternberg, Bar-Efrat and Walsh each describe frame-breaking processes and 
acknowledge the significance of such moments within broader analysis of the 
purposefulness of biblical narrative. More recently Christopher Paris has offered a 
comprehensive analysis of ‘narrative obtrusion’. Paris’ work is one of a very limited 
number of studies that are fully focused on frame-breaking, intrusion or obtrusion.1 
Cumulatively these studies illustrate both the significance of metaleptic movement 
within Biblical narrative and also the relative scarcity of specific comment on 
metalepsis. Application of Genette’s narratological model remains limited amongst 
biblical scholars. Indeed, only a handful of studies may be cited. These include Anja 
Cornils’ work on Luke-Acts; Ryan Schellenberg’s on Lucan parables; Douglas Estes’ 
on Temporal Mechanics in John’s Gospel; Ilse Muellner’s consideration of liturgical 
movement within Deuteronomy, and a collection of essays in Über die Grenze edited 
by Ute E Eisen and Peter von Möllendorff. 
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 Analysis of these contributions to biblical scholarship follow below. 
Significantly more important to my own study, however, are a range of conceptual 
themes explored in the works of three primary dialogue partners, Erich Auerbach, 
Søren Kierkegaard and Paul Ricoeur, whose works offer a breadth of conceptual 
scaffolding through which theologically to interpret the threshold between the world 
within biblical narrative and that beyond it. I have chosen to locate my study in 
reference to the work of Erich Auerbach as his writing offers a complex consideration 
of realism, figuralism and, through these lenses, the relationship between the 
temporality of the biblical text and that of the reader. Auerbach’s work is a source of 
significant stimulus for consideration of the subordination of the reader’s worldview to 
the claims made within the biblical depiction of reality. Auerbach describes this 
subordination as an integral aspect of the autocracy and tyrannical force of the 
‘elohistic form’.2 Whilst agreeing with Auerbach that the Bible invites the 
subsummation of the reader’s worldview, I am not convinced that it is the particularity 
of the Bible’s form or literary style that achieves this effect. Rather, I identify this 
process as an inevitable outcome of the time-span of biblical narrative (covering 
creation to consummation) and the concomitant sense that the reader’s own space 
and time are contiguous or connected with that described within the text. I suggest 
that these presumptions underpin biblical metalepsis and that biblical narrative 
encourages the reader to locate her world in relation to the diegesis in a manner that 
his highly comparable to other metaleptic texts that claim to represent reality.  
My engagement with Søren Kierkegaard focuses on his concern that many of 
the interpretative models employed within the Christian Church tend to create an 
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Edition with a new introduction by Edward W. Said, trans. by Willlard R. Trask (Princeton, NY: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 14. 
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interpretative distance between what is written and what is read. In his endeavour to 
reverse this trend Kierkegaard suggested that readers should ‘leap’ into the world of 
the narrative and allow themselves to be transformed by its claims. I suggest this 
manner of self-involvement may be one of the hermeneutical consequences of 
biblical metalepsis: for when the involvement of the narrator muddles diegetic 
boundaries it may also be that the reader is invited to a concomitant transgression or 
‘leap’.  Kierkegaard develops this model through the idea of readerly 
contemporaneity with the world of the narrative, and builds this idea through 
exploration of repetition, imitation and appropriation. Each of these concepts 
resonate significantly with the understanding I develop in chapters 3-6 regarding the 
effect of biblical metalepsis.  
Paul Ricoeur echoes, develops and responds to a number of decidedly 
Kierkegaardian themes.3 For example Ricoeur and Kierkegaard both emphasise the 
dialectic between explanation and understanding, both are concerned with the 
transition from text to action and both encourage readers to make personal things 
that were previously ‘foreign’. However whilst Kierkegaard supposes that biblical 
hermeneutics are safeguarded by a reader’s acceptance of her own subjectivity and 
by God’s involvement in the unveiling of meaning, Ricoeur’s model is one aspect of 
his complex and comprehensive framework regarding the symbolism of language 
and the significance of self-understanding. For Ricoeur, self-understanding is the 
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most significant pre-requisite for, and is the most meaningful an outcome of, the 
interpretative process. For the sake of the present study, three of Ricoeur’s themes 
are particularly useful. Firstly, the three stages in his model of mimesis afford a 
useful lens through which to consider the temporal paradox suggested by 
metalepsis. He suggests that the ‘prefigured’ world is ‘configured’ within texts which, 
in their reading invite a ‘refiguration’ of the world through the imagination of a future-
present. In this threefold model, Ricoeur emphasises "the intersection of the world of 
the text and the world of the reader" and he suggests this threshold invites 
refiguration in the life of the reader. 4 In parallel with this he develops a model of the 
narrative constitution of selfhood, which is a second significant theme for this study. 
Ricoeur suggests that personal identity is always formulated through narrative and 
that the discourse between personal testimony and the attestation of others allows 
an individual to understand themselves as a self among selves, and to take 
responsibility for their actions. This model is a crucial to my considerations of the 
relationship between the selfhood of biblical narrators and biblical readers. A third 
theme of particular value to my understanding of biblical metalepsis is Ricouer’s 
work on metaphor. Ricoeur explains metaphor as an irrational juxtaposition of terms 
which, in combination, allow the synthesis of new meaning. Given that metalepsis is 
the irrational juxtaposition of different diegetic levels, my explorations of the 
theological significance of biblical metalepsis extend from Ricoeur’s analysis of 
metaphor, and his repeated focus on the significance of ‘hermeneutical knots’ as a 
departure point for complex double sense, concealment and disclosure that occur in 
the transgression of diegetic frames.  
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The relationship between each of these dialogue partners is evidently a 
complicated one, for whilst each focuses on the relationship between the world of the 
reader and that of the biblical text, their hermeneutical models offer overlapping 
and/or competing claims. For example where Auerbach notes that “Scriptural stories 
… seek to subject us”, Kierkegaard goes further still, emphasising the reader’s own 
responsibility in this process.5 He suggests that it is “a dreadful untruth to admire the 
truth instead of following it.”6 It is his contention that subjugation is not a subtle ploy, 
rather it is the only proper response to the life revealed within the text. It is a ‘leap’ 
that the reader must make upon hearing the clear invitation of the Bible. 
Paul Ricoeur in some ways represents an interpretative approach that is 
diametrically opposed to Kierkegaard’s post-Kantian quest for un-critical 
contemporaneity, and in many ways he and Kierkegaard represent seemingly 
irreconcilable interpretative positions.7 My intent is not to reconcile their approaches. 
Rather, whilst predominantly holding them in counterpoint, I suggest that in the 
moment of metalepsis, biblical narrative both drives the reader away from the naïve 
realism that was criticised by Paul Ricoeur and, simultaneously, pulls them into the 
new level of self-referentiality and engagement that was encouraged by Søren 
Kierkegaard. It is my contention that, whilst the critical maturity advanced by Ricoeur 
and the sense of subjectivity lauded by Kierkegaard represent opposite 
hermeneutical imperatives, frame-breaking moments within the Biblical narrative 
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may achieve both effects at the same time. Temporal loops and shifting diegetic 
frames may simultaneously draw the reader into a sense that they share a space-
time continuum with that represented within the narrative and may also make them 
aware that actions within the primary diegesis are mediated by the voice and the 
perspective of a subjective mediating interlocutor. Engagement and alienation, 
critical interpretative distance and self-involved subjectivity may be equal products of 
metalepsis in biblical narrative, just as they are in the Verfremdungseffekt of 
Brechtian dramaturgy, in a viewer’s appreciation of illusion in art, and the apostrophe 
in classical rhetoric or modern novels. What each prohibit or restrict is a passive or 
two dimensional approach to representation which supposes that any primary 
diegesis may be meaningfully understood to present the reality of ‘what actually 
happened’ to a distant reader inhabiting a voyeuristic vantage-point. 
In chapters three to six below, I suggest that the transgression of diegetic frames 
within the Biblical narrative is an outstanding illustration of the way in which the Bible 
makes claims upon the reader and her world. Erich Auerbach, Søren Kierkegaard 
and Paul Ricoeur each offer a depth of perspective regarding the phenomenon. For 
each the threshold between the narrative and the reader is central theme, and my 
exploration of the transgression of this threshold brings their diverse hermeneutical 
approaches into play with one another, and also with Gennete’s model of 
narratology. Auerbach offers a literary landscape through which to understand the 
significance of the Bible’s claim to authority over the life and the worldview of the 
reader. Kierkegaard offers criticism of those who seek critical distance without 
acknowledging the personal invitation to transformation that is solicited by the text. 
Ricoeur offers a model for interpretation that overcomes the first naïvety of the 
reader whilst offering a philosophical basis for the narrative configuration of the self. 
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Before exploring these concepts and developing my own analysis of the 
significance of Auerbach, Kierkegaard and Ricoeur, I first turn attention toward the 
aforementioned studies of Alter, Sternberg, Bar-Efrat, Paris and Walsh as well as the 
exegetical studies of Cornils, Schellenberg, Estes, Muellner and Eisen. These 
studies ground my engagement with Auerbach, Kierkegaard and Ricoeur within the 
continuum of biblical interpretation and contextualise my subsequent analysis of 
biblical metalepsis. 
2. Biblical Frame-breaking 
2.1 Narrative Art 
Robert Alter’s magnum opus, The Art of Biblical Narrative (1981) urged special 
consideration of narratorial anomalies whereby the normally laconic mode of 
narration morphs into disquisition. His contention is that such narrative inconsistency 
should be understood as interpretative fulcrums rather than idiomatic absurdities: 
Against this norm, we should direct special attention to those moments when 
the illusion of unmediated action is manifestly shattered. Why at a particular 
juncture does the narrator break the time-frame of his story to insert a piece of 
expository information in the pluperfect tense, or jump forward to the time of 
his contemporary audience? Why does he pause to make a summarizing 
statement about the condition of a character? Why at certain points is the 
regular rapid tempo of narration slowed down to take in the details of a kind 
for which in general no time is allowed? A willingness to wonder… will help 
make us better readers of the biblical tales.8 
 
Alter’s impact upon biblical scholarship has been immense and sustained. Even in 
asking these questions he legitimated the development of narrative criticism and a 
gradual movement away from “the flattening effect of some historical scholarship.”9 
Alter’s work helped move biblical studies away from the obsessive ‘excavative ends’ 
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9
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of form critics whose exegeses dominated much of the 20th Century, towards an 
understanding of the complex artistry implicit within biblical narration. Indeed, Alter 
suggests that through complex interactions across thresholds, juggling 
inconsistencies and anomalies, biblical narrators consistently display “dazzling 
virtuosity in their arabesques of sound play and syntax, wordplay and image.” 10 
As would be expected Alter explores a range of narrative intrusions, including 
omniscient comments, adjustment in narrative stance and proleptic plot reveals. He 
suggests that such moments reveal the text to be “a kind of colloquy (the author 
speaking, the reader thinking back) between him and us.”11 Though he never uses 
the term, Alter’s consideration of anomalies within biblical narrative opens a doorway 
to a deeper appreciation of the art and the significance of moments of metalepsis.  
Meir Sternberg meaningfully developed a number a similar ideas to Alter in 
The Poetics of Biblical Narrative (1987), which remains one of the most significant 
explorations of the narratological mechanisms within biblical literature. He offers an 
exceptional analysis of the range of narratorial processes within the Hebrew Bible 
and explores the range of theological question prompted by these processes.12 Of 
particular relevance to this study are Sternberg’s conclusion about ambiguity and 
intrusion. Sternberg notes that the text frequently leaves notions of divine agency to 
the reader’s imagination and, through omission demands active interpretation from 
the reader.   
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The story-teller’s instrumental approach to intrusion accordingly explains not 
only his activity as commentator but also its limits, and not only his 
commissions but his omissions as well… In short [narrative intrusion] serves 
the Bible’s art of ambiguity.13  
 
Sternberg’s model suggests that intrusions are one aspect of a narratorial 
pragmatism which governs the narrator’s interventions. He surveys a range of 
strategies within the text, and includes intrusions as one of a number of interventions 
that are all employed by the narrator to legitimate the truth claims of the text. He 
says: 
Were the narrative written or read as fiction, the God would turn from the lord 
of history into a creature of the imagination, with the most disastrous results.14  
 
Sternberg’s sense of the clear purpose of the biblical narrator’s role and, indeed, the 
language of ‘intrusion’ is also found in Shimon Bar-Efrat’s, Narrative Art in the Bible 
(1989) which offers valuable focus upon moments of transgressions across narrative 
boundaries. Bar-Efrat suggests that in such moments: 
A double structure is created within the narrative: in addition to the stratum of 
events, which is the main one, there is the stratum of the narrator, who stands 
forward as the intermediary between the world of the narrative and us.15  
 
In Bar-Efrat’s model, instances of overt narrative comment are best understood as 
incursions through which the narrator seeks to “ensure that every reader will grasp 
the full significance of the narrative in the same way that the narrator does.”16 Bar-
Efrat concludes that the effect of these incursions is to undermine the illusion of a 
reader’s unmediated access to history and “to create a distance and reduce the 
reader’s emotional involvement.”17 Consequently, he imagines that they must have 
been kept to a minimum and he suggests that the narrator’s voice in the biblical text 
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steers between interventions that ensure desired interpretations and a covert 
presence that directs discreetly:  
The less the narrators existence is felt, the less aware we are of the fact that 
someone is mediating between us and the events, and the less we sense that 
someone is selecting and interpreting them for us… This indeed is the method 
adopted by narrators in the Bible [so as] not to impair the illusion of reality.18 
 
The particular value of Bar-Efrat’s analysis is that he affords extended attention to 
the effects of the narratorial interventions. Bar-Efrat’s work triggers consideration of 
the conventions of readership and the capacity of the narrative voice to affect the 
reception of the narrative. This theme is well developed in Christopher Paris’ 
considered evaluation of the role of the narrator as a mediator as revealed through 
‘frame-breaking’ movements in the Hebrew Bible.19 He draws similar conclusions to 
Alter, Sternberg and Bar-Efrat, contending that intervention in the primary diegesis is 
a deliberate strategy to guide readers in their interpretations and understanding of 
the narrative. 
The narrator forcefully enters a narrative to reshape the text and sculpt the 
response of the reader… Obtrusions prevent the reader from arriving at an 
unacceptable conclusion.20 
  
Paris gives a number of examples wherein the narrator forecloses ‘potentially 
unwelcome interpretative avenues’. In Genesis 22:1, for example, the narrator 
discloses proleptically that the coming narrative is a test of Abraham’s character. 
This limits the reader’s interpretative horizon regarding Abraham’s willingness to 
sacrifice Isaac: it demands that his actions are seen as demonstrations of 
faithfulness and that God is not seen as sanctioning child-sacrifice. Another example 
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cited by Paris is Judges 14:4 when the narrator privileges the reader with information 
not otherwise unveiled in the course of the story, explaining that, 
[Samson’s] father and mother did not know that [his desire for a Philistine 
wife] was from the Lord; for he was seeking a pretext to act against the 
Philistines. (Judges 14:4) 
 
Paris describes such examples as obtrusions (rather than intrusions), and suggests 
that they represent atypical attempts to ‘force a particular perspective,’ to ‘pre-
emptively respond to a question or assumption’ or ‘to lesson theological tension by 
filling a gap.’21 The interventions he describes cover a spectrum of ‘overtness’ and 
‘obtrusiveness’ and could almost as easily be defined by the more common 
‘intrusion.’ Nevertheless as obtrusion implies ‘pressing onto’ and intrusion ‘pressing 
into’, the nuance of ‘obtrusion’ may be the more appropriate, especially given Paris’ 
observations that the explanatory comments seek specifically to assert a 
metanarrative interpretation onto some otherwise ambiguous series of events. In 
particular Paris suggests that all the incursions he observes serve to grant ultimate 
agency to God, where otherwise this might be in doubt.22 Thus Paris offers a model 
for transgressions between the interior worlds of the text, that focuses on the 
narrator’s role. His suggestion is that the extra-diegetical universe dominates the 
landscape of the biblical text to such an extent that where the normally laconic 
narrator sees it as necessary, he freely transgresses the structures of his own story 
to speak into either the primary diegesis or even the world of the reader.  
Jerome T. Walsh has offered useful insights regarding frame-breaks and their 
effect in both Style & Structure in Biblical Hebrew Narrative (2001) and Old 
Testament narrative: A guide to interpretation (2010). In both he analyses how ‘point 
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of view’ and ‘narrative voice’ shift frequently in some Old Testament texts. He 
explores the significance of such modulations and goes slightly further than Alter, 
Sternberg or Bar-Efrat in his consideration of the ‘frame-breaking’ effect of these 
interventions: 
Sometimes the narrator will, so to speak, step out of the flow of the narrative 
to address the reader directly; the technical term for this is ‘breaking frame,’ 
and it changes the narrator’s voice from that of a story-teller to that of a 
commentator on the story. 23  
 
Walsh notes that frame-breaking movements and shifts in narratological stance carry 
inherent capacity to shape or unsettle readers’ reception.24 He also succeeds in 
connecting the simultaneous effects of reflective-responsibility and hermeneutical 
distanciation with the confusion between the time frame surrounding the story world 
and that surrounding the reader’s own world. This simple observation is developed 
by Walsh into a considered exploration of the difference between the timeframe of 
the story world and the present moment of the reader: 
The voice that tells the story has suddenly emerged from the background and 
spoken out on its own. This reminds the narratee that he is listening to a story, 
not witnessing something that is actually happening in the moment.25   
 
Cumulatively, Alter, Sternberg and Bar-Efrat argue that biblical narrators intervene 
and intrude into the primary-diegesis as rarely as possible. Paris posits a somewhat 
freer approach to diegetic transgressions and Walsh develops a clear sense of the 
purposefulness and the effect of such frame-breaking, quite beyond ‘forcing a 
perspective’ or ‘fore-closing’ interpretative avenues.  
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Alter, Sternberg and Bar-Efrat have contributed immeasurably to 
understanding of narrative art in the Bible, but it may be that they have exaggerated 
the economy of the biblical narrator and overstated the threat to a mimetic depiction 
of reality represented by the narrator’s incursions into his narrative. Indeed, I suggest 
that the intrusions meaningfully identified by these scholars are an integral feature of 
the continuum of biblical narrative. A brief survey reveals that: from Genesis to II 
Chronicles, reference to the narrator’s own context through the formula “To this day” 
interrupts the primary diegesis more than fifty times (Chapter six below); Ezra and 
Nehemiah move frequently from third to first person narration without logical 
explanation; in the texts of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Micah, Habakkuk 
the prophets all refer to themselves in the first person, significantly muddling a 
reader’s sense of the narrative stance; Mark’s Gospel appeals directly to the reader 
(“Let the reader understand”); Luke includes himself and his reader within his Gospel 
and in Acts (“My dear Theophilus”); John intervenes frequently in his own story (“The 
Word became flesh and dwelt among us,” and “These are written that you may 
believe”) and the seer in Revelation constantly foregrounds himself (“I, John”). 
Evidently narratorial intrusions are a prodigious and significant component of 
the actuality expressed and contained within the biblical text, to the extent that the 
reality of the narrator and even the reader ought to be understood as a part of the 
biblical model of reality – rather than the threat to its coherence that has sometimes 
been suggested. I contend that a sense of the narrator’s presence within her own 
narrative is an evitable consequence of her intervention in the story, and the more 
overt the narratorial intervention, the more the role of the interlocutor is felt within the 
story. Such presence is provocatively paradoxical for it muddles the thresholds 
between narrative and reception and between telling and told. It evidences an inner-
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biblical hermeneutic and strains the temporal boundaries of the text. The self-
involvement of the narrator is a revelation of an internal model of interpretation and is 
a declaration of divine sovereignty over time. Focus upon interventions as a 
deliberate strategy and a component of narrative artistry is genuinely useful, but 
consideration of the intrinsic hermeneutic that is laid bare, and theological 
significance of such moments may be even more theologically significant.  
2.2 Exegetical Studies 
Anja Cornils’ 2005 exploration of the ‘We’ passages in Luke-Acts (Chapter 1, 3.1 
above) represents the first significant attempts to explain biblical frame-breaking 
through Genette’s model of metalepsis.26 Her contention was that in Acts the 
movement from a hetero-diegetic to a homo-diegetic narrative stance represented by 
the “we” passages was a strategy that sought to add credibility to the whole 
narrative. She concludes that the employment of the trope is deliberate, effective and 
indicative of the rhetorical artistry involved in the creation of the text. Her contention 
is that critical evaluation of this technique brings the genuineness of the ‘we’ 
narratives into question and reveals the potential ‘fictionality’ of the narrative, for 
these pericopae are revealed to be quite conscious attempts to add power, credibility 
and authority through personal witness. Cornils’ position is repeated by a number of 
commentators, and seems to be broadly accepted, as is evident in this summary: 
The narrator appears in this ‘we’ as an anonymous companion, his primary 
characteristic being that he accompanies Paul on some of his journeys. That 
is the prime function of this ‘we’: it replaces the narrator in the diegesis. As a 
figure, he experiences the events as an eyewitness and thus lays claim to the 
authority of someone who has seen something personally. This procedure 
was very successful. Even today this narrative is received in this way, namely 
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102 
 
as an authentic eyewitness account. With Genette, we can also call this 
narrative procedure ‘metalepsis’.27 
 
Cornils’ analysis is valuable, and there can be little doubt that the inconsistency of 
the narrative voice delaminates the narrative structure, collapsing the framework 
between the primary and extra-diegetic layers. Nevertheless her conclusion, that 
Luke’s metaleptic transgressions are self-conscious attempts to add credibility are 
unproven, and it is distinctly possible that such transgressions are derived from the 
narrator’s genuine sense of the permeability between the worlds of the extra and 
primary diegesis. There seems little traction therefore in the suggestion that the 
rhetorical benefit of movement between diegetic levels is necessarily “un signe de 
narration fictionnelle.”28 
Ryan Schellenberg’s essay, ‘Which Master? Whose Steward? Metalepsis and 
Lordship in the Parable of the Prudent Steward’ (2008), has suggested that 
metalepsis is the best explanation for the confusion found in Luke 16:1-13.29 
Schellenberg remains unique in his employment of metalepsis as an explanation for 
a particularly difficult exegesis. He suggests that “The surprising intrusion into the 
parable of a kyrios who approves of debt relief compels the parable’s audience to 
reconsider their own loyalties and vindicates the debt relief scheme of the prudent 
steward.”30 
Schellenberg’s example is one I take up in greater fullness in chapter five 
(below), and so I will not rehearse his argument or my response here. However, it is 
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worth noting Schellenberg’s arguments for the application of Genette’s model to a 
biblical text. He suggested that Luke’s consistent attempts to surprise his readers 
and to confound their expectations, coupled with his consistent employment of 
embedded narratives, mean that metalepsis should be expected (amongst other 
rhetorical tools) as “salient features of Luke’s compositional technique.”31 Certainly it 
could be expected, therefore, that Luke’s gospel might be amongst the biblical 
narratives most likely to self-consciously muddle diegetic levels and break the 
frames surrounding the embedded parables within the narrative.  
Schellenberg’s article focused narrowly on interpretation of one parable, and 
as a consequence it has not had the attention that might be expected for so novel an 
approach to a ‘tricky’ parable. Schellenberg’s essay has been cited in 11 works since 
he wrote, but nine of those are narrowly focussed on the same parable or other 
similar Lucan examples. The only two studies which offer extrapolation of 
Schellenberg’s axiomatic suggestions are found in works focused on rhetorical 
strategies in Luke’s Gospel.32 
In a number of very recent works Ute E. Eisen has established herself as a 
notable commentator on biblical metalepsis.33 Her particular focus has been the 
Gospel of John but her editorship of Über die Grenze, Metalepse in Text- und 
Bildmedien des Altertums has brought together a number of meaningful contributions 
on Ancient metalepsis including articles on the Apocryphal Acts of Andrew, Rabbinic 
Midrash and the Passover narrative of Exodus 12.34 Her most significant contribution 
is her analysis of the complexities of the narratorial situation within Johannine 
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narrative. She suggests that the inconsistency between the role of the “Beloved 
Disciple” and the framing narratives (“We” in John 1:14 and “I” in John 21:24) reveal 
the reception-orientation of the narrative and illustrate the rhetorical toolkit employed 
by the narrator. She says: 
It could be shown that metalepses can also be detected in the canonical 
gospels according to Mark and John and in the Lucan double work. We find 
top-down and bottom-up apostrophes as well as merging/blending of narrative 
voices. The strategy in the Gospel according to John, where the third-person 
narrator is simultaneously a character in the story, is a special form of very 
subtle metalepsis. All these metalepses are rhetorical because they have no 
consequences for the plot. In the case of the Johannine narrative the question 
of the narrator’s location is answered by the character Jesus in the story: 
“What is that to you?” (John 21:22). Thus the narrator cannot be questioned 
by his readers either, and he is exempt from any kind of criticism.35 
 
Of particular value is Eisen’s capacity to weave the comments of previous exegetes 
into her thesis. She builds upon Josef Blank’s understanding of Johannine theology 
as a “theology of making-present”36 and acknowledges the value of Alan Culpepper’s 
insights that included observation of metalepsis in the text without naming it, 
describing instead moments which “move the reader into the scene so that even 
though it is told in the course of narrating the past, readers feel that they are in the 
scene.”37 Eisen offers a range of examples to justify her conclusion that in the 
canonical gospels and in Acts metalepsis “fuses into one presence” the frontier of 
the story and the world of narration. She ultimately concludes that the diegetic layers 
in John’s Gospel are considerably more permeable than in the other gospels and 
that the function of metalepsis and meta-narration in John is to defend the Gospel’s 
own truth claim by appeal to the narrator as an eye-witness. 
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The Lukan double work, rather, aimed at defending the reliability (ἀσφάλεια) 
of its gospel’s own diegesis in competition with the “many” others (Luke 1:1). 
The Gospel according to Mark, probably the oldest gospel, does not yet 
contain comparable self-referential passages. But readers are also directly 
addressed by subtle metaleptic strategies, whereby the readers are more 
powerfully drawn into the events and the message of Jesus so that they 
become involved.38 
 
Eisen is convincing and her focus on the “theology of attestation and making-
present” is enhanced through understanding of Johannine metalepsis. However, 
Eisen seems to exaggerate the distinction between John’s metaleptic methods and 
those in other gospels and I remain unconvinced that a purely ‘rhetorical’ metalepsis 
is even possible.39  
A unique work by Douglas Estes in 2008 focused on the temporal mechanics 
of John’s Gospel and the inconsistent sense of time evidenced in the Gospel’s 
composition.40 Estes introduces the notion of metalepsis in the Gospel as follows: 
Instead of possessing two pure, integral and distinct worlds, the Fourth 
Gospel comprises several worlds – most notably the witness and epic worlds 
– that are conflated, fractional and entangled. We can refer to the conflation of 
multiple diegetic worlds that exist in the Fourth Gospel as metalepsis.41 
 
Estes suggests that metalepses arise because the entangled narrative worlds within 
the Gospel are highly unstable.42 Estes identifies the temporal world of John’s 
Gospel as an amalgamation created by a range of metaleptic mechanisms including 
statements with indefinite temporalities, repetitions of lexical particulars across 
distinct narrative worlds, cross-over between eye-witness and omniscient 
perspectives. Each of these mechanisms is worthy of attention before Estes’ 
conclusion is considered. 
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Indefinite temporalities are identified by Estes as an entrenched feature of 
John’s narrative, and are found in those moments when it is conspicuously 
ambiguous in which diegetic world an action is taking place, such as in John 2:17. 
Having witnessed him cleanse the temple, “[Jesus’] disciples remembered that it was 
written, “Zeal for thy house will consume me.”  Estes’ primary example of lexical 
repetition is the Johannine employment of ‘signs’ across the ‘epic world’, the ‘witness 
world’, and the narrative segments (e.g. 2:11; 2:16; 6:2). He also notes the terms 
‘disciple’, ‘Christ’ and ‘witness’ amongst the most important of these signifiers: 
“[these] trans-world lexical repetitions disrupt the ontological boundaries between the 
two temporal worlds and prohibit most attempts at diegetic partitioning.”43 Movement 
between eye-witness and omniscient perspectives is noticed by Estes on occasions 
when the testimonial vantage point is an inadequate stance from which to project an 
external perspective. Examples include the Johannine narrator’s claims to know 
Jesus’ mind and to comprehend substantially more than the disciples (for example 
John 2:24-25 and 20:8-9). Estes’ conclusion is that “metaleptic conflation of the two 
Johannine worlds exists on the deepest level of narrativity and cannot be 
disentangled by the modern reader.”44 He argues cogently that metaleptic blending 
in John’s Gospel illustrates the narrator’s need to overcome the inevitable limitations 
implicit within narrative as a medium, and that metalepsis is one of the creative ways 
in which the narrator seeks to overcome ‘narrative restrictions’ and achieve trans-
world referentiality so that omni-temporal truth claims may be asserted. 
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One final study that merits particular attention is Ilse Muellner’s 2014 article, 
Celebration and Narration. Metaleptic features in Ex 12:1 – 13,16.45  This is the only 
article I have found to date that connects notions of performative force and 
metalepsis through focussed exegesis.46 In this as yet un-cited study, Muellner 
suggests that in Exodus 12 and 13 the permeability of the narrated world intertwines 
narration and liturgy, and that the text binds remote generations into recognition, 
repetition and response. She claims that through oral narration, narrative 
historiography achieves perlocutionary force in the lives of the audience.47  
The entanglement or even identification between the acting community of 
Israel in Exodus and the respective reading and acting community in Israel in 
the ritual of reading and repetition belongs in the field of metalepsis… Literary 
traits contribute to the cross-fading of the first Exodus and subsequent feasts, 
of the acting community and listening community, of the Exodus generation 
and all following generations.48  
 
Muellner argues cogently that the narration “binds subsequent generations into the 
world of narration” through a wide range of strategies including breach of narrative 
frames; ambiguous temporal structure; spatial perspective that transcends the 
location of the narrated action; semantic fields that include connections between 
active characters and future listeners; discussion of the very act of narration in the 
form of mise en abyme (‘placed into abyss’ - where an object is represented within 
itself) and confusion between a singular event and a repeatable action.49  
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Muellner offers a persuasive description of the liturgical lens of Exodus 12 and 
13 as ‘canonical metalepsis’. She concludes that the performative force of the 
narrative places inescapable obligations upon its audience: 
Blurring of the boundaries has the effect that respective reader – as long as 
they accept the text’s offer – are more strongly pulled into the world of the 
narrated than they would be with a simple identificational reading. The Torah 
as a binding text, as a text that spans across generations is structurally 
established through narration.50 
 
Muellner’s assessment could fruitfully be expanded in a number of directions. Paul’s 
narrative of the institution of the Lord’s Supper, for example, finds life and fulfilment 
through the recitation and repetition (I Cor. 11:23-26), as do the Christological hymns 
which Paul repeats in Philippians 2:6-11 and Colossians 1:15-20.51  
2.3 Summary 
The models explored above demonstrate the serious attention that biblical scholars 
have afforded to the moments of overt extra-diegetic commentary in the text and the 
language that has been developed regarding breaking-frame, entanglement, asides, 
obtrusion and intrusion has provided a useful backdrop for more recent studies.52 
Attempts to explain such transgressions as elements of a singular fixed rhetorical 
purpose undoubtedly oversimplify the range of interventions, transgressions and 
their effects evident in such anomalies. It is certainly not the case that moments of 
diegetic contamination are evidence only of “the narrator seeking to remove agency 
from a knowledgeable reader by foreclosing presumptuous questions.”53 On the 
contrary, as is shown by a number of studies, narratorial interventions and metaleptic 
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muddles do not necessarily reduce ambiguity. Often they contain the capacity to 
propel the reader into a profound depth of uncertainty or to invoke reflective 
response. 
The range of studies cited above illustrates the extent to which anomalies in 
surface structures and thresholds between narrative levels may affect a reader: 
whether binding her to repetition of a liturgy, identifying herself within a parable, or 
questioning the role of the narrative voice within the reception of the story. However, 
the scarcity of studies in biblical metalepsis is also noteworthy: there is a major gap 
between the significant comments of narrative critics in the 1980s and the more 
recent genesis of meaningful exploration into the effects of narrative intrusions or 
metalepses typified by the work of Estes or Muellner. Furthermore textual analysis 
has not yet yielded sustained theological consideration. Given the profound potency 
of studies regarding the threshold between representation and reality in film, theatre, 
art and fiction, meaningful philosophical consideration should be anticipated in 
explorations of metalepsis in biblical narrative. To an extent there is some catching 
up to do in fields of biblical hermeneutics and biblical theology. In the close readings 
that follow in chapters 3 to 6 I hope, in part to address these gaps. First though, in 
the following sections I offer discussion of realism, figuralism, contemporaneity, 
transformation, selfhood, mimesis and metaphor. These themes, as developed in the 
writings of Erich Auerbach, Søren Kierkegaard and Paul Ricoeur, establish a 
vocabulary and conceptual scaffolding which will shape subsequent development of 




3. Erich Auerbach 
Over the past 60 years the work of the German philologist Erich Auerbach has been 
of sustained significance for students of realism in Western literature. Auerbach 
examined the ‘inner’ spiritual mentalities or philosophies that are revealed in the 
changing trajectories of western literature. As James I Porter has suggested, “in a 
word, Auerbach’s writings effectively chart and then explore the difficult discovery of 
the sensuous, the earthly, and the human and social worlds.”54 It was Auerbach’s 
suggestion that consideration of language, art and literature ought to be recognised 
as evidence of the unfolding history of ideas that constitute “the wealth of events” 
and the “sensuousness of human life.”55 These themes are of particular significance 
in Dante: Poet of the Secular World (1929), Mimesis: The Representation of Reality 
in Western Literature (1953), Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, (1959) 
and the recently published compilation Time, History, and Literature (2014). 
 Auerbach’s review of Western literature contains a remarkable range and 
complexity of philosophy and thought and his work has shaped both the study of 
comparative literature and appreciation of the Bible as literature. He made bold 
claims regarding the significance of the Judeo-Christian tradition, asserting that the 
narrative composition of the biblical text is inextricable from its meaning, and that 
both form and content oblige the reader to find herself absorbed into the framework 
of salvation history narrativized in the canon.56 Whilst a great number of these 
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themes merit exploration, two particularly stand out for consideration in the present 
thesis.  
Firstly, the most famous of his conclusions is the suggestion that the worldview 
advanced in scriptural stories is a totalitarian and tyrannical depiction of reality that 
demands the submission of all other narratives: 
The Bible’s claim to truth is not only far more urgent than Homer’s, it is tyrannical 
– it excludes all other claims. The world of the Scripture stories is not satisfied 
with claiming to be a historically true reality – it insists that it is the only real world 
and it is destined for autocracy. All other scenes issues and ordinances have no 
right to appear independently of it. And it is promised that all of them, the history 
of mankind, will be given their due place within its frame, and will be subordinated 
to it. The scripture world stories do not court our favour, they do not flatter us that 
they may please us and enchant us. They seek to subject us, and if we refuse to 
be subjected, we are rebels.57 
 
The broader context of Auerbach’s argument relates to his understanding of realism, 
and this is of particular significance in later discussions about the boundaries 
between realities represented in text, and the world of the reader.  
Secondly Auerbach’s understanding of the importance of figuralism within 
Christian hermeneutics has been of sustained importance in subsequent thinking. 
Indeed, a wealth of discussion regarding the meaningfulness of time and history can 
be accessed through Auerbach’s understanding of figures. Auerbach defines a figure 
as "something real and historical which announces something else which is real and 
historical. The relation between two events is revealed by an accord or similarity."58  
Figuralism is thus a prism through which to explore the role of the time and 
perspective of the biblical narrator within Christian hermeneutics. 
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These themes augment consideration of the narrator’s role in biblical 
hermeneutics, and, since Auerbach wrote, have subsequently played a significant 
role in understanding the history of Western literature and consciousness. The value 
of close readings of individual texts that he developed, and the complex connections 
between figures and themes that he found fulfilled and repeated through the diverse 
literary aesthetics, genres and periods have been of sustained significance. 
3.1 Realism 
Abraham, Jacob, or even Moses produce a more concrete, direct, and 
historical impression than the figures of the Homeric world not because they 
are better described in terms of sense (the contrary is the case ) but because 
the confused, contradictory multiplicity of events, the psychological and 
factual cross-purposes, which true history reveals, have not disappeared in 
the representation but still remain clearly perceptible.59 
 
 
One of the most important of Auerbach’s contributions is the contrast that he draws 
between the concrete, common, dense and ambiguous picture of the world portrayed 
in realistic literary representation and the stylised, foreground-heavy approach of 
idealised narrative forms. This contrast is most evident in his essay Odysseus’ Scar, 
in which Auerbach introduced the idea of the Elohistic form in contrast to the 
Homeric. Auerbach’s view was that the realism encountered across a range of 
Western literature treats the actuality of normal life much more honestly than was the 
case in ancient and classical texts which were stylised, elevated and hierarchically 
exclusive. He traced the value of realism back to the grounded, inwardly alive, 
socially mixed and theologically ambiguous view of the world found in the Old 
Testament. Auerbach frequently returned to this theme, notably in his discussions of 
Dante, whose work Auerbach was uniquely appreciative of. Auerbach observed in 
Dante’s descriptions a naturalism that no other commentators had noticed. He 
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suggested that far from being the stylised, ethereal caricatures of the deceased that 
might be expected, Dante presents his creatures with all the vitality of everyday, 
actual people who have been shaped by time. According to Auerbach, Dante 
characters are described in all their “contingent and particular glory…for the souls of 
Dante’s otherworld are not dead… No… they are the living.”60  
 Whilst praising representations of earthly, honest human experience (and 
charting the development of such notions through the history of the western canon) 
Auerbach criticised the formal or the stylised. A good example of this tension can be 
found in the way he describes the concrete reality of Latin prose in contrast to the 
exalted poetry of French dramatists. He eulogises Gregory of Tours’s History of the 
Franks as follows: 
Gregory’s literary Latin not only is decadent grammatically and syntactically, it 
is used in his work to an end for which, originally or at least in its heyday, it 
seemed little suited—that is, to imitate concrete reality.61 
 
He goes on to laud the “precision” and the “vigor” that Gregory of Tours exemplifies 
whilst criticising the gradual debasement of such qualities in Latin rhetoric:  
For the literary Latin, and especially the literary prose of the golden age is an 
almost excessively organising language, in which the material and sensory 
side of the facts is rather viewed and ordered from above rather than vividly 
presented in its materiality and sensoriness… the stuff of reality… though it is 
mastered, is not exploited in its sensory potentialities.62 
 
Auerbach traces this elevated perspective to its zenith in the rigid formalism of 
French classicists and their ‘impoverished, ideological conception of socio-political 
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reality.’ He finds in the drama of Racine a remarkable and “extreme exaltation of the 
tragic personage” and erasure of everyday reality.63 
Racine’s consistently elevated tone… shuns every type of concrete realism. 
[Racine] went further than anyone else in isolating the scene and secluding 
the action from everything low, extrinsic, and accessory… Racine's concept of 
the natural was identified with a well-developed and well-educated type of 
human being, decorous in conduct and able to adjust with ease to the most 
exacting situations of social living… To call something natural was almost 
tantamount to calling it reasonable and seemly… The classic tragedy of the 
French [thus] represents the ultimate extreme in the separation of styles, in 
the severance of the tragic from the everyday and real.64 
 
Auerbach analysed the depth of relationship between the reality depicted within a 
text and that which was experienced by the audience. Indeed, comparison between 
the literary forms and exploration of the significance of surface aesthetics as modes 
of exploring reality are hallmarks of Auerbach’s work. Auerbach’s view, though he 
never neatly defined it, was that realism was not ultimately located in the accuracy of 
depiction or the vividness of vocabulary. Rather, it is a method of re-presenting the 
authenticity of life as it might be experienced by an audience. Realism is the artistic 
form that faithfully represents the vernacular, the mundane, the every-day and the 
experience of life shared by ordinary people. This emphasis places Auerbach 
somewhat at odds with more conventional understandings, such as that expressed 
by Terry Eagleton.  
A poet who managed to make his or her words ‘become’ the fruit they 
describe would be a greengrocer. No representation, one might say, without 
separation. Words are certainly as real as pineapples, but this is precisely the 
reason they cannot be pineapples. The most they can do is create what Henry 
James called the ‘air of reality’ of pineapples. In this sense, all realist art is a 
kind of con trick – a fact that is most obvious when the artist includes details 
that are redundant to the narrative (the precise tint and curve of a moustache, 
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let us say) simply to signal: ‘This is realism.’ In such art, no waistcoat is 
colourless, no way of walking is without its idiosyncrasy, no visage without its 
memorable features. Realism is calculated contingency.65 
 
Eagleton suggests that realism is a determined attempt to mimic reality. It is a mode 
of artifice that is characteristic by imitation of the details of life. By contrast Auerbach 
consistently identified realism in texts which others missed, identifying narratives as 
realistic narratives if they reproduced the common, concrete, humble, earthly and 
frail experience of people. He suggested that across the history of western literature, 
“each oscillation between eras accomplished a greater realism… and a higher 
degree of truth.”66  
Auerbach’s sense was that texts carried the capacity to elevate the potential 
of human consciousness through reverberating with reality, and he understood 
realism therefore to be a mode that maximised the correspondence or referentiality 
between the representation of the past in the text and the reality of the past as it has 
been interpreted or experienced.67 Auerbach’s understanding of realism is therefore, 
essentially, a methodological realism: for he asserts a model of realism based upon 
the process of connecting one discourse with the life of another.68 Auerbach 
observed that the measure of a text’s realism was not necessarily dependent on the 
accuracy of the depiction of the exterior world, but rather, on the validity of the figural 
images of the past that are exhibited in the text. Thus, in Auerbach’s work realism 
should be understood as an aesthetic mode that implicitly demonstrates 
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narratological intent toward truthful representation of ideas and experiences. It is first 
and foremost historicism that has been stripped of artificial description, creative 
licence and lofty aesthetics. This is because Auerbach considered there to be a deep 
relationship between realism and truth: indeed realism and truthfulness to the human 
experience are co-dependent. Auerbach explains: 
The Biblical narrator was obliged to write exactly what his belief in the truth of 
the tradition (or, from the rationalistic standpoint, his interest in the truth of it) 
demanded of him-in either case, his freedom in creative or representative 
imagination was severely limited; his activity was perforce reduced to 
composing an effective version of the pious tradition. What he produced, then, 
was not primarily oriented toward "realism" (if he succeeded in being realistic, 
it was merely a means, not an end); it was oriented toward truth. Woe to the 
man who did not believe it!69 
 
Auerbach’s notion of the relationship between realism and veracity has had 
sustained influence and may be illustrated through the writing of Hans Frei and 
Alister McGrath. Frei charted the gradual subtle changes in biblical hermeneutics 
that had, over time, hidden the ‘profound realism’ of biblical narrative.70 He criticised 
the manner in which biblical scholars had effected a concealment of the 
meaningfulness of scriptural narrative as a representation of reality and suggested 
that this trend had deprived readers of authentic meaning. 71   
 Frei’s work builds upon Auerbach’s analysis of the profound freight of the 
biblical worldview and is an apology for the Christian reading of scripture, wherein a 
reader is invited to understand her own world according to the Bible’s long and 
overarching history of fall, redemption and final consummation. Frei contends that 
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biblical narrative presents: “a coherent world of discourse in its own right, whose 
depictions and teachings have a reality of their own, though to be sure it is a reality 
into which all men have to fit.”72 He asserts that the meaning of biblical narrative is 
inseparable from the story itself and that, moreover, Jesus’ identity in the Gospels is 
represented in an “unsubstitutional” sense so that the person of Jesus described, 
refigured and represented in their narratives may be made ‘present’ to the reader.73 
He was convinced that a theologically self-involved reading of the realistic sense of 
the text was both the most constructive and the most appropriate hermeneutic 
possible: 
Through the coincidence and even identity between the world being depicted 
and its reality being rendered to the reader (always under the form of 
depiction), the reader or hearer in turn becomes part of that depicted reality 
and thus has to take a personal life stance toward it.74 
 
Auerbach, and Frei after him, offered a vigorous defence of historical realism, and of 
the value of this realism within the biblical canon. Auerbach’s contention is that the 
figures presented in the Bible convey historicity and that, by virtue of their visceral 
connectivity with the ambiguity and tragedy interwoven in human experience, they 
should also be understood as meaningful representations of other aspects of reality. 
This figural realism refuses to divorce the divine from the actuality of history. Instead 
Auerbach suggests that it is through its background-rich depiction of the human 
condition that the Bible succeeds in both representing reality and rendering it 
meaningful. It is the biblical depiction of the corporeal (earthly or irdisch) that most 
fully realises the reality of the celestial (inner or himmlisch).  
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This mingling of styles is not dictated by an artistic purpose. On the contrary, it 
was rooted from the beginning in the character of Jewish-Christian literature; it 
was graphically and harshly dramatized through God's incarnation in a human 
being of the humblest social station, through his existence on earth amid 
humble everyday people and conditions, and through his Passion which, 
judged by earthly standards, was ignominious; and it naturally came to have 
... a most decisive bearing upon man's conception of the tragic and the 
sublime.75 
 
For Auerbach the realism of the Gospels “rests upon a contamination of elements: 
God and man; sovereign and slaves; religious ideas and the humble milieu” and it is 
the tension between sublimitas and humilitas that underpins all that Auerbach 
considers ‘realistic representation.76 Realism then for Auerbach is the paradoxical 
presence of the meaningful in the commonplace. It is the discovery of the sublime in 
the visceral, and for Auerbach it is to be found most clearly in the manner in which 
biblical narratives locate the presence of God in the empty foreground of Mount 
Moriah, in the inner agony of Peter’s denial or the paradox of the crucified Christ: 
The historical core of Christianity… offers a more radical paradox, a wider 
range of contradiction, than anything known to the ancient world, either in its 
history or in its mythical tradition… [the incarnation] was to provoke the 
greatest of all transformations in the inner and outward history of our civilized 
world.77 
 
Despite his influence and sustained significance in theological dialogue, Auerbach’s 
elevated sense of the significance of realism has also received criticism. Frank R. 
Ankersmit, for example, has suggested that Auerbach’s criticism of other literary 
forms is driven by the fixed definition of realism that Auerbach possessed and “of 
which he perceived the enterprise of Corneilles and Racine to be a fatal 
transgression.”78 Auerbach’s analysis of narrative mode is indeed political rather than 
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formal, and intuitive rather than epistemological and is often criticised for 
approaching realism as a value-term more than a technical, historical or fixed form.79 
Ankersmit identifies five quite separate concepts of realism in Auerbach’s writing: 
“(1) the notion of the mixture of styles, (2) the notion of figura, (3) Auerbach's 
Hegelianism, (4) the emphasized sublimity of realism, and (5) reality's best 
presenting itself in experience.”80 He questions whether, “a theoretical reconciliation 
of [Auerbach’s] conflicting conceptions of realism can be achieved.” Terry Eagleton 
similarly notes the methodological weakness implicit in Auerbach’s comparison 
between realistic and aesthetic literary forms (as exemplified in Odysseus’ Scar).81  
Realism is representation in accordance with conventional real-life modes of 
representing it... We cannot compare an artistic representation with how the 
world is, since how the world is in itself a matter of representation. We can 
only compare artistic representations with non-artistic ones, a distinction 
which can itself be a little shaky.82 
 
Eagleton’s criticism is shaped by his sense that a realistic representation of reality is 
impossible. At best, realism is effectively an aesthetically realistic representation of a 
sense of reality. Eagleton suggests that the limit of realism is found in the blind spot 
of all representationalism, and his view here is of fundamental significance to later 
consideration of the self and the narrator’s own involvement in biblical narrative: 
If the source of representing is the self, it is doubtful whether the self can be 
captured within its own view of the world, any more than the eye can be an 
object in its own field of vision. In picturing the world, the self risks falling 
outside the frame of its own representations. It is the dynamic power behind 
the whole process, but one which it is hard to figure there. The human subject 
becomes the blind spot at the centre of the picture, the absent cause of the 
world’s coming to presence.83 
 
                                            
79
 Cf. Terry Eagleton, ‘Text, ideology, realism’ in Literature and Society (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1980), pp.149-73. 
80
 Ankersmit, ‘Why Realism?’, p. 73.  
81
 Eagleton, ‘Text, ideology, realism’, p. 73. 
82
 Terry Eagleton, ‘Pork Chops’ p.18. Cf. Terry Eagleton, Literary theory: An introduction (Oxford: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2011). 
83
 Eagleton, ‘Pork Chops’, p.19.  
120 
 
Although Eagleton’s work illustrates how scholars have latterly departed from 
Auerbach’s model of realism and his suggestion of its primacy, Auerbach’s 
appreciation of the significance of the humble and the visceral can still be keenly felt 
in Eagleton’s (and others’) work. Whilst Eagleton disagrees with Auerbach over the 
particular merits of realism, he nevertheless shares Auerbach’s sense of significance 
of this aesthetic mode. This is evident in his description of the heart of biblical 
realism which reflects precisely the brutality and tragedy that Auerbach considered 
an essential component of sublime narrative:  
The New Testament is a brutal destroyer of human illusions. If you follow 
Jesus and don't end up dead, it appears you have some explaining to do. The 
stark signifier of the human condition is one who spoke up for love and justice 
and was done to death for his pains. The traumatic truth of human history is a 
mutilated body.84  
3.2 Figures 
What Auerbach designates as a ‘figure’ is not to be confused with an analogy; 
rather, it is to be thought of as a specific historical entity with the capacity to 
relate to another entity within or beyond the historical process. As Auerbach 
observes, ‘earthly phenomena are on the whole merely figural, potential, and 
requiring fulfilment.’… Words, events, individuals – all were to be seen as 
possessed of a capacity, when appropriately interpreted by the intellectus 
spiritualis, to point to other aspects of a greater reality.85 
 
Auerbach’s approach to the figural has been a gift to contemporary Christian 
hermeneutics. Through figuralism Auerbach explores a model of scripture which co-
locates the meaning of the Bible with its narrative shape. Auerbach’s hermeneutics, 
“preserves the full historicity of the Scriptures along with the deeper meaning” 
suggesting that the Bible contains an historical footprint and a metaphorical 
fullness.86 In his approach to the figural Auerbach posits a degree of continuity within 
history so that one event or person may genuinely be a meaningful prefiguration of 
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their historical counterparts. This model underpins Auerbach’s understanding of the 
fundamental contribution of Christian hermeneutics to human society: 
Its integral, firmly teleological, view of history and the providential order of the 
world gave it the power to capture the imagination and innermost feelings… 
with its living historicity… [Christian Figural interpretation] was a fresh 
beginning and a rebirth of man's creative powers.87 
 
Auerbach’s concept of a ‘figure’ is therefore fundamental to his hermeneutical 
enterprise and, since the time of his writing, has been of increasing importance to 
Christian doctrine. Auerbach’s is essentially a simple observation:  
Figural interpretation establishes a connection between two events or 
persons, the first of which signifies not only itself, but also the second, while 
the second encompasses or fulfils the first.88 
  
Viewing history itself as a sequence of figure-fulfilment relationships, Auerbach 
allows the development of Christian theology which traces providence throughout the 
‘dimensions of historical happening’ without resorting to triumphalism or to poeticized 
existentialism.89 The significance of the notion of figural hermeneutics within 
Christian models of history is necessarily most obvious in approaches to the 
incarnation. This is particularly evident in Hans Frei’s “figural economy of scripture” 
which locates the centre of the Christian faith in the incarnate Christ, who is 
simultaneously fulfilment and figure.90 Frei contends that all ‘creaturely reality’ is 
fulfilled in the reconciliation of the divine and the human in Jesus of Nazareth, whose 
very self fulfils the fundamental role of all creatures as ‘witness’. Christ is figure, and 
fulfilment. He is the one who is still to come in the second advent, and who in his first 
advent represents the full range of those creatures that long for relationship and 
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reconciliation. It is not that Adam is like Christ or Christ is like Adam, both are 
historical expressions of a transcendent theme that neither completely expresses. 
The one foreshadows and is fulfilled by the other and the two are bound by history 
rather than imagination. The first figure is never obscured in future interpretation but 
is rendered more meaningful by the second figure who fulfils the symbols prefigured 
in the past. For Auerbach it was the symmetry of recursive themes in history that 
continued to interpret and be interpreted that established the value of a figurative 
hermeneutics rather than understanding through analogy. 
Auerbach’s approach to figuralism is a rich vein for biblical hermeneuticists. 
His concepts allow positive theological assertions regarding a breadth of Christology, 
appreciation of the value of reception history; recognition of the canonical 
momentum evident in prophecy and the development of historically conscious 
interpretation. He opens a doorway into consideration of the narrator as a figure of 
reception, interpretation and proclamation. His model also forecloses triumphalism 
for his concept of history itself is founded upon the suggestion that historical events 
“have something provisional and incomplete about them.” He attends consistently to 
super-chronological themes and figural interpretations that add a depth of sublime 
meaning to the events of history and, tellingly insists that history itself is inherently 
figurative: 
Thus history, with all its concrete force, remains forever a figure, cloaked and 
needful of interpretation. In this light the history of no epoch ever has had the 
practical self-sufficiency which, from the standpoint both of primitive man and 
of modern science, resides in the accomplished fact.91 
 
Mike Higton has suggested that such a particularly figural reading of history risks 
replacing “uncontrollable history... with a calculus” and he contends that the search 
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for resolution through figural reading can be reductive.92 He notes that when 
exegesis identifies a pattern in a narrative, the pattern is inevitably less rich than the 
story it describes, and that patterns and figures must remain subordinate to their 
stories rather than being allowed to replace them. Higton explains that an exclusively 
figural interpretation of the Old Testament might devalue it and must be avoided: 
Fulfilment of the Old Testament in the New is not its abolition, but rather… a 
fulfilment that sends us back again and again to read the Old Testament ‘in its 
own terms’, paying attention to its complex, contingent, disruptive nature… 
We may erect abstract doctrinal scaffolding – but we will have to make sure 
both that the doctrine is framed in such a way as not to suggest that the 
pattern we have seen is somehow a replacement for the story in which we 
found it… and that we do not suggest that this pattern is the only one that can 
be found.93 
 
This issue is one already realised in Auerbach’s model.  He asserted both the 
historical reality of the Old and the New Testaments and also their providential 
connectedness. He explained the appropriation and re-application of the Jewish 
doctrines of sin, redemption and revelation within the Christian canon but he also 
recognised the inherent devaluation (Entwertung) of Judaism that has occurred 
through Christian figuralism.94 It was Auerbach’s view that the Christian figural 
interpretation of Old Testament traditions paved the way for the eventual 
secularisation of Western theology and the beginnings of ‘earthly’ things being 
afforded “autonomous value.”95 He saw the significant de-Christianization 
(Entchristung) of Christianity as a rupture in history and suggested that a figural and 
ethical interpretation would eventually secularise the Christian faith.96  
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Secular Dante was realizing a potential within the Christian theological 
worldview that led to the dissolution of that worldview altogether. In Dante, 
“the indestructibility of the whole historical and individual man turns against 
[the divine] order . . . and obscures it. The image of man eclipses the image of 
God. Dante’s work realized the Christian-figural essence of man, and 
destroyed it in the very process of realizing it.97  
 
Auerbach’s understanding of the significance of figural interpretation must therefore 
be understood to develop competing consequences for Christian hermeneutics. On 
the one hand, he offers new depth and life to discourse and traditions, whilst on the 
other he notes the threat of assimilation into a secular evolution of Western 
Philosophy.  Auerbach imagined that Christian literature, ethics, models of selfhood 
and reality would be of sustained significance through their appropriation and figural 
re-application, even though he envisaged this re-application in a secularised 
landscape. He suggests that “eschatological anxiety” and “earthly insecurity” are at 
the heart of the Christian faith and that messianic expectations, and their lack of 
absolute fulfilment, were fundamental to the advance of an ethical and philosophical 
richness in European consciousness and literature.98 The longing for fulfilment and 
the ache for the sublime have underpinned direction of Western thought. In the 
incarnation Christianity brought transcendence into the orbit of human existence and 
‘contaminated’ human consciousness “to the point that the worldly and unworldly 
came to be gradually unified.” 99  
Auerbach suggests that enlightened historical contingency is the inevitable 
destination prefigured by the incarnation, just as the Christian kerygma was a more 
grounded expression of Jewish figuralism. Christian literature thus contains the 
genesis of modern individualism and, ironically, the figure of its own undoing and the 
seeds of modern secularism. Christian dogma and doctrine might therefore by 
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superseded whilst the remarkable paradoxes and figures at the heart of the faith 
prove to be of continued historical importance. This paradox is explained by James 
Porter: 
Figural interpretation is thus forever doomed to be self-erasing in its 
aspirations, because it marks everything that it touches with indelible ink, and 
above all what it most wishes to efface. The Old Testament was ironically 
secured, not erased, by the figural reading of it, as was earthly, worldly history 
itself. It is allegory, not figural interpretation that seeks to eliminate the Old 
Testament through the work of abstraction and mystification. Figural reading 
grounds the Old Testament again in historical reality. And so, Auerbach’s 
favouring of figural reading over allegorical interpretation has to be 
understood in this same light: as an insistence on the historical relevance of 
the Old Testament, which was being erased at the very moment that he was 
writing his essay.100 
 
Auerbach depicts the rise of realism as a gradual and inevitable emergence and he 
imagines that the Christian figuralism will itself be figurally interpreted in a more 
realistic narrative. In figural realism the meaning of Judeo-Christian literature is of 
sustained significance through its earthly incompleteness, yet the worldview it seeks 
to sustain may be consumed when ethical, human, and figural meanings outgrow it.  
In Auerbach’s model, the edifice of human understanding replicates and repeats the 
best of itself. He suggests that history operates “recuperatively, whereby each 
successive step becomes possible only thanks to what came before it,” and that 
“humanity accumulates lessons from its own historical struggles.” He understands 
“the appearance of Christ as a concrete event, as a central fact of world history” as 
the ‘decisive story’ in European hermeneutics and consciousness.101 And yet he also 
views the sublime as a staging post on the road towards a secular realism in which 
the religious figures of the past find their fulfilment. Hayden White has described this 
model as “figural causation,”  
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Auerbach’s model of figural causation informs the process in which humanity 
makes itself through its unique capacity to fulfil the multiple figures in which 
and by which reality is at once represented as an object for contemplation and 
presented as a prize… worth the human effort to comprehend and control 
it.102 
 
According to Auerbach, the historical trajectory of figures allow them to transcend 
history and create worldviews suited to their own fulfilment (a process similar to the 
manner in which moments of metalepsis allow narrative to bleed into the reader’s 
world). There is of course a paradox at the heart of this concept, for Auerbach seems 
to assert a transcendent view of the history of narrative whilst equally inferring that 
literary notions of transcendence itself will ultimately be surpassed. 
  
4. Søren Kierkegaard 
Kierkegaard’s view of the self and its significance in regard to biblical interpretation 
has had a profound effect on modern hermeneutics including through influence and 
resonance in the work of Gadamer, Heidegger, Ricoeur and Frei.103  A number of 
recent studies have offered a renewed focus on the significance of Kierkegaard’s 
existentialist approach to the interpretative process, and cumulatively they make a 
compelling argument that his views were a precursor for the development of 
mainstream 20th century hermeneutical theory.104 Nevertheless there are good 
reasons why Kierkegaard’s impact upon modern hermeneutics has been 
insufficiently appreciated. He himself offered no wholesale hermeneutic; he rejected 
the notion of a ‘scientific’ approach to reading and even those who are sympathetic 
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to his interpretative agenda have concluded that “Kierkegaard is not an exegete, at 
least not in the modern sense.”105 Because his approach to hermeneutics is so 
exclusively scriptural and his approach to scripture fundamentally exhortative, it is 
understandable that the significance of his underlying attitude has only been 
attended to in the last decades. 106  
I have chosen to examine Kierkegaard’s views rather than those of the more 
obviously historically significant hermeneuts in part because his position has not 
been sufficiently expounded or reiterated. There are also three areas of particular 
resonance between his writing and this study. Firstly, Kierkegaard suggests that 
faithful biblical interpretation demands contemporaneity with Christ, in a manner that 
muddles the temporalities of the reader and of the text. Secondly his approach to 
biblical narrative is overtly theological and is explicitly rooted in his understanding of 
a Christian faith that places demands on believers. He develops his position through 
creative exegesis, loose allusion and his own frequent metaleptic transgressions 
across and between biblical texts and his own writings. Thirdly, Kierkegaard’s work 
reverberates significantly with the notion that metaleptic contamination within biblical 
narrative stresses the role of the self in reception. He suggests that the biblical text, 
when it speaks to Christians as “God’s Word,” demands an onward repetition of the 
signs within the Gospel; invites imitation of Christ in the life of the reader; solicits the 
subsummation of the reader’s world through the act of ‘infinite resignation’, and 
functions as a mirror for the reader’s own self-examination.  
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A historical Christianity is nonsense and un-Christian muddled thinking 
because whatever true Christians there are in any generation are 
contemporary with Christ.107  
 
According to Kierkegaard, the “condition of being contemporary with Christ is the 
defining feature of genuine Christian faith.”108 Contemporaneity is therefore a term 
that requires singular focus if Kierkegaard’s themes of appropriation, imitation and 
resignation are to be understood. Kierkegaard says: 
Christ is not a comedian, not at all a merely historical person, since, as the 
Paradox He is an extremely unhistorical person. But this is the difference 
between poetry and reality: contemporaneousness. The difference between 
poetry and history is clearly this, that history is what really occurred, whereas 
poetry is the possible, the imaginary, the poetized. But what really occurred 
(the past) is not (except in a special sense, i.e., in contrast with poetry) the 
real. It lack the determinant, which is the determinant of truth (as inwardness) 
and of all religiousness, the ‘for thee.’109  
 
Across a range of his works Kierkegaard talks about the pressing immediacy of the 
“present”, the “moment” and the notion of “decision”. Highlighting the significance of 
the interpretative moment, he sought consistently to avoid what we now refer to as 
the hermeneutical circle.110 He encourages readers to rejoice in the "shipwreck" of 
reason and the "crucifixion" of the understanding by holding open the possibility of 
thinking without entering into the circularity of critical reasoning.111 For Kierkegaard, 
the meaning of scripture is a furtive echo of the divine and so, as Patrick Bigelow 
summarises, “all the reader must do is hold thinking open so that it can be ready for 
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the appearance of an acoustic illusion."112 Meaningfulness therefore arrives only and 
always in the “now” in which the reader who is “ready for thought” but is consumed 
by a vain “need for discovery”, lets the biblical text “come close.”113  
This idea about letting the communication of the Bible ‘come close’ to the 
reader is an extension of Kierkegaard’s conviction that “the situation of 
contemporaneousness with Christ is a pre-requisite for Christian faith.”114 His model 
of Christian hermeneutics is therefore about allowing believers to locate their sense 
of self within the absoluteness of Christ, rather than the reverse. For Kierkegaard it is 
a patent absurdity to contextualise Christ or culturally deconstruct the biblical text. In 
his model the opposite approach is required: the believer is invited to find herself in 
the narrative and define herself in relation to that which is absolute (Christ).  
The driving force in this for Kierkegaard was most certainly his conviction that 
in relation to the absolute there exists only one tense: the present. He perceived a 
significant threat to the Gospel in attempts to diminish the offence of the crucified 
Christ by converting the actual into the metaphorical or the historical, for both keep 
Christ distant from the reader. Historicism places millennia between readers and the 
power of Jesus, whilst poetizing the bible renders its power metaphorical. 
Kierkegaard’s approach to the first of these issues is to dismiss the significance of 
the historical distance of the Gospel: 
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The five, the seven, the fifteen, the eighteen hundred years are neither here 
nor there; they do not change Him, neither do they in any wise reveal who He 
was. 115 
 
Of the poetizing movement Kierkegaard says: 
We are misled and deceived by the trick of poetizing Christ, so that instead of 
being God He becomes that languishing compassion which men themselves 
have invented, so that Christianity instead of drawing men to heavenly places 
is impeded on its way and becomes the merely human.116  
  
Kierkegaard seeks to steer between these twin threats through the notion of 
contemporaneity, as Anthony Rudd surmises: “Kierkegaard obliges the believer to 
become contemporaneous with Christ and thus, in a sense, abolishes the gap which 
history necessarily creates.”117 By comparison to other elements of Kierkegaardian 
hermeneutics, contemporaneity as a theological concept has received significant 
evaluation and critical responses over the years. C. Stephen Evans for example has 
examined contemporaneity in some depth in his commentary on Philosophical 
Fragments, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard's Philosophical 
Fragments (1994). He suggests that contemporaneity is an “immediacy of 
experience” and is the process whereby “a person becomes a disciple, only by a first 
person encounter with the god in which the god grants the condition of faith.”118 
Every disciple of whatever generation is thus a contemporary of Christ in the 
subjective, but nevertheless real, sense: historical contemporaneity consequently 
becomes irrelevant. 
 The consensus position amongst commentators has been to regard 
contemporaneity as a spiritual or mystical experience. This view has, however, been 
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challenged by a number of writers including Merold Westphal and Patrick Stokes, 
both of whom contend that contemporaneity is an epistemic phenomenon. Westphal 
suggests that, “It would be a mistake to think that when Anti-Climacus speaks of faith 
as a mode of contemporaneity with Christ he has something mystical in mind. It is 
rather epistemic contemporaneity of which he speaks.”119  
In Stokes’ view (which is considerably more developed than Westphal’s), 
being contemporary with Christ is ultimately the cognitive process inherent within 
attentive reading, whereby an individual is able to ‘see for themselves’ the historical 
traditions about which they read.120 Stokes contrasts this cognitive view with the 
more normal approach to contemporaneousness as an experiential moment or 
religious experience.121 Stokes’ work invites a consideration of the cognitive process 
by which a reader can know for themselves, but ultimately the dichotomy he 
presents between an extramundane experience, or a specific type of experience 
directed towards an extramundane object diminishes the personal urgency evoked in 
Kierkegaard’s writings, as M.G. Piety explains: 
Johannes Climacus asserts in the context of his discussion of 
“contemporaneousness”… that Christ as “the teacher” “must know [kjende] 
everyone who knows [kjender] him, and an individual can know [kjende] the 
teacher only by being known [kjendt] by him”… This may make it sound as if 
contemporaneity, or contemporaneousness, is an epistemic phenomenon. All 
the terms for “knowledge” in this passage, however, are to acquaintance 
knowledge, not propositional knowledge; hence, contemporaneousness 
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appears equivalent to a moment of what one could call “mutual recognition” 
between the individual and God. If that isn’t mystical, I don’t know what is.122 
 
M. Jamie Ferreira’s encyclopaedic 2009 work on Kierkegaard focuses the function of 
contemporaneity as a “performative provocation.”123 Throughout her consideration of 
Kierkegaard’s use of scripture Ferreira returns consistently to notions of the invitation 
and the offence of the Gospel as the concepts through which to best understand 
Kierkegaard’s notion of contemporaneity. She insightfully extrapolates that 
Kierkegaard imagined many to be offended by the one who invites, and thus, whilst 
all might want the offer of comfort, grace and help, many will not “abase themselves 
with Christ”: 
In the halt Kierkegaard develops the notion of the "situation of 
contemporaneity" with Christ as the hallmark of faith because… "one cannot 
become a believer except by coming to him in his state of abasement, to him, 
the sign of offense and the object of faith" It calls on us to examine 
ourselves.124 
 
Ferreira expounds significantly on this view also highlighting that Kierkegaard himself 
connected contemporaneity with the invitation to imitation, and imitation with the 
necessity of suffering: 
In the end, the "situation of contemporaneity" posits a direct connection 
between [the humiliating] offense [experienced by Christ] and imitation: "to be 
an imitator means that your life has as much similarity to his as is possible for 
a human life to have."125 
  
Ferreira returns frequently to the significance of contemporaneity, and suggests that 
it is the requirement for becoming a Christian, it demands a degree of abasement, it 
invites a willingness to “suffer with him” and is the only positive outcome from 
encounter with the paradox: 
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To be contemporaneous with Christ means to be present to him in such a way 
that one risks insult and persecution from others and so even in the invitation 
it is easy to see why one would prefer to say "No thanks, I would still rather go 
on being deaf and blind etc. than be helped this way… To hear the invitation 
of faith you have to be facing Christ "as he existed" indeed, in the only way he 
has ever existed.126  
 
The significance of contemporaneity should thus be understood as a ‘multi-
dimensional’ transitional choice “in which imagination is a constitutive element”, and 
in which "leap", "decision" and “offence” shape contemporaneity as both an 
experiential and a cognitive process.127  
One voice of unmitigated criticism regarding Kierkegaard’s theology of 
contemporaneity was that of Paul Tillich. His views have remained significant during 
the fifty years since he argued that Kierkegaard’s approach to contemporaneity was 
an oversimplification. 
Kierkegaard wanted to solve the problem of historical criticism by this concept 
of contemporaneity. You can do this if you take contemporaneity in the 
Pauline sense of the divine Spirit present to us, and showing the face of Jesus 
as the Christ. But you cannot escape historical criticism by becoming 
contemporaneous with Jesus himself… For if you already know in which 
direction to jump, in the direction of Christ, for example, then you must have a 
reason for this. This reason may be some experience with him, some 
historical knowledge, some image of him from church tradition, etc., but in any 
case, you have some content…This is a problem which we have to say 
Kierkegaard left completely unsolved… His statement that you have to leap 
over two thousand years to the year A.D. 30 is simply unrealistic, because 
nobody can do that. The intellectual leap, or emotional-intellectual leap, which 
you are supposed to make with your whole self, is conditioned by two 
thousand years of church and cultural history... It is an illusion to think we can 
become contemporary with Christ insofar as the historical Jesus is the 
Christ.128 
 
There is obvious value in Tillich’s criticism: if Kierkegaard were soliciting a leap of 
faith and a contemporaneity without context or background, his approach would be 
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as naïve as those who claim to read the Bible free from ecclesiastical tradition. 
Nevertheless, my analysis of metalepsis suggests that a believer’s paradoxical leap 
toward contemporaneity with Christ is in a sense analogous to the paradoxical 
movements across spatial-temporal thresholds that are contained within biblical 
frame-breaking. The biblical text demonstrates a willingness to muddle distinct 
diegetic worlds and models a concertinaed view of history in which chronology is 
subservient to meaning. Kierkegaard seems to ask the same of the reader, and if 
models within biblical narrative are allowed to serve as the context for Kierkegaard’s 
‘leap’ then Tillich’s criticism may be negated, for the interpreting reader is, in her 
leap, repeating the leap made by the narrator. Sylvia Walsh explains:  
In his journals Kierkegaard states that 'before there can even be any question 
about having faith, there must be the situation. And this situation must be 
brought about by an existential step on the part of the individual... “The 
requirement is that you must venture out, out into water 70,000 fathoms deep. 
This is the situation”… It is occasioned by an encounter of the understanding 
with the absolute paradox, which came into existence in a decisive moment of 
time, thereby providing a historical point of departure for the eternal happiness 
of both contemporary and later followers of Christ. The immediate 
contemporary and the follower 'at second hand' thus stand essentially in the 
same situation of contemporaneity with this 'absolute fact’.129 
 
If genuine contemporaneity is determined by faith, rather than by immediate 
historical contemporaneity, and faith itself comes from God then the faithful reader of 
scripture may find herself in the same position as those who have seen God ‘face to 
face.’ Biblical narrative contains a cumulative canon of faith whilst also being shaped 
by cultural history: similarly the individual believer’s encounter with the absolute 
paradox is “conditioned by two thousand years of church and cultural history.”130 The 
shaping and conditioning of the reader who arrives at faith is therefore no different 
from the enculturation of the narrator, and thus, if there is any validity in the 
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narrator’s self-involved declaration of faith then the self-involved interpretation of the 
reader is also legitimated. Both know contemporaneity, not through their human 
consciousness or position in time, but through their relation and encounter with the 
eternal in time. 
The idea of contemporaneity is complicated and Tillich is right that the leap of 
faith invited by Kierkegaard isn’t devoid of contextual or cultural baggage. However, 
if Kierkegaard is understood to be challenging rather than ignoring historical 
criticism, reception history and theological tradition, then as Tillich himself 
acknowledged, Kierkegaard “becomes the prophetic voice” that speaks against 
obfuscation, passionless interpretation and complacent hermeneutics, and 
recentralises religion on the paradox, rather than “inadequate but well formulated 
systems.”131 
“Out with history,” Kierkegaard declares. “In with the situation of 
contemporaneity.”132 
 
4.2 Transformative Interpretations 
The matter is quite simple. The Bible is very easy to understand. But we 
Christians are a bunch of scheming swindlers. We pretend to be unable to 
understand it because we know very well that the minute we understand, we 
are obliged to act accordingly. Take any words in the New Testament and 
forget everything except pledging yourself to act accordingly. My God, you will 
say, if I do that my whole life will be ruined. How would I ever get on in the 
world? Herein lies the real place of Christian scholarship. Christian 
scholarship is the Church’s prodigious invention to defend itself against the 
Bible, to ensure that we can continue to be good Christians without the Bible 
coming too close. Oh, priceless scholarship, what would we do without you? 
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Dreadful it is to fall into the hands of the living God. Yes it is even dreadful to 
be alone with the New Testament.133  
 
Kierkegaard often criticised the “mismatch between what is written and what is read, 
between utterance and reception” that he observed in higher criticism and 
‘superficial’ aesthetic interpretations.134 He was also cynical about Danish orthodoxy, 
Hegelian speculation, Lessing’s deism and Kantian epistemology for the same 
reasons.135 His high regard for ‘what the Bible actually says’ was simultaneously a 
reaction against the vapid readings of his day and a personal quest for refreshed 
understanding of the biblical text. Kierkegaard was persuaded of the profoundly 
powerful transformative potential of the Bible, and the relevance, urgency and 
immediacy of the text is evident in the creative method with which he responded to 
biblical narratives and in a number of repeated themes including ‘repetition’, 
‘imitation’, ‘resignation’ and the notion of the biblical text as a mirror. 
Kierkegaard’s remarkably creative approach to interpreting scripture was a 
significant component of the ‘making present’ he endeavoured to achieve. The 
‘rewriting’ of biblical narratives with imaginative consideration of other possible 
outcomes and his pseudonymous engagement with texts are both aspects of this. 
The most obvious examples of creative exegesis this are found in Kierkegaard’s 
consideration of Abraham on Mount Moriah and Peter in the courtyard where 
Kierkegaard tests how the story might have developed if the characters had taken 
different paths. Iben Damgaard has suggested that this approach was part of 
Kierkegaard’s desire to break the frame around the biblical narrative through 
recasting stories less comfortably for his contemporaries. She asserts that 
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Kierkegaard sought to deconstruct Christendom’s familiarity with biblical texts for this 
had reduced them to “harmless pieces of cultural heritage.”136 This is certainly the 
case in the extended creative interpretation of Genesis 22 in Fear and Trembling 
typified by the following imaginative re-casting of Abraham’s actions: 
[Abraham] would have cried out to God, "Reject not this sacrifice; it is not the 
best that I have, I know that very well, for what is an old man compared to the 
child of promise, but it is the best that I can give you.” He would have thrust 
the knife into his own breast.137 
 
It is surely that case that in his scriptural appropriations Kierkegaard sought to 
question the reader and let their lives be interrogated by the text.138 Kierkegaard 
metaphorically makes strange that which was familiar: “in order to help the reader to 
discover it anew. [This] produces an alienating distanciation (Verfremdung).”139 Jolita 
Pons has noted the same distanciation in Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms which 
are intended to produce disquiet and which sometimes deliberately confuse and 
confound, as though asking “what is an author anyway?” Pons suggests, “Søren 
Kierkegaard was one of his own pseudonyms. Or perhaps all of them are God’s 
pseudonyms.”140 Her conclusion is that Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms and his 
fluid approach to biblical references combine together so that, “quotation and 
repetition and gift meet in the moment thus enabling appropriation through 
contemporaneity.”141 She concludes: 
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Kierkegaard’s writing never ceases to inscribe the Bible within itself. 
Kierkegaard’s texts speak to us about imitation of the Bible, reduplication, and 
becoming contemporary to God’s word – and they also embody this 
requirement. He never denies the need for thinking and reflection – indeed, he 
thinks that the task of contemporaneity can only be achieved by uniting 
imagination, thinking, and feeling in existing. Kierkegaard gives his reader a 
gift of God’s Word in the most discrete way.142 
 
Kierkegaard’s creativity demonstrates that he should be understood as more than an 
antagonistic philosopher or champion of the contrary. He certainly rejected the 
assumption that knowledge is superior to faith, but he did so because he was not 
satisfied with the notion that reconciliation toward the objective historicity of truth was 
the goal of the Christian faith.143 For Kierkegaard, higher criticism and the Hegelian 
obsession with historicity and objectivity were ideas that stood in the way of the 
paradoxical repetition invited by the Bible, whereby readers, through a necessarily 
subjective and active interpretative process, appropriate the life of Christ in their own 
lives. Kierkegaard, through creative interpretation and emphasis upon repetition and 
imitation sought to develop transformative interpretations that might “break the circle 
of hermeneutics through the moment of decision.” 144 
The idea of “repetition” was one aspect of the transformative ‘moment of 
decision’ that Kierkegaard encouraged. It is explained most simplistically when 
Kierkegaard (speaking pseudonymously as Johannes Climacus) says, “Forward he 
must, backward he cannot go.”145 By this Kierkegaard means that the human can 
become themselves authentically only through the forward momentum in which the 
self becomes concrete, appropriates the faith of the figures in biblical narrative and 
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reduplicates in their own moment the truth of God’s relatedness to his creatures. 
Repetition is grounded in the forward-moving typological inter-textuality of the Bible, 
the formation of the self in God’s image and the disavowal of attempts to repeat the 
past. Rebecca Skaggs suggests that Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘repetition’ is actually a 
new category of existence: it is the transition from possibility to actuality and is the 
development of the enlightened self. 
Repetition involves a movement forward in existence, and, as such, it 
enlightens Kierkegaard’s interpretation of scripture: readers should allow 
themselves to be challenged by the text as they read it before God. From this 
angle, it is not important who wrote the biblical text or our own exegetical, 
historical, or cultural conclusions. The main thing is the appropriation of the 
text, allowing the reader to move forward.146 
 
Here then is Kierkegaard’s first hermeneutical priority: seeing oneself in relation to 
the text. For Kierkegaard the purpose of hermeneutics was the transformation of the 
self through subjective appropriation. He asks, “Is my life an expression of the truth?” 
and says, “One must do what the Word says.”147 
Obedience to the Word is particularly well developed in Kierkegaard’s concept 
of the imitation of Christ. Kierkegaard was insistent “the demonstration of Christianity 
really lies in imitation,” and that “certitude… does not precede but follows, is in and 
with the imitation of Christ.’148  
The imitation of Christ, is really the point from which the human race shrinks. 
The main difficulty lies here; here is where it is decided whether or not one is 
willing to accept Christianity…If it is abolished completely (so Christianity 
becomes, existentially, as easy as mythology and poetry and imitation an 
exaggeration, a ludicrous exaggeration), then Christianity spreads to such a 
degree that Christendom and the world are almost indistinguishable, or all 
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become Christians; Christianity has completely conquered – that is, it is 
abolished!149 
 
The ‘Imitation of Christ’ is therefore to be understood as the authentic reduplication 
of the image of Christ, who “constitutes… what it means to be human.” The process 
of imitation depends on the individual understanding that Christ, the prototype, 
represents the ideal that no Christian can fulfil, but who can teach the primacy of 
faith, the need for grace, and a sense of one’s own impotence before God.  Joel D.S. 
Rasmussen has suggested that for Kierkegaard any hermeneutical model that 
inhibited imitation, limited application, or diminished the immediate impact of the text 
upon the reader would have been an anathema: 
His priority therefore, seems to be that of ascertaining the different ways a 
past can become reconfigured as a present reality for an interpreter.150 
Evidently it  was fundamental to Kierkegaard’s hermeneutic that the biblical text 
should be allowed to challenge the reader to position her own reality inside the 
scope of the biblical text in a way that would transform her situation. Kierkegaard’s 
writings “stir the waters of language” and use the “ambiguity and dialectical elasticity” 
of biblical quotations to encourage self-involved hermeneutics.151 Indeed almost 
every commentary on Kierkegaard notes above all else his quest for a fullness of 
faith and for biblical interpretation that confronts the reader.152 Kierkegaard’s 
intimation was that only the one who has experienced “inward deepening” 
(Inderliggjorelse) through délaissement, abandonment or resignation can truly 
approach the biblical text and find in it sacred history, or God’s Word. Approaching 
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the Bible any other way merely produces an incarnation-less history.153 Kierkegaard 
contrasts those who try to hold on to historicism and imagine themselves to possess 
rational faith with those rare true ‘knights’ who fully resign themselves to the divine. 
Kierkegaard imagines meeting such a man: 
Here he is. Acquaintance made, I am introduced to him. The moment I set 
eyes on him I instantly push him from me, I myself leap backwards, I clasp my 
hands and say half aloud, "Good Lord, is this the man? Is it really he? Why, 
he looks like a tax-collector!"154  
 
At the heart of Kierkegaard’s hermeneutical project then, self-resignation, subjectivity 
and personal appropriation of the text are fused.155 These themes all emerge not 
only in the language of repetition, imitation and resignation but also in Kierkegaard’s 
insistence that the Word should be understood as a mirror.  
 God’s Word is the mirror—by reading or hearing it I am to see myself in the 
mirror.156 
   
Patrick Stokes has explained that for Kierkegaard there are important 
phenomenological reasons for the repeated use of this metaphor. He contends 
helpfully that the immediate self-recognition involved in seeing oneself in a mirror 
and the evaluative experience that this immediacy evokes conjure precisely what 
Kierkegaard anticipates in his biblical interpretation.157 
The first requirement is that you must not look at the mirror, observe the 
mirror, but must see yourself in the mirror. This seems so obvious that one 
might think it would scarcely need to be said.158  
 
Damgaard suggests that Kierkegaard employs the Bible as a mirror “in which we see 
ourselves truly, since it reveals our self-deception.”159 She builds upon Kierkegaard’s  
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own application of the story of Jacob’s struggle with God, noting that for Kierkegaard 
this dramatic enactment of the meeting between the reader and the biblical 
commandment is a struggle in which the reader is transformed through the discovery 
of his own illusory sense of himself.160 Kierkegaard considered any movement within 
scholarship that obfuscates the text’s purpose as a mirror of the self to be 
“craftiness,” contrived because “we really do not want to see ourselves in that mirror 
and therefore we have concocted [thirty thousand different ways of reading]… to 
make the mirror impossible.”161  
Kierkegaard insisted that faithful Christian hermeneutics were fundamentally 
rooted in an invitation to reconsider the nature of the self in the light of the Passion 
and Resurrection of Christ. Interestingly, in his own endeavours to achieve this goal, 
Kierkegaard’s writing itself becomes a study in metalepsis. He consistently muddled 
the thresholds between hypo-diegetic biblical stories and his own commentary, he 
blended imaginative reconstructions located in his own time and interpretations of 
actual biblical narratives and he wrote pseudonymously to create distanciation and 
facilitate appropriation. Kierkegaard’s endeavours to challenge the subjective 
situation of his own readers result in consistent transgressions of the threshold of the 
biblical text within his writings and reveal the integral value of metalepsis to 
transformative hermeneutics. 
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5. Paul Ricoeur 
Everyone needs a story to live by in order to make sense of the pastiche of 
one’s life. Without a narrative a person’s life is merely a random sequence of 
unrelated events: birth and death are inscrutable, temporality is a terror and a 
burden, and suffering and loss remains mute and unintelligible.162 
 
In the midst of Paul Ricoeur’s extensive philosophical exploration of narrative, 
human identity, reality and meaning there are three monumental and interlocking 
concepts that are axiomatic to the theological conclusion of this study. In his seminal 
study Time and Narrative (1984, 1985 and 1988), Ricoeur explores the complex 
relationship between time and narrative and develops a threefold model of the 
human experience of time. He suggests that within human consciousness and 
descriptions of time there are three inter-related and imaginary acts. He calls these 
stages, mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3 and he suggest that narrative allows 
individuals to make sense of past experiences (mimesis1) and the imagined future 
(mimesis3) through the prism of the present (mimesis2). This model represents a 
useful backdrop to my own consideration of the paradox of narrative temporality and 
the significance of metalepsis as a trope that short-circuits the divide between past, 
present and future. 
A second, and no less important theme is examined in ‘Narrative Identity’ 
(1991) and Oneself as Another (1992), in which Ricoeur develops a model of the 
narrative constitution of the self. This model is of particular significance to my 
understanding of the relationship between the disclosure of the narrating self within 
metaleptic texts, and a reader’s sense of their own selfhood, and is of sustained 
influence to the theological anthropology I develop in Chapter seven (below). 
Ricoeur suggests that as humans convert chronology into story (a process he calls 
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‘emplotment’) we intuitively pull together (“prendre ensemble”) threads of meaning 
from the narratives we inherit. Motives, presumptions, preconceptions and prejudices 
are framed and shaped by the moments we weave into stories in order to make 
sense of our lives. Story-telling is therefore fundamental to the constitution of the 
self. Necessarily this theme resonates profoundly within the questions I explore 
about the boundaries of biblical narrative and their capacity to shape the reality of 
the reader. 
 A third concept that is particularly resonant for this study is Ricoeur’s notion of 
metaphor. This is of less immediate consequence for biblical theology than Ricoeur’s 
writings on time and selfhood, but has been of sustained philosophical significance 
particularly in postmodern conversations about ethics, epistemology and language. 
Ricouer’s suggestion is that metaphor and symbol act as the primary interpreters of 
reality. His famous aphorism suggests that “the symbol gives rise to the thought.”163 I 
view Ricoeur’s analysis of the nature of metaphor as a parallel enquiry to 
considerations of metalepsis in this thesis, for much of what Ricoeur suggests about 
metaphor could equally be said about metalepsis. For example, Ricoeur states “the 
metaphorical process transposes meaning from fiction to reality”, and he asks, “What 
does the metaphorical statement say about reality... It carries us across the 
threshold from the sense towards the reference of discourse.”164 These sentiments 
could equally apply to metalpesis and to the intrusion of the narrator into the diegetic 
framework of the biblical text, for each also moves the reader across a threshold into 
a new consideration of their own reality.  
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The notion of mimesis is integral to Ricoeur’s understanding of time and of selfhood, 
for he understands mimesis as a bridge between time and the story-telling process in 
which the self discovers meaning. Ricoeur sees narrative itself as the prism through 
which individuals can interrogate, examine and understand the past and imagine the 
future. As Donald Polkinghorne summarises, “For Ricoeur, Narrative is the discourse 
structure in which human action receives its form and through which it is 
meaningful.”165 Narrative represents the world of human action and is the structure 
through which events are meaningfully gathered together. Ricoeur’s model builds 
upon both Aristotle’s sense that narrative is “the imitation of action”, and also 
Augustine’s model of time which was divided into three parts: the past-present 
(memory), the attentive present (present) and the expected-present (future).166 
Ricoeur’s model fuses elements of both and establishes three stages of 
interpretation through which to understand time. 
Ricoeur’s three stages develop a model in which “our present actions are 
made meaningful by interpreting them in terms of a recollected past and a projected 
future.”167 These three stages Ricoeur defines as Mimesis1, Mimesis2 and Mimesis3. 
Mimesis1 is the prefigured life: the goals motives, presumptions, preconceptions that 
frame an individual’s way of being in and conceiving of the world. “Mimesis1 is the 
world of everyday action already characterized by a meaningful conceptual network 
that makes narrative possible.”168 It is the landscape of time we inherit and are 
shaped by and the conceptual networks that have been forged within the mind. 
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Mimesis2, the present present, is a mediating function where individual events and 
actions from Mimesis1 are woven into the individuals’ world-view. This process of 
‘emplotment’ allows new understandings of time and experience to develop, but this 
stage requires both a degree of reflection and also a sense of distance from 
preunderstandings and perspectives shaped through Mimesis1. Mimises3 is the 
refigured world where the hypothetical and the actual collide.169 This future present 
allows the individual to appropriate the ‘now’ and the ‘then’ of their own past, imagine 
possibilities for the future and realise new ways of being. Mimesis3 opens up new 
actions in real life. It is “the hermeneutic imagination that liberates the reader into a 
free space of possibility.”170  
In this threefold model Ricoeur brings into focus the inextricable connection 
between temporalisation and narrative. Temporality characterises mimesis, and 
mimesis explains temporality. Through the process of emplotment in Mimesis2 the 
discordances that are felt in an individual’s life between remembered, experienced 
and imagined time are brought into a cohesive story. This process expresses the 
essential tensions between the creature operated on by time, and the narrative 
interpretation that seeks to extract coherence from time. Interpretation therefore 
necessarily defies the linearity of experienced time. It is the process that reconciles 
the differences between time as it is experienced, as it is imagined and as it is 
remembered or re-told. Interpretation can only ever be located between prefigured 
and refigured understandings of human temporality. Interpretations reinforce, 
reference or reject the meaning and significance suggested by prior narratives and 
actions and they make sense of the human experience of time. Through the human 
experience of time and the process of interpretation narratives accumulate 
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prodigious combinations of potential meanings which loop or repeat actions in time 
and foreclose, shape or distort their significance. Narrative discourse should 
therefore be understood, according to Ricoeur’s model, as a self-referencing spiral, 
which moves inherited and prior pre-understandings through language and discourse 
toward a distanciated self-awareness and to new understandings of the world. The 
more adequately narratives reference and make sense of the actions and choices of 
individuals, the more they become meaningful and gather momentum through time. 
As Ricoeur says, 
[Narrative] is the attempt to 'grasp together' successive events. The art of 
narrating, as well as the corresponding art of interpretation, therefore requires 
that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession of moments... 
through this… the worlds of... authors and texts open up.171 
 
Ricoeur’s analysis of the comprehensive interplay between the human experience of 
time and human expression in narrative is one of his most fundamental contributions 
to hermeneutical theory. His insistence is that meaning always develops in the 
mediating function of Mimesis2, in the dialectical relationship between critical 
awareness and belonging. He suggests that “writing is the consecration of the 
distanciation between the text and the author” and that reading and interpretation are 
the actualization of new worlds of possibility which are achieved in the movement 
between perception and imagination.172  
The distanciation of meaning and event is virtual in all discourse… in a sense 
we belong to historical tradition through a relation of distance which oscillates 
between remoteness and proximity. To interpret is to render near what is far 
(temporally, geographically, culturally, spiritually). In this respect, mediation by 
the text is… genuinely creative. The text is, par excellence, the basis for 
communication in and through distance.173 
 
                                            
171
 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. by John Thompson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 278-79. 
172
 Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 131. 
173
 Ibid., p. 67. 
148 
 
In the reading event Ricoeur locates a meeting between the interpreter’s inner world 
and the particular world of each text to allow the creation of a new picture or 
understanding in the consciousness of the interpreter. He posits therefore that the 
object of hermeneutics can never be the text itself, because the text is part of 
Mimesis1, and is prefigured in the past. The text interpreted in the present is 
therefore always the text as “discourse.”174  Because this conversation can only ever 
be developed in the present, the calcification of narrative in the structure of a text will 
never obscure the fundamental purpose of the discourse, which is, “someone saying 
something to someone about something.”175 Ricoeur calls the discourse between the 
world of the text and the world of the reader’s present “configuration” and he 
contends that when a narrative text intrudes into a reader’s consciousness in this 
way texts “project a world of meaning” that beckons readers “to enter, engage, and 
be transformed by the encounter.”176  
In mimesis2 readers bring meaning out of the fragmentary landscape of 
mimesis1 and Ricoeur suggests that this process requires both a sense of distance 
from that which is remembered and a willingness to appropriate the events that are 
described or recollected. Crucially, Ricoeur reveals that distanciation is never the 
opposite of appropriation because both are reflexive movements that happen in the 
attentive present of the reader’s now, and both are aspects of the inescapable 
temporality of the reader.  
  Moments within narrative that demonstrate narratological self-involvement 
and metaleptic muddles between diegetic layers illustrate the discursive nature of the 
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text for they point towards the existence of an interior hermeneutic within the text in 
which the narrator engages in the process of emplotment, distanciating herself from, 
locating herself in relation to and appropriating the meaning of prior events. Biblical 
metalepsis is an overt demonstration of the struggle in the interior of texts between 
self-transcending imagination and the limits of fragmented experience, between the 
movement towards distanciation through historiography and the movement towards 
appropriation through testimony. Within biblical narrative, in moments such as 
metaleptic transgressions, narrative asides or the disclosure of the self-involvement 
of the narrator, an inner biblical hermeneutic is offered which matches the “tension 
between distanciation and appropriation” in the exterior hermeneutic arc.177 The 
same tension that Ricoeur describes in the life of the reader is also pregnant within 
the text. Thus I suggest that in odd moments when biblical narratives confess 
unexpected subjectivity or transgress the rational boundary structures, the text 
reveals the unavoidable tension in the interior life of the text. Narrative discourse 
may be the consecration of distance between author and meaning, but it is also the 
foundation for readerly appropriation.  
5.2 Others, Narrative and the Self 
There are two interlocking aspects of Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of selfhood that 
are fundamental to later considerations in this thesis. These are firstly, the 
relationship that he establishes between selfhood as otherness, and secondly, the 
concept that he develops regarding identity as a form of narrative.  
According to Ricoeur, self-understanding develops only in our relationships 
with others, because awareness of the difference between the self and the other is 
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axiomatic to any constitution of selfhood. Ricoeur begins his exploration in Oneself 
as Another by examining the language of embodied selfhood, and moves from here 
to note that, as each human has a body through which experience of the world is 
mediated, there are a range of sensations that each experience and that each also 
naturally attributes to other persons who have bodies.178 However, Ricoeur reveals 
that because the others who have bodies are distinct from the self, every individual 
ought to be aware of the profound uncertainty about the sensations actually 
experienced by others.179 It is therefore impossible for an individual to know if the 
experience they ascribe to themselves and that they also attribute to others, is 
actually similar. 
From this epistemological dilemma Ricoeur develops a model of otherness, 
and from the distinction he draws between the self and the other, he goes on to 
establish that self-awareness comes only through one’s relation to the life that is 
shared with and among others in the world. Ricoeur resists any philosophy which 
suggests that selfhood may be discovered through interior journeys, for he claims 
that to speak of “the self” must always suggest a relationship of distinction between 
this same-self and the other. It is the non-similarity and the divergence between the 
self and the other that demarcates the boundary of the self. A sense of selfhood is 
thus defined by the complicated interplay between distinction from, and similarity to, 
others.  
We have to acquire simultaneously the idea of reflexivity and the idea of 
otherness, in order to [develop] a strong sense of that which correlates and 
belongs to the self… and [that which constitutes] and belongs to another.180  
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The others in reference to whom the self is defined are therefore fundamental to the 
sense of selfhood that an individual may develop. This is a notion that was already 
expressed by Kierkegaard: 
A kind of otherness that is not the result of comparison… can be constitutive 
of selfhood…The selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate 
degree that one cannot be thought of without the other.181  
 
In awareness of alterity and non-similarity a human being then is both a self which 
relates to itself and also, in its distinctiveness, a being that is “established by 
another.”182 The self is an ontological category depended on that which is beyond 
itself. It is not that selfhood is a foundation, and otherness is an additional category, 
rather otherness is a constituent component of selfhood.   
Otherness is not added on to selfhood from outside, as though to prevent 
[selfhood’s] solipsistic drift… it belongs instead to the tenor of meaning and to 
the ontological constitution of selfhood.183 
 
The significance of this approach in my thesis is that it helps to explain how the 
narrating persona finds themselves constituted in relation to the divine Other and, 
furthermore, it supports the model of selfhood I perceive in the life of the reader who 
is called to define herself in reference to the biblical world-view and its characters, 
rather than augmenting her reality through these figures. The selfhood demonstrated 
by biblical narrators and invited in their readers is one in which the Other, and the 
stories of other others, constitute and defines the self. 
The second significant theme developed in Ricoeur’s model of selfhood is his 
claim that identity (which he splits into two forms, ipse and idem) is itself a narrative 
construct.  
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It is in telling our own stories that we give ourselves an identity. We recognize 
ourselves in the stories we tell about ourselves, it makes little difference 
whether these stories are true or false, [for] fiction as well as verifiable history 
provides us with an identity.184 
 
Ricoeur suggests that an individual’s sense of self is conceptually constituted: there 
is no intrinsic, deep down, esoteric ‘thing’ that is itself the essence of selfhood or the 
determinant of our sense of self.185 Our sense of self is found in the stories about 
ourselves that we remember and repeat. An individual’s selfhood is therefore defined 
by the episodes they allow to form a story which, when strung together in sequence 
(emplotment), create an impression of a persisting character that is separable from 
all the others within this narrative. Ricoeur suggests: 
Self identity… is a discordant concordance…a situation where we can bring 
ourselves together narratively only by superimposing in some way a 
configuration with a beginning, a middle, and an ending. But in the same way 
we are always in the process of revising the text, the narrative of our lives. In 
this sense, we may construct several narratives about ourselves, told from 
several points of view… We are capable of occupying each of these three 
positions, character, narrator, author, in turn [but] we cannot rest with any of 
them.186 
 
Selfhood then, at least in Ricoeur’s model, far from being an abstract concept or an 
existential absolute, is a sense of seperability from the other that is simultaneously 
defined by the distinction between the individual and others, and shaped by the story 
that only the self can construct.187 The telling and retelling of the stories that shape 
self-hood allow the emplotment of prior moments, memories and interactions with 
others (whether factual or fictional) to forge insight into the self, such that an 
individual’s identity is figured primarily through their repeated, remembered 
representations of experience rather than through the experiences themselves. 
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The story of a life continues to be refigured by all the truthful or fictive stories 
a subject tells about himself or herself. This refiguration makes this life itself a 
cloth woven of stories told.188 
 
In Ricoeur’s model narratives of selfhood are prescriptive as well as descriptive, for 
the process of emplotment not only helps to make sense of events in the past, it also 
establishes imaginative parameters for the future. 
Whilst Ricoeur’s model is fascinating as a backdrop for my exploration of the 
reader’s self-involvement in the biblical narrative there are inherent weaknesses in 
this approach. In particular Amanda Ford has suggested that as attractive as 
Ricoeur’s model is, it says little about the reliability of the self as a narrator. Further, 
it “is built on assumptions about capacity and capability which can constrain our 
definitions of what it means to be selves”, yet it does not satisfactorily develop any 
sense of communal or shared development of identity.189 Despite these potential 
limitations, Ricoeur contends that selfhood and hermeneutics are overlapping areas 
of enquiry, with selfhood always dependent on hermeneutics, and hermeneutics 
always a journey toward self-discovery. He claims that “hermeneutics is the very 
deciphering of life in the mirror of the text.”190 In this tangle of reflectiveness, self-
awareness, textuality and interpretation he offers a development of Kierkegaard’s 
model of the Word as a mirror and provokes consideration of the significance of self-
involvement within biblical narratology and reception. 
5.3 Metaphor 
Metaphor presents itself as a strategy of discourse that, while preserving and 
developing creative powers of language, preserves and develops the heuristic 
power wielded by narrative.191 
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Ricoeur’s examination of metaphor focuses on the creative power of language and, 
in particular, the manner in which metaphor produces new possibilities and 
configurations of the imagination. He claims that metaphor clothes ideas with images 
and turns these into a reality in the interpretation of the reader: “metaphor does not 
exist in itself but in and through an interpretation.”192 From these novel 
rapprochements new semantic fields are born and these compound forms extend the 
world of the reader, facilitating an understanding that was previously impossible. 
Metaphor is an extension of reality via unexpected representation. It claims not to be 
reality, but to be a mediation between existentially distinct realities, which, when 
combined together absurdly, can achieve emotional, imaginative and creative force. 
In part it is through the shock of the juxtaposition of two incompatible terms that a 
new depth of meaning is generated. Ricoeur suggests that metaphorical 
interpretation presupposes a literal meaning which it then destroys, forcing a new 
meaning or outlook:  
Metaphor is first and essentially an ‘odd’ predication that transgresses the 
semantic and cultural codes of a speaking community.193 
 
The creative power of metaphor should therefore be understood to develop through 
juxtaposition and transgression. As Peter C. de Vries explains: 
Metaphor is a transgression of language codes and categories. Through its 
association of previously unrelated concepts, metaphor creates new, multiple 
meanings and changes the linguistic structures within which it operates. 
Metaphor is able to present truth, not as a verifiable presentation of the world 
as it is perceived by the reader, but as a manifestation of the world in a new 
way.194 
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Much of Ricoeur’s claims about the philosophical significance and creative power of 
metaphor might also be said about metalepsis.195 Indeed, in many ways, metalepsis 
does with diegetic layers what metaphor does with words and I would suggest four 
areas of particular similarity: 
1. Ricoeur suggests that metaphor is “the semantic impertinence” found in 
sentences where mutually unsuitable terms force new understanding, and I 
suggest that metalepsis may well be understood as narratological impertinence; 
for it achieves meaning through the obligation created by the mutual unsuitability 
and inappropriate interaction of seemingly ontologically distinct voices. The 
muddle of narrative stances that becomes overt in metalepsis forces interpreters 
to see these previously separate worlds within a shared continuum, and this 
leads towards a new understanding of reality.196  
2. Ricoeur claims that a metaphor is “a calculated error, which brings together terms 
that do not go together and, by means of this apparent misunderstanding, causes 
a new hitherto unnoticed relation of meaning to spring up between the terms.”197 
If metaphor is a calculated error at the level of the sentence, then metalepsis is a 
‘calculated error’ at the diegetic level which occurs in the assimilation of narrating 
stances that do not logically fit together. Metalepsis ‘lays bare’ the previously 
covert relationship between the extra or hypo-diegetic world and the primary 
diegesis and invites consideration of the meaningfulness of this relationship. 
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3. Ricoeur notes that, “metaphor transforms a self-defeating, sudden contradiction 
into a meaningful contradiction, imposing on the word a new sort of twist.”198 
Metalepsis similarly transforms a self-defeating, sudden contradiction into a 
meaningful contradiction, imposing on a narrative a new sort of twist. Just as 
metaphor obtains meaning from absurdity so metalepsis too creates new depth of 
meaning through the absurd transgression of thresholds. Metalepsis defeats 
realistic interpretations of texts demanding that narratives are understood via the 
threshold of the act of narration. This deeper understanding twists previous 
interpretations and rasies questions of the relatedness of the narrative world and 
the reader’s world.  
4. Just as Ricoeur suggests that metaphor proceeds from the tensions between 
words that are juxtaposed in a figurative sentence and their relation to 
experienced reality, so metalepsis exists in the tension between narrative worlds 
figured in different narrative levels.199 Where metaphor assimilates two hitherto 
distant terms and renders them comparable in the construction of a new reality, 
metalepsis brings together two previously distinct diegetic layers allowing 
concepts and characters from one to extend the parameters in the world of the 
other.200  
This analysis of the similarities between metaphor as a figure of speech and 
metalepsis as a structural trope does not mean that metaphor or metalepsis are 
figurally related or hierarchically connected. Rather, the two phenomena produce 
parallel effects through the absurdity of language: metaphor does so through pairing 
words and transcending both their prior meanings and limitations, whilst metalepsis 
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does the same across the similarly absurd limitations of narrating thresholds. Both 
create new meaning through juxtaposition and both bring new life to language. 
Metaphor reveals there is no term within the cornucopia of human language that 
cannot be ransomed and combined to create newness, vision and an expanded 
horizon: I suggest that the same is true of the fusion of narrative layers.  
Ricoeur’s rigorous examination of metaphor, which is at first glance a simple 
figure of speech, provides a powerful window onto the potency of other devices that 
combine absurd juxtapositions to create a new meaning. When Ricoeur’s 
understanding of the metaphorical process is applied to metalepsis, new light is shed 
upon the significance of the confusion between irrationally related narrative levels. 
Tangled narratological thresholds allow a revised vision of reality to be developed 
though the impertinence, tensions, and twists that blend realities and representations 
in the moment of metalepsis.  
 
6. Synopsis 
Auerbach, Kierkegaard and Ricoeur offer divergent approaches to the biblical text, 
and, in the case of Ricoeur and Kierkegaard, competing claims regarding the nature 
of competent hermeneutics. In the four close readings that follow, I will develop a 
cumulative sense of the hermeneutical implications of Biblical metalepsis. I contend 
that these moments of diegetic boundary breaking are highly relevant to 
consideration of Auerbach’s claims regarding the autocratic trajectory of the biblical 
world view. Furthermore, Biblical metalepsis also brings into focus the counterpoint 
between Kierkegaard’s hermeneutics of contemporaneity and the balance that 
Ricoeur suggests readers must find between “explaining” and “understanding”. This 
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dichotomy finds some resolution in the double sense of metaleptic moments, where 
diegetic boundary breaking and overt the narratorial intervention are foregrounded. 
Here readers are simultaneously invited to locate their own world in reference to the 
world within the narrative, whilst also being challenged by the temporal paradox of 
the muddled diegesis. This manner of engagement and distanciation brings the 
perspectives of Kierkegaard and Ricoeur equally into play, without necessarily 
reconciling their differences. The value of Auerbach, Kierkegaard and Ricoeur as 
dialogue partners will be apparent in the hermeneutical explorations at the end of 
each of the next four chapters, and more particularly still, in the theological 
conclusions of Chapter 7, where the philosophical and theological stimulus they 
provide, as well as the illustrative potential of the range of frame breaking 
movements explored in Chapter 1, come into focus once again. Before this, in the 
following chapters, my primary focus is the identification of a range of diverse biblical 






“Let the reader Understand” 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 “Let the Reader Understand” 
And Jesus began to say to them, "Take heed that no one leads you astray. 
Many will come in my name, saying, `I am he!' and they will lead many astray. 
And when you hear of wars and rumours of wars, do not be alarmed; this 
must take place, but the end is not yet… But when you see the desolating 
sacrilege set up where it ought not to be (let the reader understand), then let 
those who are in Judea flee to the mountains; let him who is on the housetop 
not go down, nor enter his house, to take anything away; and let him who is in 
the field not turn back to take his mantle. And alas for those who are with child 
and for those who give suck in those days!” (Mark 13:5-17) 
 
The so called ‘mini-apocalypse’ of Mark 13 functions as a final exhortation to Jesus’ 
most immediate followers and an eschatological warning to the readers of the 
Gospel. It reads as continuous direct speech (13:5-37) during which the diegetic 
integrity of Jesus’ address is maintained. The passage is universally acknowledged 
as an important component in Mark’s story, indeed some suggest it represents the 
interpretative crux of Mark’s narrative: “like a window which allows a close view of 
Markan circumstances.”1 Mark 13:2-37 is Jesus’ longest speech in Mark’s Gospel by 
a considerable margin. Occurring whilst Jesus is sitting on the Mount of Olives, 
immediately prior to Jesus’ anointing at Bethany and subsequent passion in 
Jerusalem, the uninterrupted dialogue decelerates the plot and, combined with the 
overt and especially urgent eschatology, adds a sense of tension to the coming 
events. The text inherently reads as the culmination of Jesus’ teaching, especially 
finishing as it does with the words, “What I say to you, I say to all: watch!” (Mark 
13:37) There are no extra-diegetic comments or narrative interruptions, apart from 
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one interjection in verse 14, where a voice, which seems to be that of the narrator, 
appeals to the reader in the third person with a unique accent of urgency, saying: 
“Let the reader understand.”  
This verse attracts attention because it represents a narrative anomaly. It 
unquestionably relates to Daniel 9:27 from which the reference to the ‘desolating 
sacrilege’ derives: 
The people of the prince who is to come shall destroy the city and the 
sanctuary. Its end shall come with a flood, and to the end there shall be war; 
desolations are decreed. And he shall make a strong covenant with many for 
one week; and for half of the week he shall cause sacrifice and offering to 
cease; and upon the wing of abominations shall come one who makes 
desolate, until the decreed end is poured out on the desolator. (Dan. 9:26-27) 
 
It is hard to imagine Jesus addressing Peter, James, John and Andrew in private as 
‘the reader,’ and therefore consensus suggests that the appeal to the reader is a 
parenthesis in which the extra-diegetic narrative voice interrupts Jesus’ discourse.2 
This being the case, the narratorial intervention is entirely unique in the Synoptic 
Gospels as a direct appeal to the reader. Mark’s Gospel is replete with extra-diegetic 
interruptions, and the narrator routinely interrupts the progress of the narrative to add 
notes which facilitate the development of the story. However, these are barely 
noticed because they function as an integral feature of the threshold between the 
primary and extra-diegetic surfaces. An example of a very simple interruption 
effected by a narrative comment is found in 3:30.  
“Truly, I say to you, all sins will be forgiven the sons of men, and whatever 
blasphemies they utter; but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never 
has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin” -- for they had said, “He has an 
unclean spirit” (Mark 3:28-30). 
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Here, to explain the discourse between Jesus and the scribes, Mark’s narrator uses 
his role to deviate from the normal chronological movement of the narration to add a 
retrospective note of explanation, analeptically inserting a crucial clarification. Within 
Mark’s Gospel there is an abundance of similar clarifying comments, additional 
details and narrative asides in the narrator’s own voice. Such interventions are 
fundamental characteristics of the role of the narrator in Mark’s Gospel. However, 
Mark 13:14 is the only occasion when the narrator seems to appeal directly to a 
reader and, moreover he does so by interrupting the speech of his main character. If 
this moment really does address the extra-diegetic reader it is an entirely 
anachronistic metaleptic intervention that transgresses the threshold between the 
primary and extra-diegetic layers, and it is therefore no surprise that some 
commentators have been reluctant to adopt this interpretation. 
Mark 13:14 is surrounded by, and entangled in, a nexus of imperatives that 
contribute to urgent eschatology and invites shrewd exegesis.3 The provenance of 
this pericope has been much discussed, and the relevance of the passage to the 
persecuted church sometime after 70 AD is routinely noted. This sense of urgency 
and the suggestion of an imminent parousia seems integral to the discourse and 
lends itself to a context of persecution that was experienced after the fall of the 
Temple. On this basis, a common conclusion is that “in Mark 13 we do not find an 
historical speech of Jesus.”4 Focus on the significance of the eschatological 
expectations revealed in the speech has, perversely, obscured the narrative 
significance of anomalous parenthesis. The maelstrom of higher criticism has 
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precipitated diverse suggestions about the appeal to the reader as a theological 
interpolation, a redaction, or an historical utterance of Jesus. However, these 
approaches may have obscured the unique narrative effect of the direct appeal.  
1.2 Hypothesis 
My hypothesis is that the parenthesis “Let the reader understand” represents a direct 
appeal from the narrator to the Gospel reader. When viewed as an interjection that 
muddles the threshold around Jesus’ speech, Mark 13:14 functions as a moment of 
metalepsis that solicits urgent understanding. The imperative exhortation demands 
that readers of the Gospel understand the ‘signs of the times’ and it invites them to 
recognise that Jesus’ subsequent warnings are also relevant to them. I contend that 
“Let the reader understand” is the most overt contamination of narrative layers in 
Mark’s Gospel. It achieves an unexpected interruption in Jesus’ speech and creates 
a unique transgression of the boundaries between the characters within the story 
and those outside it that are reading or listening to the Gospel.  
There are good reasons to regard that the parenthesis as a Markan 
metalepsis rather than an aside from Jesus and these arguments are axiomatic to 
the hermeneutical observations I pursue later. In this Chapter I will therefore 
consider the following four arguments.   
1. The context of Chapter 13 supports the claim that the voice addressing the 
“reader” is that of the narrator appealing to his extra-diegetic audience, rather 
than Jesus prophetically and opaquely referring to future readers of Daniel, or to 
Peter, James and John, who were the only disciples present with him at this point 
in the story.  
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2. Mark interrupts his primary narrative discourse on several other occasions and 
includes frequent explanatory parentheses in his narrative: given the significance 
of the discourse in chapter 13 it is conceivable that Mark sought to highlight 
elements of Jesus’ teaching here in line with other narratorial parentheses. 
3. Jesus consistently refers to his “hearers” but this is the only example in any 
Gospel where he may be claimed to refer to “readers.” Given the oral tradition it 
seems impossible that Jesus imagined a multitude of literate owners of Danielic 
scrolls in his audience.5 None of the references to reading in Mark’s Gospel can 
be considered comparable to this direct appeal. 
4. Matthew and Luke repeat chapter 13 almost verbatim, but depart significantly 
from the sense of 13:14. This indicates that the parenthesis was confusing even 
in its first interpretations; it was considered worthy of clarification; and both 
Matthew and Luke saw the parenthesis as an invitation to themselves as readers 
of Mark to ‘understand’, to interpret and to contextualize the warning highlighted 
by the parenthesis. 
In the following analysis, as these four arguments are expanded, a cumulative sense 
emerges that Mark 13:14 represents a direct appeal to the readers of the Gospel. As 
such, the verse represents a significant breach of the normal boundaries between 
diegetic worlds. This conclusion is of hermeneutical significance, inviting 
observations which are developed in the final section of the Chapter regarding 
Mark’s approach to time, his expectations regarding readerly response and self-
involvement and his understanding of the boundaries between the representation of 
reality in his writing and the world of the reader. 
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2. Permeable Thresholds 
2.1 Daniel’s reader or Mark’s reader?  
There are two alternative and competing interpretations of 13:14. The first is the 
approach that contends that “Let the reader understand” is an appeal from Jesus to 
his own audience, inviting them as readers of Daniel to interpret the signs of their 
own time in light of the ‘abomination of desolation’. The second possibility is that 
Mark is appealing to readers of his own writing, inviting them to shrewd 
understanding of the text he writes. 6 This dichotomy is of particular significance, for 
if the appeal is part of Jesus’ speech the verse is unusual, but surely not metaleptic. 
Jesus’ appeal to readers of Daniel is unexpected, but if he is challenging his own 
audience to be better exegetes then the verse is not an apostrophe, nor is it even a 
change of direction. On the other hand if in this moment Mark is interjecting to 
interrupt Jesus and draw attention to a point of particular interpretative significance 
for his own reader, then the verse really is a tangled loop and a contamination of the 
threshold between the primary and extra-diegetic worlds. This change of direction, 
with a switch between Jesus’ audience in the primary diegesis and extra-diegetic 
reader of the Gospel, suggests that the clause is similar to classical apostrophes, 
(especially as the voice addressing the audience is indistinguishable from that of 
Jesus just as was the case in classical apostrophes on stage).  This is very rare in 
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the biblical canon and the only other example in Mark that is cited by scholars is in 
9:41:  
For truly, I say to you, whoever gives you a cup of water to drink because you 
bear the name of Christ, will by no means lose his reward.7 
 
Willi Marxsen was one of the first scholars to bifurcate interpretations according to 
these options, and with him I suggest that, “In consideration, there are two options: 
[the verse either appeals to] the reader of the book of Daniel ... or the reader of the 
Apocalyptic leaflet” (das Danielbuch... oder apokalyptische Flugblatt).8  
Daniel’s reader 
There are a range of arguments that support the claim that 13:14 represents a call 
for urgent understanding of prophecy from the book of Daniel. Firstly, some suggest 
that appeal to the reader functions as an aspect of Midrash and that Jesus’ speech 
in this chapter should be understood as part of this milieu. Secondly, this reading 
removes the sense of transgression between the layers of the narrative evident in 
the alternative reading: if the verse is Jesus addressing his friends then the diegetic 
structures and integrity are maintained in the manner that might be expected. Finally, 
the verse is consistent linguistically with the rest of Jesus’ speech in the chapter.  
Lars Hartman attempted to reconstruct a Jewish milieu of “parenesis” 
(exhortation) through which chapter 13 could be best understood.9 Accordingly he 
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suggested that the speech should be understood as an example of Jesus’ method of 
Midrash, in this instance focused on Daniel.10 As a consequence he concluded that 
the reader who is invited to understand is “the reader of Daniel – not of Mark.”11  
Thomas R. Hatina, like Hartman, emphasised the priority of Mark’s narrative context 
over speculative historical reconstructions and suggested that Mark consistently 
appeals to Old Testament text through allusion. He claims that understanding this is 
fundamental to establishing the proper context for the verse.12 The primary 
conclusions of both (that Mark 13 is Jesus’ own exhortative exegesis of 
eschatological prophecy), seems valid. It is not, however, necessary to infer from this 
context that the parenthesis of 13:14 must also be Jesus’ own words. Indeed it is 
distinctly possible that chapter 13 includes an authentic representation of Jesus’ 
words whilst the parenthesis is a narratorial intervention.  
Larry Perkins arrives at the same conclusion as Hatina and Hartman for quite 
different reasons. He suggests that if the parenthesis of Mark 13:14 is an address to 
the extra-diegetic readers of the Gospel, then it significantly interrupts the rhetoric of 
Mark’s narrative. Consequently he concludes that it makes more sense to 
understand it as an aside from Jesus to his actual audience. As Jesus addresses 
Peter, James, John and Andrew in private during chapter 13, Perkins argues that the 
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appeal to understand is consistent with “Jesus’ frequent corrections of his disciples’ 
misunderstandings.”13 Perkins prefers the notion of an intact diegetic universe 
uninterrupted by appeal to the reader – and this is understandable, for it increases 
the integrity of the primary discourse. Perkins is at pains to suggest that “this clause 
is part of Jesus’ discourse because its language fits the way that Jesus in Mark 
challenges people to read - that is, interpret correctly - the Old Testament.”14 He 
concludes that the parenthesis is addressed specifically to the disciples as readers 
of Daniel. There are a number of issues with this model that limit its probability. 
Firstly, Perkins suggests that “the third-person form [in the parenthesis] parallels 
other instructions that Jesus gives to his disciples.”15 Given that the disciples are 
nowhere else addressed as readers this comparison seems a little tenuous. 
Secondly Perkins asserts that the readers’ receipt of the warning is of secondary 
importance when compared to that of the disciples. He comments that “readers of 
discourse also hear the injunction.”16 This model seems to neglect the notion of the 
Gospel as narrative shaped for an audience, and supposes that Mark did not have 
the reader in mind when he wrote.17  
Beyond the notions above, that the discourse represents midrash, that Jesus 
often challenges his disciples to understand and that an aside from Jesus maintains 
the integrity of the diegesis, there are linguistic reasons for accepting the suggestion 
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that the verse appeals to the reader in Jesus own audience.18 In particular “Let the 
reader understand” fits in with the quartet of other warnings within the speech each 
having a structural similarity that is especially evident if Greek word order is 
maintained: “The one reading – let him understand” (13:14); “The ones in Judea – let 
them flee” (13:14); “The one standing on the roof top – let him not descend” (13:15); 
“The one in the field – let him not turn back” (13:16), “The ones who are pregnant 
and the ones suckling – pray that your flight isn’t in winter” (13:17). Each of these 
constructs functions as an exhortative imperative - an observation that goes 
unnoticed amongst those who argue for the parenthesis as an appeal to the public 
reader of Daniel, though it may have strengthened this case.19  
Mark’s Reader 
The reasons for suggesting that 13:14 is an appeal to the reader of Mark are more 
varied than the reasons for the alternative. These include suggestions regarding an 
apocalyptic super-structure for the speech; claims that the verse is a later redaction; 
evidence of grammatical inconsistency which makes the appeal a dark clue; and the 
contention that the Gospel is written to be read aloud.  
Norman Perrin suggests that the narrative stages within the chapter were 
typical within the apocalypse genre and concludes of the parenthesis that, as a direct 
appeal to the audience, it is Mark’s attempt to replicate the frequent second person 
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‘you’ of apocalyptic discourse.20 According to his model this moment within the 
Gospel is a demonstration that Mark was attempting to include the reader, like the 
disciples, in the privileged ‘inner circle’ who had access to Jesus’ special teaching 
and that this direct engagement with the audience is a clear indicator of the 
apocalyptic provenance of Mark 13. Perrin reads the parenthesis as a key indicator 
that the chapter is the third part of an apocalyptic drama with three “realistic 
narrative” acts. He argues that 13:9-13 is about Christians “preaching and being 
delivered up,”21 so that “when the third act is complete the drama will reach its climax 
in the coming of Jesus as Son of man.”22 Perrin’s apocalyptic focus has been revised 
and revisited frequently, for example in Mary Ann Beavis’ commentary. She 
interprets chapter 13 as “an apocalyptic interlude” in between five scenes of flowing 
narrative.23 Similarly Vernon K. Robbins has suggested that chapter 13 is the 
“interweaving of apocalyptic discourse amongst other multiple textures.”24 Whilst 
neither these, nor other publications have repeated Perrin’s framework, his influence 
is apparent in the continued frequency of articles referring to Mark as an apocalyptic 
text.25 Such approaches typically also adopt the conclusion that 13:14 is an appeal to 
the Markan reader. The fundamental weakness of these interpretations is that, even 
if Mark 13 as a whole is an apocalyptic text, asserting that those who supposedly 
‘accompany the seer’ are invited to see themselves as ‘readers’ is both 
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unprecedented and improbable. It seems much more likely that the call to 
‘understand’ is an urgent challenge to comprehend eschatological events unfolding 
in their own reality rather than a cryptic call toward an apocalyptic hermeneutic. 
Consequently observations of apocalyptic structure, whether valid or not, are 
redundant in terms of interpreting 13:14. 
Rudolf Pesch understood Mark 13 as a lacuna interpolated into the Gospel. 
Furthermore, he saw appeals within this passage to “watch” and to “be aware” as 
potentially even later redactions.26 The basis of this conclusion was Pesch’s 
conviction that the Gospel has a six-fold structure. He suggested that each of these 
sections contain a regular ‘stoichiometric’ structure but that Chapter 13 doesn’t fit 
into this framework. Instead Pesch suggests that the bulk of the chapter was a 
Jewish apocalyptic tract which was reinterpreted by Mark and included wholesale. 
This claim (also made by S.G.F Brandon), and the further suggestion that Mark’s 
readers would have recognized this structure, bear little weight given the 
heterogeneous interpretations that both preceded and have succeeded Pesch’s 
assertion.27 Pesch’s model carries limited weight. Dependence on an unwieldy 
hypothesis regarding the superstructure of the Gospel that ought to be understood 
by readers, but that never actually has been, is a decidedly limiting factor.   
Tim Geddert and Lloyd Gaston, quite separately, see 13:14 as a cryptic clue 
to the reader of Mark.28 Geddert suggests that “Mark deliberately did not tell the 
reader which ‘abomination’ was expected, and most importantly, Mark made it quite 
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clear that more is being implied [through “let the reader understand”] than is being 
said.”29 He contends that throughout Mark’s Gospel, “subtle clues enable the 
discerning reader to grasp points Mark is intending to communicate… These subtle 
clues [become explicit] in Mark 13, where two ‘watchwords’ are used calling disciples 
to discernment and discipleship.”30 Lloyd Gaston suggests that the key to 
understanding Mark 13 lies in the destruction of the temple, which is why Mark 
locates the scene at the entrance to the temple (Mark 13:1). Gaston suggests that 
the original context of Daniel’s ‘abomination of desolation’ was vague enough to 
allow Christian appropriation of the phrase in 40AD when Emperor Caligula ordered 
his own image to be erected in the Jerusalem temple. At that time there was no 
question of the abomination bringing the kind of destruction associated with Mark’s 
apocalypse. However, when that crisis passed, the oracle (and with it the phrase 
‘abomination of desolation’) was reinterpreted eschatologically with the expected 
destruction of Jerusalem in mind.31  Mark was able to reinterpret the phrase 
'abomination of desolation' eschatologically, focusing on the destruction of the 
temple and the arrival of a personal antichrist because the original Danielic context 
for the phrase ceased to be viewed as the only historical reference point for the 
oracle (Antiochus IV Epiphanes’ desecration of the Temple in 167 BC being closely 
paralleled by Caligula’s actions two hundred years later).32  
Gaston insists that the parenthesis is Mark’s own cryptic allusion intended to 
highlight the significance of the grammatically anomalous masculine participle 
hestēkota (“set up”), for hestēkota does not agree in gender with its neuter modifying 
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noun, bdelugma (“desolating”).33 Gaston comments that the parenthesis is 
“conservatively interpreted to refer either [to the book of Daniel, or the apocalypse], 
but surely there is a third possibility… namely that these words are from Mark to 
indicate the significance of the grammatical anomaly.”34 Gaston asserts that 
hestekota must refer to the anti-Christ personally, rather than to a plural and 
impersonal jumble of stones, and that Mark anticipates that imminent persecution will 
be inaugurated by a personal Antichrist. Mark, he suggests, is attempting to ensure 
Christians do not mistake the abomination, but rather understand it as a parousial 
precursor.  
Whilst Geddert and Gaston are right about the challenge interpreting 13:14 
presents, it seems unnecessary to claim that Mark held a secretive, nuanced 
understanding of the ‘abomination of desolation’ and attempted to point believers 
cryptically towards an eschatological anti-Christ.35 Such a theory is too convoluted, 
especially given that there is an adequate, and much simpler interpretation; namely 
that Mark is highlighting the fact that as he writes, Jesus’ warning has already been 
realised and the disaster Jesus suggests is imminent is now a present reality for the 
Markan reader. I would also note that the abomination referred to could be either the 
idolatrous image set up, or the deity it represents, and ambiguity of gender might 
therefore be useful to Mark.36 Furthermore Mark uses a masculine participle with a 
neuter noun elsewhere when the noun represents a personal being (cf. Mark 9:20 
and 26) and Gaston has overstated the unusualness of grammatical constructions 
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that contravene normative semantic rules. Such instances are defined in Latin as 
constructio ad sensum and are frequently found in English as examples of ‘notional 
concord’ where agreement between terms is found in the notion rather than the form 
of a noun.37 For all these reasons it is difficult to accept the suggestion that “Let the 
reader be aware” refers exclusively to Mark’s subtle grammatical cue. 
Robert Fowler has analysed the bridge-building strategies of Mark’s rhetoric 
and paid significant attention to the parenthesis of 13:14. He suggests that:  
Characters within the story do not address “the reader” outside the story, at 
least not in ancient literature… The parenthesis makes no sense at all as a 
statement by Jesus.38  
 
Whilst the first part of this observation maybe an oversimplification (cf. Chapter 1 
section 4.1 above), Fowler supports his claim with arguments about the narrative 
effect of the passage – especially when read aloud.  
Jesus delivers the chapter long discourse, full of the veiled, figurative 
language of apocalyptic. Although the disciples remain on the stage 
throughout the apocalyptic discourse, we in the audience tend to forget their 
presence because the entire discourse is spoken over their heads and directly 
at us.39 
 
The assumption that the audience is necessarily an aural one colours Fowler’s 
reading. For example Fowler suggests that the parenthesis is quite possibly, “a kind 
of wink or stage direction to an anagnostes (a lector or professional public reader) 
reciting the Gospel of Mark before an assembled audience.”40 Fowler notes: 
The emphatic second-person plural pronouns [frequent in chapter 13] 
ostensibly engage the four disciples on the stage, but they are too emphatic to 
do only that. Rather, they raise the intensity of Jesus’ language to such a pitch 
that the story level is transcended… The last verse of the chapter spells out 
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explicitly at whom the speech is really aimed: “And what I say to you I say to 
all: Watch”. This statement is about as close as an ancient author can come 
to direct address by a character within the story to the audience outside.41 
 
Whilst the observation about the diegetic frame-breaking is useful, the conclusion 
that this is exceptional amongst ancient texts is erroneous and it is hard to justify the 
conclusion that the reader addressed in parenthesis is different from the audience.42 
Indeed, address to the audience in contemporaneous texts is well evidenced and it is 
actually Fowler’s model of the inclusion of a note to a lector within the body of the 
narrative that is without precedent. Given that the focus of the exhortation is the 
desecration of the temple it seems more reasonable to assert that Mark is conscious 
of the risks facing his own readers as he writes, rather than that he is recording 
historically an address to four disciples which is incidentally of urgent importance to 
his readers or appealing ambiguously to those who will read in public to an audience. 
Summary 
The claim that Mark 13:14 addresses the reader of Daniel is supported by three 
strong arguments. It is indisputable that Jesus’ public teaching was akin to Midrash, 
as is evident in some of his most significant pronouncements (for example, Luke 4, 
“It is written”; Matthew 6, “You  have heard it said… but I tell you” and Mark 7:6, “Did 
not Isaiah prophesy of you…”). Mark 13, a speech of singular importance that is 
deeply rooted in Danielic visions, may therefore be legitimately understood as 
Midrash. It is also true that the imperative ‘understand’ in 13:14 matches the 
subsequent imperatives embedded in Jesus’ speech. Nevertheless the most 
important argument supporting this view is that an aside to the Markan reader strains 
the narrative structure unacceptably, and that therefore the parenthesis must be 
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understood as an appeal to the reader of Daniel. This conclusion may be easily 
avoided if the verse is understood as a moment of metalepsis, for this device makes 
a Markan interruption and transgression of narrative structures entirely explicable. 
Indeed, if the verse is understood as a metaleptic transgression of diegetic 
thresholds then the appeal functions just as ancient apostrophes, seeking to grab the 
attention and heighten the engagement of the reader of Mark’s text. It is unlikely that 
a character would undertake an anonymous appeal to the ubiquitous ‘reader’ of 
scripture when he was in private with his closest disciples, and that in this context he 
would use a third person construct and language that belied the intimacy of the 
context. Conversely it seems entirely plausible that the narrator might intervene 
incongruously because of the context evident at the time of his writing so as to 
highlight the particular prophetic relevance to his audience of Jesus’ words. 13:14 
therefore makes most sense as a moment of metalepsis born out of eschatological 
urgency. Ironically, other arguments supporting the idea that the parenthesis is a 
metaleptic aside to the Markan reader are relatively weak. Claims that the verse 
addresses the reader in an attempt to fit in with an apocalyptic structure; that it is a 
redaction or interpolation; that it is an overly subtle clue; or that it is evidence of an 
aural context, are all disappointing.  
I broadly agree with Petersen, Geddert and others who suggest that Mark 13 
represents a call to understand and interpret wisely the whole Gospel. There seems 
genuine value in the notion that “Let the reader understand” invites abnormal 
participation from the reader. Equally, Perrin’s claim that the appeal to the reader 
deepens the readers’ sense that they are part of a privileged audience is plausible. 
Robbin’s notion that the parenthesis adds complexity to the intertextual surface of 
the chapter is compelling, Pesch’s observation that the imperatives to “watch” and 
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“be aware” are critical to understanding the chapter is valid, as is Fowler’s 
observation that the verse must inevitably feel to the reader like a direct appeal. The 
parenthesis’ obvious function is as an alert to the reader and the listening audience, 
inviting them to interpret Jesus’ words within their own social context. This view has 
been promoted by Ernest Best and Harry Gamble who, without any effort to 
construct a previously obscure super-structure, claim that the parenthesis operates 
as “a riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma.”43 Put simply, the parenthesis “let 
the reader understand” achieves unavoidable effect upon actual readers of Mark’s 
Gospel. Complex models regarding genre, grammatical anomalies and aural 
audiences do not achieve an incontrovertible sense that the parenthesis appeals to 
Mark’s reader. However, treating it as a metaleptic interruption instantly negates the 
most significant concern of those who suggest that the verse can only function as an 
appeal to the reader of Daniel. 
2.2  Parenthesis in Mark 
In some senses Mark 13.14 is not entirely unique in the Gospel, for, as is expected 
in any narrative, Mark includes numerous other explanatory parentheses in his text. 
These intrusions are either meta-diegetic moments of ‘explicit commentary’ by the 
narrator, including parenthetical clauses introduced by gar (for), hoti (that, because 
or since), and hina (in order that), or are the ‘implicit commentary’ of statements 
made by characters within the story.44 Obvious examples of Markan parenthesis 
include the addition of detail, such as in 5:42 (“She was twelve years old”); cultural 
explanation such as in 7:3 (“For the Pharisees, and all the Jews, do not eat unless 
they wash their hands”); translation, such as in 7:11 (“That is, given to God”), 15:16 
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(“That is, the praetorium”), 15:22 (“Which means the place of a skull”); and 
theological interpretations such as in 7:19 (“Thus he declared all foods clean.”). 
Greek punctuation did not include textual demarcation of parenthesis, but through 
the pronounced movement from primary diegetic plot or discourse to extra diegetic 
commentary the supplementary and incidental character of these comments is 
clearly evident.  
Comparing the parenthesis of 13:14 with other narrative insertions, Craig 
Evans posits a functional and linguistic consistency. He comments, “This parenthetic 
comment is Markan [is comparable to] his other insertions in 2:10; 3:30; 7:11, 19 and 
may be intended to alert readers to Dan. 12:5–13.”45 Whilst there is no precise 
taxonomy of such narrative operations or diegetic intrusions in the text it is sufficient 
to note that there is a significant frequency of such interruptions in Mark’s narrative 
and that it is certainly not unusual that the narrator of Mark’s Gospel interrupt the 
progress of the primary diegesis to elucidate some point of importance.  
Of the narratological interventions in the Gospel, the closest comparable 
example to the parenthesis of 13:14 is that of 7:11. This stands out as the only other 
occasion within the Gospel where the voice of the narrator interjects directly into 
Jesus’ speech. These two examples share the unique significance of representing 
occasions when an extra-diegetic voice interrupts the speech of the most central 
character within the primary diegesis. 
And he said to them, “You have a fine way of rejecting the commandment of 
God, in order to keep your tradition!  For Moses said, `Honor your father and 
your mother'; and, `He who speaks evil of father or mother, let him surely die'; 
but you say, `If a man tells his father or his mother, What you would have 
gained from me is Corban' (that is, given to God) -- then you no longer permit 
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him to do anything for his father or mother, thus making void the word of God 
through your tradition which you hand on. And many such things you do” 
(Mark 7:9-13). 
 
“That is, given to God” provides a parenthetical translation of the Aramaic term 
Corban and is indisputably a direct interjection in a speech of Jesus. This 
intervention can only be understood as a extra-diegetic voice, for it is inconceivable 
that this parenthesis was actually Jesus translating his own use of Aramaic for the 
sake of his hearers. Whilst Gospel readers might be unfamiliar with Aramaic, for 
Jesus’ own audience it was their lingua franca. Translation elsewhere in the Gospel 
occurs exclusively through the voice of the narrator (cf. 3:17; 5:41; 7:34; 15:22; 
15:34). It is therefore unsurprising that the interruption of 7:11 is unanimously 
accepted as a translation proffered for the sake of clarity to a non-Aramaic audience 
in the voice of the narrator.46 The significance of this is that 7:11 establishes a 
precedent through which the parenthesis of 13:14 should be understood. Mark’s 
narrator does interrupt the discourse of the primary diegesis, and even intervenes in 
the direct speech of Jesus.  The parenthesis of 13:14 can therefore be most simply 
understood as an intervention seeking to emphasise or clarify the words of Jesus in 
the same mode as the less controversial interruption “That is given to God” found in 
7:11.  
2.3  References to reading in Mark 
 The audience of the Gospel is frequently referred to in Jesus’ direct speech; so that 
whenever he appeals to his own ‘hearer’ a coalescence of narrative layers is 
achieved which makes the reader feel addressed. An example of this would be 
Jesus’ comment in Mark 4:11, “To you has been given the secret of the kingdom of 
God, but for those outside everything is in parables.” The use of the second person 
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participle, “you,” naturally includes the reader within Jesus’ audience. This process is 
even more overt in moments when Jesus appeals directly to his hearers, for example 
in Mark 4:9 Jesus says, “He who has ears to hear, let him hear.” 
Nevertheless, the petition to the “reader” in Mark 13:14 is unique. 
Consequently, there is a degree of incongruity about the phrase. Even though “Let 
the reader understand” fits within the structural paradigm of Markan extra-diegetic 
interventions, its narrative function is unusual in its prima facie appeal to the reader. 
Larry Perkins has correctly noted that no other narrative comment or notes of 
explanation in Mark’s gospel appeal to an additional text as the key for interpreting 
the event or comments embedded in the story.47 Furthermore, there are no other 
instances in Mark’s Gospel of overt reference to the reader. Consequently, much 
more than other meta-diegetic commentary it intrudes in a manner that necessarily 
raises questions about the “reader” of the parenthesis. Significantly the parenthesis 
may provoke a different response from the first century reader as compared to the 
modern reader, as Mark’s disclosure of a ‘presumed reader’ evokes an awareness of 
historical distance in the hermeneutics of those who follow subsequently.  
Given the lack of other overt Markan or canonical appeals to the reader, it is 
unsurprising that there are divergent interpretations regarding whom is being 
addressed in the parenthesis.  It is decidedly the case that the text represents a 
significantly less muddled literary framework if the aside is actually an address of 
Jesus to his disciples and their contemporaneous readers of Daniel. In addition 
Jesus’ arguments about interpretation of Torah and his criticism of hermeneutical 
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conventions (common in debate between rabbis) can be offered as a background to 
the verse.48 Perkins adopts this approach: 
It is not unexpected then that the Markan narrator, given this strong Jewish 
tradition and the Jewish setting of the story, would have his protagonist 
engage other Jewish religious leaders in debates regarding specific sacred 
texts. This would be a normal means for establishing his hero’s bona fides as 
prophet and perhaps even messianic leader, establishing justice and 
righteousness through his understanding of, teaching about, and personal 
modelling of these sacred precepts and stories.49 
 
He notes that there are three other occasions in Mark’s Gospel where Jesus 
employs the verb ‘to read,’ namely, 2:25, 12:10 and 12:26:  
And he said to them, “Have you never read what David did, when he was in 
need and was hungry?” (Mark 2:25). 
 
[Jesus said to them,] “Have you not read this scripture: `The very stone which 
the builders rejected has become the head of the corner’?” (Mark 12:10). 
 
Jesus said to them, “Is not this why you are wrong, that you know neither the 
scriptures nor the power of God... Have you not read in the book of Moses, in 
the passage about the bush?” (Mark 12:24-26).50 
 
In each of these cases Jesus uses the phrase, oudepote anegnōte (Have you not 
read). So the phrase “Let the reader understand” (ho anaginōskōn noeito) is distinct 
from the other references to reading in terms of grammar, syntax and vocabulary. 
This distinction alone is not sufficient to dismiss the suggestion that 13:14 represents 
the same kind of appeal to the reader as those found in his dismissal of the 
Pharisees’, priests’ and elders’ readership, however, there are two other good 
reasons why the parenthesis of 13:14 should not be read in the same vein as 2:25, 
12:10 or 12:26.  
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Firstly, in each of the other instances Jesus is involved in explicit controversy 
with various Jewish leaders about Torah hermeneutics and application. In all three 
cases Jesus appeals to elements in the Jewish canon, offers a specific, somewhat 
unusual interpretation, and uses this as the basis to deal with a question or criticism 
addressed as a challenge to him and his mission. However, in 13:14 there is no 
controversy, no hermeneutical debate, no need for Jesus or Mark to justify Jesus’ 
actions, and the setting is intimate rather than public. It is highly implausible that 
Jesus would address his closest disciples obliquely as “the one reading” and the 
appeal to ‘the reader’ therefore does not naturally translate as a request from Jesus 
that his disciples maintain discerning midrash in days of eschatological crisis. “Have 
you not read,” fulfils an entirely different narrative purpose from “Let the reader 
understand.”  
Secondly, it is also important to observe that the narrator in 13:14 is focusing 
on the issue of understanding, not the issue of reading. Whereas readership in the 
other three cases is about validating or justifying an application of scripture, 
readership in 13:14 is about being prepared, aware and insightful. As Perkins says,  
While these two activities, understanding and reading, are certainly 
connected, the force of the imperative is related to understanding in contrast 
to reading. This makes this text somewhat different from the other three 
contexts in this Gospel’s narrative.51 
 
It is also noteworthy that when Jesus is particularly emphatic in his address, or wants 
to draw attention to a teaching, his most frequent idiomatic expression is, “Let the 
person who has ears to hear, hear” (Mark 4:9 and 23). This proverbial expression 
would surely be expected if the parenthesis is a moment of emphasis for Jesus’ 
predominantly illiterate disciples and it would certainly have given sufficient accent of 
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urgency to his words. Whilst Mark alludes to Jesus’ listening audience frequently 
within the frame of the narrative, and he recounts Jesus challenging the readership 
of religious leaders occasionally, 13:14 remains unique as an address to readers 
who are most definitely not the hypocritical scholars he opposed. The parenthesis of 
13:14 should therefore be understood as an appeal to an entirely different reading 
audience from any of those who interact within the primary diegesis.  
  
2.4  Comparison with the Synoptic Accounts 
Decontamination in Matthew 
So when you see the desolating sacrilege spoken of by the prophet Daniel, 
standing in the holy place (let the reader understand), then let those who are 
in Judea flee to the mountains; let him who is on the housetop not go down to 
take what is in his house; and let him who is in the field not turn back to take 
his mantle. And alas for those who are with child and for those who give suck 
in those days! (Matthew 24:15-19) 
 
Whilst Mark’s parenthesis could, in theory, apply to the future public reader of Daniel 
or to the disciples as interpreters of biblical prophecy, the precise identity of the voice 
appealing to the reader remains ambiguous. Matthew’s text is different from Mark’s 
in two particularly significant ways. Firstly the audience being addressed by Jesus is 
different. Mark’s Jesus addresses just a select inner core of disciples: Peter, James, 
John and Andrew, and the intimacy of this interaction makes it much less likely that 
the third person appeal to ‘the reader’ is aimed at the disciples as readers. However, 
Matthew’s text refers less specifically to ‘the disciples.’ This larger audience makes it 
seem slightly more possible that Jesus is referring to some, or all of them, as readers 
of Daniel’s prophecies. The less intimate setting in Matthew’s narrative makes an 
exhortation on the importance of discerning discipleship and interpretation feel more 
appropriate. Secondly, and much more significantly, Matthew introduces explicit 
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reference to the prophet Daniel, where Mark only alluded to his words. Matthew 
says, “So when you see the desolating sacrilege spoken of by the prophet Daniel… 
flee to the mountains” (24:15). 
The effect of these differences is that the confusion of Mark’s parenthetical 
intrusion is significantly reduced. The appeal to the reader remains, but a surface 
reading allows this appeal to be understood as a direct instruction from Jesus to the 
disciples, which also applies ‘coincidentally’ to the reader (as do all his instructions to 
varying degrees). This approach means that the reader of the Gospel of Matthew 
feels addressed much less particularly, urgently or uniquely. Whilst both versions 
ensure that the reader is prepared to interpret Daniel and Jesus’ words in the light of 
anticipated persecution, it seems reasonable to conclude that Matthew offers 
clarification of Mark’s text to reduce diegetic confusion and to eliminate ambiguity. It 
seems much more probable to posit that Matthew sought to decontaminate the 
literary framework of the Markan text he received than that Mark sought to muddle 
Matthew’s more simplistic framework. It is appropriate to suggest that Matthew does 
everything possible to reduce the contamination of Mark’s narrative framework but 
virtually impossible to imagine a context in which Mark would want to obfuscate 
Matthew’s text. 
Clarification in Luke 
But when you see Jerusalem surrounded by armies, then know that its 
desolation has come near.  Then let those who are in Judea flee to the 
mountains, and let those who are inside the city depart, and let not those who 
are out in the country enter it;  for these are days of vengeance, to fulfill all 
that is written. Alas for those who are with child and for those who give suck in 
those days! For great distress shall be upon the earth and wrath upon this 
people... Now when these things begin to take place, look up and raise your 
heads, because your redemption is drawing near. (Luke 21:20-28) 
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The hypothesis that Matthew sought to decontaminate the extra-diegetic intrusion of 
the narrator in Mark 13 is supported by careful reading of Luke’s version of the 
pericope. Where Mark is obscure, and Matthew slightly clearer as to the role of the 
reader as a discerning disciple, Luke eliminates confusion altogether by discarding 
entirely the reference to the reader. Luke offers fewer hints as to the nature of a 
potential ‘desolation’ but offers more clarity as to what sign will precede this disaster. 
He reframes the desolation without any reference to the Danielic ‘abomination’ and 
suggests unambiguously that it is the encircling of armies around Jerusalem that 
indicates the imminence of the eschaton.  
This re-contextualisation of Jesus’ exhortation has the effect of reducing the 
depth of knowledge of Old Testament prophecy required for a reader to feel like a 
discerning disciple and replacing it instead with a good grasp of current affairs or 
military action. Luke’s warning is engaging for a Gentile reader with little grasp of the 
historical significance of the earlier ‘abomination’ of Antiochus IV Epiphanes. 
Appropriate discipleship no longer requires knowledge of Daniel alluded to in 
Matthew. Furthermore, Luke has restored an emphasis on contemporaneous 
awareness which matches Mark’s “Let the reader understand” much more deeply if 
the Markan parenthesis is an appeal to the reader of the Gospel rather than the 
reader of Daniel. If Mark intended his readers to discern the abomination as the 
dawning of the eschaton then Luke fulfils this reading and makes it clearer for non-
Jewish readers. However, if the evangelist had Matthew’s reading in mind Luke has 
entirely missed the point.  
Matthew and Luke with their very different priorities may be seen as 
representing divergent readings of Mark. This suggestion in itself represents not only 
a controversial conclusion about the primacy of Mark but also an indication of how 
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anomalous the parenthesis of Mark 13:14 is. Its interpretation in the subsequent 
synoptic accounts is almost as divergent as is imaginable:  precisely the effect that 
might be imagined from a confusing transgression of diegetic norms.  
Matthew and Luke then should be interpreted as those who have read Mark’s 
appeal as an appeal to themselves. Matthew recognises himself as a reader of Mark 
and choses to highlight the significance of Daniel’s words, cryptically alluded to in 
Mark, but of profound significance to his own Jewish audience. Luke recognises 
himself as a reader of Mark and focuses on surrounding armies as a sign of 
imminent disaster, believing this to fulfil Mark’s warning without needing a Danielic 
retrospective. They both feel fully authorised to edit and to clarify the understanding 
that they have been asked to develop. Their reception and adjustment of the Markan 
parenthesis demonstrates precisely the shrewd interpretation required by Mark. 
2.5 Summary 
The parenthesis of 13:14 is anomalous to the extent that (a) it refers to the reader or 
listener whilst none of Mark’s other parentheses do, (b) all of Jesus’ other references 
to the reader or listener are addressed to second person (e.g. “have you not heard”), 
whereas 13:14 appeals to the third person, and (c) it interrupts Jesus’ speech to urge 
a particular depth of understanding. Nevertheless, these abnormalities are not, per 
se, proof that the parenthesis is a metaleptic contortion of the role of the narrator and 
of the primary character. As a narrative strategy the use of a third-person imperative 
necessarily encourages the reader or listener of Jesus’ exhortations and discourse to 
apply instruction to him/herself. R. Fowler notes plausibly that this is a rhetorical 
strategy that, “a good teacher like Jesus might use to express a general truth that 
would include his intimate followers but also could extend beyond that circle to 
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others.”52 It remains possible that the direct appeal for discernment speaks “to both 
the intra-narrative [and extra-narrative] audience.”53 
I would nevertheless argue that the primary effect of the parenthesis is upon 
the extra-diegetic reader and its presence does achieve a distinct narrative 
interruption or ‘frame-breaking.’54 Crucially, quite apart from the diversity of meaning 
and setting, comparison between other references to readership and that found in 
13:14 are broadly irrelevant, because in 13:14 the narrative effect is entirely different. 
Given the urgency of the surrounding chapter and the prophecies contained therein it 
is hard to read the parenthesis as anything other than an urgent appeal to the 
Gospel reader. The reader of Mark is not personally engaged by the question, “Have 
you not read?” found in 2:25, 12:10 and 12:26. The apologetic vindication of Jesus’ 
actions broadcast through these passages has, in each case, an explicit ‘target 
audience’ within the primary diegesis. However, in the urgent eschatology of chapter 
13, the ambiguity of the appeal to the third person, and the lack of an obvious 
audience to whom Jesus would address this appeal means that the parenthesis “Let 
the reader understand” inevitably includes the reader within the interpretative 
community of those who hear Jesus’ words. Mark’s Gospel establishes a clear 
paradigm of meta-diegetic intrusions into the primary diegetic layer and interruptions 
in the interactions of the characters who inhabit that universe, but the parenthesis of 
13:14 uniquely and unambiguously turns attention toward the extra-diegetic reader of 
the Gospel. This achieves a genuine diegetic disturbance. The depth of this 
metaleptic effect is vividly attested to in the adjustments made in Matthew’s and 
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Luke’s accounts of the same discourse which seek to reduce the diegetic 
contamination and clarify the distinction between the signs of the eschaton and the 
reading of prophecy. 
The parenthesis of Mark 13:14 is not the only overt interruption in Mark’s 
Gospel, nor is it the only parenthesis. However, it is unique in its address toward the 
audience and its function as an apostrophe that increases readers’ self-awareness of 
their own role in the reception of Jesus’ teaching. The appeal to the reader is 
unmistakably undertaken in the voice of the narrator and in this sense the excursus 
is absolutely anomalous because it represents a movement across diegetic 
thresholds that contaminate the framework around Jesus’ speech. This moment of 
metalepsis precipitated attempts in Matthew and Luke to reduce the difficulty of the 
interruption and their endeavours illustrate the depth of confusion around the 
demands of the self-involving parenthesis. 
 Mark interrupted Jesus to ensure that his own audience would not miss the 
personal relevance of Jesus’ eschatological challenge: an intervention that speaks 
volumes about the permeability of narrative thresholds and about Mark’s 
presumption that Jesus’ words carry permanent omni-diegetic significance.  
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3. Hermeneutical Implications 
3.1 In light of resurrection 
Mark’s Gospel is grounded in the experience of Jesus’ empty tomb and rooted in the 
faith that this moment is the epicentre of history.55 In a sense the apostrophe of 
13:14 is uniquely significant with regards to the claim that all of time is relative to the 
resurrection, for it is the only moment in the Gospel which overtly locates the 
reader’s existence within the same temporal continuum as that of Jesus’ audience 
and disciples. Though the inclusion of the reader in 13:14 is unique as a direct 
appeal to the audience, it demonstrates the sense purveyed throughout the narrative 
that the reader is part of a temporal reality that Mark describes as the “Kingdom of 
God.” Naturally therefore, the discerning reader of Mark may feel consistently invited 
toward a sense of privileged inclusion within the community of those who “have ears 
to hear” (Mark 1:15 and 4:9). The messianic secret motif and the voyeuristic vantage 
point afforded in incidents such as the transfiguration reinforce the feeling that the 
reader is a privileged audience member. This stance is nowhere more manifest than 
in the invitation of 13:14. Here the presence of the apostrophe reveals that the 
narration is not a hermetically distinct from its reception, rather it becomes obvious 
that there are readers whom Mark has expected to engage and who are invited to 
hear Jesus’ words directly.56 There is some value in Vincent Taylor’s comments that 
                                            
55
 Cf. Raymond Edward Brown, The death of the Messiah: from Gethsemane to the grave: a 
commentary on the Passion narratives in the four Gospels (New York: Doubleday, 1994). 
56
 Matthew 27:52-53 as also been examined as an apocalyptic apostrophe. Cf. K.L. Waters, ‘Matthew 
27:52-53 as Apocalyptic Apostrophe: Temporal-Spatial Collapse in the Gospel of Matthew’, Journal of 
Biblical Literature 122, no. 3 (2003), pp. 489-515.  
190 
“the parenthesis reads… like a dark hint, a clue to Christian eyes but an enigma to 
others.”57  
The parenthesis thus reinforces the sense of privileged knowledge Mark has 
already developed by binding narrator and reader into continuous community and 
obliging confluence of worldview (as with Auerbach’s model of the New Testament). 
This is inevitable, for the apostrophe infers that Jesus’ words to his disciples also 
apply with equal relevance to future readers. The apostrophe on its own validates 
entirely what Hans Frei suggested when he claimed that the gospel’s propositional 
content could not be separated from its literary form.58 For the appeal to the reader 
achieves an experience of ontological convergence, suggesting as it interrupts 
Jesus’ words, that the reader’s own existence and that of the characters within the 
narrative are located within a shared concatenation. The interruption shows that the 
Gospel is found in reading, in listening, in receipt, acceptance and application - for 
the content and shape of the narrative are genuinely inseparable and are both 
inextricably aimed toward appropriate reception and response.59 Mark’s text 
therefore leaves no question that the Jesus of the narrative is central to reality far 
beyond the spatiotemporal parameters of his primary diegesis, and even across the 
span of human history. Somehow the framework around the diegesis has stretched 
itself to accommodate even the reader within its continuum and Mark’s appeal to the 
reader invites all those who come after to “absorb their own life into its world.”60  
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The Markan gospel is written under the conviction that Jesus’ resurrection 
renders all he said and did valid, significant and interpretable in the future, a future 
that is itself determined by the emptiness of the tomb. “Let the reader understand” 
therefore functions as a promise of the significance of the resurrection in perpetuity, 
for the narrator of the Gospel, in light of the empty tomb, feels able to speak with 
certainty regarding that which is to come. The future reader will inevitably find herself 
in the midst of threatening and fearful eschaton, but this is itself to be interpreted in 
the light of what was an equally threatening and fearful passion.  Indeed such is the 
meaningfulness of the Christ revealed in the Gospel, that the Markan narrator finds 
himself unable to wait until the end of the story to explain the things of greatest 
significance. Somehow, in the light of the empty tomb Mark knows that Jesus’ words 
are pregnant with promise, with meaning and with a significance which cannot be 
contained within a single diegetic continuum or limited temporality. He therefore 
intervenes in the development of the discourse because he narrates under obligation 
to help the reader understand how to proceed in a post-resurrection world. He invites 
the reader to surrender the horizon of their hermeneutic to the new truth outworked 
at the end of the Gospel and to let their own interpretative sphere be shaped by the 
dimensions of the story. Those who already know that the outcome of Jesus’ journey 
to Jerusalem must understand Chapter 13 as more than a warning of tribulation: it is 
also an invitation to courage, to composure and to a confidence that even the trials 
of the eschaton, in the light of the resurrection, must give way to the new and the 
eternal. Mark’s intervention, read in resurrection faith, repeats a theological truth that 
is asserted consistently throughout the canon: 
Remember not the former things, nor consider the things of old. Behold, I am 
doing a new thing; now it springs forth, do you not perceive it? I will make a 




“Let the reader understand” is consistently recognised as an exigent imperative 
highlighting the significance of the eschatology revealed in the chapter. Though the 
apostrophe is addressed on the same horizontal plane as the inter-diegetic 
characters, the inclusion of an implied reader transgresses the boundaries that 
normally maintain the integrity of the story and it prevents the reader from remaining 
immersed within the story world. The presence of the “reader” shatters the illusion 
that the reader is herself a witness of the events in the story world. Any simplistic or 
voyeuristic sense of an external ‘spectator role’ is prohibited by the diegetic deflation 
that occurs when Jesus’ dialogue is interrupted. The primary diegesis is punctured 
and its cogency as a distinct world is suddenly challenged. Whilst intuitively the 
parenthesis seems to include the reader within the world of Peter, James, Andrew 
and John as a privileged disciple, this effect is patently not all that the phrase 
achieves, for the interruption also makes the reader aware that she is a reader and 
not an external observer. The collapse of diegetic distance achieves a similar effect 
as Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt (as discussed in chapter one above) which prevents 
an audience from losing itself completely within the framework of the narrative, 
inviting a self-consciousness of the readerly role instead.61 Indeed, the effects of the 
parenthesis are exactly as described by Jerome Walsh: demanding provocative and 
reflective self-involvement whilst also foregrounding the narrator and creating a 
distance between the reader and the primary diegesis.  
Breaking frame establishes a link between past events and the narratee’s 
present adding new dimensions of concrete realism and personal relevance to 
the narratee… [whilst also] distancing the narratee from the 
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narrative…affording the narratee (and the reader) leisure to undertake 
reflection and distance to make the judgments that the narrator is urging. 62 
 
Walsh’s summary is useful in that it connects the changed narrative stance with the 
effect upon the reader. His emphasis upon reflectiveness and distanciation highlights 
the self-involvement required of the reader and the manner in which a narrator’s 
intervention in the text can confound the normal stability between the time frame that 
surrounds the story world and the reader’s own world. The parenthesis of 13:14 
reminds readers that an immediate discernment is required of them in their own 
space-time continuum, an appropriate purpose given the urgency of Mark’s 
eschatological subject matter. This accent of urgency may primarily promote a 
discernment regarding the significance of Jesus’ words, but it also succeeds in 
provoking self-awareness in the reader of her own interpretative parameters and 
theological priorities. The reader is invited to ‘understand’ firstly, how urgently the 
Gospel and the words and warnings of Christ apply to her own situation and 
secondly that she is indeed a reader, called in her own continuum to follow Jesus 
faithfully. The parenthesis challenges readers to return to their own world from the 
Mount of Olives and from their immersion in the inter-diegetic characters’ world. It 
effects an awareness that the Gospel’s meaning is not to be found only in its 
theological content but even more so in the interpretative event, for the good news is 
about what happens in the life of the reader as much as, if not more than, it is about 
what happens in the life of the text. This process of finding oneself in the text 
muddles the boundaries between ‘reality’ and ‘representation’, interfering with the 
delivery or execution of the text, whilst at the same time achieving a profound depth 
of conversation between a narrative discourse and its reception.63 The interruption 
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contributes to this strategy by defamiliarising and distancing and making the reader 
aware that they are indeed a reader and not a spectator perched at the edge of the 
primary diegesis. I therefore agree with Fowler that “The text does not so much 
convey some cargo of information as remind the reader that the process of reading 
is a temporal experience.”64 In this way Mark (perhaps even more than Matthew, 
Luke or John) “intentionally avoids clarity and so teaches readers to shoulder 
responsibility for their responses to Jesus' story.”65 The transgression of diegetic 
layers is a significant component of this process. 
Mark intends the reading of his Gospel to solicit appropriate response and 
action, and the metaleptic effect of the parenthesis contributes to this end through 
foregrounding the narrative textures and roles of the narrator and narratee. This 
accentuates the urgency of shrewd readership and highlights the significance of the 
reader. Mark implies a highly self-involved model of readership and demands that 
readers are aware that they themselves are addressed from within the world of the 
text. Urgent discernment is required in the extra-diegetic world of the reader more 
than even the inter-diegetic world of Jesus, Peter, James, Andrew and John, for it is 
the post-resurrection reader who must face the eschaton and consequent trials.  
Where fictional narratives depend upon the immersion of the reader within the 
inter-diegetic universe of the characters, Mark’s Gospel depends absolutely on a 
sense of continuity between the inter-diegetic and extra-diegetic layers of the 
narrative and yet demands that the reader does not remain immersed in the story 
world: a faithful reading of Mark demands a paradoxical self-involvement wherein the 
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reader knows herself to be both included within the scope of the kerygma and yet 
also alive to the interpretative distance created by the new paradigm of her own 
context. Perhaps it is only the reader who accepts the invitation to break the frame of 
the narrative who can find the generative potential and the significance of the text’s 
provocation in their own life, as Rowan Williams has claimed: 
Revelation is essentially to do with what is generative in our experience – 
events or transactions in our language that break existing frames of reference 
and initiate new possibilities of life… Revelation decisively advances or 
extends debate, extends rather than limits the range of ambiguity and conflict 
in language. It poses fresh questions rather than answering old ones… Thus 
‘revelation’ is a concept which emerges from a questioning attention to our 
present life in the light of a particular past – a past seen as ‘generative’.66 
 
3.3 Omni-diegetic coherence  
Whilst the reader’s existence is never elsewhere acknowledged by characters in the 
primary or hypo-diegetic levels, the apostrophe of Mark 13:14 locates the reader on 
the same plane as Jesus’ disciples – for the reading community and the disciples all 
hear Jesus’ warnings and the narrators intervention prevents the reader from 
imagining that the warnings only apply to the disciples. This achieves an experience 
of ontological convergence, so that the readers’ own existence and that of the 
characters within the narrative seem to be located within a shared continuum. In the 
context of Mark 13:14 the apostrophe, when read,  punctures Jesus’ speaking not 
just with the extra-diegetic intrusion but also with the presence of the reader who 
cannot read “Let the reader be aware” without also hearing themselves being 
addressed. 
Whilst Matthew and Luke diverge in their re-presentation of the warning of 
Mark 13:14 they both recognised the warning as axiomatic to the engagement of the 
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reader – and applied the warning differently according to the needs of their readers. 
Mark’s text has inherent ambiguity and the incongruous nature of the parenthesis 
may have a greater effect than either Matthew or Luke’s more precise exhortations. 
In a simple sense the diegetic indeterminacy found in Mark 13:14 is not incidental to 
the structure of the story, it is quite possibly axiomatic to the narrative, for the explicit 
acknowledgement of the existence of the reader provides a cohesive framework for 
engagement with readers and audiences.  
The paradox of the narrative intrusion is that on one level it demands that the 
reader distinguishes their own world from that of the story-world, successfully 
“deautomatizing perception” and preventing any sense of immersion in the aesthetic 
representation of the text.67  Yet at the same time on another level the appeal for 
understanding presupposes that the urgency of Jesus’ words is as relevant to the 
reader as it was to Jesus’ audience. Here then is evidence that within the Bible itself 
is an invitation toward precisely the contemporaneity that Kierkegaard spoke of, for 
Mark demands that Jesus’ words to his disciples are heard and actively interpreted 
by every subsequent generation of readers. The parenthesis is unambiguous that it 
addresses readers in their own ‘now’, and that this moment is defined by, and 
situated in relation to, the kerygma of the Christ. There is inevitably debate about 
whether Mark had a particular presumed reader, or a community in mind when he 
wrote, and whilst the inclusion of the reader in parenthesis in chapter 13 does not 
resolve this question it does demonstrate that the gospel was written to be read 
(rather than being heard through the readership of a lector) and that Mark anticipated 
Jesus’ words operating with profound relevance beyond the thresholds of the story 
world. To read Mark’s Gospel without allowing a sense of contemporaneous 
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relevance in Jesus’ words is therefore to enjoy the aesthetic realism of Magritte’s 
The Treachery of Images without comprehending any French, or to crop the frame 
from Borrell del Caso’s Escaping Criticism so as to enjoy the depiction more fully.  
Whilst historical and/or geographical dissonance may lead modern or critical 
readers to feel more alienated from Jesus’ words than readers or hearers in the first 
century church, they cannot ignore the claim placed upon them by the narrative, 
particularly through the parenthesis that suggests that distance and time do not 
diminish the need for urgent understanding. Even though there is necessarily a 
sense of counterpoint between the first-century and the twenty first-century exegete, 
the text continues to provoke a sense of omni-diegetic coherence, whereby the 
worlds of the audience in the primary diegesis (Peter, Andrew, James and John) and 
the worlds of the extra-diegetic audience are bound together through the 
transcendent significance of Jesus’ words. 
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Chapter Four:  
“Oh that my words were written!” 
199 
1. Introduction 
1.1 ‘Oh that my words were written!’ 
Have pity on me, have pity on me, O you my friends, for the hand of God has 
touched me! Why do you, like God, pursue me? Why are you not satisfied 
with my flesh? "Oh that my words were written! Oh that they were inscribed in 
a book! Oh that with an iron pen and lead they were graven in the rock for 
ever! For I know that my Redeemer lives, and at last he will stand upon the 
earth; and after my skin has been thus destroyed, then from my flesh I shall 
see God, whom I shall see on my side, and my eyes shall behold, and not 
another. My heart faints within me! 
(Job 19:21-27) 
 
Job’s impassioned declaration, that he longs for his words to be recorded, is situated 
near the end of his response to his friend, Bildad. In exasperation at continued 
persecution by his friends, Job makes parallel assertions in this passage that a 
written record or a kinsman-redeemer will eventually vindicate him. The expression 
of yearning for a written demonstration of innocence, bracketed as it is by Job’s 
preceding torrent of frustration and his subsequent appeal for a vindicator, therefore 
feels like a very coherent conclusion to the rest of his response to Bildad in 19:1-27, 
for he is crying out in exasperation: since his friends clearly won’t exonerate him, 
surely posterity or a redeemer will? Throughout this response Job explores his sense 
of sequestration (“those whom I loved have turned against me” 19:19)  and 
eventually, finding no justification for his suffering in the words of his friend, nor any 
sense that God is being fair to him, Job cries out in frustration, “Why do you, like 
God, persecute me?”  This question, and its partner in the next hemistich, “Why are 
you not satisfied with my flesh?” (19:22), build on the growing isolation that Job 
reflects throughout 19:13-19. He says,  
He has put my brethren far from me, and my acquaintances are wholly 
estranged from me. My kinsfolk and my close friends have failed me; the 
guests in my house have forgotten me; my maidservants count me as a 
stranger; I have become an alien in their eyes. I call to my servant, but he 
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gives me no answer; I must beseech him with my mouth. I am repulsive to my 
wife, loathsome to the sons of my own mother. Even young children despise 
me; when I rise they talk against me. All my intimate friends abhor me, and 
those whom I loved have turned against me (19:13-19). 
 
Because of the sense of isolation and despair Job expresses, his desire for a record 
of his innocence and his desperate vision of a future redeemer feel perfectly 
understandable to the reader. They are derived from the deep personal anguish 
expressed so clearly in the preceding verses. As none of his current relationships 
provide a circumstance in which he could be vindicated he comes to the inevitable 
conclusion that his only hope for vindication is through the future action of a 
redeemer or through written record preserved in perpetuity. He suggests that his 
hope can only be realised through the dispassionate witness of written testimony or 
in the compassionate intervention of a benevolent kinsman-redeemer.1 
In this passage Job does not address God (who is spoken of in the third 
person) and, save the brief rhetorical questions of 19:22 (“Why do you pursue me as 
God does?”), he does not specifically address his friends. Thus the passage has a 
sense of soliloquy about it. In these verses Job manages at the same time to 
reassert his sense that his friends should be more sympathetic; to establish the basis 
of his claim against God (“evidence to be used in his coming ‘legal action’”); and 
somehow through iteration to remind himself of his own grounds for hope, namely 
that he will one day be vindicated. In some ways these verses function together as a 
list of possibilities which together offer Job tangible grounds for hope.2 
                                            
1
 Norman Habel suggests that the book of Job is structured so as to contrast God’s “celestial verdict 
declaring Job in the right” with “the earthly verdict of Elihu finding Job in the wrong.” Norman C. 
Habel, ‘The Role of Elihu in the Design of the Book of Job’, in In the Shelter of Elyon: Essays of 
Ancient Palestinian Life and Literature in Honor of G. W. Ahlström, ed. by W. Boyd Barrick, John R. 
Spencer, and Gösta Werner Ahlström (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1984), pp. 83 – 98 (p. 87). 
2
 Norman Whybray, Job (Readings, a New Biblical Commentary) (Sheffield: Phoenix Press, 2008), 
p.98. 
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Aside from the structural and sequential context a number of lexical 
observations are also noteworthy. The opening expression of verse 23, “Oh that…” 
(mi-yitten) is a recurring formula in Job which marks “momentous flights of hope” and 
therefore demonstrates a significant degree of continuity with the rest of the book of 
Job.3 Five other uses match hyperbole and desperation in a similar manner to the 
sentiments expressed in 19:23-24: 
Oh that I might have my request, and that God would grant my desire; 
that it would please God to crush me, that he would let loose his hand and cut 
me off! (6:8-9) 
 
Oh that you would keep silent, and it would be your wisdom! (13:5) 
 
Oh that you would hide me in Sheol, that you would conceal me until thy 
wrath be past, that you would appoint me a set time, and remember me! 
(14:13) 
 
Oh, that I knew where I might find [God], that I might come even to his seat! 
23:3-4 
 
Oh, that I had one to hear me! (Here is my signature! let the Almighty answer 
me!) Oh, that I had the indictment written by my adversary!  (31:35)4 
 
Job’s expressed desire for written testimony is consistent structurally and 
linguistically with the other utterances of deepest desire found throughout the book. 
Equally, the meter of the passage matches a rhythm that occurs numerous times in 
the book. The most common meter is a hemistich of two sets of three syllables, 
though the next most common patterns are longer units of 4 & 4 or 4 & 3.5 19:23a 
and 19:24a are examples of a third long meter 3+4 syllable unit, and there are twenty 
two occasions when this pattern emerges, often two or three times in quick 
                                            
3
 Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job: A Commentary (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1985), p. 303.  
4
 The phrase is also found on the lips of Zophar in 11:5, “But oh that God would speak, and open his 
lips against thee.” 
5
 W.B. Stevenson, The poetry of Job: a literary study with a new translation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1947), p. 57. He adds, “though shorter ones than normal are conspicuous by their rarity” (Loc. 
cit.). 
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succession.6 The complaints of some scholars such as C.J. Ball that the “Masoretic 
text is too long for the metre in 23a” are therefore unwarranted given the frequency 
of this asymmetrical pattern.7 Therefore translations which afford particular attention 
to the meter may merit more consideration than those which assert amendments. Of 
note are the efforts of W.B Stevenson, D. Wolfers and R. Alter, whose translations all 
achieve a lively sense of rhythm: 
I would that my words were written, 
with a pen of iron on lead. 
I would they were traced in a book, 
or forever engraved on a rock.8 
 
I would that my words were written,  
that they were inscribed in an archive.  
With iron pen on lead,   
Carved in the rock forever.9 
 
Would, then, that my words were written,  
that they were inscribed in a book, 
with an iron pen and lead,  
to be hewn in rock forever.10 
 
Each of these translations manages a sense of symmetry and syntax that reflects 
the alteration, assonance and rhythm of the Hebrew. Given that meaning and a 
literal faithfulness to the original text are achievable this should be seen as a strong 
indication that reconstructions of an alternative text are unnecessary. 
                                            
6
 Further exploration of this pattern is undertaken by Tur-Sinai who compares the destruction of 
compound parts of a sentence across rhythm stichoi in this text with a similar pattern found in Psalm 
29:8. Naphtali Herz Tur-Sinai, The Book of Job: a new commentary (Jerusalem: Kiryath Sepher, 
1967), p. 203. 
7
 C.J. Ball, The Book of Job a revised text and version (London: Clarendon Press, 1922), p. 275. 
8
 William Barron Stevenson, The poem of Job: a literary study with a new translation (New York: 
Kraus Reprint, 1980), p. 49. 
9
 David Wolfers, Deep things out of darkness: the book of Job: essays and a new English translation 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), p. 487. 
10
  Robert Alter, The wisdom books: Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes: a translation with commentary, 
(New York: WW Norton, 2011), p. 83. 
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1.2 Hypothesis 
Job’s plea that his case might be recorded for posterity in an enduring written 
testimony works on two different levels. On the surface this plea is a hyperbolic 
expression of Job’s confidence in his own innocence or YHWH’s righteousness. 
However, at another level it is a piece of narratological humour, in which the poet 
delights in the irony of his own craft. Job’s complaints in the preceding verses lead 
very naturally to a desire for a written record, and there is nothing incongruous about 
his appeal for indelible vindication. Whilst the appeal for enduring testimony found in 
19:23 lacks some of the characteristics that might be expected of a statement of 
narratological self-involvement, this is nevertheless an entirely appropriate lens 
through which to interpret the verse. It is virtually impossible to construe a context in 
which the author could have written about Job’s desire for written record without at 
the same time alerting readers to the fact that, in his own role as story-teller, he was 
creating precisely such a testimony. This suggests that the author considered it 
appropriate to enfold his own sitz im leben, humour and uncertainty within the 
paradigm of theological revelation. The verse reveals that the telling of the tale is a 
source of satisfaction and amusement for its writer, and as a consequence 19:23 is 
particularly significant in understanding the text, for the irony of the verse reveals that 
the author intends to be outlived by his text and is delighted at the prospect. In a 
sense in this verse, in the middle of profound theological confession, both Job and 
our writer are both equally the subjects of the joke. Job is shown to be entirely 
ignorant that his words are being written down and that he is a character in a story 
whilst the writer creates a legacy that, to be fulfilled, must outlive him (because for 
Job’s request to be fulfilled he cannot live to see the success of his artistry even 
though he creates a permanent record). “If only my words could be written down” is 
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thus a profound commentary on the historical remoteness of Job, the finitude of the 
poet and the reader’s similar confinement within an inexorable chronology and 
dependence on the providence of God. 
Significantly, the phrase, “if only my words could be written down” evokes at 
the same time a chorus of affirmation that Job’s words have indeed been written 
(“They are written down Job!”) and, de facto, an awareness in the audience that they 
are reading or hearing them.  There is in fact no humour at all in Job’s plea unless 
the audience responds with a privileged sense of awareness, rather like a 
pantomime audience might repeat the refrain, “He’s behind you!” Furthermore, this 
amused perspective is only possible if the audience is distant in time from the 
expression of desire for a permanent memorial, as it is precisely the audience’s 
separation from the narrator’s voice that achieves ironic realisation that Job’s plea 
has been fulfilled. The joke can only work in the presence of self-involved audience 
who are aware that there is a gap between the events of the story and their own 
hearing of it, for it is this distance that creates the degree of permanent vindication 
for which Job is so desperate. Thus a depth of mirth and satisfaction is available for 
the self-involved audience who are conscious of their hermeneutical participation, for 
only these remote readers can know that Job’s hopes have been more amply fulfilled 
than he could have imagined. 
The poet’s irony at this point is overlooked by every commentator with no 
references to the incidental amusement caused by the plea for written record, nor 
any observation of intentional humour. By contrast my contention is that the appeal 
for written vindication is fundamentally a self-referential joke. This hypothesis does 
not negate the place of verses 23-24 within Job’s own voice: for the plea functions 
naturally as a part of Job’s rhetoric and as a valid component of the response he 
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makes to the accusations of his friends. It is entirely to be expected, given Bildad’s 
obstinacy, that Job would cry out for a written memorial through scroll, stele, stylus 
or carving. Nevertheless I suggest that in this act of self-referential humour the poet 
includes himself within the frame of the text, increasing the reader’s awareness of 
the story-teller’s art, perhaps in part rather like countless artists have done in their 
paintings including, for example, Velazquez, painting himself into the background of 
The Maids of Honour.11                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
My suggestion is that there is a great deal of significance in these verses which 
evidence the self-referential voice of an accomplished poet joking not only about the 
fact that Job deserves a written legacy but also about his own role in this endeavour. 
Situated as it is in such proximity to the famous appeal to a kinsman redeemer 
(verses 25-27), Job 19:23-24 is commonly overlooked. Commentators anticipate the 
more exciting promise of a redeemer in the subsequent verse and pay minimal 
attention to the humour of the poet revealed here. However, given that the reference 
to writing in this verse is inherently self-referential and the irony self-targeted, the 
narrator’s inclusion of him/herself within the frame of the text as a subject of mirth 
may be of profound significance. Whilst the Joban poet expresses his own presence 
within the text only on this occasion, the nature of this self-involvement is unusually 
reflective. Though it reveals nothing of geography, theological provenance or cultural 
context, it does reveal that irony in the text is not ultimately or exclusively a 
theological tool and nor is YHWH the exclusive target of the author’s jesting. The 
evidence of the narrator’s self-referential humour within the primary diegesis 
suggests that he does not set out to subtly mock God, rather the entire book is 
                                            
11
 Similar famous examples of self-referential art include Michelangelo’s self-inclusion in his 1541 
Sistine Chapel The Last Judgement; Goya’s portrait of Charles IV and Jan van Eyck’s depiction of 
The Arnolfini wedding. 
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grounded and situated within a framework of omni-directional irony which is applied 
not only to the main characters, but even to the narrator. 
Consequently, close consideration of the nature of the written record alluded to in 
Job’s plea, and the comic context of the book are significant in establishing these 
verses as a self-aware metaleptic joke. This hypothesis depends to varying degrees 
on three premises:  
1. That complications in the received text are not so substantial as to discount 
the suggestion of a nuanced and subtle narratological joke about writing.  
2. That Job’s plea really is a request for a written record of some sort – an issue 
debated in some commentaries. 
3. That it would not be unusual for the author of Job to employ subtle and self-
effacing humour in this passage. 
It is not my intention that these considerations should be taken as proof that Job 
19:24 is a self-referential joke. Establishing the validity of the received text, 
examining what manner of writing is meant in this verse, and considering the style of 
the Joban narrator’s humour do not provide sufficient grounds for a deductive 
conclusion to this end. However, cumulatively these arguments do, at the very least, 
legitimate the possibility that at one level, the verse functions as as a self-
deprecating joke. I suggest these explorations cross a probability threshold, justify a 
renewed consideration of the poet’s humour and invite consideration of range of 
hermeneutical implications. To this end I first proceed through analysis of arguments 
regarding the received text of 23-24, examination of vocabulary related to writing 
within Job and review of the range and scope of humour within the book before 
attending to hermeneutical implications at the end of the chapter. 
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2. Self-referential Humour 
2.1 Controversial Interpretations 
There are three areas of debate regarding the context of Job’s cry for written 
testimony that require particular consideration: translation of the word la'ád (forever, 
19:24b), alteration of the term kathab (to write,19:23) and the meaning of the chiastic 
parallelism of ani (myself, verses 23 and 27). These areas of contention are very 
limited and consequently there is generally a sense of consensus regarding the 
location of verses 23-24 within its surrounding textual context and the broad meaning 
of the pericope. 
The translation of the word la'ád “for ever” in 19:24b was a common 
consideration in studies in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Theodotion and the 
Vulgate translated la'ád as “as a witness.” This change became popular again in a 
number of modern translation following John Peter Lange’s 1840 commentary.12 This 
amendment needs only the pointing to be adjusted with a sheva’ and a tsere, ‎ but 
with David Clines I consider this ‘arbitrary.’ 13 Conveying, as it does, precisely the 
permanence that might be desired of a written record, there is no good reason to 
reject translation of la'ád as “for ever.” Furthermore there is strong attestation for this 
translation in the parallel passage in Isaiah 30:8 because la'ád only makes sense if 
translated “forever.” F. Delitzsch has persuasively argued that, “one should follow the 
MT here in reading la'ád since in the present form of the text the three definitions of 
                                            
12
 Philip Schaff (ed.), Lange's Commentary on the Holy Scripture – an exegetical and doctrinal 
commentary, Volume 3: Job to Ecclesiastes, translated by Rev. Dunlop Moore and Rev. Samuel T. 
Lowrie (Harrington, Delaware: Delmarva Publications, 2014), p. 65. 
13
 David J. A. Clines, Job 1-20. Word Biblical Commentary 17 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1989), p. 
433. Clines notes that Micah 1:2 and Micah 7:18 have two different meanings for l’d, just as Job 
seems to in 16:8 and 19:24. See also Edouard Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job, Vol. 1, 
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1967), p. 282.  
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time form a climax: for the future, for the farthest future, for the unending future.”14 
Given the overt parallelism between Isaiah 30:8 and Job 19:24 it is therefore illogical 
to posit a different meaning for the same word. 
The second question regarding textual inaccuracy relates to a suggested 
alteration of kathab (to write or engrave) in 23a because of the repetition in 24 of the 
act of engraving (this time chatsab). Bernhard Duhn argued that the different words 
couldn’t possibly both be presumed to mean engrave.15 Kurt Galling and Clines 
(amongst others) have, however, refuted this idea suggesting the repetition contains 
an obvious and intentional hyperbaton (reversal of anticipated word order) so that 
“the extremely elegant arrangements of the words, [allows] bsphr to stand, per 
hyperbaton, emphatically prominent.”16  
Finally, David Wolfers has suggested that the duplication of ani (myself) in 
verses 25- 27 implies that the desire for a redeemer expressed in verses 25-27 
stands in emphatic contrast to the earthly hope considered in 23-24, and that the first 
ani in 19:25 (“but I know”) therefore demonstrates a rejection of written testimony as 
a form of vindication. According to Wolfers this is because passages in Job which 
duplicate ani “always place Job in contrast to the view of another.”17 Wolfers 
therefore suggests:  
                                            
14
 F. Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Isaiah II (1890), p. 29. 
15
 Bernhard Duhm, Das Buch Hiob (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1897). 
16
 Clines, Job 1-20, p.432. Kurt Galling, ‘Die Grabinschrift Hiobs’, Die Welt des Orients 1 (1954), pp. 
3-6. 
17
 Wolfers, Deep things, p. 382. Wolfers claims that such conflicts occur 20 times in Job “for the 
specific purpose of pointing a contrast between the speaker and another subject, usually the person 
being addressed. In v.7 there is an unmistakable use of this convention. The ani of this verse should 
therefore induce us to search of the context for a source of contrast to the speaker” (Loc. cit.). 
However, this “adversative continuation” is difficult to accept, as both the desire for a written record 
and the longing for the intervention of redeemer seem to be equally Job’s. 
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The waw of 25 does not imply any logical continuation (and), rather it seems 
to stand in adversative sense (but) – earthly wishes are vanity compared to 
the real hope of a redeemer.18  
 
This hypothesis is tenuous, particularly as the cumulative effect of 23-27 expresses 
such a remarkably similar intent to the cry found in 16:18-19, “O earth, cover not my 
blood, and let my cry find no resting place. Even now, behold, my witness is in 
heaven, and he that vouches for me is on high.” Nevertheless it remains possible 
that the author is pointing out the limitations even of the written memorial he is 
writing by contrast to the benevolence of a redeemer: an accent of further irony. 
Analysis of the meter, style, language and content of Job’s plea, “If only my 
words were written”, suggests it is a natural and coherent expression of his desire for 
eventual justification. Verses 23-24 represent an integral part of Job’s own speech 
and reveal significant artistry through parallelism of terms whose repetition create a 
sense of crescendo that is only diminished through attempts to correct or reconstruct 
the text.  
2.2 Books, Scrolls and Stelae 
The most common disagreement concerning to 19:23-24 relates to the meaning of 
sepher (book) in 23b. Whilst the majority of published translations interpret this as 
‘scroll’ or ‘book’ there are reasons for questioning this, and as a consequence the 
extent to which the passage is referring to writing, rather than to the erection of a 
stela or monument has been the subject of some debate. A second uncertainty 
surrounds the use of ophereth (lead) in 24b. Modern understanding leaves 
commentators uncertain as to how lead and iron might be used together to make 
lasting marks in stone. This question is of significance, for translations which suggest 
that each of the four hemistichs alludes to chiselling a monument necessarily 
                                            
18
 Loc. cit. 
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diminish the suggestion that the verses are part of a conscious self-referential joke. 
Whilst this possibility is not entirely negated, it is much harder to posit an intentional 
parallel between Job’s plea and the scribal work of the author if these verses do not 
in fact imply that Job wished his words to be written down in the same manner as the 
author himself was writing. There may be some irony in Job wishing for his words to 
be chiselled on rock, but the irony is more overt and self-referential if his plea is for 
words written in a scroll.  
Carving a book 
Whilst sepher normally means scroll, script or scribe, its employment in 23b is 
puzzling as the verb Haqaq (in the same verse) normally means to chisel or 
engrave.19 To many commentators it seems improbable that Job is referring to a 
book having letters cut into it and therefore a number suggest that b’sphr does not 
mean ‘in a scroll’, but is rather one of a number of foreign terms subsumed into Job’s 
language. This argument was first articulated by Henry S. Gehman. He noted that 
the “original connotation of the root sphr was ‘to cut’… accordingly sepher is 
juxtaposed with haqaq which in background is a synonym… to make sense of the 
words as they stand we render ‘Oh that in an inscription they were inscribed!’”20 
This suggestion has been widely received and adapted: A. Guillaume 
suggested “B’sphr is almost certainly Accadian as one does not cut letters in a 
book.”21 E. Dhorme, noting that haqaq is employed consistently to mean engrave but 
that the root sepher is of famously diverse meaning, suggested that “everything 
seems to suggest that we should recognise here, the Assyrian word siparru ‘copper’, 
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 David J.A. Clines (ed.), The dictionary of classical Hebrew, Vol. 3 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1996), p. 277. 
20
 Henry S. Gehman, ’רֶפֵם, an Inscription, in the Book of Job’, Journal of Biblical Literature 67, no. 3 
(1944), pp. 303-307 (p. 306). 
21
 Alfred Guillaume, Studies in the Book of Job with a new translation ed. by John Macdonald (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1968), p. 101. 
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‘brass’ which supposedly recurs in Isaiah 30:8 and Judges 5:14.” 22 Following similar 
logic but coming to a different conclusion, Norman Habel suggested that sepher was 
in some languages originally the word for a stele rather than book and he also cited 
Isaiah 30:8 as justification of this translation.23 Robert Gordis employed different 
logic but came to the same conclusion: “In view of Job’s desire for ultimate 
vindication b’sphr must refer to durable material and can scarcely mean “book” or 
“scroll,” particularly in view of the instruments mentioned in 24a.”24 Duhm found an 
entirely different way to reconcile the cutting with the book translating, “inscribed in 
his book” and suggested that the book in question may be the permanent record 
God keeps.25 
Thus b’sphr has been variously presumed to mean copper, stele, inscription 
or divine record – but on account of its being the object of the verb ‘to cut’ it is now 
rarely translated to mean a parchment/ papyrus book or scroll. Nevertheless I think 
there are three good reasons to maintain a conventional interpretation. Firstly, in Job 
31:35 sepher describes a book, in a context where, because Job promises to carry it 
on his shoulder, the word cannot have been referring to a stele, inscription or copper 
because each of these would have been too heavy, a fact missed in all the creative 
reconstructions I have reviewed. Here Job pleads:  
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 Dhorme, A Commentary, pp. 281-282. 
23
 Habel, The Book of Job, p. 292. Thus Habel’s translation is: “O if only my case were recorded! Oh if 
only it were inscribed on a stela, With iron stylus and lead, Carved on rock forever!”  Marvin Pope 
makes a similar argument: “The Copper treasure scroll at Qumran may be a record for posterity of the 
kind that Job is interested referring to.” Marvin H. Pope, Job: A New Translation with introduction and 
commentary. The Anchor Bible, Vol. 7 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 143. 
24
 Robert Gordis, The Book of Job: Commentary New Translation and Special Studies (New York: 
JTS Press, 1978), p. 202. 
25
 Duhm, Das Buch Hiob, p. 93. 
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Oh that one would hear me! Behold, my desire is, that the Almighty would 
answer me, and that mine adversary had written a book. Surely I would carry 
it on my shoulder; I would bind it on me as a crown (31:35).26 
  
Whilst in this instance the sepher in question is the object of the more common verb 
kathab this occurrence nevertheless indicates that to the author of Job sepher could 
mean a book or scroll. Secondly, as Clines argues “in view of the poor attestation of 
the supposed bsphr “copper” in Hebrew it remains preferable to take the word as 
meaning “inscription” and therefore applying to a written record.27 Finally, whilst it 
would be unusual to engrave words in a scroll it is not impossible at all that Job 
might ‘wish’ for such an inscription and that an emphatic cutting action, originally 
used to describe words being chiselled into monuments continued to be employed 
even after words were written in scrolls rather than carved in stele. In this instance 
haqaq might be taken to mean an emphatic and more permanent record than any 
mere kathab could provide and it is not therefore implausible to imagine Job longing 
for words to be cut into a scroll or for the narrator to offer precisely this unusual 
picture of an engraved scroll emphasising the extra permanency Job desires. 28 
Whilst there is some etymological ambiguity, the most frequent use of both 
‘inscription’ and ‘scroll’ makes the best sense of 19:23-24. Additionally the verb 
kathab (to write) is employed on 227 occasions in the Hebrew Bible and 
consequently any reading which diverts from suggesting that verse 23 is alluding to a 
specific written form of Job’s words is hard to justify. 
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 Gary Staats suggests usefully that in 31:35 Job is alluding to his afore-stated wish for a written 
testimony. Gary Staats, Commentary on Job (Washington: Logos Bible Software, 2009), p. 76.  
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 Clines, Job 1-20, p. 432. 
28
 A fourth point is made by Stevenson. He notes, “Yet words have been preserved in a book and 
would exceed the usual bounds of an inscription on a tablet of bronze.” However, this argument 
seems less than valid as it presumes that the book of Job is precisely the testimony Job wanted, 
whereas he might have been satisfied with a simple recorded of his protestations, which might very 
well have fitted on a small tablet. Stevenson, The poetry of Job, p. 86. 
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Multiple inscriptions 
The nature of the inscription in verses 23 does not substantially alter my notion that 
the author of Job was offering an ironic reflection on his own art. However, the 
impact of diverse suggestions regarding writing tools and materials is that there no 
consensus regarding the total number of ‘writings’ depicted in 23-24. Some suggest 
that Job is eager for three inscriptions: one in a book, one in iron and one on rock. 
Others suggest two: one of parchment and one in rock. A third suggestion is that Job 
appeals for one record, but hyperbolically alludes to all the techniques of literature 
that he can imagine. Whether what is imagined in these verses is actually one, two, 
three or four inscriptions does have some impact upon the thesis. I have mentioned 
above views which suggest there are two types of inscription (scroll and lead etched 
rock). This view is increasingly common. Prior to the growing acceptance of this view 
a number of commentators suggested a climactic progression from parchment to 
lead to rock, thus: 
O that my words were written 
Were engraved in parchment 
Or with an iron stylus on lead 
Or carved in rock for all times.29 
 
This view credits the text with the most regular symmetry, a view which has much 
credit given the repetition of key words and the precise parallelismus membrorum 
(parallelism between poetic lines) identified by most translators between 25 and  
26.30 
Nevertheless, whilst the most common suggestions are that two types of 
writing are alluded to, Robert Gordis finds only one inscription. He notes that 
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 This model and a virtually identical translation is also adopted by Samuel Rolles Driver and George 
Buchanan Gray, A critical and exegetical commentary on the book of Job: together with a new 
translation, Vol. 1 (New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1921), p. 170. 
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 Cf., Wolfers, Deep things, p. 486 ff. 
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Jeremiah 17:1 refers to two types of engraving on one type of material: “The sin of 
Judah is written with a pen of iron; with a point of diamond it is engraved on the 
tablet of their heart, and on the horns of their altars” (Jeremiah 17:1). Accordingly, 
therefore, he asserts that there is no need to posit a symmetrical relationship 
between the writing materials – in his view it is acceptable to imagine 23a and b both 
leading to the detailed description of verse 24. Gordis suggests Job is not asking for 
one or other type of writing, rather he is longing for the most permanent form 
possible – a carved stone. If this is the case it is possible that Job was merely 
alluding to his desire for a physical record of some description, rather than 
emphasising the significance of writing.31  
Naphtali Herz Tur-Sinai has also offered an approach which diminishes the 
significance of the appeal for a written testimony was that of. He suggested that Job 
had no desire at all for a written record, but was rather considering four different 
types of record, those recorded in parchment, in iron, in lead and in rock. He 
suggests that Job merely considers written testimony as a device which may have 
occurred to the audience of the poem so as to reject it as useless and unwanted: IN 
his view it should be understood that Job is saying “Should I comfort myself saying: 
Oh that my words were written down for ever… No! this is poor comfort for me who 
will soon be no more.”32 
Whilst I cannot agree with Tur-Sinai that Job’s desperate mi-yitten (“Oh – 
that…”) is actually a dismissal of the benefits of a written record, I can see no 
overwhelming reason for adopting any one of these models over the others. It seems 
                                            
31
 His suggestion is that “in view of Job’s desire for ultimate vindication bsphr must refer to durable 
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that what is required is acknowledgment that the text contains at the same time a 
clear pattern of progressive repetition and a degree of ambiguity. In technical poetic 
terms verses 23-24 contain a number of significant figures of speech:  
The repetition in 23a and 24b of ‘engrave’ kathab… chatsab is an example of 
‘adnominatio’ (repetition of a word but in a different form)  
“Mi-yitten…mli mi-yitten” (oh that they were… oh that my words…) in 23a+b is 
an example of ‘Paromoiosis’ (parallelism of sounds in words across adjacent 
clauses).  
The inclusion of several writing materials (sepher, barzel, ophereth, tsur) is 
evidence of ‘expolitio’ (repetition of the same idea, changing its words), 
‘palilogia’ (repetition in order to increase a sense of fullness or communicate 
passion) and ‘scesis onomaton’ (a series of successive, synonymous 
expressions.)  
The repetition and ambiguity of nomenclature together draw attention to both the 
talent of the author and the significance of Job’s desire for vindication. The narrator 
says in fifteen words what he could have said in four and thereby highlights the value 
of his own writing as a sympathetic testimony toward Job. 
Chocolate Teapots 
A final question regarding the writing implied in verses 23-24 is less critical to my 
hypothesis, but still of significance. There is some uncertainty concerning the use of 
the lead and iron to mark on stone. The syntax leaves uncertainty as to how the 
lead, iron and stone are related to one another, so that there are significant 
divergences in modern translations: 
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O that my words were written down! O that they were inscribed in a book! O 
that with an iron pen and with lead they were engraved on a rock for ever! 
(NRSV). 
 
Oh, that my words were recorded, that they were written on a scroll, that they 
were inscribed with an iron tool on lead, or engraved in rock forever! (NIV). 
 
I wish that my words could be written down or chiselled into rock (CEV). 
 
There remain a number of competing suggestions as to what method was being 
considered.  Whilst in theory a lead tool would be useless for chiselling an inscription 
into a rock, Dhorme has suggested that the text is actually alluding to “a known alloy 
of iron and lead, the lead serving the purpose of colouring matter to enable the 
engraver to mark out his letter before cutting into the stone.”33 He notes that iron and 
lead stand side by side as elements in an alloy mentioned in Ezekiel 22:20 (“They 
gather silver and brass and iron and lead and tin into the midst of the furnace”) and 
thus concludes with the following translation: 
Oh that my words might be written down, Oh that they might be engraved on 
brass, That with a tool of iron and lead They should remain engraved in the 
rock forever.34 
 
Conversely a number of translations have persisted with the idea that the text is 
referring to the use of an iron stylus punching letters into lead, like pen and paper.35 
William Brownlee in particular sought to emphasise the ancient practice of inscribing 
in lead for the sake of its permanence.36 He cited the Roman practice of using lead 
tablets for supplication or curse, noting that these tabellae devotionis were dropped 
into sepulchres in appeal to the gods precisely because of their permanence. His 
argument therefore was that if Job is seeking a permanent testimony of his legal 
case this practice might be exactly the sort which would appeal to him.   
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Nevertheless, the most common interpretation has been adopted from Rashi 
(Rabbi Shlomo Itzhaki, 1040-1105), who suggested that molten lead was run into the 
letters that had been chiselled in the stone. Robert Alter follows this view saying, 
“The lead initially puzzling, was explained by Rashi as the material used to darken 
the incised letters in order to make them more visible, and archaeology now offers 
some confirmation of this idea.”37 Whilst the archaeological evidence is not prolific 
the famous cuneiform inscription at Behistun seems to show this type of inscription 
with words above the head of Darius showing a residue of lead.38  
The evidence of the Behistun inscription and the interpretation of Rashi 
suggests that iron, lead and rock may, at the very least be imagined in use together. 
On the balance of probability therefore, if the iron pen, lead and rock represent one 
form of written record, ‘written and inscribed words that are inscribed in a scroll’ may 
also function cumulatively and represent one method of writing. The best translation 
of the verses therefore remains one that encompasses a double structure regarding 
writing on a scroll and writing on a stone – such as that of the RSV: 
Oh that my words were written! Oh that they were inscribed in a book!  
Oh that with an iron pen and lead they were graven in the rock for ever! 
 
2.3 Irony, Parody and Comedy 
There is very little doubt that the book of Job contains a significant depth of comedy. 
Works by James Williams (1971), William Whedbee (1977), David Robertson (1977), 
Yair Hoffman (1983), Bruce Zuckerman (1998), Dick Geeraerts (2003) and Abigail 
Pelham (2010) have convincingly emphasised a number of different elements in the 
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composition of Job that add humour to the narrative.39 Whilst a wide range of 
humour is universally acknowledged there remains considerable debate about the 
balance, direction and purpose of the Joban author’s irony. The depth, tenor and 
target of humour within the book is of fundamental significance to my approach to 
19:23-24, for my claim rests on the idea that the author could legitimately be 
expected to make a joke about his own role within the reception of the story. To this 
end I make the following observations: 
1.  Humour is evident at every level of the text: in dialogue, structure and plot; in 
the words of Job, the narrator, his friends and God. 
2. God, Job and Job’s friends are all subjects of humour and it is not reasonable 
to suggest that Job alone, or God alone is the target of humour. 
3. Given the background of the books as an exploration of natural suffering it is 
unsurprising that the most frequent comic images are related to nature and 
mortality. 
Cumulatively these propositions make a probabilistic case for my reading of Job 
19:23-24 as an example of self-effacing ‘gallows humour’ wherein the writer jokes 
about his own status and art. 
Entrenched humour 
Northrop Frye defined ancient comedy as a genre founded upon “a U-shaped plot, 
with the action sinking into deep and often potentially tragic complications, before 
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suddenly turning upward into a happy ending.”40 This is a description that William 
Whedbee suggests applies to the whole book of Job, in which Job’s descent into 
confused despair eventually leads to a paradoxical confession (in which he learns 
how much he does not know) and an unexpected ‘happy ending’. Whedbee 
suggests that the book is in the genre of a tragic-comedy: 
When the poem of Job is set in its full and final literary context, replete with 
Prologue and Epilogue as well as the Elihu speeches, the most apt generic 
designation of the book is comedy. In proposing a comic interpretation, I wish 
to… focus on that vision of comedy which has at least two central ingredients: 
(1) its perception of incongruity and irony; and (2) its basic plot line that leads 
ultimately to the happiness of the hero and his restoration to a harmonious 
society. When viewed from this perspective, Job emerges as "the great 
reservoir of comedy" (Christopher Fry). Thus we find such comic elements as 
caricature and parody in the depictions of Job's friends, young Elihu, God, and 
even Job himself. Moreover, the "happy ending" of Job, long a problem for 
interpreters, alters the tragic movement of the book and helps to confirm its 
comic side.41 
 
Yair Hoffman goes further than Whedbee, suggesting that Job, more than any other 
biblical book, “is constructed on all levels upon a basis of irony” and that moreover, 
this irony is “at God’s expense.”42  Irony is explained as ‘dissimulation between what 
is presented and what is actually the case’ and there is surely an abundance of 
dramatic and unexpected dissimulation developed at every level of the text. Hoffman 
suggests that the inadequacy of God’s answers to Job constitute an indirect 
confession from the author and an ironic admission of failure: 
The author guides the reader towards a critical evaluation of the doctrines of 
retribution presented in the speeches of God, thereby advancing the ironic 
statement that even God himself is unable to provide a suitable answer.43 
 
Hoffman is not alone in this synopsis: Katharine J. Dell for example has advocated a 
very similar position, claiming that the book of Job consistently misuses the form of 
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‘legal debate’ to entirely diminish the validity of the argument against Job, so that 
whilst both YHWH and Job’s friends present valid points, the structure of their 
arguments intentionally undermines them.44 
This thesis is understandable, after all consistent presence of irony within the 
book is rarely contested. Nevertheless it is a compositional fallacy to suggest that the 
frequent use of irony necessarily defines the whole text as ironic: irony may be one 
of the author’s tools without being his purpose. Indeed there is good evidence to 
suggest that humour is part of the internal hermeneutic of Job, but that far from being 
the purpose of the text, irony is embedded in the author’s worldview just as artistry is 
embedded in his poetry and familiarity with other Hebrew scripture is embedded in 
his language. Humour is found at every level within the theodicy including within the 
structure of the plot, intertextual allusions, caricatured roles and regular ironic 
allusions. These need to be considered as part of a continuum of amused authorship 
rather than as the sole purpose of the text.45 Hoffman and Dell’s arguments that the 
text pokes fun at YHWH focuses too narrowly at the dialogue between Job and God, 
and misses the evidence of characterisation, intertext and plot structure which all 
indicate that humour is part of the underlying matrix of the book rather than a tool to 
undermine God. 
The strongest evidence of the entrenchment of humour may be noted in the 
structural parodies which play on other biblical themes. These intertextual allusions 
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are noted by a range of commentators.46 In particular it is often noted that the 
wisdom genre is parodied in the words of Job’s friends; Psalm 8 is parodied in Job 
7:17-18; creation hymnody is parodied in 9:2-10 and the righteousness of the 
prophets is parodied in Job 9:28. These do not function primarily as a chance to 
mock preceding text or genre, and they are certainly not all ironic at the expense of 
YHWH. Instead they riff, play on prior structures and reveal a creative, humorous 
and iconoclastic hermeneutic. The following examples show how Joban intertext 
functions first and foremost as a humorous development of preceding texts, opening 
new doors to uncertainty rather than repeating the prior theological edifice. 
What is man that thou art mindful of 
him, and the son of man that thou dost 
care for him? (Psalm 8:4) 
 
What is man, that thou dost make so 
much of him, and that thou dost set thy 
mind upon him, dost visit him every 
morning, and test him every moment? 
(Job 7:17-18) 
 
If I say, “I will not mention him, or 
speak any more in his name,” 
there is in my heart as it were a 
burning fire shut up in my bones, 
and I am weary with holding it in, and I 
cannot. (Jeremiah 20:9) 
 
If I say, “I will forget my complaint, I will 
put off my sad countenance, and be of 
good cheer,” I become afraid of all my 
suffering, for I know thou wilt not hold 
me innocent. I shall be condemned. 
(Job 9:27-29) 
 
Who looks on the earth and it 
trembles, who touches the mountains 
and they smoke! I will sing to the 
LORD as long as I live; I will sing 
praise to my God while I have being. 
(Psalm 104:24-33) 
 
Who alone stretched out the heavens, 
and trampled the waves of the sea; who 
made the Bear and Orion, the Plei'ades 
and the chambers of the south; who 
does great things beyond 
understanding, and marvellous things 
without number… For he crushes me 
with a tempest, and multiplies my 
wounds without cause; he will not let me 
get my breath, but fills me with 
bitterness. (Job 9:8-18) 
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In each of these examples the Joban hermeneutic sardonically inverts the building 
block of prior theological confidence offering a nuanced sense of a text that might 
otherwise stand in condemnation of Job. JiSeong James Kwong has argued in 
similar fashion that intertextual allusion to Deutero-Isaiah brackets key doxological 
phrases such as “He who alone stretched out the heavens” (which is found only in 
Isaiah 44:24 and Job 9:8) with “Job’s despairing lament.”47 Consequently, the Joban 
text seems to share a depth of theological language whilst inviting honesty about the 
human experience. The history and inherited traditions of the prophets, the psalms 
and the Torah are thus included in Job’s quest for vindication, for with only moderate 
filter they are teasingly opened to new possibility and question, with the notion that 
suffering is a punishment for the unrighteous exposed and, potentially, rehabilitated. 
It is an oversimplification to suggest that the re-interpretative process mocks prior 
text. Sometimes intertextual references in Job are of no ironic consequence (19:24 
being a good example), sometimes intertext is employed for multiple conflicting aims 
(e.g. the lexical links between Psalm 104 and the speeches of Job, Elihu and 
YHWH), sometimes the intertextual re-affirms the prior text uncritically (e.g. Psalm 8) 
whilst sometimes, through a new context it subverts it (Jeremiah 20). These texts 
remain in dialogue with Joban theology, neither being consistently agreed with, nor 
being consistently ridiculed. They are involuntary dialogue partners in a poetic form 
of theological conversation which never quite climaxes into an elenchus or a 
refutation of prior theodicy or anthropology. The Joban poem is able to hold different 
theological positions together in tension, “disclosing the limitations of each but also 
the degree of truth present in them all.”48 As Carol Newsom has suggested,  
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In dialogue, rival perspectives concerning what is required of a person of 
piety…contest one another and enlist a network of implications and 
engagements. Read as a polyphonic work, the purpose of the book of Job is 
not to advance a particular view… Rather, its purpose is to demonstrate that 
the idea of piety in all its contradictory complexity cannot in principle be fitted 
within the bounds of a single consciousness.49 
 
Intertextuality then sometimes adds to the irony of the text, but this is certainly not 
always the case. The intertextual elements of the theodicy contain elements of 
parody, but they also add depth to the depiction of the divine, they form a theological 
backdrop to the argument explored by Job, and infer intertextual force upon the 
voices of God, Job and his friends. Every allusion helps to contextualise the Joban 
complaint within the prior theology of wisdom, creation, faithful prophecy, doxology 
and divine proclamation. Just as it is mono-dimensional to claim that intertextuality in 
Job is intended to mock prior traditions it is also a caricature of the narrator’s humour 
to claim that God is the sole target of parody. Humour is found at every level of the 
construction of the book as a lens through which the motif of the righteous sufferer 
can be explored with honesty.  
Indiscriminate subjection 
David Robertson, Abigail Pelham and Dick Geeraerts, along with Hoffman and Dell 
(above), have separately suggested that the focus of the irony, satire and parody in 
Job is fundamentally aimed at God. Robertson claims that irony functions primarily 
as “a joke at YHWH’s expense”, Pelham contends that the humour of the tale 
achieves “an ironic anti-climax that may oblige actually God to appear”, and 
Geeraerts argues: 
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If we contrast the common expectation of an omnipotent God with the image 
drawn in the Book of Job - the image, that is, of an all too human, fumbling, 
embarrassed God - then the text has an overall ironic meaning. 50 
 
The conclusion of these arguments is that the humour in the book combines to 
undermine the case against Job and consequently to diminish the reader’s sense 
that God can be definitively described as just. Pelham says that the book of Job 
ultimately leaves us “waiting for the comedy of life to be invested with meaning, to be 
made tragic.”51 Robertson goes further still, suggesting that:  
The irony in Job is all pervasive, encompassing the entire book in its arms, so 
that, for example, YHWH's speeches are a joke on him, Job's replies tongue-
in-cheek, and the ending ludicrous… Even Job's repentance is "tongue-in-
cheek:" the hero bows his head but with a sidelong glance to his audience he 
winks his eye. 52 
 
Katharine Dell contributes to this thesis, adding that whilst Job’s friends seem (at 
least on the surface) to be frequently correct, the audience, having heard the 
prologue, knows that their ‘wisdom’ is actually ill-informed vanity. As Dell puts it, 
“misuse of forms highlights Job’s friends’ ignorance through reinterpreting their legal-
ease sceptically/ironically.”53  Dell and Robertson both also assert that God’s 
sarcasm is itself subversively ironic. They have separately argued that because 
God’s style of response is so similar to Job’s it seems at least possible that the 
author is reducing him to Job’s level. God repeats Job verbatim (“I will not keep 
silent” 41:12) and speaks with the same indignation and hyperbole.54 Consequently 
Robertson wonders if God’s rhetoric is deliberately no more satisfying than Job’s 
indignation. Further, Dell (and Whedbee) suggests that God speaks in the same 
voice as Job and that a significant portion of God’s own defence depends on the 
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characteristics of two mythical beasts, which ultimately renders his heavy handed 
approach less satisfying than Job’s own humour. This, they suggest, leads 
necessarily to the conclusion that God’s sarcasm is ultimately penned as an 
expression of theological scepticism.55 
I find these approaches unsatisfying. The depth of humour across the book of 
Job seems too indiscriminate to be explained as a subtly undermining ironic clue that 
reduces the theodicy to a criticism of the divine, and such a conclusion negates the 
complexity of the theological picture in the text. As James Williams concludes: 
At times, may I admit, I think that the whole thing is terribly funny. But irony is 
never really funny is it? For what kind of universe must Job now live in? A 
meaningless universe mismanaged by a chaotic, capricious, jealous Tyrant. 
But I confess that I have a problem with this reading of Job… It makes sense 
of the text and does not involve a tortuous moulding, yet I revolt against it.56 
 
With Williams, Bruce Zuckerman searches for an explanation of the irony and 
humour within the text and concludes that the book of Job was written as a parody of 
the stereotypical righteous sufferer as well as a satirical critique of divine 
omnipotence. 57 This view is more reasonable, but even this may understate the 
range of humour in the text.  My suggestion is that the humour in the book of Job is 
indiscriminate – with God, Job, his friends, the created order and even the narrator 
himself becoming the butt of one joke or another.  
The following quotations illustrate the range of those within the text who are 
targeted subjects of the narrator’s humour. This omni-directional humour is of 
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genuine significance, particularly as it diminishes the claim that the irony in Job is 
fundamentally focused on the divine. 
Job himself is witheringly questioned by God, rendering some of his 
confidence grotesque. Here, sarcasm and rhetorical questioning invite a humorous 
vision of humanity and of manliness. The very notion of righteous indignation is hard 
to countenance when juxtaposed with an image of a man having to tuck his tunic 
between his legs to face physical challenge, and the metaphor makes anthropic 
grumbling seem absurd: 
Gird up your loins like a man; I will question you, and you declare to me. 
Will you even put me in the wrong? Will you condemn me that you may be 
justified? Have you an arm like God, and can you thunder with a voice like 
his? Deck yourself with majesty and dignity; clothe yourself with glory and 
splendour. (40:7-9). 
 
God’s indignation regarding Job’s finitude and his lack of perspective also invites the 
reader to acknowledge that she shares Job’s ignorance and his lamentable finitude: 
Where is the way to the dwelling of light, and where is the place of darkness, 
that you may take it to its territory and that you may discern the paths to its 
home? You know, for you were born then, and the number of your days is 
great! (38:19-21) 
 
It is clearly hard to sustain the argument that God’s treatment of Job must be 
interpreted as subtle iconoclastic mockery of the divine figure. It is true that YHWH 
consistently plays upon the power imbalance between himself and his creature and 
this does not endear him to the reader as a figure of generosity or care. It is also true 
that there is surprising similarity between the style of speech employed by God and 
by the flawed humans he challenges. Nevertheless God’s speeches first and 
foremost provoke a genuine awareness of the boundary of the human being rather 
than a rebellion against his perceived heavy-handedness. 
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Like Job, Job’s friends also suffer sarcastic riposte that mocks their wisdom 
and care. It is noted by a number of commentators that the friends resemble the 
classical comic figure of the alazon, a stock character in Greek theatre known as an 
imposter and offender, who views himself significantly more favourably than he 
ought. According to Sypher this is typical of what happens to the alazon: 
In the course of the comic debate the supposed wisdom of the alazon is 
reduced to absurdity, and then the alazon himself becomes a clown.58 
 
In the second and third cycles of speeches the friends come increasingly ludicrous 
resorting, ad nauseam to endless repetition. Cox suggests that “in ridiculing they 
become ridiculous.” This notion is also iterated by Whedbee, who adds that “the 
friends become cruelly and grotesquely comic as they strive with increasing 
dogmatism to apply their faulty solutions to the wrong problem.”59 The most obvious 
example of humour at their expense is Job’s own criticism of them: 
Galling comforters are you all. Have windy words a limit? What moves you to 
prattle on? I, too, could talk like you if you were in my place. I could harangue 
with words, I could shake my head at you, I could strengthen you with my 
mouth, My quivering lips would soothe you. (16:2b-5). 
 
How you have helped the powerless, Aided the arm that had no strength! 
How you have counselled the unwise, Offered advice in profusion! 
With whose help have you uttered words, Whose breath came forth from you? 
(26:2-4). 
 
Elihu is also singled out as a focus of some comedy. Patrick Skehan has described 
him as “a caricature.”60 This notion may be justified by “the ludicrous boastfulness of 
Elihu’s introductory remarks [which] may have been introduced as a comical element 
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to relieve the tragic tension.”61 Here, unambiguously, Elihu plays the role of the 
younger generation who criticise the old. His hubris and confidence match the 
stereotype of the foolish youngster. 
I am young in years, and you are aged; therefore I was timid and afraid to 
declare my opinion to you. I said, `Let days speak, and many years teach 
wisdom.' But it is the spirit in a man, the breath of the Almighty, that makes 
him understand. It is not the old that are wise, nor the aged that understand 
what is right. (Job 32:6-9) 
 
Even the mighty Levi’athan represents an opportunity for a joke, his power 
reimagined in the context of a domestic pet: 
 “Will you play with him as with a bird, or will you put him on leash for your 
maidens?” (41:5) 
 
It must be concluded that there is no character, creature, theme or category that is 
considered inappropriate as a subject of humour. 
Death and Dying 
The frequency of humour regarding mortality is a final theme that supports my 
hypothesis.  This is not surprising given that the text is a theodicy, and that it 
continually juxtaposes human finitude with the eternal and almighty power of the 
divine. Nevertheless the author’s willingness to include the devastation of death and 
the reality of dying within the scope of his humour adds somewhat to the claim 
regarding 19:23. If, in this verse, the author is making a self-referential joke at his 
own expense highlighting the longevity of the text against his own finiteness, it 
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should be expected that elsewhere in the book there is evidence of the author’s 
willingness to laugh at these themes. There is ample evidence of precisely this 
approach throughout the book: 
Can mortal man be righteous before God? Can a man be pure before his  
maker? Even in his servants he puts no trust, and his angels he charges with 
error; how much more those who dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is 
in the dust, who are crushed before the moth. Between morning and evening 
they are destroyed; they perish for ever without any regarding it. If their tent-
cord is plucked up within them, do they not die, and that without wisdom?' 
(4:17-21) 
 
No doubt you are the gentry; and with you wisdom will die.(12:2) 
 
 
One dies in full prosperity, being wholly at ease and secure, his body full of fat 
and the marrow of his bones moist. Another dies in bitterness of soul, never 
having tasted of good. They lie down alike in the dust, and the worms cover 
them. (21:23-26) 
 
[The Ostrich] deals cruelly with her young, as if they were not hers; though her 
labour be in vain, yet she has no fear; because God has made her forget 
wisdom, and given her no share in understanding. When she rouses herself to 
flee, she laughs at the horse and his rider. (39:16-18) 
 
In each of these instances the author explores mortality teasingly. The metaphor of 
the tent-cord, the irony of dying with much wisdom, the moist marrow of dead bones 
and the laughing ostrich, who leaves her young each evince an irreverent approach 
to mortality and a remarkably erudite artistry. Without doubt here, and in other 
occasions where men are described enjoying their days “like a hireling” (14:6), where 
even their “steps are numbered” (14:13), where Job suggests he would like to “die in 
his nest” (29:18) and in the final verse when he dies “full of days!” (42:17), death is 
the subject of ribaldry, fascination and contempt. Given this context it would be 
almost perverse if the narrator’s own mortality were not within his mind whilst he 
wrote and it therefore seems distinctly possible that beneath Job’s appeal for a 
written record lies a self-referential poetic expression of ‘gallows humour.’ 
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3. Hermeneutical Implications 
3.1 Corresponding Worlds 
The joke of 19:23 draws attention to the narrator’s own artistry and circumstance for 
only the briefest of moments. This passing appearance is a little like Brecht’s stage 
hands, whose presence instantly lays bare the mechanisms by which the dramaturgy 
is produced and prohibit ‘romanticised gawping’. The narrator’s self-referentiality 
consequently diminishes profoundly the reader’s sense that the text contains an 
absolutely omniscient or authoritative voice. How then, is the reader persuaded to 
accept the authority and theological validity of the text? 
 In laying bare the device and locating himself and the reader as witnesses to 
Job’s suffering, the narrator invites a reading that is primarily theological rather than 
historical. The inclusion of a proleptic joke suggests that the narrator and reader are 
both equally intended to play a role within the narrative as witnesses of Job’s 
experience and that, however, temporally remote they might be, it is the witness of 
the narrator and the reader that vindicates Job and rehabilitates his reputation extra-
textually as a righteous sufferer. In this reading Job’s friends become literary foils – 
their faithless failure and their foolishness corrals the reader to an antithetical 
sympathy and encourages the reader to stand up for the righteous sufferer and play 
the part of kinsman-redeemer. It is not that the reader forecloses the necessity of a 
future living redeemer, rather, in every generation until Job’s eventual justification 
before the throne of God, the reader, as long as she sides with Job (which the 
prologue demands she must), plays the role of temporary vindicator. Job’s plea for a 
mediator, and then for a witness, crescendos towards his plea for a written record 
and a kinsman-redeemer: 
231 
He is not a man, as I am, that I might answer him, that we should come to trial 
together. There is no umpire between us, who might lay his hand upon us 
both. Let him take his rod away from me, and let not dread of him terrify me. 
Then I would speak without fear of him, for I am not so in myself. (Job 9:32-
35) 
 
Even now, behold, my witness is in heaven, and he that vouches for me is on 
high. My friends scorn me; my eye pours out tears to God, that he would 
maintain the right of a man with God, like that of a man with his neighbour. 
(Job 16:19-21) 
 
The reader, knowing Job’s innocence, feels compelled towards mediating or 
interceding on Job’s behalf, and acting as a witness to his innocence. The knowing 
wink in ‘if only my words could be written’ therefore comes as a relief, for the written 
words suggest that the reader is not alone in the endeavour to represent the 
innocence of the righteous sufferer – the narrator is also working to this end. 
Implicitly, the existence of the Joban cry for a written testimony includes the book’s 
audience in the community of the faithful who have written, have read, have 
empathised, have advocated or argued on Job’s behalf. There is a chain of reception 
that starts within the text itself in the narrator’s joke, and this interior narratorial self-
involvement invites a corresponding agency in the world of the reader. 
Job then is an archetype and a figure, and the drama of his suffering 
anticipates that the reader will fulfil the role of witness to the written record of his 
suffering. The self-referential narrative allusion regarding the written record of Job’s 
case short-circuits Job’s pleas: in the very act of being read the plea invites the 
reader to vindicate Job’s righteousness, and thus become a figural answer to Job’s 
prayers. 
The narrator’s inclusion of the reader within his joke also reveals that the 
Joban theodicy is narrated with the presupposition of comparability between Job’s 
world and that of the reader, and an implied sense of contiguousness. The narrative 
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is written with the expectation that the same types of suffering experienced in the 
figural world will be known in the reality of the reader: indeed the theodicy depends 
on the fact that Job’s indignation at his unjust suffering resonates in the experience 
of the reader. The narrator’s ironic allusion to himself as one who records Job’s 
words for posterity adds to the sense that a presumed trans-diegetic correspondence 
of experience lies behind the narrative. The reader is invited into a conspiratorial 
defence of the righteous sufferer and, perhaps, as they fulfil this role readers are 
learning to provide consolation for those who suffer in their own world in radical 
counterpoint to the foolish counsel provided by Job’s incompetent friends. 
3.2 Narrative mediation 
Given the irony throughout the narrative and the explicit relativity of relationship 
between the audience and the narrator established through this joke, it follows that 
such humour is potentially a tool established by the narrator to ensure that the 
reader is “drawn into an act of reading that involves an active part on stage rather 
than a discreet view from the upper balcony.”62 This unavoidable spectator role is 
particularly significant for the Joban audience, as it locates the reader in the role of 
jury, witness and potentially as vindicator of his innocence.63 As the narrative has 
established Job’s innocence from the beginning in a heavenly scene which the 
audience is aware of, but which Job’s friends are not, the audience, once aware of 
their role as active witnesses, feel inescapably engaged in the quest for his 
exoneration. As Job’s friends offer him no absolution or comfort the narrator places 
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increasing burden on the audience to understand their role as potential vindicators: 
an example of an ‘auto-implicatif’ obligation.64 
The role of the narrator is equally interesting, for whilst the narrator’s jesting 
introduces the audience to their role as reader, the joke of 19:23 also highlights the 
presence of the narrator as a mediator between the situation described and the 
reader. Any act of narrative releases a story into a world of uncertain reception and 
this normally results in the loss of control and power for an author.65 In this one verse 
however, the narrator positions himself as the fulcrum between the sufferer and their 
vindication. The Joban narrator unleashes a poetic theodicy into the world with 
confidence that the proposed solution will win the audience around. The text is filled 
with confidence that suffering is not a consequence of unrighteousness and that 
indeed, as the aphorism suggests, ‘bad things happen to good people’. In some 
sense the allusion to Job’s need for a written record is like an artist’s signature and 
represents the narrator’s desire for recognition of his own role. The narrator in this 
one verse highlights his own central role in the drama of the narrated theodicy, he 
never appears within the drama overtly but his presence off stage is undeniable (a 
little like Godot in Beckett’s Waiting for Godot). In a sense the narrator here 
highlights the fact that his own work in recording Job’s suffering is what secures 
temporal exoneration for him. It is in the act of writing that Job is rescued from a 
literary lifetime of uncertainty as a biblical prefiguration of Schrödinger’s cat: hanging 
equally between judgement and vindication. The mediation of the narrator introduces 
the audience as a witness to Job’s suffering and thereby creates an act of 
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observation that results in certainty for the sufferer: he exists not in a purgatory of 
injustice, but in perpetuity as a figure of righteousness.  
The role of the narrator as mediator is worthy of further consideration. Whilst it 
is obvious that the narrator mediates between Job and his sympathetic audience, it 
is also possible that the narrator situated himself as mediator between Job and God, 
and, it might be inferred, Israel and God.66 In the self-referential joke of 19:23 the 
narrator shows self-awareness of his role and of the capacity of his writing to 
vindicate both Job and Israel, of whom Job functions as a figure in many ways. 
Wolfers, for example, argues that the writer of the book is a “heretic” disagreeing 
with the theodicy of the Deuteronomistic historian.67 Wolfers’ list of Deuteronomic 
quotations and allusions implies that the narrator of Job was familiar with 
Deuteronomy and that Job’s suffering is a litany of the curses of Deuteronomy 28. 
Taking the role of story-teller and ensuring that Job is vindicated therefore suggests 
that the Joban narrator is also acting as the counterpart to ha-satan (‘the satan’), the 
adversary, of Job 1:6-12.68 Where ha-satan accuses and tests, the narrator mediates 
and intercedes, presenting Job’s case to the audience and suggesting a context for 
Job’s divine vindication. The narrator therefore presents his own role as affording 
temporary earthly prefiguration of the heavenly advocate, as though lasting memorial 
represents a step towards eventual redemption.69 The connection between the 
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immediate mediation of the narrator alluded to in the self-referential joke and the 
eventual mediation of the ultimate redeemer is evident in the ease of transition from 
the longing for the written record to the confident declaration of eschatological 
vindication: 
If only my words were written, if only they were cut in a book  
With a pen of iron on lead, carved on rock forever: 
But I know that my redeemer lives, 
and he will stand up on the earth in the end.70 
 
Given the narrator’s role in helping to fulfil Job’s longing for vindication, it is arguable 
that the narrator is also fulfilling a mediating role on behalf of other righteous 
sufferers, including perhaps, Israel. The narrator, as counterpoint to the adversary, 
presents a story which suggests that suffering is the consequence of adversarial 
testing. Through this perspective he proffers hope that despite Deuteronomistic 
curses, Israel may legitimately confront God, if not face to face, then at least through 
arbitration. 
The book of Job is [thus] an example of scripture in conversation with itself as 
it draws on other biblical texts, challenges their veracity and relevance, and 
draws new conclusions. 71 
 
This is nowhere more obvious than in the plea for a written record, for in this moment 
the Joban author references his own artistry and at the same time subverts God’s 
instruction to the prophet Isaiah. Instead of taking up the role of the witness against 
Israel, as was demanded of Isaiah, in his self-referential joke the Joban narrator re-
casts the role of witness as one whose story-telling resists dogmatic theodicies and 
instead testifies against injustice, inequity and suffering. Forging a sympathetic brief 
for himself, the Joban narrator does what is demanded by the prophets but achieves 
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a quite different end, attesting to the innocence of the righteous sufferer and the 
people who wrestle with God, rather than their guilt. 
And now, go, write it before them on a tablet, and inscribe it in a book, that it 




Chapter Five:  




1.1 Which master? 
He also said to the disciples, "There was a rich man who had a steward, and 
charges were brought to him that this man was wasting his goods. And he 
called him and said to him, `What is this that I hear about you? Turn in the 
account of your stewardship, for you can no longer be steward.'  
 
And the steward said to himself, `What shall I do, since my master is taking 
the stewardship away from me? I am not strong enough to dig, and I am 
ashamed to beg. I have decided what to do, so that people may receive me 
into their houses when I am put out of the stewardship.' So, summoning his 
master's debtors one by one, he said to the first, `How much do you owe my 
master?'  He said, `A hundred measures of oil.' And he said to him, `Take 
your bill, and sit down quickly and write fifty.' Then he said to another, `And 
how much do you owe?' He said, `A hundred measures of wheat.' He said to 
him, `Take your bill, and write eighty.'  
 
The master commended the dishonest steward for his shrewdness; for the 
sons of this world are more shrewd in dealing with their own generation than 
the sons of light.   
 
And I tell you, make friends for yourselves by means of unrighteous mammon, 




The Parable of the dishonest steward is one of the most enigmatic of Jesus’ 
teachings. The parable is found only in the Gospel of Luke. It is located in a section 
which recounts Jesus’ journey from Galilee to Jerusalem (Luke 9:51 to 19:27). It 
succeeds the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32) and is followed by the 
parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31). The parable begins in 16.1 
with the standard idiom “there was a certain man” (anthrōpos tis ēn plousios), similar 
versions of which also appear in 16:19 (almost identically: “There was a certain rich 
man”, anthrōpos de tis ēn plousios); 7:41 (“And there was a certain creditor”); 14:16 
(“A certain man once gave a great banquet”); 15:11 (“There was a certain man who 
had two sons”); and 19:12 (“A certain nobleman”). Whilst this introductory formula 
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marks fairly clearly the beginning of an embedded parable there is considerable 
debate about the textual limits of the parable, the relationship between the parable 
and the appended teachings and the meaning of the parable itself.  
There are a number of problems for the reader, “which have been multiplied 
by scholars into incalculable difficulties.”1 The accepted crux of problems 
surrounding interpretations of the parable is undoubtedly to be found in verse 8a, 
where “The Master commended the unjust steward” (kai epēnesen ho kyrios ton 
oikonomon tēs adikias). The master’s praise appears incongruous and without 
justification, for the steward has been doubly dishonest. The multitude of articles 
seeking exegetical resolution for this verse demonstrates how difficult it is to 
comprehend why the master would laud the shrewdness of one who had just 
cheated him.  
This incongruity is accentuated by the abnormally opaque meaning of the 
parable – after all, whilst it would be strange for a master to praise his steward it 
seems even less probable that Jesus would employ a tale of such unrighteousness 
as an example for his disciples. Further, the odd moral message with which Jesus 
ends the parable also solicits attention. “Making friends by means of unrighteous 
mammon” is not only without parallel in other accounts of Jesus’ teaching, it is 
entirely at odds with other Lucan teachings about the use of wealth, notably Luke 
14:12-14, in which precisely the reverse practice is advocated. In addition, whilst 
“making friends by means of unrighteous mammon” is recommended in one clause, 
in the next Luke implies condemnation of the steward, explicitly criticising unfaithful 
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stewardship: “And if you have not been faithful in that which is another's, who will 
give you that which is your own?” 
Modern readership can be usefully divided according to the solution that is 
offered to the initial problem question, “Why does the master praise the steward?”2 
The secondary issues regarding why Jesus uses the tale and how the subsequent 
teaching matches the parable can only be attended to once a model explaining verse 
8a has been resolved. Approaches to this verse may be classified broadly as follows:  
1. Praise is offered for some reason that is now obscured because of 
mistranslation or misunderstanding at some point in the transmission of the 
story. 
2. The rich man praises the steward because he comes to a realisation of some 
moral, social or financial benefit to himself (enlightened self-interest). 
3. Jesus’ praise for the steward is ironic, and through his words he intends 
castigation of those who unworthily seek to buy friendship (ironic praise). 
4. Jesus praises the steward even though he is a cheat, because although he 
has stolen from his master he has been generous, 
5.  Even though he has been deceitful, the steward is an example of shrewdness 
and this is why he is praised. 
Each of these approaches merits careful analysis as a departure point for further 
consideration regarding the meaning of the tale and its application. 
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1.2 Why does the master praise the steward? 
Errata 
There are three different suggestions as to where in the text errors might have 
occurred in translation or transmission which have resulted in the received text losing 
the original meaning of the parable. Some suggest the Greek preposition ek (from) is 
the problem, some posit the term adikia (unrighteous) has been mistranslated and a 
third theory suggests ambiguity in the Aramaic terms brk and ‘rym, have resulted in 
Greek translations of plousias (shrewdness) and epenensen (praise) where the 
original ought to have been rendered “foolishness” and “condemnation”. 
The earliest modern suggestion of mistranslation came from H. Compston 
(1920) who supposed that Jesus’ exhortation in 16:9 was misunderstood or 
mistranslated by Luke.3 In his view the instruction to “Make friends for yourself by 
means of unrighteous mammon” is an exhortation which makes little sense in its 
current form. He cited 12 examples from the Oxford Hebrew Lexicon in which the 
preposition min (from) which he presumed to be the most likely Aramaic idiom 
leading to the use of ek (from) in the Greek, was used to mean ‘away from’ or 
‘without.’4 His alternative reading therefore has Jesus say, “Make friends without 
dirty money, so that when wealth fails or ye die, you will have a more enduring 
refuge.”5 
R. Scott extended this argument further by highlighting the Aramaic context of 
the verse and claiming that, ‘the mammon of unrighteous’ is as Hebraistic a phrase 
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as one could expect to find, even in Greek translation and therefore “it would be 
natural to regard the preceding preposition also as a Semitism.”6 This would mean 
that he Aramaic min, might have been the original term, and one of its meanings is 
“away from”. Scott suggested that the Greek preposition ev should have been used if 
the meaning was truly “by means of”. J.C. Wansey came to the same conclusion via 
a different hypothesis: “All ambiguity would disappear and a new light be thrown on 
the parable, if a single change of half a word is made in the text as it now stands.”7 
He conjectured a Greek rather than Aramaic source for the problem, whereby a form 
of scribal reverse dittography had led to the textual presence of ek rather than ektos. 
Wansey proposes that the text be restored to read ektos (without). Thus according to 
this model it is Luke’s failure to capture the ambiguous meaning of the Aramaic 
preposition min or to accurately render the Greek which leads to such confusing 
moral application. This interpretation naturally leads to the conclusion that it is the 
steward’s master who praises him in 8a and that Jesus’ subsequent moral teachings 
should be understood in opposition to the rich man’s praise.8  
More recently some who assert an error in translation or transcription have 
focused on the suggestion that the word alikia (experience) has erroneously been 
rendered adikia (unrighteousness). This notion was first suggested by C.S. Mann: 
May there not be an error in the text? In reading or writing from dictation a 
lambda might easily be misread as a delta. If then in our text in 16:8 ADIKIA  
is read as ALIKIA… we would then have a manager commended for his 
experience. What I have suggested is no more than intelligent guess-work.9 
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Thomas McDaniel makes a suggestion similar to Mann’s, but rather than swapping a 
lamda (λ) for a delta (δ) posits that the affirmative dikaias (faithful) is a more 
appropriate translation than the negative adikias of the received text.10 McDaniel 
offers no model for how this error was derived, instead moving onto a “philological 
methodology” to explain the problems in 16:9, in which he repeats Compston and 
Scott’s views as outlined above.11 Thus Mann and McDaniel suggest that the text 
really reads, “The master commended the righteous/experienced steward for his 
shrewdness.”12  
In their different ways Compston, Scott, Wansey, Mann, McDaniel and 
Schwarz all argue that their version of the parable is ‘simpler.’ Whilst this may be 
true of the reading they offer, their hypothetical reconstructions explaining the 
processes that lead to error in translation or sustained misinterpretation are 
manifestly more complex. Imagining that Luke was unaware of the complications 
surrounding this parable suggests an unreasonably naïve model of authorship and 
narration; suggesting that he appended an irrelevant moral message because he 
didn’t understand the parable is absurd (especially given his is the only Gospel to 
recount the tale); and reducing the story to a simple moral message is 
inappropriately insipid.   
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Enlightened Self-Interest 
There are a number of interpreters who, rather than seek an error in the text to 
rationalise the master’s praise, suggest that the master praises the steward as a 
consequence of his realisation that the steward’s debt remission is actually shrewd 
and is of some social or ethical benefit to him. These commentators suggest that the 
rich man perceives some personal benefit arising from the steward’s actions and 
praises him accordingly. Landry and May for example emphasise the implausibility of 
a dishonoured master praising his steward, and suggested emphatically that there 
were no imaginable circumstances in Greco-Roman society where this could be 
justified. Consequently in their summary of the parable they concluded that the 
master’s praise must indicate that the steward’s actions had benefitted him. They 
suggest: 
A master hears that his steward has been misappropriating funds… The 
steward faces a crisis…He forgives a portion of the amount owed by his 
master's debtors. People would assume that the steward was acting on the 
master's orders, so these gestures would make the master look generous and 
charitable in the eyes of society.  The master hears what the steward has 
done and praises him for his actions.13 
 
Landry and May argue that very few of Jesus' parables actually seek to deconstruct 
societal norms, and that in fact many “are more mundane, ordinary illustrations of 
points and ideas that were not beyond the capacity of average, uneducated, ancient 
persons to understand.”14 On this basis they argue that the most plausible 
explanation for the master’s praise is that the steward had genuinely benefitted him: 
only such a simple conclusion makes sense. 
                                            
13
 David Landry and Ben May, ‘Honor restored: New light on the parable of the prudent steward (Luke 
16: 1-8a)’, Journal of Biblical Literature 119, no. 2 (2000), pp. 287-309 (p. 309). 
14
 Loc. cit. 
245 
John Goodrich has recently published a comparable argument.15 He suggests 
that the master’s praise is earned and deserved by the steward and he argues that 
the parable is an illustration of “the strict ethical demands of the kingdom of God.”16 
Goodrich suggests that in antiquity, good stewardship was not synonymous with “the 
meticulous collection of the master’s debt”, rather “wealthy proprietors often had to 
reduce debts… in order to enable and encourage their repayment.”17  
For all their insight into Greco-Roman stewardship and the agricultural 
practices advocated by Pliny, Cicero and Columella, Landry, May and Goodrich do 
not overcome the basic paradox of the parable: even if the steward is praised for 
prudent remittal of debts, he has already earned the epithet ‘dishonest’.18 The 
parable includes no suggestion that the steward acts out of righteous intent; the debt 
reduction is as underhand as the initial deception, and is only undertaken 
begrudgingly by the steward to save himself from serious punishment. 
Consequently, as the tale offers no reversal of this judgement it is impossible for the 
audience to share the conclusion the steward has somehow changed his behaviour 
for positive purpose. Furthermore if the verdict is that of the rich man, who somehow 
realises that his steward’s deceit is to his benefit this verdict rests in opposition to the 
moral message of Jesus beyond the tale regarding honesty and the value of serving 
only one master. 
Landry and May’s, and Goodrich’s models leave readers surmising that the 
profit loving-rich man was willing to overlook dishonesty having found reduction of 
                                            
15
 John K. Goodrich, ‘Voluntary Debt Remission and the Parable of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16: 1–
13)’, Journal of Biblical Literature 131, no. 3 (2012), pp. 547-566. 
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debt to be mysteriously to his benefit, and also that Jesus saw this self-interested 
business strategy as analogous to prudent discipleship. Given the dishonesty of the 
steward this is a dissatisfying solution indeed, and we are no closer to understanding 
why Jesus would agree with the master’s praise of his steward. 
Ironic praise 
A number of studies have advocated the idea that the unexpected praise for the 
servant is rooted in irony. Proponents of this view include Paul G. Bretscher (1951) 
Geoffrey Paul (1958), Donald R. Fletcher (1963) Isak J. du Plessis (1990), S.E. 
Porter (1990) and Douglas M. Parrott (1991).19  Bretscher suggested that in verses 8 
and 9 Jesus should be understood to mean the exact opposite of what he said. His 
ironic commendation of the steward is actually a rigorous condemnation. When he 
says, “The sons of this world are more shrewd in dealing with their own generation 
than the sons of light” he means, “This is a wisdom the sons of light would not dream 
of.” And when he says, “Make friends for yourselves by means of unrighteous 
mammon, so that when it fails they may receive you into the eternal habitations” he 
means, “Use all God’s gifts to make friends of the sinners of this world… Let them 
[try and] open the gates of everlasting habitations you fool!”20 Bretscher argued that 
this kind of irony is only conveyed in modulation of the voice, and that therefore it is 
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lost in writing. In his view only the context of the narrative could reveal that Jesus 
was being ironic. Parrot’s conclusion is very similar. He states,  
The steward should have been condemned. Since he was not… there is a 
problem with the received text… the original text remains but it lost its original 
character… It is essentially an ironic lesson teaching that… forgiveness is 
incompatible with trusting one’s own cleverness for ultimate security.21 
 
Donald Fletcher contends that it is impossible to construct any sense in which Jesus’ 
praise of the steward could be compatible with other sayings in Luke, noting for 
example that other parables conclude with warnings about the cost of discipleship 
and the uselessness of worldly wealth, for example Luke 14:33, “So therefore 
whoever of you does not renounce all that he has cannot be my disciple.”22 
Consequently, Fletcher suggests that the Gospel context demands that the applause 
be treated as irony. He notes that in Luke there are examples of “clean” and 
“righteous” being used as sarcasm (Luke 5:31 and 15:7). He posits that the 
“shrewdness” credited to the steward in 16:8a is equally, explicitly and unmistakably 
ironic, its humorous tone all the more evident in the oxymoronic juxtaposition “eternal 
tents.”23 His paraphrase of 16:9 is as follows: 
Make friends for yourselves,” he seems to taunt; “imitate the example of the 
steward; use the unrighteous mammon; surround yourselves with the type of 
insincere, self-interested friendship it can buy; how far will this carry you when 
the end comes and you are finally dismissed?24 
  
I. J. du Plessis and S. Porter broadly follow Fletcher’s model. Both contend that if the 
pronouncements of verses 8 and 9 are read at face value there is an insurmountable 
contradiction of Jesus' teaching elsewhere.25 Both suggest, therefore, that the 
steward's shrewdness in v. 8a must be applauded ironically “to encourage the same 
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enthusiasm in Jesus' disciples for eternal interests.”26 Porter challenges the arbitrary 
distinctions drawn by many who attempt to separate what the steward did from how 
he did it, suggesting that a surface reading which allows the steward to be both 
sacked and praised for his dishonesty is irrational.27 There is some validity in this, as 
the text provides no evidence of charitable intent or an endeavour to achieve social 
justice. Nevertheless the text does offer more discrimination than Porter notes. This 
is particularly evident in verses 1 and 8. The steward is charged with “wastefulness” 
(16:1) he is then described as “dishonest” (16:8) before finally being praised for 
“shrewdness” (16:8). This suggests that the parable is fundamentally constructed to 
distinguish between these vices and virtues, despite Porter’s insistence to the 
contrary.  
It is very hard to justify a thesis of ironic praise: the audience are given 
inadequate pointers and reaching this conclusion is only possible if there is no 
chance at all that the steward’s shrewdness was actually commendable. 
Stolen Generosity  
The most traditional approach to verse 8a is to suggest that whilst the steward has 
been dishonest his actions somehow merit applause from Jesus.28 The majority of 
interpreters who adopt this approach seek to reconcile the behaviour of the steward 
with Jesus’ teaching about generosity and justice, and therefore suggest that the 
steward’s remission of debt, whether as an act of generosity or self-interest, is an 
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example of charity that Christians should imitate.29 In effect the message of the 
parable is that Jesus’ disciples should give up their worldly wealth to help the poor, 
and so gain the friendship of God. Some significant nuance is found in variations on 
this theme, for example Paul Gächter (1949) suggested that the dishonesty of the 
steward initially is broadly irrelevant: it is an unnecessary background. Only the 
foreground actions of the steward really matter, and these teach the disciples to 
“give riches to brethren in need.”30 This view is repeated regularly, including by R. 
Daniel Schumacher (2012) who summarises the position: “The steward is unjust but 
his generosity is wise.”31 
Others offer alternative nuance, suggesting that the manager gave up his 
commission to decrease the total amounts that the debtors owe to the rich man. 
They conclude that, through one mechanism or another, this means disciples should 
give up worldly wealth in order to somehow gain eternal wealth. This is the view of 
Dennis Ireland (1989), David De Silva (1993) and C.L. Geluk (2011) who exemplify 
this perspective:  
The parable invites the use of possessions in service of the needy.32 
  
The reader response is intended to be acts of generosity.33 
  
The master is God, who praises the steward for finally benefitting his 
neighbour not himself.34 
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A third suggestion is that Jesus praises the steward for his actions as he has 
‘unwittingly’ redressed the oppression of the poor. In this model the steward’s 
redistribution of wealth is an illustration of Jesus’ message to the wealthy Christian 
disciples that they should not turn their back on the poor. This idea is advanced by 
M. Ball (1995) who surmised that the parable invited disciples to win friends in 
heaven by making friends among the poor on earth.35 R.A. Baergen (2006) similarly 
suggested that the parable is a message of good news for the powerless – for it 
highlights the idea that the ethic of justice supersedes the obligations of employment 
or even moral norms pertaining to honesty.36 F.E. Udoh (2009) suggested that the 
parable in its current form is incidentally subversive in that it undermines social 
obligations with the notion that commitment to heaven outweighs any other. In his 
view the original form of the tale is unreconstructable.37 
Generosity and social justice are laudable virtues and Jesus consistently 
demands that his disciples develop these characteristics. However, the problem with 
this interpretation is that there are no sign posts within the parable that would lead 
the audience to notice ‘unwitting’ generosity, hypothetical reduction of commission or 
that the steward had suddenly developed a social conscience. To the contrary he is 
overtly self-interested and in the verdict of 8a he continues to be characterised as 
dishonest and shrewd. 
Deceitful Wisdom 
In contrast to the above suggestions, some commentators continue to criticise the 
profligacy of the steward and identify only the steward’s shrewdness or foresight as 
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redeemable features.  Joachim Jeremias’ view is fairly typical here. He asserts that, 
“Jesus’ purpose is to assert that ‘The steward is a rascal; but he is a wonderfully 
clever rascal.’”38 Jeremias argues that there is a significant difference between Jesus 
praising the clever steward “because he acted dishonestly” and praising the 
dishonest steward “because he acted cleverly.”39 Accordingly, Jesus can praise 
clever behaviour without praising dishonesty. Other proponents of this view, 
including much earlier commentators such as F. Godet (1870) and R.C. Trench 
(1882), similarly argue that lauding the steward’s plan is by no means the same as 
affording him moral approval.40 It remains common to suggest that Jesus uses an 
example of a morally reprehensible character to illustrate how much more his 
believers should show prudence, foresight and wisdom.41 A further useful insight is 
added by J.M. Creed who recognises that Luke uses other unrighteous characters 
on two other occasions, in the parable of the ungracious friend (11:5-7) and the 
unjust judge (18:1-8).42 This certainly suggests that Luke is not uncomfortable 
employing a parable that draws a moral message from less than moral behaviour.43 
Emphasising some element of shrewdness as the reason for the master’s 
praise has the significant advantage of meaningfully connecting the parable to the 
subsequent Lucan explanation, “for the sons of this world are more shrewd in 
dealing with their own generation than the sons of light.” It is necessarily the case 
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that the parable relates to shrewdness above all else because it is this virtue alone 
that is praised in verse 8b. As this explanatory phrase is adjoined simply through the 
preposition hoti (that, because or since) it is evidently ‘shrewdness of the sons of this 
world’ that is somehow demonstrated by the steward. However, whilst this reading 
avoids unnecessary abstraction it does leave the reader with a significant narrative 
anomaly. This was clearly identified by Joachim Jeremias:  
If the beginning of vs. 9 is a Lucan composition, which would seem to leave 
Luke at variance with himself. How is it that Jesus in the third person 
interrupts his first person discourse?44 
 
Many commentators have therefore avoided this solution because of the diegetic 
entanglement it entails, as is further explained by Fletcher:  
As the material is found in Luke's gospel it would be awkward to read it with 
the kyrios of vs. 8a referring to Jesus himself, because of the way Jesus 
speaks in the first person in vs. 9.45 
 
If 8a represents the voice of Jesus praising a shrewd ‘rascal’ then the purpose of the 
parable becomes fairly clear. It is not an opaque tale about accidental virtue, it is not 
a badly mistranslated parable and it is not an example of misconstrued irony. 
However, it is a moment of considerable confusion which muddles the master of the 
steward and Jesus, the master of the primary diegesis. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The identity of the master in 8a defines the interpretative problem of the parable. If 
‘the master’ is the rich man of the parable then the reader is left with the difficulty of 
developing an interpretation in which the rich man perceived benefit from the actions 
of his steward. Those who do suggest that the “master” of 8a is synonymous with the 
rich man of 16:1 argue that the parable ends with his unexpected praise, rather like 
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the unexpected intervention of the father in the parable of the prodigal son (15:20), 
the host of the great feast (14:23) or the owner of the vineyard (20:13). Most 
commentators adopt this stance and there are numerous translations which attempt 
to bind the judgement pronounced in verse 8a to the opinion of the hypo-diegetic 
master, including the following variations:  
And his master commended him… (NASB)  
So the master praised… (NKJV and NCV) 
The master praised his dishonest steward (CEV). 
 
However, no logical reason is established within the text to justify such a positive 
reaction to the double deception of the steward and, as established above, attempts 
to reconstruct such a reason misconstrue either the character of the steward, the 
benefit of his actions or both.   
If, conversely, ho kyrios is translated as ‘the Master’ who told the parable 
(Jesus) the reader is left questioning why Jesus is so clumsily moved from his 
position as first-person story-teller to first-person commentator via a pronouncement 
in the third-person, and why Jesus used a story of a dishonest man to advance the 
virtue of shrewdness. Many commentators have adopted this approach concluding 
that the master must be Jesus, but the reasons for advancing this solution often 
seem to rest on intuitive judgements. Repeated aphorisms such as, “no master 
would truly praise a steward who cheated him” or “only Jesus would offer such a 
counter intuitive judgement” generate equally problematic questions, for example, 
“Would Jesus praise a steward that a master wouldn’t praise?” or “Could an 
audience be expected to understand such a judgement if Jesus was truly being so 
counterintuitive?”46 Consequently the identity of the “master” has remained 
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problematic. Nevertheless, I contend that there are four good reasons to read ho 
kyrios as Jesus: 
1. Everywhere else in Luke’s Gospel the absolute use of ‘the master’ (ho 
kyrios) with the definite article refers to Jesus. It is this form found in 8a.47 
The adjective plousios (rich) in Luke is always used negatively – it is 
therefore highly unlikely that the rich man of 16:1 corresponds with God, as 
masters sometimes do in Jesus’ parables of servants and their employers. 
This means that the master’s praise in 8a may stand in contrast to the 
response that would have been expected of the steward’s actual (hypo-
diegetic) master. 
2. The parable sits within a Lucan context that focuses the reader upon 
surprising judgements and an unexpected verdict on the nature of wisdom 
(phronimos). As the parable leads the audience from the start to predict the 
rich man’s response, if the master of 8a is Jesus, his voice achieves an act 
of refocusing his audience’s attention on the reality that the parable is not 
about the response of the rich man, but is actually focused on the 
behaviour of the steward/disciples. This violation of normal story-telling 
rules, in which the audience finds the story is not about what they expected, 
is a technique used frequently by Luke.48  
3. The parable is consistent with contemporaneous tales of servants 
outwitting their masters. In employing such a tale Jesus’ use of an immoral 
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character to achieve a spiritual lesson is consistent with the rabbinic 
technique of qal wahomer. It is therefore not inconceivable that Jesus 
deliberately advanced a tale of an unrighteous man to highlight the virtue of 
shrewdness and that he considered this characteristic even more important 
for his followers than for the steward in his tale. Shrewdness is quite 
different from honesty, and Jesus’ teaching in this parable discerns 
between the two. A man can be contemptibly dishonest, whilst also being 
admirably shrewd. 
4. This is not the only parable Luke interrupts with extra-diegetic comment or 
pronouncement from the primary diegesis. Indeed the boundaries of Jesus’ 
parables and his interactions with the audience within the primary diegesis 
are often blurred in Luke’s gospel. Luke 16:1-7 is also not the only Lucan 
parable which demonstrates premature completion or metaleptic confusion. 
My approach here is not entirely unique. An important recent study by Ryan 
Schellenberg has also advanced the suggestion that verse 8a is a moment of 
metalepsis.49 Schellenberg’s employment of Genette’s model of narrative layers is 
original to this problem, and there is much about his approach with which I concur. 
Schellenberg follows a great number of commentators in suggesting that ho kyrios 
(the master) of verse 8 is Jesus and not the ‘rich man’ mentioned in verse 1.50 
Accordingly, the parable really ended in verse 7 with the steward still in crisis, and 8a 
is a moment of metalepsis which truncates the tale and returns to the primary 
                                            
49
 Schellenberg, ‘Which Master?’ pp. 263-288. 
50
 Cf. Ireland, ‘A History’ (p. 310) and De Silva, ‘The parable of the prudent steward’ (p. 268) who also 
advance this view.  
256 
diegesis.51 Schellenberg analyses other Lucan transgressions between the hypo-
diegetic story-world of the parables and the primary diegesis of Jesus and his 
disciples. He notes that it is not unusual for Luke to interrupt the hypo-diegetic world 
and muddle the narrative framework of the parable with Jesus’ own comments. The 
oddity of this interpretation is that the pronouncement of verse 8 is made in the third 
person, suggesting that Jesus’ parable and explanation are interrupted by an extra-
diegetic narrative comment that muddles the transition from the hypo-diegetic 
parable to the primary diegesis. Schellenberg employs Genette’s model of 
metalepsis to explain this confusion, and posits that metaleptic contamination of the 
story-telling voice is the most useful lens for explaining the transgression of narrative 
layers and consequent narratological confusion. I concur, and find that a reading 
which accepts the master’s praise as a moment of metalepsis provokes a convincing 
sense of the transcendence of Jesus’ judgement.   
My hypothesis is broadly in alignment with Schellenberg’s approach. I will 
emphasise some divergent details and will approach the text differently. In particular, 
I suggest that the parable of the unfaithful steward is essentially incomplete; for Luke 
has constructed a narrative in which Jesus, through the voice of the narrator, 
interrupts the meta-diegetic tale that he himself is telling, creating a sense of an 
omni-diegetic ‘master’ who offers praise for the steward before the audience could 
ever have been allowed to expect such an outcome and before the parable has 
achieved any sense of resolution. The reader anticipates the response of the rich 
man but instead Luke interrupts the tale with Jesus’ verdict: an unexpected 
theological interpretation vindicating shrewd profligacy and challenging the disciples 
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within the primary diegesis well before the story had a chance to reach its dramatic 
conclusion.52 As such it is an unsatisfying tale which, rather like an imperfect 
cadence, leaves its audience without a sense of clear completion. This degree of 
pluripotency has potential to generate enhanced theological impact and place 
interpretative obligations on the reader.  
Remarkably, as long as it is accepted that 8a is a metaleptic interruption a 
profound range of background issues are resolved. In support of this hypothesis I 
now examine Luke’s usage of the masters, stewards and rich men; the significance 
of shrewdness in connected parables; contemporary tales of smart servants; the 
rabbinic technique of qal wahomer and other examples of metalepsis in Luke. 
  
2. The Real Kyrios 
2.1 Luke’s Glossary: Masters, Stewards and Rich Men 
The Master vs. His Master 
Luke’s general application of ‘the master’ elsewhere in the gospel is highly significant 
for attempts to understand to whom ho kyrios in 16:8a refers. The absolute use of ho 
kyrios occurs on twenty three other occasions in the gospel. In seven of these ‘the 
Lord’ refers to God.53 Six occur before the birth of Jesus and the one further 
occurrence referring to God is found in 20:42 which quotes directly Psalm 110. In 
fourteen other occasions ‘the Lord’ refers unambiguously to Jesus.54 In the two 
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remaining instances (12:42 and 14:23) ‘the master’ is a reference to a hypo-diegetic 
character who represents either Jesus or God. 
And the servant said, `Sir, what you commanded has been done, and still 
there is room.' And the master said to the servant, `Go out to the highways 
and hedges, and compel people to come in, that my house may be 
filled.' (Luke 14:22-24) 
 
Whilst these examples plainly refer to a hypo-diegetic master, the correspondence in 
identity between this master and ‘the LORD’ is indisputable. Consequently it is fair to 
say that even in the two occurrences which are figurative, Luke’s employment of ho 
kyrios always refers to ‘the LORD.’ The only ambiguity is whether Luke sees 
references to Jesus as ho kyrios and God as ho kyrios as interchangeable. It should 
therefore be expected that ho kyrios in 8a refers to ‘the LORD’ or at the very least a 
hypo-diegetic character who is a figure for the Lord of the primary diegesis. Luke 
18:6 offers a particularly useful analogy, where unmistakably it is Jesus who steps in 
to comment on the parable of the Unjust Judge: 
He said, "In a certain city there was a judge who neither feared God nor 
regarded man; and there was a widow in that city who kept coming to him and 
saying, `Vindicate me against my adversary.' For a while he refused; but 
afterward he said to himself, `Though I neither fear God nor regard man, yet 
because this widow bothers me, I will vindicate her, or she will wear me out by 
her continual coming.'" And the Lord said, "Hear what the unrighteous judge 
says. And will not God vindicate his elect, who cry to him day and night?” 
(Luke 18:2-7) 
  
In this example, the extra-diegetic Lord terminates the parable and his judgment 
stands as the boundary of the parable in a similar manner to that which occurs in 
16:8a. Luke is exceptionally consistent in his use of ho kyrios and 16:8a and 18:6 are 
certainly not the only occasions when the judgement of ho kyrios is used to bookend 
an embedded parable. Indeed Luke’s employment of the term Kyrios is particularly 
polysemous (certainly more than is the case in Mark or Matthew) and each parable 
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in Luke that talks of ‘a master’ also has at its diegetic threshold the overt presence of 
‘the master.’55 
Stewards vs. Servants 
Luke’s Gospel contains five parables in which domestic servants (douloi or 
oikonimos) figure prominently: the doorkeeper (douloi, Luke 12:35-38); the overseer 
(oikonimos, Luke 12:42-46); the dishonest steward (oikonimos, Luke 16:1-8); the 
talents (doulos, Luke 19:12-27) and the servant's reward (douloi, Luke 17:7-10).56 
Matthew records four (including one unique example: the unmerciful servant, 18:23-
28) and Mark records just two. Three of Luke’s parables are unique to his text (the 
throne claimant, the servant’s reward and the dishonest steward). John D. Crossan 
adjudged the “servant parables” to form “thematic unity” focused on the master-
servant relationship within which a critical moment of tension reveals an unexpected 
truth.57 Crossan suggested that ‘servanthood’ was a key motif in early ecclesiology 
and discipleship and that the parables functioned cumulatively to reinforce a clear 
“superior-subordinate” dichotomy. This model, suggested Crossan, was intended to 
reinforce a sense of discipleship in the service of the Lord.  
To illustrate the centrality of the superior-subordinate axis, Crossan, and more 
recently Beavis, have both appealed to the parable of the servant's reward in Luke 
17:7-10 as an illustration of the normative relationship between master and servant 
in Gospel parables: 
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Will any one of you, who has a servant ploughing or keeping sheep, say to 
him when he has come in from the field, `Come at once and sit down at 
table'? Will he not rather say to him, `Prepare supper for me, and gird yourself 
and serve me, till I eat and drink; and afterward you shall eat and drink'? Does 
he thank the servant because he did what was commanded? So you also, 
when you have done all that is commanded you, say, `We are unworthy 
servants; we have only done what was our duty (Luke 17:7-10). 
 
In Crossan’s view, this surprising parable is an example of Jesus deliberately using 
the well-known Greco-Roman social norms governing relationships between 
servants and masters to contradict the “horizon of expected normalcy”, for his tale 
shows that, contrary to expectations, “even good servants are not rewarded.”58 As 
the most common contemporary stories about servants placed them in the role of 
‘the clever slave’, it is possible that Jesus here once again surprises his audience by 
inverting social expectations.59 In Crossan’s model Jesus does this by undermining 
any clear sense of causality between what might be ‘socially acceptable virtuous 
behaviour’ and expected divine reward. Crossan reads the dishonest steward (as 
well as the un-merciful servant, the wicked tenants and the vineyard workers) in the 
same light, suggesting they are parabolic illustrations of the counter-cultural nature 
of God’s judgement or grace. 
Crossan’s emphasis on the unexpected nature of the servant/master 
relationship is useful and it is appropriate to note that the dishonest steward is one of 
a number of servants who do not get what they deserve, or who do get what they do 
not deserve. Nevertheless I would not emphasise the unity of the servant parables. 
This is because the surprise verdict often declared in these parables is far from 
unique to servant parables. Indeed a great number of Jesus’ teachings intentionally 
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challenge the theological and socio-economic presumptions of his audience. This 
has been described as one of Jesus’ axiomatic rhetorical tools.60 There is an 
abundance of examples, including the parables of the Pharisee and the tax collector 
(Luke 18:10-14), the story of the widow’s two mites (Luke 21:1-4). 
Evidently the surprise reversal of expectations is not a unifying factor that 
applies only to the servant parables. Equally there is no more unifying form in the 
construction or characterisation of servant parables than there is in ‘agricultural 
parables’ or ‘building parables’ or ‘banquet parables’. In some servant parables there 
are good servants and ungrateful masters (Luke 17:7-10), in others there are bad 
servants and forgiving masters (Matthew 18:21-35). Thus whilst Crossan is right that 
servant parables “share a thematic unity concerning a master-servant relationship 
and a moment of critical reckoning therein,” such a conclusion is actually little more 
than a truism: parables about servants are all parables about servants.61 It seems 
improbable therefore, despite Crossan’s analysis, that the parable of the dishonest 
steward ultimately finds its meaning in reference to other parables about servants. 
Rich Men 
If the master who praises the steward is actually Jesus and not the steward’s own 
master it is natural to ask if Jesus’ praise is in contrast to the response that might be 
expected from this hypo-diegetic rich man of 16:1. Fletcher concludes on this matter 
that “the steward has been commended for acting wisely, whether this is by his 
master or by Jesus himself does not matter too much.”62 However, I would argue that 
if the master of 8a is Jesus, it becomes distinctly possible that his commendation of 
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the steward is offered in direct opposition to the judgement expected from the mouth 
of the rich man, and that this is the very purpose of the parable. This notion is 
supported by scrutiny of the cases in Luke’s gospel where we encounter the 
adjective ‘rich.’  
In every other instance in Luke’s Gospel the term ‘plousios’ carries distinctly 
negative connotations. There are seven other pericopae containing the term. In 6:24 
Jesus pronounces ‘woe’ on those who are ‘rich’; in 12:16 Jesus tells the parable of ‘a 
certain rich man’ who turns out to be a fool; in 14:12 Jesus’ listeners are enjoined not 
to invite ‘rich’ neighbours to dinner; in 16:19-22 Jesus tells of the ‘rich man’ who 
ignores his neighbour Lazarus; in 18:23-25 a ‘rich young man’ is disappointed 
because his wealth prevents him following God; in 19:2 Zacchaeus, ‘a sinner’ is 
introduced as a ‘rich’ chief tax collector and in 21:1 the ‘rich’ in the temple treasury 
are criticised for giving little out of their abundance.63 Separately there are other 
wealthy characters in the Gospel such as the feast-giver of 14:16 and the nobleman 
of 19:12 who are evidently affluent but are not described as “rich”. Neither of  these 
characters are condemned or cast negatively, which suggests that quite possibly in 
Luke’s parlance the term ‘rich’ implies more about an individual’s management of 
wealth than their net-worth: being wealthy is not sinful, but being ‘rich’ is shorthand 
for character sketches of those who through their selfish miserliness resist God’s call 
to generosity. A number of commentators draw similar conclusions. Bernard B. 
Scott, for example, suggests that the notion of a “rich man” is part of the “repertoire 
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of social expectation” employed by Luke.64  Landry and May note that superfluous 
use of the adjective ‘rich’ is “probably [employed] to increase the hearer's antipathy 
toward this character [as] in most such stories the rich man is cast in the role of the 
villain.”65  John Lygre also suggests that Luke’s audience would presume that 
“anyone who gets ahead is thought to have done so at the expense of everyone 
else.”66 
I see no reason to disagree with Scott, Lygre or Landry and May. Luke’s use 
of the adjective plousios is self-evidently pleonastic (given the social status and 
wealth revealed in the rest of the story) but is utilised because of the significant 
negative connotation it conveys and to avoid any straightforward association 
between the steward’s master and the Master. It suggests that Jesus’ praise of the 
steward’s wisdom is not only a simple tale about wisdom and preparation for the 
eschaton, but also about how such wisdom rests in stark contrast to those whose 
selfish wealth at first appears perfectly righteous. Tacitly Jesus’ praise of the steward 
stands in significant contrast to his attitude towards the rich man. Even though the 
rich man performs no obvious or active wrong in the foreground of the story he still 
remains a figure who is outside the Kingdom, as through Luke’s Gospel, the rich and 
the poor fall on either side of the coming judgment, with the poor vindicated and the 
rich thrown out.67  
If the master of 8a is the ’rich man’, in the act of praising his steward this ‘rich 
man’ must have made a unique movement away from the typos of other rich men; 
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for the master’s praise in 8a is offered as a true, proper and divine judgement. 
However, there are no grounds at all for this reading, either within the text or in the 
suggestion of any interpreters. It cannot be established therefore that through the act 
of praising the steward the rich man was somehow redeemed from his miserliness 
and it consequently seems most unlikely that there could be direct correspondence 
between the hypo-diegetic ‘rich’ master and the right judgement of the ‘master’ who 
praises the steward. The ‘master’ who praises the steward should therefore be seen 
as offering a contrasting judgement to that expected by a typical ‘rich’ man and the 
commendation of the steward’s shrewdness should be understood as coming from 
Jesus, the real kyrios.  
2.2  The primacy of shrewdness in connecting parables 
There are a number of adjacent or thematically similar parables that are sometimes 
used to help contextualise the parable of the dishonest steward. These include a 
range of servant parables (explored above), parables related by the motif of houses 
and most persuasively, parables of wisdom and foolishness including the parable of 
the Prodigal Son, the Rich man and Lazarus and that of the Rich Fool.68 
The Prodigal Son 
Michael R. Austin (1985) suggested that the parable of the prodigal son should more 
accurately be called “the parable of the Hypocritical Son” and that the story of the 
dishonest steward might better be called the “prodigal servant.”69 He suggested that 
these two parables functioned as a pair. He noted that the story of the prodigal’s 
return was not comparable with the tale of the lost coin or sheep, but rather, hinged 
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on the reaction of the older brother to the prodigality of the younger brother and his 
father’s grace. He suggested that the significance of unexpected grace was the first 
of several connections between the circumstances of the younger son and those of 
the steward: 
In both stories there has been reckless waste by one man of another man's 
property: the younger son of his father's wealth (his 'living', 15:12) and the 
servant of the rich man's wealth (his 'goods', 16:1)... Another point of similarity 
between the two stories is that a turning point is reached in each when the 
younger son 'came to himself and said ... ' (15:17) and the servant 'said to 
himself…' (16:3). That a similar moment of self-awareness following an 
identical action should be described in such similar ways within an almost 
identical grammatical and syntactical construction in parables which stand 
together and which occur in only one Gospel cannot possibly be explained as 
a chance occurrence.70 
 
In Austin’s view the two parables are not accidentally adjacent but function together 
as a challenge to the judgmental nature of the Pharisees who fail to acknowledge 
their own self-interest and are thus surprised by the profligate forgiveness and praise 
shown by the father/master in the two parables. Austin is not alone in this reading 
although his view has been moderated somewhat. John Kilgallen (1997) reiterated 
the parallels suggesting that the two parables together accentuate the need for 
shrewdness: 
Jesus's major, indeed single emphasis [in these two parables], is the praise of 
that shrewdness which matches means to end. This likeness in prudence, 
between the Son and the Steward… explains why these two people, Son and 
Steward, were joined in sequence.71  
The Rich man and Lazarus 
David Bidnell (2011) and J.Y. Jeong (2011) have also emphasised the linguistic 
similarities and the equally provocative conclusions in the parables of the dishonest 
steward and the prodigal son, whilst also noting further connections between these 
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two parables and the story of the Rich man and Lazarus (16:19-31).72 This story 
does not share the same depth of correspondence found between the prodigal son 
and the unjust steward. There is no profligacy, no sudden realisation and no 
unexpected reversal of fortune. Nevertheless, positioned immediately after the 
parable of the unjust steward this parable further legitimates the sense that criticism 
of miserliness and a challenge towards appropriate use of resources are central to a 
potential triptych of stories that sketch the divine verdict regarding unacceptable 
abundance. The overlap of themes also supports the basic conclusion that the 
parable of the unjust steward is not accidentally located in its Lucan context. Jeong’s 
conclusion therefore seems appropriate:  
A common theme clearly comes to the surface in all three parables… Each 
character in three parables is recklessly prodigal with property for their own 
self-contentment, regardless of its ownership. Their covetousness toward 
possessions eventually causes them to fall into a predicament.73 
   
Wealth, squandering, regret and unexpected grace mark all three stories and each 
hinges on the contrast between foolishness and wisdom. It is noteworthy that the 
three stories are adjacent and that all three parables are unique to Luke. 
The Rich Fool 
In a recent article, R. Daniel Schumacher has departed from the view which 
connects a number of the parables in chapters 15 and 16 and has instead 
highlighted the connections between the parable of the dishonest steward and that of 
the rich fool (12:16-21). He posits three key reasons why he believes that these two 
parables should be seen as singular companion parables. Firstly he notes that both 
parables share four acts or “movements”: (1) Introduction of primary characters 
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(12:16 and 16:1); (2) Crisis of event which sets story in motion (12:16 and 16:1); (3) 
Inner monologue of primary character responding to the dilemma or opportunity 
before them (12:17 and 16:3-7); (4) A surprising proclamation (12:20 and 16:8).74 
Secondly he asserts a strong lexical similarity between the two parables. Both begin 
with the phrase, “a certain man” whom both introduce as “rich.” In both the main 
character enters into a soliloquy with the words “what shall I do” (12:17 and 16:3), 
the rich man is a fool (aphron), whilst the steward is wise (phronimos). Thirdly both 
parables reverse the logical conclusion. Logic dictates that the rich man of 12 is 
recognized as acting wisely and the steward of 16 as acting foolishly, but this is the 
opposite of the judgement pronounced by God. The rich man should be praised for 
his prudence, and the steward should be condemned for cheating: instead, the rich 
man is condemned for prudence and the steward is praised for cheating! 
Schumacher, and before him Halvor Moxnes, both conclude that the 
condemnation of the Rich man in 12:19 is not because he had done anything morally 
wrong in accruing his fortune, after all his actions are similar to Joseph’s in Genesis 
41. However, his invitation to “eat, drink and be merry” (12:19) is directed solely to 
himself and is therefore an illustration of his selfishness.75 Thus in Schumacher’s 
scheme the dishonest steward is a counterpart to the Rich Fool because one stored 
up and one scattered. Both were selfish, but the scatterer is praised for his wisdom, 
whilst the one who stored up is accused of foolishness. This is because the 
steward’s distribution of wealth is an imitation of the profligacy of God, whilst the 
Rich Fool uses wealth to benefit no-one but himself.76 Literally the steward’s 
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distribution is a ‘scattering’ (diaskorpizo), a term Schumacher suggests is only 
elsewhere found in Luke in The Magnificat, which refers to the ‘scattering’ of the 
proud and “the rich being sent empty away” (Luke 1:51).77  
Schumacher’s commentary is useful. Certainly the counterpoint between the 
unexpected condemnation of the rich man’s lack of wisdom (aphron) and the 
implausible praise of the steward’s shrewdness (phronimos) is a meaningful context 
in which to place the parable. However, the structural similarity is limited and applies 
almost equally to the majority of Luke’s parables; the common lexical connections 
are narrow and, crucially, Schumacher’s attention to the steward’s distribution of 
wealth is misplaced. The Steward is not praised for ‘scattering’, rather he is praised 
for ‘prudence’ (16:8). Indeed, his master’s original condemnation for wasteful 
scattering is never contested or reversed. In fact the parable depends on the fact 
that the accusation of wastefulness in 16:1 (“charges were brought to him that [his 
steward] was wasting (diaskorpizo) his goods”) is both true and worth the dismissal 
of the steward. Consequently it is not valid to suggest that the steward is praised 
because he scattered his master’s wealth in counterpoint to the contemptible 
‘storing’ (sunnaxo) of the rich man in 12:18.  
Summary 
The range of connections between the prodigal son and the dishonest steward and 
their place next to each other reveals that Luke saw the prodigious confusing 
generosity of God as sharply contrasting with the attitudes toward wealth and 
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judgement amongst the religious population of his day. The parable of the rich man 
and Lazarus also provides a significant parallel through character study of an 
apparently righteous individuals who is proved foolish, in stark contrast to the 
laudable wisdom of the unrighteous steward who, under duress and to preserve self-
interest, acts shrewdly. The story of the rich fool also builds on this motif, though with 
less direct connection or lexical overlap. This nexus of themes covers overlapping 
and contrasting key Lucan vocabulary for wisdom, foolishness, shrewdness, riches, 
scattering, this age and eternity and is arguably a much fuller theological context 
than a monochrome typological relationship between the servant/master and 
disciple/Lord.78 Certainly if we read the praise of the steward as a commendation 
delivered by Jesus rather than the rich man then the parable of the dishonest 
manager is fully consistent with Luke’s other usage role models of selfish wealth and 
unexpected wisdom. Thus, in some sense the relationship between servant and his 
‘rich’ master is a parabolic façade from behind which, through the judgement of ho 
kyrios, a much greater depth of overlapping and unexpected meanings emerge. 
There is not enough evidence to posit intentional singular or primary interplay 
between the parables of the dishonest servant and the prodigal son, the rich man 
and Lazarus or rich fool and it cannot easily be asserted that the similarities between 
any of these represent a deliberate or unique relationship between the parables. 
Nevertheless themes of surprising divine verdict, the role of foolishness/prudence, 
wealth/squandering and the divine pronouncement of judgment certainly justify 
claims that there is a degree of affinity between these parables. Consequently the 
verdict of 8a should be interpreted in light of the connections between wisdom and 
wealth that it shares with its immediate neighbours and it is reasonable to conclude 
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that the verdict of 8a should be understood as praise from ho kyrios who wishes to 
highlight the value of shrewdness, even through the story of a dishonest man. 
2.3 Contemporaneous Context 
Whilst Luke’s own world of parables provide ample thematic background through 
which to understand the vocabulary and theological significance of the parable of the 
dishonest steward, ancient Greek tales of shrewd servants and contemporaneous 
Jewish middoth both also provide further context for understanding the parable. 
Outsmarting the Boss 
The motif of a servant outwitting his master was a popular theme in ancient near 
eastern stories and was addressed in detail by Roman writers. A notable example 
comes from Herodotus in Histories II.122. He records that Rhampsinitus (identified 
with Ramses III century, who reigned from 1182-1151 BC) was outwitted four times 
by the son of a stone mason. This young man stole from King Rhampsinitus three 
times, evaded traps, rescued the body of his brother and tricked the King’s daughter. 
Herodotus wrote, 
Now when this also was reported to the king, he was at first amazed at the 
ready invention and daring of the fellow, and then afterwards he sent round to 
all the cities and made proclamation granting a free pardon to the thief, and 
also promising a great reward if he would come into his presence. (Histories 
II.121) 
  
In this story Herodotus’ reader is invited to share the marvel of the Pharaoh and view 
the stone mason’s son as a worthy suitor for Rhampsinitus’ daughter by virtue of his 
shrewdness and cunning. Similar tales are found in the Life of Aesop (in which 
Aesop escapes a false accusation through inducing vomit) and in Plautus’ comedies 
which consistently employ the figure of the cunning servants to comedic or dramatic 
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effect.79 In one famous example in the comedy Pseudolus for example the rich 
master (Simo) eulogizes his crafty slave (Pseudolous) for getting him out of trouble:  
Simo: Now what I'm going to do is to prepare a reception for [the chief slave] 
Pseudolus - oh, no, not the kind of reception you have seen in many another 
comedy, a reception with whips and irons. No… I'm going to bring out that two 
thousand drachmas which I promised to give him... By gad, he's the cleverest, 
craftiest, wickedest creature alive! The trick that took Troy, and all the wiles of 
Ulysses, are nothing to what Pseudolus can do! (Pseudolus) 
 
Mary Ann Beavis asserts that a Greco-Roman audience would have been very 
familiar with the Greco-Roman literary tradition of the picaresque slave, typified in 
the Life of Aesop and would be unsurprised by an amusing tale of a slave’s revenge, 
trickery or trouble.80 She suggests that, “although the Plautine servi callidi often 
evade the dreadful punishments that threaten them, it is important to note that 
Greco-Roman audiences regarded as hilarious the spectacle of a slave facing dire 
threats of extravagant torture.”81 In these circumstances she suggests that the drama 
was often structured to ensure that the servant’s escape turned the pomp of the 
master into a comic spectacle.  Erich Segal makes a similar observation. He notes 
the drama found in texts recalling a remarkable range of tortures threatened to 
slaves, including iron chains, hot tar, burning clothes, restraining collars, the rack, 
the pillory and the mill, but suggests that whilst the dire threat effects dramatic 
tension, the spectacle of the slave or servant rescuing his master was considered 
even more dramatic and enjoyable. “The most common dilemma presented is that of 
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a young man who is in love and insolvent and who turns to his clever slave for 
salvation.”82 
It is reasonable to note the degree of similarity in plot between the typical 
tales of cunning slaves and the parable of the dishonest steward: (1) the servant is in 
trouble with his master; (2) the servant takes action to remedy the situation; (3) the 
servant escapes threat and outwits his master. Beavis concludes, “The parable thus 
conforms closely to the expectations of an ancient audience acquainted with stories 
in which clever servants, like Aesop and the steward, get the better of their 
masters.”83 This rudimentary correspondence between the parable and the 
phenomenal range of Greco-Roman tales leads Rene Baergen to argue that the 
‘concrete’ relations of Roman masters and their managerial slaves provides a 
background which, when undermined by Jesus’ parabolic scenarios, reveals the 
depth of his social iconoclasm: “This parable of a rich man and his ingenious slave 
would appear to encode and overturn the conflictual reality of powerful elite and 
powerless non-elite experienced by its first-century audience.”84 This is an 
overstatement, as the typos of the servi callidi was well understood, Jesus does not 
promote the steward’s behaviour as a model of what his disciples should do to 
overcome injustice, and there is no evidence that Jesus’ parable was intended, or 
was used, to challenge societal structures.  To the contrary, Jesus uses the familiar 
motif of a slave outsmarting his master to create an unexpected illustration of the 
significance of shrewdness.  
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Commentators who highlight the significance of the Greco-Roman literature 
on oikonomos essentially reveal one common conclusion: in any tale of a slave or 
servant outsmarting their master, whether this motif is employed for dramatic or 
comic effect, the slave is the victor and his own shrewdness invites justifiable praise 
from the audience at some level.85 Thus, judging from the contemporaneous context, 
it is quite probable that the master of 16:8a is Jesus. Background literature suggests 
that whilst it is possible for a steward’s master to begrudgingly praise his cunning, it 
is more common still for the audience to be guided toward praise of the picaresque 
servant at comic cost to his master. The voice of praise in 8a is therefore best 
understood as Jesus, who speaks as narrator to his primary diegetic audience and to 
the extra-diegetic reader to praise the steward because he displayed a wisdom 
lacked by his master or by the disciples. The Greco-Roman context adds weight to 
the notion that the master’s praise is Jesus’ verdict at the expense of the rich man, 
pronounced as an unexpected interruption of the hypo-diegetic world to challenge 
audiences toward a shrewd prodigality. This is hardly a teaching of revolutionary 
iconoclasm, but it may, nevertheless, illustrate Jesus’ willingness to confound 
expectation regarding the relationship between shrewdness and prodigality.    
Qal Wahomer 
One of Jesus’ consistent teaching methods or exegetical principles (middoth) seems 
to be the application a rabbinic technique known as ‘qal wahomer’ which broadly 
means ‘from the lesser to the greater’ (a minori ad maius in Latin). 86 This technique 
was supposedly one of the distinctive features of first century Pharisaic Judaism and 
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was the first rule of both Rabbi Hillel and Rabbi Ishmael.87 A number of typical 
examples of this method are found across synoptic gospels.  
Consider the ravens: they neither sow nor reap, they have neither storehouse 
nor barn, and yet God feeds them. Of how much more value are you than the 
birds! (Luke 12:24) 
 
If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how 
much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who 
ask him! (Matthew 7:9-11) 
 
 
In both of these instances there is overt movement from a small example to a 
significant principle, effected through the correlative pronoun in the construct pοsοs 
mallon (‘how much more’) which occurs ten times in the New Testament. Of these 
three are in Matthew (7:11 above, 10:25 and 12:12), three are in Luke (11:13; 12:24 
above and 12:28),  two are in Romans (11:12; 11:24) and two are in Hebrews (9:14, 
10:29). These are not the only occasions of argument from minor to major, but they 
represent the most overt occurrences. A significant number of other examples occur 
in Luke’s Gospel less explicitly, as exemplified below:  
If it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God 
has come upon you. (Luke 11:20)  
 
Does not each of you on the Sabbath untie his ox or his ass from the manger, 
and lead it away to water it? And ought not this woman, a daughter of 
Abraham whom Satan bound for eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on 
the Sabbath day? (Luke 13:15-16) 
 
Hear what the unrighteous judge says. And will not God vindicate his elect, 
who cry to him day and night? Will he delay long over them? I tell you, he will 
vindicate them speedily. (Luke 18:7-8) 
 
In each of these instances Jesus suggests that as one proposition is true because of 
an underlying principle, it necessarily follows that the same principle will be applied 
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on a larger scale.88 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, has suggested that every Qal wahomer is 
made of three logical propositions: two premises and one conclusion:  
The first premise states that two things, A and B, stand to each other in the 
relation of minor and major importance. The second premise states that with 
one of these two things, A, a certain permissive law applies. The conclusion is 
that the same law is applicable to the other thing, B.89  
 
A number of scholars have posited that this same technique arises in diverse 
synoptic parables, but given the significant frequency of overt indices of qal wahomer 
in Luke’s gospel, it is surprising that a more complete survey of the technique in 
Luke has not been undertaken.  Nevertheless Gächter is one scholar who comes to 
the conclusion that in Luke 16 Jesus challenges his disciples to learn from the 
example of the dishonest steward.  
Jesus brings home to his disciples how much more than the steward they 
should detach themselves from riches, apply it to their brethren in need, and 
thus secure for themselves an eternal reward. This is the natural end to a 
perfect parable.90  
 
This argument has not been significantly commented on since Gächter wrote in 
1950. My interpretation of the meaning of the parable is somewhat different from 
Gächter’s but I would nevertheless agree with his analysis that the parable 
represents a clear instance of qal wahomer through which Jesus reasons as follows: 
If a steward, facing immanent judgement for his inappropriate use of 
resources, realises he needs to act shrewdly, how much more must it follow 
that ‘children of light’ who know they face immanent divine judgement ought to 
act shrewdly. 
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2.4 Examples of Metalepsis in Luke 
Hypo-diegetic narrative in Luke’s Gospel is sometimes constructed so as to offer 
unavoidable theological resonance that is directed toward the extra-diegetic 
audience.91 This is particularly noticeable when characters within parables function in 
tension with their counterparts in the primary diegesis or when key terms are 
repeated across each level resulting in metonymic confusion. Both of these elements 
have the capacity to obscure precisely who is being addressed by whom.92 This is 
exactly the effect highlighted by William Nelles, who has suggested that, “the 
interpenetration or overlapping of levels forces the reader to make other connections 
between the characters and worlds of different levels.”93 Tellingly, the most 
significant examples of this phenomenon in Luke’s Gospel are all unique to Luke.  
Luke 16:31 describes a moment in which Jesus, who is telling a parable, puts 
into the mouth of Abraham an anticipation of Jesus’ own resurrection: 
But Abraham said, `They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them.' 
And he said, `No, father Abraham; but if someone goes to them from the 
dead, they will repent.' He said to him, `If they do not hear Moses and the 
prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone should rise from the 
dead.' (Luke 16:29-31) 
 
This pericope represents a definite slippage between Luke’s message to his readers, 
Jesus’ message to the Pharisees and Abraham’s message to the deceased and 
tormented rich man within the parable. Nominally Abraham is making a point to the 
deceased protagonist within the confines of the parable’s dialogue, but what is 
actually being pronounced functions at a level of discourse two layers removed from 
that of the parable. Luke enables his readers to feel as though Jesus is addressing 
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them and his own audience, allowing the rhetoric within the embedded discourse to 
escape the boundary of the parable. This muddling of diegetic thresholds is aimed 
toward the amplification of an eschatological warning and the rich man is employed 
to add urgency to the post-resurrection context of the audience. The eschatological 
context may be of no significance but it is notable that a similar movement occurs in 
other eschatological pericopae. For example, when Jesus is asked, “Teacher, bid my 
brother divide the inheritance with me,” he replies with the parable of the Rich Fool. 
This story concludes with another direct appeal that cuts through diegetic layers. 
God said to him, `Fool! This night your soul is required of you; and the things 
you have prepared, whose will they be?' So is he who lays up treasure for 
himself, and is not rich toward God (Luke 12:13). 
 
Here the voice of God intrudes into the hypo-diegetic level to castigate the rich fool 
but his voice also speaks at the primary diegetic level as an answer to the brother 
requesting arbitration. Even the extra-diegetic audience hears the warning and God 
is revealed to be an omni-diegetic presence, whose word applies equally across 
each narrative plane. 
Given the imminence of the eschaton in Luke’s schema it is unsurprising that 
an urgency of outlook pervades his Gospel or that other parables also demonstrate 
diegetic transgression that conveys eschatological urgency. Whilst the 
eschatological crux in each of the parables above may be relevant to Jesus’ 
audience in the world of the primary diegesis, their resolution and warning strains the 
distinction between diegetic levels and suggests that Luke consistently has in mind 
multiple layers of audience. A further significant example of this movement from the 
hypo-diegetic to the extra-diegetic audience is identified by C. Kavin Rowe in the 
parable of the faithful steward (Luke 12:41-48). This too focuses on an 
eschatological warning more relevant to Luke’s readers than Jesus’ hearers: 
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But if that servant says to himself, `My master is delayed in coming,' and 
begins to beat the menservants and the maidservants, and to eat and drink 
and get drunk, the master of that servant will come on a day when he does 
not expect him and at an hour he does not know, and will punish him, and put 
him with the unfaithful (Luke 12:41-46). 
 
The significant metaleptic movement within this parable is that the master’s 
punishment muddles a hypo-diegetic action, “he will punish him”, and an entirely 
distinct extra-diegetic eschatological action, “and put him with the unfaithful.” Here, in 
one sentence, the action of the Lord and the world of an embedded narrative occupy 
the same frame, and the threshold between levels has been fully contaminated. 
In some ways this example is more obvious than others because of the 
metonymy it contains around the Lord. Rowe has suggested that Jesus’ frequent 
description of the master of the household in this parable (and the subsequent 
dialogue) as “Lord” is unnecessarily repetitive.94 It is natural for Peter to say to 
Jesus, “Lord, are you telling this parable for us or for everyone?” (12:41) and equally 
natural for the narrative to record, “and the Lord replied…” However, in a parable 
about a homeowner (oikodespotés) there is absolutely no need for the ‘homeowner’ 
to be morphed into the ‘Lord’ (kyrios). The same must be true of the ‘rich man’ of 
16:1. It seems then, that Luke uses ‘Lord’ very loosely as an appellation so that even 
homeowners and rich men may suddenly be described this way in times when their 
own actions provoke interesting contrasts or parallels with the action of ‘the LORD’. 
This process also occurs in the parable of the narrow door. Here, as Schellenberg 
says, “two parallel scenarios—the embedded householder’s reckoning and the 
judgment of the Son of Man—intermingle freely, illuminating the analogy between 
them.”95 
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David Hermon has identified these lexical repetitions as a strong measure of 
metalepsis, suggesting that utilisation of repeated vocabulary items across different 
frames preconfigures the text for threshold transgression.96 On this basis I would 
suggest that parables that have sometimes been dismissed as confused allegory 
should actually be seen as urgent eschatological tropes in which Luke intentionally 
employs confusing metonymy and diegetic ambiguation. This notion is also 
expressed by Ryan Schellenberg who has said of these parables that their narratives 
invite the audience to consider how Luke’s story of Jesus and Jesus’ embedded 
stories are mutually interpretive:  
Intrusion into the embedded narrative of material that is not readily 
comprehensible… [forces] the audience to make recourse to another level of 
discourse.97 
  
I contend therefore that the lexical overlap between diegetic thresholds should be 
seen as demonstration of the intentional permeability within Luke’s layers of story-
telling. Whilst the frequent overlap between narrative levels is normally subtle and 
rarely distorts the shape of the story world, it often achieves the effect of adding 
urgency to an understanding of the immanence of the eschaton.98 In many ways, the 
art of Luke’s use of embedded narrative is that his careful framing distinguishes a 
coherent set of hypo-diegetic, parabolic worlds that are distinct from the world of the 
primary diegesis; but the action of God occurs across each diegetic world, and the 
fluidity and overlap of vocabulary allows surprising verdicts and eschatological 
warnings to “pop up” from the page and directly speak into the extra-diegetic context.  
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2.5 Jesus’ verdict 
The hypothesis that the voice of the master in verse 8a should be understood as that 
of Jesus is supported by the theological continuum that stretches across a range 
Lucan parables, lexical evidence from Luke’s normal use of words, Greco-Roman 
stories of servants who outwit their masters and Jesus’ use of the qal wahomer 
technique. Each supports the notion that Jesus truncates his hypo-diegetic tale to 
praise an act of shrewdness. Luke here contrasts the judgement of the steward’s 
master with the judgement of the Master, the kyrios whose verdict consistently 
transgresses diegetic thresholds and transcends the normal boundaries of story 
worlds. The voice that praises the steward must be understood as that of Jesus 
whom Luke allows to confuse the threshold between diegetic worlds.  
Interpreting 8a as a metaleptic moment makes sense of the parable of 16:1-7 
and it also contributes significantly to understanding of the teachings that follow the 
parables in verses 9-15. The oddity of verse 9 is not entirely negated, but if it is 
accepted that Jesus praises the servant because his profligacy is so shrewd, then it 
seems that in 16:9 he may also be suggesting that it is not as foolish as it might 
seem to invest in earthly friendships and demonstrate reckless generosity with 
possessions. Jesus says, “I tell you, make friends for yourselves by means of 
unrighteous mammon, so that when it fails they may receive you into the eternal 
habitations” (16:9). Here he is building upon the notion, illustrated by the parable, 
that the urgency and profligacy in this lifetime are a shrewd response to the 
anticipation of judgement. Whilst he highlights these themes, Jesus does not 
promote the steward’s moral character, indeed in the subsequent verses he 
pointedly criticises dishonesty (adikía), the precise term he used to introduce the 
steward. He says, “He who is dishonest in a very little is dishonest also in much” 
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(16:10). This criticism itself is a metaphor that Jesus then applies spiritually: “If then 
you have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will entrust to you the 
true riches? And if you have not been faithful in that which is another's, who will give 
you that which is your own? (16:10-12). Faithfulness here both includes the 
steward’s generosity and excludes his dishonesty. 
I contend that 16:7 is the terminus of the parable. In 8a Jesus truncates his 
tale, and Luke amplifies Jesus’ unexpected judgement through the ambiguity of ho 
kyrios, who traverses the boundary between the embedded and primary diegesis. 
Jesus’ praise calls for urgent shrewdness, after which he moves on to deliberate on 
a range of themes that have been raised by his parable: eternal judgement, 
faithfulness, stewardship, true riches and the incompatibility of competing masters.99 
His final conclusion is that, despite dubious behaviour it is the profligate steward 
rather than the rich man who is shrewd, because through his generosity he serves 
the purpose of the real kyrios. 
No servant can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the 
other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot 
serve God and mammon. (16:13) 
 
 
3. Hermeneutical Implications 
3.1 Loose Threads 
Jesus’ praise of the steward in Luke 16:8a curtails and ‘prematurely’ concludes the 
parable of the dishonest steward. The unfolding drama of the steward’s urgent 
response to his master’s demand leads the audience to expect a second scene in 
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which either he gets his comeuppance or he escapes disaster. However, this never 
happens and, moreover, the reasons for the unexpected judgement in the sudden 
interruption of 8a are never fully explained. Certainly the tension of the tale invites an 
expectation of resolution, and the surprise verdict invites some anticipation of 
meaningful elucidation. Nevertheless there is no narrative closure or completion, and 
the reader is left with a sense that the outcome of the story is actually unimportant. 
The success or otherwise of the steward’s malfeasance, the verdict of the rich man 
and the response of the debtors is of no consequence to Jesus’ tale. The parable 
receives no ending because though he began with “a certain rich man” his narrative 
is more of a character sketch than a drama. He is painting the picture of a man 
whose circumstances demand shrewd and immediate action. Any further detail might 
have made the steward’s circumstances less analogous than those of Jesus’ 
audience, rather than more: for though the need for urgent wisdom applies to the 
faithful, listening disciples gathered around Jesus, it is unlikely that the particularity of 
the steward’s dishonesty does. 
Jesus’ point is to contrast the foolishness of those who are upright and self-
righteous, but who act selfishly, with the wisdom of others who, regardless of motive, 
act urgently and shrewdly in the face of unavoidable judgment. The narrative 
strategy he employs to illustrate this message is unusual but it is not unique to this 
parable. Indeed, in a great many synoptic parables there is a lack of resolution 
regarding some strand of the hypo-diegetic plot. Whilst many parables themselves 
offer concrete and vivid images, the precise connections to the Kingdom of God, and 
the consequences for characters within the stories remain in doubt. Did the older 
brother eventually join the banquet for his prodigal sibling (Luke 15:32)? Did the 
injured traveller amass a prodigious debt for the Samaritan at the inn (Luke 10:35)? 
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How is the kingdom like a mustard seed (Luke 13:19)? Why are all the workers in the 
vineyard paid the same wage (Matthew 20:9)? Why are some of the bridesmaids 
shut out of the feast (Matthew 25:10)? The lack of development or resolution in each 
of these examples almost suggests that Jesus never wants his audience to get too 
engrossed in the hypo-diegetic world, the threshold of which is safeguarded by rapid 
return to the primary diegesis which achieves Verfremdungseffekt.  “Glotzt nicht so 
romantisch,” Jesus says, as though his ability as a rabbi is of more significance to 
the gospel writers than his aptitude as a story-teller and the impact of the tale is 
more important than its plot. 
The closest comparable truncation to that observed in Luke 16:8a occurs in 
the parable of the persistent widow in Luke 18.6 (mentioned above). Here, as with 
the parable of the dishonest steward, the audience is led to anticipate more than the 
cursory and begrudging response of the judge. But Jesus again interrupts before the 
audience discover what resolution the widow receives and again Jesus employs qal 
wahomer to explain the relevance of the sketch to his audience.100  
The elliptical endings offered in a number of parables invite recognition that 
their primary purpose is not mimetic artistry but the solicitation of urgent response. 
These are undernourished fictive figures that “tease the hearer into active 
thought.”101  The parable poses a question with which the reader must struggle. As 
Richard Lischer comments:  
The New Testament itself is a collection of unresolved and sometimes chaotic 
episodes whose plot can only be completed by those who hear and retell 
them. “Go, tell your friends what God as done for you,” Jesus says. We never 
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see them do that, for it is clear that we, the readers, are meant to perform the 
rest of the story.102 
 
Here then it is evident that the readerliness demanded of Luke’s audience is 
unrelenting. Even when Jesus is telling stories to his disciples it is Luke’s audience 
who are invited to respond, and the loose threads of the hypo-diegesis mimic the 
status of every reader’s life: ever unfinished and needful of completion.  
3.2 Parabolic Collapse 
In section 2.3 (above) I alluded to the strain placed on diegetic thresholds in Luke 
and also, particularly, to the work of C. Kavin Rowe in identifying moments of 
diegetic confusion. Rowe particularly focuses on the interplay between the kyrios in 
parables and outside of the parables, and suggests that the movement of this term 
across the diegetic thresholds has the effect of blending the narrative worlds:  
‘The story-world created by the narration of parables is intertwined with the 
Gospel narrative through the word kyrios as it is read on both levels, as 
“master” in the world of the parable, and as “Lord” along the allegorical lines 
that Luke so clearly provides.103 
 
Schellenberg posits a similar depth of diegetic intertwining. He observes number of 
parables in which there is “free exchange of imagery from one narrative level to the 
other.”104 This is most overt in Luke 13, when in hypo-diegesis the master of the 
house pronounces extra-diegetic judgement: 
You will weep and gnash your teeth, when you see Abraham and Isaac and 
Jacob and all the prophets in the kingdom of God and you yourselves thrust 
out. (Luke 13:28) 
 
Eta Linnemann suggests that such confusion is accidental. She suggested that the 
process in these parables is one whereby the “reality part” invades the “picture part.”  
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It cannot have been intended that in such a place the picture part and the 
reality part should fall together. For in that case the narrator would have given 
up the power of analogy and deprived the parable of the effect intended.105 
 
Whilst Linneman sees the transgression between the narrative levels as diminishing 
the power of the parable, with Dallenbach, Nelles and Schellenberg, I draw the 
opposite conclusion. Luke’s story of Jesus and Jesus’ embedded stories are 
mutually interpretative and the threshold between them is deliberately permeable.106 
This may well deprive the parables of the fullness of the power of analogy, but this is 
no accident: Jesus does not want his characters to occupy a distinct, intact world 
and none of his parables develop beyond their embryonic expression. Luke does not 
allow them to develop as allegories and he does not try to extract metaphorical 
meaning from every letter or pen stroke (Matt. 5:18). Instead hypodiegetic tales abut 
the primary diegesis arising from it and augment it.  The intentionality of this collision 
of ‘picture part’ and ‘real part’ is particularly evident in the unique manner in which 
Luke’s Jesus creates a number of parables from his immediate situation, as though 
the world of his primary diegetic interactions and that of the hypo-diegetic parable 
were always permeable. Two occasions where Jesus creates direct verisimilitude 
between a parable or extended metaphor and a circumstance developing in his own 
diegetic level may suffice as evidence of this correspondence:  
And they said to him, "The disciples of John fast often and offer prayers, and 
so do the disciples of the Pharisees, but yours eat and drink." And Jesus said 
to them, “Can you make wedding guests fast while the bridegroom is with 
them? The days will come, when the bridegroom is taken away from them, 
and then they will fast in those days. (Luke 5:33-35) 
 
Jesus said, “Simon, I have something to say to you… a certain creditor had 
two debtors; one owed five hundred denarii, and the other fifty. When they 
could not pay, he forgave them both. Now which of them will love him more?" 
(Luke 7:40-42) 
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The other Gospels also include these interwoven episodes, and their treatment of 
the story of the anointing is especially interesting. The narrative frame around the 
parable is iterated in comparable form in Matthew 26:6-13, Mark 14:3-9 and John 
12:1-8, but none of the other Gospels includes the embedded parable of the debtor 
(Luke 7:41-42). Luke’s unique employment of a short parable thus reveals the 
particular fragility of diegetic thresholds in his Gospel, for Luke’s Jesus is uniquely 
creative in the way he pulls strings of hypo-diegesis from his own circumstances in 
the primary diegetic world.  
Given the wealth of interpenetration described between the world in which 
Jesus lived and the world of which he told, it would certainly be unsurprising for Luke 
to imply that a corresponding permeability exists across the threshold of the world ‘in’ 
which he told and the world ‘of’ which he told, i.e. between the world of his own 
audience and that of Jesus’ audience, between the reader and the text. Like Duane 
Hanson’s Security Guard, initially it is easy to mistake the level addressed by Luke’s 
hypo-diegetic figures and the boundary between levels of representation remains 
opaque.  
Luke’s contamination of narrative layers is a provocative, muddling and 
significant strategy that allows both God as Judge and Jesus as Lord to speak 
across every narrative level. The Gospel claim is that Jesus’ good news places 
demands upon every audience and that this necessitates the collapse of parabolic 
worlds and collision of diegetic levels. The subservience of hypo-diegetic figures 
therefore serves to illustrate the supremacy of the ultimate figure, the Christ, for 
whom all thresholds are permeable. 
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3.3 Mobius’ Strip 
The fluidity between narrative levels in the Lucan parables is much more notable 
than in Mark and Matthew. This is not to say that the other synoptic gospels do not 
imply omni-diegetic coherence, but rather that each gospel attempts to traverse the 
gap between Jesus’ hearers and the gospel readers differently. Matthew, for 
example, adds explanatory commentary not found in Mark or Luke, a typical case 
being the inclusion of the uniquely detailed interpretation of the parable of the weeds. 
The absence of such explanations in Luke and Mark suggests that Matthew employs 
a more specific, directed and purposeful theology than the other synoptic texts, and 
that it is his intent to employ detail from the narrative world to explain the reader’s 
world with only limited ambiguity. There are a number of characteristics in the way 
Matthew treats the thresholds between the hypo-diegetic and primary diegetic worlds 
that, through their absence in Luke, illustrate Luke’s own relaxed approach to 
diegetic thresholds between narrative levels.  
1. Matthew makes every effort to show that the world of the parables yields overt 
and direct meaning in the world of Jesus and his audience, a world that in turn is 
interpreted specifically to produce effect for Matthew’s own audience.107 For 
example the brief Matthean parable of the weeds is followed with lengthy 
explanation.  
2. The narrative structure of Matthew’s Gospel leads to the conclusion that the 
interpreter’s present is the most significant time frame and it is almost as if 
Matthew views the extra-diegetic as real, the primary diegesis as an extension of 
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reality, and the hypo-diegesis as a servant of reality.108 Thus narratological 
comments explicate events within the primary diegesis seeking to make their 
meaning in the extra-diegetic audience as plain as possible.  For example, to 
justify the complexity and confusion of a number of paradoxical parables, 
Matthew explains that Jesus’ parables themselves were a fulfilment of Psalm 
78:2 ("I will open my mouth in parables”).  
3. Matthew clearly anticipates the relevance of Jesus’ parables to his own audience, 
but he also employs many more strategies than Luke does to clearly demarcate 
the boundary of the hypo-diegesis and to accentuate the relevance of the 
parabolic world for his own extra-diegetic audience. Extended epithetical 
explanations and requests for explanation from characters in the primary diegesis 
are the most obvious devices. Examples include: “Explain to us the parable of the 
weeds of the field” (Matthew 13:36) and “Explain the parable to us” (Matthew 
15:15) 
Noting these simple strategies employed in Matthew highlights precisely the absence 
of such techniques in Luke’s narrative and accentuates the fluidity between narrative 
thresholds that is found in Luke’s Gospel. In Luke it is the characters themselves 
who act as figures for the world beyond the parable: without the close shepherding 
and detailed interpretations provided by Matthew, it is the extravagance of their 
behaviours and the nuance in their contexts which invite the reader to learn lessons 
from their lives. Luke sees no need to explain precisely the significance of each 
interaction, and includes more unresolved parables than Matthew as though he 
intends to maximise the figural interplay between worlds. Dominic Crossan has 
                                            
108
 This is most obvious in Matthew’s ‘anachronistic’ employment of ecclesia within Jesus’ direct 
speech: “If your brother sins against you… [and] if he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; 
and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector” 
(Matthew 18:15-17). 
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elaborated this point in some detail, suggesting that in parables a reader is 
presented with “imaginary gardens with real toads in them.”109 
Luke is content to let diegetic toads hop in whichever garden they please, 
where Matthew is eager to ensure the toads stay in their rightful context and the 
fullness of their allegorical meaning is extrapolated in the real world. In addition Luke 
establishes Jesus as an overtly omni-diegetic operator who speaks homologously 
across textual surfaces. There is easy movement between the primary diegesis and 
hypo-diegesis at the threshold of numerous parables. Additionally the identity of the 
kyrios is consistently polysemous. Together these attest to the degree of omni-
diegetic coherence within Luke’s Gospel; a coherence that is alluded to by Luke in 
his prologue, as he describes the things accomplished among us: 
Inasmuch as many have undertaken to compile a narrative of the things which 
have been accomplished among us, just as they were delivered to us by 
those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word, it 
seemed good to me also, having followed all things closely for some time 
past, to write an orderly account for you. (Luke 1:1-3) 
 
Luke’s model of reality is like a Mobius strip: an ‘impossible space’ that short circuits 
its own boundaries, removing the edge between inside and outside and suggesting 
an illogical surface. It is one continuous side that twists through 180 degrees and 
presents an unexpected and illogical anamorphism. There is a fluidity of orientation 
and an ambiguity about the diegetic thresholds in Luke’s Gospel that suggest a 
similar confused continuity between the representational and the real.110 The 
intrusion of the kyrios of the primary diegesis into the parables he tells renders the 
worlds of the Jesus and his hypo-diegetic characters mutually interpretative. This 
                                            
109
 Crossan, In Parables, p. 15. Crossan quotes from Marianne Moore’s 1935 poem, ‘Poetry’: 
Marianne Moore, Complete poems (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 6. 
110
 Robert Fowler adopts a similar analogy when looking at Markan movement between metaphor and 
irony and uncertainty and incongruity. Further, he cites the visual conundrums of M.C. Escher as a 
useful illustration of the Markan mode of discourse that “continually makes insiders of outsiders by 
making outsiders of insiders.” Fowler, ‘Let the Reader understand’, p. 221. 
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interior hermeneutic suggests a complex sense of figure fulfilment that develops 
across narrative thresholds, rather than within distinct worlds. In turn this invites the 
extra-diegetic audience to imagine that the role of the kyrios may also find fulfilment 
beyond the narrative in their own world.  
On every level, across every threshold and whichever way the loop is twisted, 
the master demands shrewd service from every listener. The parable of the 
dishonest steward is just one of the embedded narratives within Luke that implicates 
those outside of both the hypo-diegetic and extra-diegetic frames, not only as mutual 
witnesses with the narrator, but also as co-recipients of Jesus’ challenge. Muddled 
diegetic frameworks diminish the reader’s capacity to remain detached from the 
confusion and the imperatives of omni-diegetic master. 
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1.1 “To this day” 
So Moses the servant of the LORD died there in the land of Moab, according to 
the word of the LORD, and he buried him in the valley in the land of Moab 
opposite Beth-pe'or; but no man knows the place of his burial to this day. 
(Deut. 34:1-6) 
 
A consistent feature of the narrative labelled the ‘Deuteronomistic History’ 
(abbreviated to DH where appropriate) is the recurrence of the explanatory phrase 
“To this day” (‘ad hayom).1 It is a turn of phrase which explains the continuing 
presence of a place name or a geographical feature, and is most commonly ascribed 
to a single Deuteronomistic redactor (abbreviated to Dtr), who seems to be passing 
comment on features that have remained extant from the day of the narrative 
occurrence, until his own day. “To this day” occurs forty four times between 
Deuteronomy and the end of II Kings (books commonly recognised as the DH and 
eight times in Genesis (now often understood as the first part of a history that 
stretches from Genesis to Kings).2 This frequency is particularly notable because 
one of the oft-cited characteristics of the Deuteronomistic History is the highly 
subsidiary role of narrative voice.3 Throughout the DH, dialogue is generally framed 
by only the most frugal narrative comments: normally this is a simple inflected verb 
form such as “and he rose” or “then he said.” In this way, the normative structure of 
the text brings speech to the foreground making readers less conscious of narrative 
                                            
1
 The phrase is present in a prodigious range of other biblical narratives, but the total count of 
instances in the Deuteronomic History makes the DH a particularly fruitful field for analysis. In all that 
follows when referring to the Deuteronomic History, by implication I include Deuteronomic redactions 
present in Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers as per the increasingly popular “Primary History” 
model which recognises literary continuity stretching from Genesis to II Kings. Cf. Thomas L. Brodie, 
Genesis as Dialogue: A Literary, Historical, and Theological Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
2
 There is also one instance in Numbers 22:30 (though this is not an etiological comment). This total 
does not include instances in direct speech when a character reports the continuation of a tradition or 
fact until their own day within the primary diegesis. 
3
 Cf. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p.63. 
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presence.4 Most actions are described through the words of participating characters. 
Consequently the phrase “To this day” is an interruption of significant effect. It not 
only provides an abnormal proleptic interruption to the progression of the narrative, 
but also contaminates an otherwise pristine and chronologically consistent 
presentation of history.  
In the overwhelming majority of cases “To this day” functions as an almost 
poetic refrain and affects only a minor interruption in the progress of narrative and 
plot. However, although the formula is relatively inconsequential to a surface 
reading, the introduction of the narrator’s place and time within the story world 
represents the intrusion of an otherwise entirely separate diegetic plane. The 
introduction of the narrator/redactor’s world reminds readers that the presentation 
before them is mediated by the time, place and theology of a historical narrator. This 
mediation both validates a described historical continuum and, at the same time, 
alerts the reader to the distance between the world of the text and their own world. 
Tellingly it also reveals the redactor’s presupposition that his presumed readers will 
be people who share knowledge of the landmarks he refers to. These consequences 
are sufficiently unsettling for the phrase to have caused significant interpretative 
consternation.  
The consistency with which commentators have noted the problems caused 
by the “To this day” formula attests to the depth of diegetic contamination and 
muddle  created by the phrase, especially in terms of understanding the distance 
between the time of the events described and the time of the narratives’ telling. A 
number of Rabbinic, Patristic, Reformation and Enlightenment scholars have 
                                            
4
 Cf. David J. A. Clines, Interested parties: The ideology of writers and readers of the Hebrew Bible 
(London: A&C Black, 1995), p. 234; Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 114-115 and Meir 
Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, p. 190 – 193. 
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afforded significant attention to the “To this day” formula. Brief summaries of a 
number of examples include responses such as that of Isaac Abravanel: “The phrase 
‘To this day’ demonstrates by necessity that book [of Joshua] was written long after 
the affairs it reports”; Jerome’s acknowledgement that: “by ‘this day’ we must 
certainly understand the time of the composition of the history restored by Ezra”;  
John Wesley’s consideration of authorship: “’To this day’ must be among those 
passages not written by Moses, but inserted”, and Hobbes’ critical consideration: “As 
the writer saith ‘reamaineth unto this day’ needs must therefore be long after the time 
of Moses and Joshua.”5 
1.2 Purpose of the phrase 
Typically, usage of the formula “To this day” makes a simple etymological or 
etiological case and includes the phrase, “Therefore that place to this day is 
called…” Of the fifty four occurrences in Genesis to II Kings there is minimal variation 
in the precise formula ’ad hayom (in almost every instance it is a combination of a 
specific converted imperfect verb and a subsequent modified noun.)6 There is 
nevertheless significant variation in the application of the formula and in suggestions 
about the primary purpose of the phrase. 
Etymology 
The most common application of the phrase is the establishment of a causal 
connection between a place name and an event reported within the narrative. For 
example:   
                                            
5
 Isaac Abravanel, Commentary on Former Prophets (Jerusalem: Hebrew Press, 1965), p. 68; 
Jerome, Adversus  Helvidium, 1.7; John Wesley, On Deuteronomy, 39; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 
III 33.6.  
6
 Brevard S. Childs, ‘A Study of the Formula, “Until This Day”‘, Journal of Biblical Literature 82, no. 3 
(1963), pp. 279-292, p. 282. 
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Israel stoned [Achan] to death; they burned him with fire, cast stones on him, 
and raised over him a great heap of stones that remains to this day. Then the 
LORD turned from his burning anger. Therefore that place to this day is called 
the Valley of Achor. (Josh. 7:26)7 
 
Very similar examples can also be cited where a place name is described as 
remaining “To this day” but no causality is posited, and consequently the phrase acts 
more like an archaeological footnote. For example: 
And the man went to the land of the Hittites and built a city, and called its 
name Luz; that is its name to this day. (Judges 1:26) 
 
The phrase also frequently functions to explain a strange term, title or place name. In 
such instances “To this day” tends to accompany a simple yet tangential explanation 
of a genealogy or an individual’s name: 
Thus both the daughters of Lot were with child by their father. The first-born 
bore a son, and called his name Moab; he is the father of the Moabites to this 
day. The younger also bore a son, and called his name Ben-ammi; he is the 
father of the Ammonites to this day (Genesis 19:36 -38). 
 
It was Gunkel’s suggestion that these simple etymological explanations were the 
original form of the “To this day” phrase, but that more nuanced or perspective-laden 
examples continued to be added for some time after these original expressions. The 
effect of this continuum was to obscure the simplicity of the original etymological 
purpose.8 
Etiology 
An alternative explanation to the etymological proposition is the suggestion that the 
phrase was used primarily to etiological effect. This hypothesis was advanced by 
                                            
7
 Detailed analysis of this example is undertaken by Richard Hess who considers the various versions 
of the genealogy of Achan in Joshua 7:1-24 and 1 Chronicles 2:7. Having reviewed the variant 
spellings, the etymologies, and attestations of the six names in that genealogy he suggests that 
'Achan' was the original name in the story, and the name 'Achar' (which alone among the six names 
lacks extra-biblical attestation) was later afforded to Achan because of his association with the Valley 
of Achor and his responsibility for causing 'trouble' (oukr). Richard Hess, ‘Achan and Achor: Names 
and Wordplay in Joshua 7’, Hebrew Annual Review 14 (1994), pp. 89-98. 
8
 Hermann Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis (London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1901), p. 53. 
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Friedemann Golka, who suggested that narratives containing the “To this day” 
formula were primarily orientated towards the explanation of the origin or the reason 
for the existence of a state of affairs.  Despite advancing this hypothesis, Golka 
nevertheless complained about the lack of distinction between etiological motifs and 
etiological narratives, and suggested that commentators had inflated the number of 
purported etiological narratives to the point that almost every tale in the Pentateuch 
was an etiological in origin.9 This was a problem Claus Westermann had already 
noted. He suggested that etiological notes were secondary to etiological narratives – 
the later enumerating rather than narrating.10 According to Golka’s model, etiological 
motivations were axiomatic to the structure of Old Testament narrative, but the “To 
this day” formulas were secondary in importance to the narratives which included 
etiological meaning within their deep structural “arc of tension.”11 Simple examples 
include the naming of an altar at Ophrah and the pillar of Rachel’s tomb. In both the 
narrative is etiologically orientated and includes the testimony formula to add 
additional weight to the etiology proposed in the story. 
Then Gideon built an altar there to the LORD, and called it, The LORD is 
peace. To this day it still stands at Ophrah, which belongs to the Abiez'rites 
(Judges 6:24).  
 
So Rachel died, and she was buried on the way to Ephrath (that is, 
Bethlehem), and Jacob set up a pillar upon her grave; it is the pillar of 
Rachel's tomb, which is there to this day (Genesis 35:20). 
 
                                            
9
 Friedemann W. Golka, ‘The Aetiologies in the Old Testament: Part 1’, Vetus Testamentum 26, no. 4 
(1976), pp. 410-428 p. 410. Cf. Petrus Johannes Van Dyk, ‘The function of so-called etiological 
elements in narratives’, Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 102, no. 1 (1990), pp. 19-33 
(p. 33).  
10
 Claus Westermann, ‘Arten der Erzählung in der Genesis’, Forschung am Alten Testament 
(München: Kaiser,1964), pp. 9-91. 
11
 Likewise John Bright concluded that etiological stories were attached after the Pentateuch and 
Deuteronomistic history were completed at the hand of a redactor who sought to contextualise ancient 
creatively historicised stories. John Bright, Early Israel in recent history writing: a study in method, No. 
19 (Cambridge: A.R. Allenson, 1956), pp. 89-100. 
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In this model “To this day” is advanced as a common component of etiological 
legends which seek to explain “no end of the questions which interest a primitive 
people.”12 Gunkel also explored this idea, suggesting that these applications were 
“fictitious stories” explaining actual underlying tribal and ethnographic tensions, 
“explained poetically.”13 Thus Genesis constantly returns to definite places, such as 
Bethel, Penuel, Shechem, Beersheba and the trees, wells, and stone monuments 
there because these are “the primitive sanctuaries of the tribes and families of Israel” 
the history of which had been long since forgotten.14 
Theological explanation 
In all of the examples above, and in every other case, the phrase “To this day” 
legitimates the historicity of the narrative and thereby justifies the account of the text. 
This is often fairly inconsequential in reception. However, there are also a significant 
number of examples where more substantial and historically significant theological 
beliefs or cultic tradition are justified more overtly.15 In the former category are a 
number of stories which each point to the miraculous power of God. These 
pericopae offer much more than a simplistic suggestion of the persistence of a state 
of affairs or a descriptive summary of causality. They affect a distance of perspective 
and a theological depth to the narrative as they seek to prove the efficacy of God’s 
word. An example of this is found in Judges 15:19: 
                                            
12
 Golka, ‘The Aetiologies’, p. 419.  
13
 Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis, p. 19. 
14
” Ibid. p. 33. 
14
 Gunkel failed to justify his conclusion that etiological legends were the foundational texts 
(grundschrift) of Genesis, rather, this inference was necessitated by his presumption that Genesis 
demonstrates the almost animistic roots of primitive “Israelitish” religion. Ibid., pp.22-35. 
15
 Golka suggests that tribal relationships are the principal cause of etiological traditions. “In the 
Jacob-Esau Cycle we find that aetiologies always occur when the rivalry of the two persons is to be 
seen in a tribal perspective. On the basis of sociological and traditio-historical evidence we seem to 
be justified in stating that the pure family narrative is the terminus a quo of aetiology.” ‘The Aetiologies 
1’, p.268. 
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And God split open the hollow place that is at Lehi, and there came water 
from it; and when he drank, his spirit returned, and he revived. Therefore the 
name of it was called En-hakkor'e; it is at Lehi to this day (Judges 15:19). 
 
Examples which are primarily focused on cultic justification (for example  I Kings 8.8, 
II Chron. 35.25, II Kings 17.34 & 41, I Sam 5:5 and Genesis 32:25-32) seem to 
explain not just the continued presence of a cultic practice, observance or law, but 
the reasons for it. In each case the etiology begins “therefore” or “this is why…” 
When they rose early on the next morning, behold, Dagon had fallen face 
downward on the ground before the ark of the LORD... This is why the priests 
of Dagon and all who enter the house of Dagon do not tread on the threshold 
of Dagon in Ashdod to this day  (I Samuel 5.4-5). 
 
A further, more famous example offers an apology for a cultic practice found in the 
middle of the story of Jacob’s wrestle with God. 
When the man saw that he did not prevail against Jacob, he touched the 
hollow of his thigh…Therefore to this day the Israelites do not eat the sinew of 
the hip which is upon the hollow of the thigh, because he touched the hollow 
of Jacob's thigh on the sinew of the hip (Genesis 32:25- 32). 
 
The division between etymological, etiological and theological purpose may, 
ultimately, be unnecessary. Fundamentally etymological, etiological and theological 
purposes overlap in the DH. Indeed, given that the formula is sometimes used to 
explain names, sometimes words and sometimes religious beliefs or traditions it may 
be that the purpose of the phrase lies less in what is pointed back towards and more 
in the reception and inheritance of these traditions. I suggest that the “To this day” 
phrase is fundamentally audience focussed. Its purpose does not lie in singularly 
etymological, etiological or theological explanation, but in multi-faceted appeal to the 
audience. It seems likely that whenever the narrative addressed traditions, places 
and names that the narrator or redactor was familiar with, he took the opportunity to 
connect the story with the extra-diegetic community. The purpose of the phrase 
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therefore lies in its capacity to connect the discourse of history with the discourse 
and the shared life of the extra-diegetic community.  
1.3 Provenance  
Given that the phrase “To this day” offers the clearest evidence of the world of the 
compiler, redactor or editor and that the inclusion of the phrase often includes overt 
theological, cultural, ethnic, socio-political, temporal and geographical tones, it is not 
surprising that early form critics paid significant attention to the formula in their 
discussions about the formation of the Pentateuch, nor that on-going discussions 
about the nature of the Deuteronomic redaction have given the phrase priority.16 
Significant consideration of the “To this day” formula is common in studies exploring 
the nature and role of a redactor within the Deuteronomistic History, and since the 
origins of the documentary hypothesis, studies have consistently asserted that the 
“To this day” formula is a fundamental indicator of the presence of a redactor. These 
perspectives are not fundamental to my study, and what follows is therefore a 
rudimentary summary of the three most important theories regarding the provenance 
of the phrase. These competing models are (1), that it is part of a primitive 
background text, (2) that it represents a colloquial idiom employed by a number of 
the different redactors, or (3) that it is an intentional expression of personal testimony 
derived from a specific Southern Pre-exilic redaction. 
Primitive Grundschrift 
According to Hermann Gunkel the “To this day” traditions were part of a broad and 
primitive interest in the justification of cultic traditions. Indeed Gunkel and others 
have suggested that pericopae that included the “To this day” formula were amongst 
                                            
16
 For example Jeffrey C. Geoghegan, The Time, Place, and Purpose of the Deuteronomistic History: 
The Evidence of “Until This Day” (Providence, RI: Brown Judaic Studies, 2006). 
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the most primitive source which underpinned later narratives. Gunkel suggested 
these were traditions used by “early Israel as a matter of course to explain 
geographical or tribal names without any scientific spirit and wholly on the basis of 
the language as it stood.”17 This suggestion supposes that uses of the phrase, “and it 
is still called X to this day,”  are therefore examples of an author identifying a modern 
word which sounded more or less like an unexplained name and then proceeding to 
“tell a little story explaining why this particular word was uttered under these 
circumstances and was adopted as the name.”18 Gunkel’s contention was that such 
explanation was at the heart of all of the earliest narratives within the Torah: 
The instinct for asking questions is innate in man: he wants to know the origin 
of things… thus in the legends of Genesis we find the beginnings of human 
science; only humble beginnings, of course, and yet venerable to us because 
they are beginnings, and at the same time peculiarly attractive and touching, 
for in these answers ancient Israel has uttered its most intimate feelings, 
clothing them in a bright garb of poetry.19 
  
Martin Noth (1943), Albrecht Alt, Friedemann Golka (1976) and Burke O. Long 
(1991) have each expanded Gunkel’s view, interpreting the phrase as part of a 
series of etiological legends, whose fabric constitutes some of the earliest traditions 
in the Old Testament which remained woven throughout later narratives, indeed 
Golka concluded that etiological stories derived from the time of the Israelite tribes.20 
Noth and Alt suggested that in a number of examples etiological explanation was the 
purpose for an entire story and the whole narrative in such cases is considered to be 
constructed to explain a phenomenon. More recently Susan Zeelander has 
concluded that: 
                                            
17
 Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis, p. 28. 
18
 Loc. cit. 
19
 Ibid. p.25. 
20
 Friedemann W. Golka, ‘The Aetiologies in the Old Testament: Part 2’, Vetus Testamentum 27, no. 
1, (1977), pp. 36-47 (p. 44).  
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In the manner of Rudyard Kipling’s Just So Stories ancient writers began with 
a contemporary condition and created stories that would explain the 
condition.21 
 
This hypothesis satisfies an intuitive reading that a fundamental aspect of ancient 
story-telling included a desire to explicate complex phenomenon. However, there is 
much evidence to suggest that the etiology is not the earliest constitutive element of 
the DH. John Bright has argued cogently that “it can be proved that the aetiological 
factor is often second in the formation of these traditions and it cannot be proved that 
it was ever primary.”22 William F. Albright, took a similar approach, critiquing 
Gunkel’s model through examples such as Genesis 25:16, where the etiology of 
Jacob’s name is decidedly tangential to the story. Equally, Isaac L. Seeligmann has 
explored the etiological sections of The Book of Jubilees, a text which adds details to 
a number of Genesis stories to justify cultic traditions. A clear example of this 
process is found in the efforts in the Book of Jubilees to explain the date of the 
Jewish Shavuot holiday.23 This passage suggests that the feast of weeks and the 
annual covenant renewal are derived from a festival “celebrated in heaven from the 
day of creation till the days of Noah”, the timing of which (“twenty six jubilees and five 
weeks of years”) correlates with the calendar for Shavuot (cf. Jubilees 6:15-18). 
 Seeligmann’s analysis suggests an inversion of the model developed by 
Gunkel. He persuasively evinces the existence of a rich Jewish tradition of adding 
explanatory notes to existing narratives, rather than building narratives around 
names. The fundamental tenets of Gunkel’s model lack evidence and the notion of a 
primitive ‘grundschrift’ is therefore rarely accepted amongst modern commentators. 
                                            
21
 Susan Zeelander, Closure in Biblical Narrative, (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 107. 
22
 Bright, Early Israel, p. 91. 
23
 Isaac Leo Seeligmann, Aetiological elements in biblical historiography (New York: Zion 26, 1961), 
pp. 141 – 142. See Jubilees 6:1 and 6:17 for explanations of the date of the Jewish Shavuot holiday. 
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Product of many redactors 
Brevard Childs (1963) popularised a different notion, namely that ‘To this day’ 
reflects the hand of many redactors across a broad timespan.24 Childs’ suggestion is 
that because “To this day” appears in all of the literary strands identified by source 
critics “the formula [must] reflect the age of many different redactors.”25 Because of 
the consistency of language and grammar he believed that the formula was not part 
of the original traditions but was “secondarily added as a redactional commentary on 
existing traditions.”26 He suggested that “To this day” should be seen as one of the 
“major creative forces” underlying many narrative components within Genesis – 
Kings.27 He notes that in II Kings there are a prodigious range of sources which 
cover a timespan of almost 300 years and each contains the refrain. 
The sources are frequently identified and the diversity of age is certain. The 
formula appears in material most likely from the source styled the "Book of the 
Acts of Solomon" (I Kings 11 41; cf. 8 s; 9 21), from material in the "Book of 
the Chronicles of the Kings of Judah" (II Kings 8 23; cf. II Kings 8 22; 10 27, 
etc.), from a collection of prophetic narratives (II Kings 2 2), and only 
infrequently from the Deuteronomistic historian (II Kings 17 23, 34).28 
 
Childs concluded that the formula was not an attempt to justify the status quo but 
rather an element of personal testimony and contemporary insight to historical 
narrative added to the text of the DH by innumerate hands who all sought to confirm 
the traditions they had received and personally knew to be true. 29  
                                            
24
 Childs, ‘A Study of the Formula.’ 
25
 Childs, ‘A Study of the Formula’, p. 292.  
26
 Ibid., p. 290. It is difficult to explain how Childs can note the consistency of the language whilst 
arguing for application across centuries. His hypothesis depends on the notion a wide variety of 
redactors felt equally compelled to add their own personal testimony formulaically: “In personal 
testimony… writers are recording independent traditions to which they add the formula secondarily… 
adding to and confirming a received tradition” (p. 292). 
27
 Ibid., p. 279   
28
 Ibid., p. 292. 
29
 Ibid., p. 282. Two further categories also exist: sometimes the phrase “To this day” is found in direct 
speech which affirms the nature of things in the day of one of the characters and there are also 
sociological comments associated with “To this day” that they are not genuinely etiological. 
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Southern Pre-exilic Redaction 
Abraham Kuenen (1870) suggested that the ‘To this day’ phrase is evidence of a 
wholesale and single-handed redaction of the DH whereby theological and ethnic 
prejudices are justified through reference to earlier traditions. This notion has 
subsequently been developed frequently, with significant detail (and some deviation) 
being added by Frank Moore Cross (1973), Mordechai Cogan & Hayim Tadmor 
(1988) and Jeffrey Geoghegan (2003) amongst others.30  
Abraham Kuenen was the first to note that a significant element of the “To this 
day” comments amounted to a Judean assertion of dominance over Edom and of the 
illegitimacy of the Northern Kingdom. Examples he cited included phrases such as, 
“So Edom revolted from the rule of Judah to this day” (2 Kings 8:22) and “So Israel 
has been in rebellion against the house of David to this day” (I Kings 12:19).31 These 
express a specific context in space and time much more than some other examples 
of “To this day” because there is only a limited window in which such proclamations 
could have been made. Frank Moore Cross built on these observations, positing a 
dual redaction of the DH. He suggested that there was a pre-exilic redaction prior to 
the final 6th century version of the text and that the ‘To this day’ phrase was part of 
the intermediary rather than final redactive level. He noted that, “in portions written 
by the Deuteronomistic author, the expression ‘to this day’ presumes the existence 
                                            
30
 F.M. Cross, Canaanite myth and Hebrew epic (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1997) (pp. 268 – 283); Mordechai Cogan and Hayim Tadmor, II Kings: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary (Anchor Bible 11, New York: Doubleday, 1988) (pp. 96-97, 186, 214) 
and Jeffrey C. Geoghegan, ‘“Until This Day” and the Preexilic Redaction of the Deuteronomistic 
History’, Journal of Biblical Literature 122 (2003), pp. 201-227. 
31
 For a range of further developments see Thomas Rӧmer (ed.), The Future of the Deuteronomistic 
History, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000); R. E. Friedman, The Exile and Biblical Narrative 
(Decatur, GA: Scholars Press, 1981) and Richard D. Nelson The Double Redaction of the 
Deuteronomistic History, JSOTSS 18 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1981). 
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of the Judean state.”32 His conclusion is still seen as compelling by many, such as 
Richard Nelson who has concluded:  
The recurring phrase ‘to this day’ represents the redactional contribution of a 
pre-exilic historian witnessing to the continued existence of realities 
mentioned in sources. This phrase is incorporated into every source known to 
have been employed by the historian. It is used in close proximity to obviously 
Deuteronomistic material and touches on Deuteronomistic interests.33 
 
Cross, and those who have followed his lead, pay particular attention to I Kings 
12:19, which offers incontrovertible evidence of a pre-exilic Judean interest in at 
least some of the strands containing the ‘to this day formula.’34 Here the narrator 
passes judgement on the Northern kingdom: “So Israel has been in rebellion against 
the house of David to this day.” Jeffrey Geoghegan has built on Cross’s insights 
regarding the provenance of the witness formula whilst rejecting the notion of a 
double redaction. He comments that the geographical, socio-political and theological 
assumptions implicit in pericopae containing the “To this day” phrase reveal an 
overwhelmingly similar interest and knowledge. He claims: 
The to this day traditions represent a unified temporal, geographical and 
religio-political perspectives on the basis of which we are able to identify when 
[the Dtr] lived, where he lived, and even why he wrote. 35 
 
Geoghegan’s model suggests that the “To this day” formula is part of the final 
compilation of the history and he notes that the phrase is used with reference to 
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 Cross, Canaanite myth and Hebrew epic, p. 275. 
33
 Richard Nelson, ‘The Double Redaction of the Deuteronomistic History: The case is still 
compelling’, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 29, no. 3 (2005), pp. 319-337 (p. 326). 
34
 Cross’s original suggestions have generated a range of suggested adaptations including argument 
for an earlier Hezekian, rather than Josian, history. (See B. Halpern, ‘Sacred History and Ideology: 
Chronicles' Thematic Structure-Indications of an Earlier Source’, in The Creation of Sacred Literature: 
Composition and Redaction of the Biblical Text, ed. by R. E. Friedman, Near Eastern Studies 22 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 35-54. Also A. F. Campbell and M. A. O'Brien, 
Unfolding the Deuteronomistic History (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000), p. 130: “Since Cross's 
original studies, the theory of a dual redaction of the DH has had numerous defenders and now 
stands on firmer evidentiary ground.” 
35
 Jeffrey C. Geoghegan, The Levites and the Literature of the Late-Seventh Century’, in Scribes 
Before and After 587 BCE: A Conversation, ed. by Mark Leuchter (Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 7, 
2009), p. 33. 
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almost exclusively ‘Southern’ geography, referring to only two regions, six individual 
towns, seven memorials and three natural landmarks. 36 He identified limited and 
distinct religio-political themes which were of significant interest to the narrator:  
The rebellion of the North and of Edom… Subjugation of Hivites, Amorites, 
Hittites, Perizzites and Jebusites… Non Israelite forced labour… the curse on 
Jericho… the removal of the high places…proper handling of the Ark of the 
Covenant of YHWH, the rights and responsibilities of Levites… centralized 
worship… Judahite-Edomite interactions… The reading of Torah of Moses.37 
 
All of the issues he identifies in pericopae connected to “To this day” traditions are of 
demonstrable interest to a priestly, pre-exilic, southern redactor. This is particularly 
obvious in the four matters attested to more than once: the presence of Jebusites in 
Jerusalem (Josh. 15:63 and Judg. 1:21), the naming of Havvoth Jair (Deut. 3:14 and 
Judg. 10:4), the naming of Beer-sheba (Gen. 21:25-33 and Gen. 26:31-33) and the 
presence of non-Israelite forced labour within society (Josh. 16:10 and I Kgs. 9:15). 
I am broadly persuaded by Geoghegan’s suggestion that the formula was 
inserted in one single act of compilation or redaction.38 It is difficult to adjudicate 
between redactional models, however the singularly southern, priestly, pre-exilic 
perspective of the phrase is good reason to support the notion of a single redaction. 
The continued presence of “until this day” at every level of the history is evidence 
that the element of “personal” testimony found across the diverse strands of the DH 
may well be the product of a single historical redactor confirming the plausibility of 
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 The regions and towns are: Havvoth Jair (Deut 3:14 and Judg 10:4), Cabul (I Kings 9:13), Gilgal 
(Josh 5:9), Emek Achor (Josh 7:26), Luz (Judg 1:26), Mahaneh Dan (Judg 18:12), Perez-Uzzah (2 
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 Jeffrey C. Geoghegan, ‘“Until This Day” and the Preexilic Redaction of the Deuteronomistic History’, 
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 Cf. Geoghegan, The Time, Place and Purpose pp. 10-41. 
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diverse received traditions extant in his day and, in his mind, worthy of inclusion in 
the final history.  
1.4 Hypothesis 
Much has been said about the process of redaction in the Deuteronomic History and 
the significance of the “To this day” phrase as a contextualising ‘witness formula’. 
There is now a broad consensus about the phrase epitomised by Geoghegan’s 
review of the geographical scope and theological interest associated with the phrase, 
and his hypothesis of a single southern pre-exilic redactor is persuasive.  
My assertion is that examples of the “To this day” phrase do indeed help to justify 
conclusions about the redaction of the Deuteronomistic History but that occurrences 
also provide a provocative lens onto the nature of narratological mediation, 
subjectivity and authority. It is more theologically profitable to ask what “To this day” 
formula reveals about the interior hermeneutics of the DH than about the context of 
the redactor. The formula is an implicit admission of relativity; an overt expression of 
the narrator’s own hermeneutical situatedness; and an acknowledgement of his role 
as an interpreter of sources and traditions. These revelations are potentially of 
substantial theological significance, whilst observations about interpolation and the 
date or identity of the redactor(s) are of excavative value but limited interpretative 
impact. The distinctly subjective view of history revealed in the phrase, and the 
demonstration of narratological self-awareness illustrates that the narrator 
understood his role as a compiler and teller of history, not just a recorder of a 
chronology. “To this day” interrupts the primary diegesis metaleptically, folding in the 
world of the narrator into that of the story and introducing the narrator’s time and 
place, an inclusion that implies a depth of ‘self-involvement’. Understanding the text 
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in this way has the potential to meaningfully and significantly inform the manner in 
which the history is read.  
In the following analysis, I therefore intend to examine the significance of the 
phrase in comparison to other narrative interruptions in the Deuteronomistic History, 
and explore the use of “To this day” beyond the DH, including in classical literature. 
These directions bring into focus the ‘strangeness’ through which “To this day” 
conflates or compounds timespans and geographical distance and the manner in 
which the reader’s immersion in the history is inevitably suspended. I contend that in 
this movement the reader’s own day is re-positioned relative to the narrative and that 
despite its frequency in the Deuteronomistic narrative, the ‘Testimony Formula’ 
remains an anomalously overt acknowledgement of, and invitation to, profound 
subjectivity. 
 
2. Authority and Subjectivity 
2.1 Other narrative interruptions in the DH 
Whilst the “To this day” formula affords the reader of the DH a uniquely overt 
disclosure of the narrator’s presence, there are other interruptions, parentheses and 
asides within the narrative that include overt evaluation, reflection or commentary.39 
Direct comments by the narrator to the narratee demonstrate overt narration, and in 
these circumstances the presence of the narrator may be tangibly discerned in a 
space and time beyond the location of the primary diegesis. The “To this day” 
                                            
39
 Cf. David Toshio Tsumura, ‘Coordination Interrupted, or Literary Insertion AX&B Pattern, in the 
Books of Samuel’, Literary Structure and Rhetorical Strategies in the Hebrew Bible ed. by Lenart de 
Regt, Jan de Waard and Jan Fokkelman (Leiden: Brill, 1996) pp. 117-132. Also David Toshio 
Tsumura, The First Book of Samuel (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2007), p. 577.  
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formula is a primary example of overt narration, but there are many other instances 
which articulate precisely the same narrative stance.  These moments attest the 
narrator's spatial, temporal, theological and geographical points of view, though not 
as overtly as the “To this day” formula. Whilst the narrator in the DH is generally 
laconic, offering rudimentary stage management of the primary diegesis, his extra-
diegetic interventions often significantly interrupt the otherwise sequential 
progression of the story.40 I suggest that there are a number of overlapping forms of 
interruption including phrases that are demarcated by the clause, “in those days” and 
that disclose the temporal distance of the narrator from the action of the narrative; 
explanatory parentheses which are external to the temporal progression of the 
narrative; and interventions that introduce a secondary name for a place or person.  
Much like the “To this day” formula (and closely related to the phrase), “In 
those days” (bayamim hahem) distinguishes between the time of writing and of the 
events in the story. There are seventeen occurrences in the DH, the following two 
being typical: 
In those days the LORD began to cut off parts of Israel. Haz'ael defeated them 
throughout the territory of Israel (2 Kgs 10:32). 
 
And the people of Israel inquired of the LORD (for the ark of the covenant of 
God was there in those days, and Phin'ehas the son of Elea'zar, son of Aaron, 
ministered before it in those days) (Judg. 20:27). 
 
These instances establish a temporal divide between the events described in the 
primary diegesis and the time of the narrative act. Most occurrences simply reveal 
the narrative to be a retrospective history (e.g. 2 Kings 10:32, above) and in such 
instances “In those days” is an idiomatic reminder of the timeframe of the primary 
diegesis. In five instances however an explanation is being offered for a state of 
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 Cf. Adam Stewart Brown, Discovering David in Light of 1 Samuel 25: A Narrative Critical Reading of 
1 Samuel 24-26 (McMaster University PhD Diss., 2009). 
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affairs that no longer persists. These refer to the presence of the Nephilim (Gen. 
6:4), pre-monarchic government (Judg. 17:6), the presence of the Ark of the 
Covenant (Judg. 20:27), a dearth of prophecy (I Sam 1:3) and burning incense to 
Moses’ bronze serpent (II Kgs 18:4). Cumulatively they begin to reveal the context 
and situation of the narrator. His world is replete with prophets and kings but 
deprived of giants, the Ark, any meaningful prophecy, and Moses’ Nehushtan. This 
narratological world is glimpsed only briefly, and barely begins to intrude into reality 
represented in the primary diegesis. 
Explanatory parentheses typically include tangential comments which function 
somewhat like a footnote (often citing another source or reference) offering further 
evidence in support of the story or clarification of an obscure detail:  
And Gideon said to them, “Let me make a request of you; give me every man 
of you the earrings of his spoil.” (For they had golden earrings, because they 
were Ish'maelites.) (Judg 8:24). 
 
David intoned this lamentation over Saul and his son Jonathan. (He ordered 
that The Song of the Bow be taught to the people of Judah; it is written in the 
Book of Jashar) (II Sam. 1:17-18). 
 
A number of these instances include a definitive sense of temporal distance between 
the extra-diegetic comment and the narrated action of the primary diegesis. One 
instance even includes the “To this day” testimony formula, which illustrates 
something of the close relationships between the two devices: 
Now Saul's son had two men who were captains of raiding bands… Ba'anah, 
and… Rechab, sons of Rimmon a man of Benjamin from Be-er'oth (for Be-
er'oth also is reckoned to Benjamin; the Be-er'othites fled to Gitta'im, and 
have been sojourners there to this day) (II Sam. 4:2-3). 
 
Finally a particularly frequent form of intrusion may be found in instances where a 
second name for a person or location is offered (most commonly Jerubba'al/ Gideon, 
Mount Si'rion/Hermon, Bethel/Luz and Jebus/Jerusalem). These instances clearly 
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indicate the hand of redactor who has added a familiar name to one that was already 
established in the narrative for the sake of his audience who might not have been 
familiar with a more ancient appellation.  
And the house of Joseph sent to spy out Bethel (Now the name of the city 
was formerly Luz) (Judg. 1:23). 
 
Now the cities of the tribe of Benjamin according to their families were 
Jericho… Zela, Ha-eleph, Jebus (that is, Jerusalem), Gib'e-ah and Kir'iath-
je'arim: fourteen cities with their villages (Josh 18:21-28). 
 
 
 As with “To this day” each of these interruptions is found in every source and in 
each of the foundational documents considered part of the DH. Although “To this 
day” introduces the time and place of the narrator more explicitly than any other 
reference, it should therefore be understood as an expression of narrative 
subjectivity and temporal awareness that is entirely consistent with the other types of 
interruption found within the DH. The “To this day” formula is part of a paradigm of 
extra-diegetic interventions, explanations and indicators of narratological temporality 
that are woven into the fabric of the narrative and are a constituent part of the 
narrative strategy.  
2.2 “To this day” In the canon 
Beyond Genesis and the DH, the phrase “To this day” is used a total of forty two 
occasions in the biblical canon.41 It is a common turn of phrase that is by no means 
exclusive to the DH. Many references explain etiological, etymological, ethnological 
or geological phenomenon in exactly the same way as the DH does. For example, 
place names and tombs are frequently afforded contextualizing reference: 
                                            
41
 I have excluded from this count occasions when a character reports in direct speech the 
continuation of a tradition which persists until their own day as these demonstrate the normalcy of the 
idiom but reveal almost nothing about the day of the author. 
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This is the tomb which he built in Modein; it remains to this day (I Maccabees 
13:30). 
 
Brethren, I may say to you confidently of the patriarch David that he both died 
and was buried, and his tomb is with us to this day (Acts 2:29). 
 
Judas went and hanged himself. But the chief priests, taking the pieces of 
silver, said, "It is not lawful to put them into the treasury, since they are blood 
money." So they took counsel, and bought with them the potter's field, to bury 




Instances beyond the DH commonly justify or explain diverse religious traditions. For 
example in I Esdras (and 2 Chronicles 35:25) annual lamentation for Josiah is 
elucidated:  
And in all Judea they mourned for Josiah. Jeremiah the prophet lamented for 
Josiah, and the principal men, with the women, have made lamentation for 
him to this day  (I Esdras 1:32). 
 
In somewhat similar fashion in Matthew’s gospel, apologetic explanation is offered 
for the controversy surrounding Jewish explanations for Jesus’ missing body. 
The chief priests… said, "Tell people, `His disciples came by night and stole 
him away while we were asleep.' And if this comes to the governor's ears, we 
will satisfy him and keep you out of trouble." So they took the money and did 
as they were directed; and this story has been spread among the Jews to this 
day (Matthew 28:15). 
 
Further, in exactly the same way as is found in the DH, ethnic relationships are also 
explained through the phrase. As with the DH, this category represents the most 
common use of the phrase: 
The Romans took captive the [Greeks’] wives and children; they plundered 
them, conquered the land, tore down their strongholds, and enslaved them to 
this day (I Maccabees 8:10). 
 
And when Achior saw all that the God of Israel had done, he believed firmly in 
God, and was circumcised, and joined the house of Israel, remaining so to 
this day (Judith 14:11). 
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[David] wiped out his enemies on every side, and annihilated his adversaries 
the Philistines; he crushed their power even to this day (Wisdom of Jesus Son 
of Sirach 47:7). 
 
One final category of uses of “To this day” found in the Bible but not in the DH, are 
those which God is said to have spoken. In Baruch, 2 Esdras, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, 
the voice of the Lord is said to declare judgement “To this day” or criticise the 
unfaithfulness of his people, “To this day.” These are of some significance as they 
seem to indicate the voice of God functions with narrative synonymy to the voice of 
the narrator. The following example from Ezekiel is typical. Here God, in parenthesis, 
appears to offer Ezekiel an etymology for the place Bamah (which means high 
place): 
Thus says the LORD GOD: In this again your fathers blasphemed me… 
wherever they saw any high hill or any leafy tree, there they offered their 
sacrifices and presented the provocation of their offering; there they sent up 
their soothing odors, and there they poured out their drink offerings.  (I said to 
them, What is the high place to which you go? So its name is called Bamah to 
this day) (Ezk 20:27-30). 
 
The range of applications of “To this day” in the DH are met and exceeded in the 
broader canon of biblical texts, so that the overt presence of the narrative voice is 
experienced in an overwhelming diversity of narrative. This is particularly the case in 
historical narratives, where the highest frequency of instances occur (for example 1 
& 2 Chronicles, I Maccabees, Judith, Matthew and Acts). Even though the frequency 
of occurrences is broadly comparable, none of the books come close to the total 
number of occurrences in the DH, where the phrase consequently stands out more 
and functions like a repeated refrain.42 
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 For example, there are eleven instances in c. 40,000 words in 1 & 2 Chronicles and also eleven in 
c. 45,000 words in I and II Samuel. Though this analysis is undertaken in translation using the  RSV 
text. 
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“To this day” is not an unusual phrase in the Bible and is not exclusive to the 
DH. A majority of narratives within the Bible canon offers the personal witness 
formula “To this day” as a declaration of historical reliability. This is more obvious in 
the DH than in many biblical texts, partially because of the distance in time between 
some of the events described and the time of narrator. As the timespan covered 
within the DH is wider than in many other biblical narratives, the interruption 
achieves a greater sense of chronological dissonance, narratological relativity and 
indeed uncertainty regarding the identity, authority and legitimacy of the narrator 
than is the case in texts such as Ezekiel, Matthew or Acts (for example), where a 
single narrative voice is associated with a named individual whose own day is 
identifiable and of intrinsic significance to the narrative. 
2.3 “To this Day” in Classical Literature 
The phrase “To this day” is far from unique to the authors of biblical history. Several 
commentators have already described the depth of similarity between the Hebrew 
formula in the DH and ‘contemporazing comments’ in ancient histories. John Van 
Setters for example describes the use of formula in Greek, Roman and Egyptian 
literature. He suggests that “the witness formula is a historiographic convention… in 
the same category as source citations, which have the function of raising the 
credibility of the writer”.43 
The same approach is taken by Childs, who paid significant attention to the 
etiological content of Greek authors. He observed that Hesiod, Callimachus, 
Pausanias and Herodotus all afforded significant attention to etiological explanations 
and that, “moreover, in many of these stories a Greek equivalent to the Hebrew 
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 John Van Seters, In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and the Origins of 
Biblical History (Warsaw, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1997) p. 50. 
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formula appears… with particularly great frequency in Pausanias, and in 
Apollodorus, in Ovid and the Lives of the Prophets.”44 Childs’ suggestion was that 
the use of the “To this day formula” was consistently located in classical literature 
within the broad traditions of etiological explanations. Further, he also noted that the 
formula was most frequent in the writings of those who placed significant value in 
their own personal testimony, notably Herodotus and Pausanias. Both of these 
frequently verify empirically the continued presence of the tradition from their own 
observations.  
Burke O. Long has also compared the use of the formula in the book of 2 
Kings to the “contemporizing summaries” in classical histories.45 Like Childs, he 
suggests that the usage found in Old Testament narrative is part of a shared literary 
convention employed consistently by ancient historians to confirm the accuracy of 
their own account, a view also held by Marc Brettler, who has suggested that, “the 
Deuteronomistic historian honestly believed… [he] was simply viewing the past from 
the perspective of his present, he was writing history like all other historians.”46  
I include here only a brief survey of classical application of the phrase, 
including the Annals of Thutmose III, Herodotus’ Histories, Polybius’ Histories, Livy’s 
Ab Urbe Condita and Plutarch’s Parallel Lives (covering 1450 BC to 120 AD) to 
illustrate the ubiquity and range of uses that may be found. 
The Annals of Thutmose III are records of the military campaigns from the 
Egyptian 18th dynasty and are found in carved inscriptions on the inside walls of the 
Temple of Amun at Karnak. Inscribed between 1504 and 1450 BC, they mostly 
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record detail of military movements and plunder. Just once in the introductory 
comments the scribe records the continued presence of a scroll recording the King’s 
accomplishments, “To this day.” Here then the formula adds weight to the evidence 
offered in the narrative. 
Now everything which his majesty did to this town and to that wretched enemy 
and his wretched army is set down by the individual day, by the individual 
expedition, and by the individual [troop] commanders… They [are] set down 
on a roll of leather in the temple of Amon to this day. (Annuls of Thutmose III, 
Karnak, 90)47 
 
Herodotus’ Histories (written in 440 BC) explores the origins of the Greco-Persian 
Wars and offers a depth of ethnological and geographical traditions – many of which 
seem legendary or fanciful. There are sixteen occurrences of the phrase “To this 
day” all of which substantiate an etiological explanation for an ethnographic reality or 
monument still present in Herodotus’ day. 
From Scythes, the son of Hercules, were descended the after kings of 
Scythia; and from the circumstance of the goblet which hung from the belt, the 
Scythians to this day wear goblets at their girdles (Histories IV.11)  
 
Herodotus also refers to traditions that he himself has observed, continuing “until my 
day.” There are twelve instances of this version of the witness formula.48 
From this descent of Rhampsinitus into Hades, and return to earth again, the 
Egyptians, I was told, instituted a festival, which they certainly celebrated in 
my day (Histories II.20). 
 
Polybius’ Histories cover the rise of the Roman Republic between 246 and 146 BC. 
He championed the notion that historical writing should only report that which could 
be substantiated by eye-witnesses, and therefore he claimed that because his 
writing was based on interviews it had a factual integrity. He emphasized the 
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316 
testimony of witness interviews and sought to personally validate his witnesses direct 
experience of events (cf. XII, 4c, 3; 25b, 4). He also claimed that his own main period 
of history fell within the lifetime of witnesses who could be cross examined (IV, 2, 
2).49 Polybius uses the phrase “To this day” on four occasions, each time as an 
archaeological or literary footnote adding subtle weight to his claims of authority. 
Cicero stretched his neck forth from the litter and was slain, being then in his 
sixty-fourth year. Herennius cut off his head, by Antony's command, and his 
hands — the hands with which he wrote the Philippics. For Cicero himself 
entitled his speeches against Antony “Philippics”, and to this day the 
documents are called Philippics (Book 8, 48:1). 
 
Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita (begun around 27 BC) sought to provide an authoritative 
history of Rome and the Romans from the earliest fables of its foundation to his own 
time. His occasional use of the phrase “To this day” is almost identical to that of 
Polybius who wrote 120 years earlier. Strangely it is found only in the earliest stories 
he narrates, the later books being devoid of this formula. It is also noteworthy that 
like his predecessors Livy intervenes often in his narration, noting, “I am unable to 
say definitely” or “I believe that,” but again, such comments appear much more often 
in the earlier books of his history than the latter. 
In order that wars might be not only conducted but also proclaimed with some 
formality, [Numa] wrote down the law, as taken from the ancient nation of the 
Aequicoli, under which the Fetials act down to this day when seeking redress 
for injuries (Ab Urbe Condita 1.32). 
 
In his Parallel Lives, Plutarch (46-120AD) compared twenty three pairs of famous 
Romans and Greeks, writing their biographies in parallel to demonstrate the 
comparability between the two. To this end he is criticised for frequent inaccuracies 
because often it seems that extracting a comparison was more important to him than 
factual precision or historical accuracy. Plutarch uses the “To this day” formula 
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regularly, verifying every possible detail; particularly with reference to Greek 
practices about which he intends to educate Romans. There are thirty-eight 
instances of the phrase, of which thirty-six refer to Grecian traditions.  
Moreover, [Cicero’s]... fame for oratory abides to this day. (The life of Cicero) 
 
The examples above show that use of “To this day” in the Deuteronomic History fits 
within a continuum of uses across a range of historical sources in the ancient near 
east, and the usage in the DH is unremarkable in frequency, etiological function and 
validatory effect. Every occasion within the DH could just as easily have occurred in 
Greco-Roman or Egyptian texts. In all of these instances the phrase is used to 
validate some aspect of the tradition which can still be verified in [the author’s] own 
time: most commonly used in reference to ethnological and geographic traditions. 
There is almost nothing anomalous in the Dtr’s employment of the phrase, for it was 
a totally normal, almost ubiquitous expression in ancient historical narratives. 
However, there are two minor differences between application of the formula in the 
DH and in other ancient texts.  
Firstly, Geoghegan has pointed out that in a number of ancient sources “To 
this day” is often accompanied by personal opinions. This is particularly evident in 
Herodotus’ writing:  
Herodotus will pass judgement on a tradition, even expressing incredulity 
despite the presence of confirmatory evidence…conversely, Dtr does not 
privilege us with his opinion on these matters… While Herodotus will express 
his opinion about the reliability of an account, Dtr does not pass judgement on 
his sources.50  
 
It is arguable (and perhaps worthy of greater analysis) that Dtr is no less willing to 
refer to his own day, but is more reserved about offering his own opinions overtly.  
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 Geoghegan, ‘Time, place, and purpose’, p. 137-138. 
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Secondly, the most significant difference is that the “To this day” of biblical 
narrative relates to the unspecified day of an entirely anonymous narrator. 
Conversely, the application in similar histories was frequently rooted in attempts to 
validate the reliability of the narrator as a witness. Herodotus, Polybius, Livy and 
Plutarch are all overt about their identity as the Historian and narrator behind the text 
and when they say, “To this day” the reader knows almost exactly which ‘day’ is 
referred to. The “To this Day” of the DH however relates to an ambiguous 
temporality. It does not ground the narrative in the specific context of a named 
interlocutor nor proclaim the authority of a single figure. Unlike the works of the 
named historians, it therefore implies a sense of the perpetuity of days and remains 
particularly open to dialogue with the ‘day’ of the reader. 
2.4 Temporal Fusions 
The use of “To this day” in the DH is one thread within a continuum of purposeful 
etiological, etymological and theological interventions in the Deuteronomistic History. 
The presence of the formula provides particular insight into the relationships 
between the temporality of the narrative voice and of the diegesis itself and the 
tensions between these two time frames. 
Firstly, whilst Robert Alter has commented on the economy of the narrative 
structure in the history, where the majority of the plot is unfolded through direct 
speech, there is a high frequency of interjections (such as “To this Day”) which 
regularly reveal the perspective and presence of the narrator. This somewhat 
undermines Alter’s argument: 
Narration is thus often relegated to the role of confirming assertions made in 
dialogue—occasionally, as here, with an explanatory gloss. In regard to the 
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proportions of the narrative, third-person narration is frequently only a bridge 
between much larger units of direct speech.51 
 
Whilst Alter is right that the plot often develops through speech, it is also the case 
that the regular incursions into the diegesis of phrases such as “To this day”, and “In 
those days”, ensure that the perspective of the story-teller is rarely far from the 
surface of the narrative. Without saying much, through the briefest parentheses, 
explanations, tangential sub-stories and personal witness formula, the narrator’s own 
subjectivity and narrative presence are disproportionately felt.  
Secondly through the juxtaposition of authoritative hetero-diegetic narrative 
structure and the introduction of the historical and geographical context of the 
narrating self, the narrative invites an understanding of the subjectivity of 
representation in an entirely anomalous manner. The presence of the narrator’s own 
day dominates the temporal landscape of the text and as a consequence the diegetic 
structure reads less like a primary layer with addended extra-diegetic conversation 
and more like an amalgam of loops of temporality, for the time zone of the text is 
regularly switched backwards and forwards between the narrators’ own day and the 
time of the events he describes. The diegesis includes the time of the events 
themselves and of their telling and, by silent implication, the immeasurable interval in 
between. This metaleptic contamination of temporalities also brings the reader’s 
context and subjectivity into frame, and creates a dissonance that denies a simple 
reading of the DH as an authoritative and objective historiography. This dissonance 
is amplified through reception over time: for “To this day” becomes incrementally 
more confusing the more days that there are separating the reader and the narrator. 
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Finally, and most significantly, “To this day” reveals the profound paradox of 
all biblical narration. Biblical narratives offer no overt mechanism as a justification for 
the authority of the story they tell, and yet they persist in claiming that their own 
stories are universally true. How can it be that a story-teller, who is an undeniably 
finite expression of space and time, can represent that which is universally true 
whilst holding quite comfortably to her own subjectivity and finitude? It is not a 
surprise that biblical narrative purports to be a true and accurate representation of 
reality (as is explicitly the case in Luke 1:4), nor is it a surprise to read of a narrator 
whose self-disclosure of subjectivity involves him within the frame of the story (for 
example II Peter 1:16). What is curious about the “To this day” formula however, is 
that it juxtaposes the notion of authority with that of anonymous narratological 
relativity: as if declaration of self-involved relation to the discourse is no barrier to 
proclamation of the divine view. That the narrative voice can, at the same time, own 
its subjectivity whilst claiming to report God’s verdict is either an act of profound 
locutionary hubris, or else a revelation that human agency is not precluded from the 
divine manifesto.  
 
3. Hermeneutical Implications 
3.1 The Things Themselves 
Consensus suggests that in the Deuteronomic History the narrative voice is 
omniscient; a contention evident in the voices of numerous exegetes. Robert Alter, 
for example, has stated that “through a dizzying epistemological trick the self-
effacing figures who narrate the biblical tales, by a tacit convention in which no 
attention is paid to their limited human status, can adopt the all-knowing, unfailing 
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perspective of God.”52 This is an idea repeated by J.P Fokkelman, who suggests 
similarly that omniscient narrators make themselves scarce and from “mid-Genesis 
to II Kings only comment where essential”.53 
However conventional this notion is, it seems strangely misplaced; after all, 
what is ‘essential’ about the sustained presence of a rock, a place-name, or any 
other etymological detail included with the “To this day” formula? 54 None of these 
issues is central to the plot of the narrative, leading to disparaging suggestions that 
perhaps “To this day” references are historically anachronistic tangential 
interpolations of cultural imperialism.55 To the contrary, given that the “To this day” 
interventions intrude into carefully framed dialogue, and bring the identity, 
geography, theology and context of the author into focus, I would suggest that the 
Deuteronomic redactor is prodigiously explicit about his own relativity. This is not a 
clumsy inconsistency or accidental metaleptic contamination, nor should the pre-
exilic, southern, priestly point of view identified be imagined as a weakness or 
limitation of the text. Rather, the Deuteronomic History is richer for the confession of 
the interlocutor’s position in time and space. Such context is always relevant to the 
story a narrator tells, and the Dtr’s inclusion of his own ‘wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewußtsein’ (historically effected consciousness) within the narrative is a revelation 
of relativity and a statement of self-awareness. Such moments of narrative presence 
are not occasions in which the subtle author has dropped his guard; this is not the 
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omniscient façade cracking; on the contrary, the interventions are deliberate and 
purposeful. The effect of this personal witness to geography, politics and religious 
tradition within the narrative is that the reader becomes aware of a previously extra-
diegetic character, whose voice (having previously functioned predominantly to 
connect chronological events) becomes important in its own right as a mediator 
between the world of the story and of the reader.56 
It should be noted that the confession of temporality is in tension with the 
narrator’s frequent claims to know the mind of God, which is why the witness formula 
is sometimes seen as clumsy interpolation. The narrator within the Deuteronomic 
history does often claim a degree of divine sagacity and transcendence of 
perspective which routinely leads to the observation that “the narrator in [the 
Deuteronomistic History] speaks with a sense of divine omniscience.”57 There are 
many examples where the text pronounces divine judgement, most famously those 
in which the narrator describes YHWH’s verdict on the life of a ruler:  
Nevertheless for David's sake the LORD his God gave him a lamp in 
Jerusalem, setting up his son after him, and establishing Jerusalem; because 
David did what was right in the eyes of the LORD, and did not turn aside from 
anything that he commanded him all the days of his life, except in the matter 
of Uri'ah the Hittite (I Kgs 15:4-5).  
 
Statistically, there is a strong positive correlation between positive pronouncements 
and the longevity, prosperity or militaristic success of the rulers described in 
narrative. Likewise negative judgements (“he did evil in the eyes of the Lord”) almost 
always refer to those whose reigns were short, or unsuccessful. The Deuteronomic 
narrator’s way of highlighting a fulfilled prophecy is another indicator of the claim of 
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authority.58 I would not disagree with the observation that the narrator claims 
sometimes to speak with divine knowledge and authority, but would note that the 
confessions of subjectivity in the “To this day” formula function as a counterpoint. 
The narrator is given a voice that is the same time liminal and inspired, transcendent 
and incarnational. 
Because of the selective nature of the witness formula those states of affairs 
described as persisting “To this day” are perceived as possessing a temporal and 
geographical factuality. It is highly improbable that the Dtr chose to substantiate the 
things he did for any reason other than his certainty about them. There is no 
legitimate reason that the Dtr could have been so selective in the things he 
described as continuing until his day unless he was relatively confident of these 
things. The fact that he doesn’t validate some of the most important of his theological 
claims suggests very strongly that those which he does are selected, not because of 
their relative importance, but because of the evidence for them. It is then, precisely 
because not everything is afforded a witness formula attesting to accuracy or 
continuity, that the narrator himself becomes ‘grounded,’ and ‘situated,’ even ‘real-
for-the-reader.’ The limits of the narrator’s knowledge revealed through the 
subjective validation of moments and monuments locates the speaker’s place and 
time as the deictic centre of the text and reveals that the narrator considers himself 
to be part of a common world, shared between the prefigured history he describes, 
the imagined audience he addresses and his own situation. The narrators’ 
intervention in the world he describes produces an unexpected amalgam of subject 
and object, for the narrator claims commonality with the things he describes and 
invites the reader to understand that the extra-diegetic world is as equal a part of ‘the 
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things themselves’ as the stones, monuments, time and space of the primary 
diegesis.  The day of the narrator therefore operates as an extension of the 
represented revelatory world. The narrator places his own world within the scope of 
the diegesis. Gadamer explains: 
Thus the world is the common ground, trodden by none and recognized by all, 
uniting all who speak with one another…The infinite perfectibility of the human 
experience of the world means that, whatever language we use, we never 
achieve anything but an ever more extended aspect, a 'view' of the world. 
Those views of the world are not relative in the sense that one could set them 
against the “world in itself,” as if the right view from some possible position 
outside the human, linguistic world, could discover it in its being-in-itself… The 
world is not different from the views in which it presents itself.59 
 
The narrator describing his own day in the DH can be understood through Ricoeur’s 
model of threefold mimesis, for he is persuaded that the view of the world he 
possess (m2) is a realistic representation of what has been (m1) and what will be 
(m3). It is not that he seeks to assert a mimetic totalitarianism, rather, sharing such 
common ground with the patriarchs and prophets that were his predecessors he 
cannot imagine any other world. He has, after all, touched the stones, drunk from the 
wells and seen the monuments described in the stories he has inherited. The 
narrator in the DH models a readerliness of history that allows his own day to be 
absorbed within the text. He prophetically lays claim to the future, anticipating that 
his audience will also find that their own day shares common ground with the 
narratological context and the represented past.  
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3.2 Self-Involved Reception 
The narrator’s intentional self-referentiality throughout (and indeed beyond) the 
Deuteronomistic History precipitates an awareness of the relativity of the story-
teller’s perspective and thereby invites a reciprocal awareness in readers of their 
own significant and unavoidable subjectivity. This process provokes a much greater 
sense of self-involvement than could otherwise be achieved, and is a mechanism 
that has also been identified by Markus Bockmuehl in diverse texts including 
Matthew 28:20 (“I am with you always”), Revelation 2:7 (“Whoever has ears, let them 
hear”) and I Thes. 2:13 (“We thank God continually”) where the present tense or the 
first person perspective employed by the interlocutor invites the reader’s self-
involvement.60  
In these cases and in many others, the implied reader is drawn into an act of 
reading that involves an active part on stage rather than the discreet view 
from the upper balcony… The realities of which the Bible speaks are properly 
only accessible to believers like the implied reader.61 
  
Bockmuehl suggests that narration in the present tense engulfs the reader and 
places inalienably “transformative and self-involving demands” on her.62 Similar 
comments are found in the interpretations offered by a myriad of theological 
commentators, including Anthony Thiselton and Donald Evans, offer similar 
conclusions without necessarily sharing an underlying hermeneutic. Thiselton 
suggests that in the narrative structure of the synoptic parables, “Jesus does not 
simply throw down a message but comes to meet the hearer in the parable-text.”63  
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Donald Evans notes a similar sense of readerly engagement but locates readerly 
obligations in the ‘exercitive force’ of biblical language rather than plot or structure. 
Exploring Speech-Acts in Genesis, he suggests that “even to call God creator is 
confess the reader’s own human status.”64  
Each of these responses imply that biblical hermeneutic ought to 
acknowledge that reading involves much more than a fusion of the horizons of the 
text and the horizons of the reader, for the inner-biblical hermeneutical process 
evident in the narrator’s disclosure of his own day demonstrates that the text itself is 
a conglomeration of prior representations and realities fused, ordered and orientated 
towards reception. The inclusion of the narrator’s day is merely one example of a 
continuous strategy across biblical narrative that invites a self-involved interpretation 
and the repositioning and reinterpretation of the reader’s world in relation to the 
narrative, exactly as has already identified in Ricoeur’s model of ‘configuration’. 
Ricoeur suggests that, “meaning occurs at the intersection between the world of the 
text and the world of readers, it is mainly in reception that the capacity of the plot to 
transfigure experience is actualised.”65   
The hermeneutical models of Werner Jeanrond and Jean Ladrière are also of 
particular interest here. Jeanrond suggests that reading texts theologically provokes 
“authentic experience which does not leave unchanged the person… In these texts a 
reality imposes itself upon us which shatters our self-understanding.”66  
Jeanrond’s model is founded upon the suggestion that theology is necessarily 
hermeneutical and that theological texts themselves are constituted by both their 
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internal organisation and “external relatedness.”67 He considers texts to be “dynamic 
potentials” the semantic promise of which can only ever be realised when 
appreciated for the “concrete situatedness” of their own context as well as the 
“situation of communication which is also constitutive of meaning.”68 His conclusion 
is that the theological content of the bible, which is ultimately located in the person 
and the event of Jesus Christ, is “only accessible” to those who involve themselves 
in its discourse. It is not that the human self should be the starting-point for 
interpretation (as Ricoeur sometimes seems to suggest), rather critical self-
awareness of the reader’s own situation is one aspect of hermeneutics.69 
No concept of understanding can lay claim to adequacy unless it includes 
right from the start a dimension of criticism regarding both the matter (Sache) 
of the text and the situation in which the interpretation takes place.70 
 
Jean Ladrière posits a similarly nuanced relationship between the reader’s present 
and the hermeneutical circle. He proposed that theological discourse and language 
are self-constituting acts of understanding: for properly theological statements only 
‘work’ when readers or hearers re-examine their own sense of the relationship 
between “one’s self and the world” and accept certain axioms.71 Jeanrond develops 
this further, suggesting not only that the involvement of the self is a pre-requisite for 
successful interpretation, but that it is the goal of successful interpretation too: 
“sense is disclosed only for those who, through interpretation, enable reference to 
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themselves to take place.”72 Ladrière’s notion of auto-implication is founded upon the 
claim that religious texts contain ‘auto-implicatif’ effects.73   
To see Christ in the mystery of God, one must already possess a certain 
rapport with that mystery. One must already have been transformed by the 
divine action.74   
 
Here Ladrière locates the necessity of self-involvement within the speech-acts 
model, suggesting that felicity conditions for the text require prior acceptance of 
some of the tenets and presumptions of the text.  
My suggestion builds upon Ladrière’s and Jeanrond’s approaches whilst also 
borrowing from Kierkegaard’s notion of appropriation, and Ricoeur’s claim that 
“Spiritual interpretations all seek in one way or another to make us participate as 
believers in Christ’s sufferings through a life of sacrifice and letting go of self.”75 I 
suggest that the open-ness of the self to transformative interpretation is a pre-
requisite of biblical hermeneutics, but this is not because hermeneutics is solely self-
discovery, nor because it is a perlocutionary inevitability, nor because reception is 
integral to the text. Rather the reader’s self-involvement is obliged by the interior 
hermeneutic of the narrative which reveals the presence of a self-involved narrator, 
and which shows itself to be unavoidably orientated towards a discourse of 
transformation. Through reflexivity, subjectivity and self-disclosure narrative voices in 
the biblical text often reveal that their narratives are shaped by perspective and are 
attending primarily to meaning in history rather than mere events, “cloaked and 
needful of interpretation.”76 This is not to say that willingness to disclose personal 
narratological context and self-involvement denudes the text of validity as 
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description, history, report or statement, but rather that the biblical text does not seek 
to obscure the narrator’s self-involvement in history. In this the text itself stands as 
an anticipation of concomitant readerly self-involvement in the ‘literary event.’77  
It might be concluded that moments of narratological self-involvement ‘give 
the text legs’, they legitimate a range of self-involved reception and prove the 
“dynamic potential” of the text.78 The self-involved narrator solicits the response of a 
self-involved reader, who, whether or not Edom and Israel still fight, and whether or 
not Jacob’s stones still stand, can talk of her own day as part of the continuum of 
biblical narrative. Narratorial self-involvement is thus the embodiment of the invitation 
extended to readers toward similar self-involvement, and is a strategy to ensure 
reception: after all, the text can continue to have an effect “only if those who come 
after it still, or once again, respond to it.”79  
Thus the value of the self-referential narratological intrusions in the 
Deuteronomic History is not particularly the precision of etiological explanation or the 
useful geographical or cultural clarification. Rather, with ‘auto-implicatif’ force such 
moments generate profound capacity: for the world of biblical history can absorb and 
fuse further future hermeneutical horizons if, as invited by the narrator’s own 
participation in diegesis, the reader will emulate the accents of self-involvement 
disclosed by the narrator. Here, in the admission of relativity and subjectivity 
represented by the “To this day” formula of the Deuteronomistic Historian, is 
evidence of Auerbach’s sense of figures finding fulfilment in the recuperative 
development of human consciousness, history and understanding. In the 
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Deuteronomistic History the intervention of the narrator reveals that the 
pronouncements, judgements and declarations of the text are the product of a 
specific and unambiguously corporeal voice. Further, the introduction of this 
unusually overt layer of humanity within the hermeneutical process reveals that 
knowledge of the divine perspective proffered in sacred texts is necessarily and 
unquestionably mediated by the perspective and context of the narrating interlocutor.  
Given that the Dtr repeats the testimony formula alluding to his own context 
so frequently, it is clear that he is unabashed about his role. This suggests that the 
intrusion of the self-referential narrative voice is not insignificant or peripheral. To the 
contrary, the narrator’s inclusion of his own context within the story is a profound 
admission of temporal finitude, embodied subjectivity and personal perspective. This 
is an odd juxtaposition which suggests that the narrator considers their narrative 
project to be a legitimate fusion of subjectivity and authority, and audaciously, that 
the one arises from the other. The situation of the self then, is a legitimate subject for 
inclusion within divine drama. Indeed, the subjective voice that has redacted or 
compiled the history includes their contextualising witness formula in interruptions 
that detrimentally affect narrative cadence and diminish certainty regarding the 
omniscient and authoritative point of view sustained in much of the narrative. It 
seems that the Dtr is unafraid of the inescapable connection between the context in 
which he tells and the context of which he tells, as though he is unperturbed by the 
notion propounded by Heidegger that “time itself is something we are made out of, 
before it is something we can [describe].” 80  
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3.3 The Tyranny of Time 
The Old Testament… presents universal history and everything else that 
happens in the world can only be conceived as an element in this sequence.81   
 
Auerbach’s famous observation reflects upon the seemingly totalitarian cosmology 
that appears frequently in biblical narrative, even if on occasions the narrators 
themselves are conscious and overt about their own finitude. Auerbach’s thesis is 
certainly supported by the universal declarations of truth which abound in Genesis 
and the DH. Such claims do indeed suggest a singular and non-negotiable model of 
history. Genesis alone offers one hundred references to “the earth” and ten to “all the 
earth.” Between Genesis and II Kings the phrase occurs twenty times, and fourteen 
of these make apparent claims of universal factuality, for example in Genesis 11:8, 
“The LORD scattered them abroad from there over the face of all the earth,” or in 
Genesis 41:57, “Famine was severe over all the earth.” Similar claims covering the 
entire span of space and time are a consistent feature of many other biblical 
narratives. Obvious Gospel examples include Matthew 28:20, “Lo, I am with you 
always, to the close of the age,” and John 1:1, “In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God and the Word was God.”82  
Narrative comments that imply omniscience in regard to the fullness of time 
and the breadth of space understandably seem to suggest that an “omnivorous” 
world view is implicit in the text.83 Nevertheless, I would suggest it is not the form, or 
even the approach of the text that makes it tyrannical, rather it is the span of time 
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and space covered within a narrative that shapes a sense of tyranny in the 
perception of the hermeneut: any narrative that asserts a truth claim regarding the 
totality of time is thus necessarily tyrannical. Conversely, a narrative that makes a 
truth claim relating to only a limited moment and a limited geography is necessarily 
less demanding.84 To make a claim about a moment in time is to assert a truth but to 
make a claim about all time is to assert the truth – both are exclusive 
representations, it is just that the latter generates more obligation and has more 
consequence and significance than the former.85 If the time span covered within a 
text includes past, present and future epochs or eons, the absorption of the reader’s 
reality within the span of the narrative is a necessary corollary. It is the breadth of 
time reported on, rather than the manner in which it is reported, that is of most 
significance to a reader’s sense that her own world is a part of the totality narrated 
within a text. 
I would therefore dispute Auerbach’s notion regarding the autocratic tyranny 
of the world of biblical stories. It is time which is tyrannical and not text. Any text that 
offers a narrative representation of elapsed time purports an exclusive version of 
reality. This is not because the representation itself is an act of tyranny, but because 
time is a tyrant. Time, unrepeatable, unrelenting and unyielding, possesses all the 
characteristics of a despot. Whilst the future may be pluripotent, the past is decidedly 
binary, and therefore any mimetic comment about what has happened (or indeed is 
happening) is a claim upon reality that excludes, or that logically contradicts, other 
versions or interpretations. 
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Ultimately then, the biblical narrative is truly tyrannical, not because it 
possesses unusual appetite for world-views, nor because it possesses a unique 
realism, nor because it is abnormally voracious, but because it attempts to describe 
universal time, from creation to consummation. Time is the ultimate tyrant, and by 
virtue of the biblical purview of time (a scope that includes the described events, the 
context of the narrator and the circumstance of all future readers), the biblical 
narrative must necessarily convey a totalitarian perspective. There is very little about 
the mimetic form of biblical narratives that is unique: a range of the structures, 
artistry and composition found in the Bible may also be found in the great works of 
Herodotus, Polybius, Livy and Plutarch. Indeed, the words of Ezra and Nehemiah 
are decidedly less demanding and totalitarian than Josephus’ representation of 
history. It is not ultimately the structure, style or shape of the narrative that separates 
the biblical stories from their ancient narrative counterparts or comparators; rather it 
is the amplitude: the comprehensive breadth of time encompassed. 
Because of the human condition and experience of being, the tyranny of time 
is unavoidable and therefore no ‘realistic’ mimetic representation can be democratic. 
Chronology is never liberal and sequential stories must lay claim to a non-negotiable 
version of reality. At the same time however, the very act of telling a story is an act of 
defiance against the tyranny of time rather than a conspiracy to subjugate: to narrate 
is to lay claim to a truth that transcends the finiteness of human experience. I 
therefore suggest that a story-teller is she who is least willing to accept the tyranny of 
time; seeking freedom from the consuming ingurgitation of chronology through 
figure, meaning, recursion and metaphor. In narrative, the narrator asserts a 
definition of a moment or span of moments that resists the rapaciousness of time. 
For if conscious reflection, recollection and retelling in narrative were not sustained, 
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the tyranny of time would be absolute. It is through our capacity to produce figure, 
symbol and metaphor that we assert the existence of meaningfulness in history, and 
through our narratavized memories that we save events from the cold dissipation of 
the past. Narrative asserts themes and meanings in sequences and invites 
understanding of the transcendence of providence or purpose above the passage of 
time. Auerbach is undoubtedly right that there is an autocratic force at work in biblical 
narrative, but I contend that this same force, to varying degrees, is common in any 
narrative sequence that is not explicitly, overtly or entirely fictional.86 Biblical 
narratives do not seek to subjugate the reader to a model of reality, rather they seek 
to rescue us from a ‘model-less’ view of reality in which the clockwork inevitability of 
sequence deprives us from meaning, leaving life itself as no more than “the 
fortuitous concourse of atoms.”87 Biblical narratives compete with other worldviews to 
identify the purpose above the span of time, and declare that there is a providential 
force in space and time that cannot be circumvented or obscured by the limitations of 
subjectivity, finitude or humanity.  
Biblical narrative asserts a view of time and space that is undemocratic and 
subsuming – but only to the extent that any narrative purporting to encompass both 
the beginning and end of time must be.88 This is managed without attempt to avoid 
or deny the subjectivity and liminality of the narrator’s perspective, precisely because 
biblical narratives are not a tyrannical attempt to subject everything else that 
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 Auerbach says, “It insists it is the only real world [and is]… destined for autocracy” (Mimesis, p. 15). 
This insistence is not an aesthetic function or a consequence of narrative style, it is a consequence of 
the scope of the text. 
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 William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian 
Institution (Government Pritning Office: Washington, 1898). 
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 Thus even Auerbach is subsuming when he makes a claim to a universal true view of history. He 
offers a totalitarian interpretation of time when he suggests two major historical ruptures, “each 
constituting moments when vertical, transcendental meaning is shattered in the course of the 
horizontal, forward propulsion of history.” Auerbach’s model, and any other that attempts to sketch 
history, necessarily offer non-negotiable perspective. Auerbach, Mimesis, xxvii. 
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happens in the world into a predetermined sequence.89 Were they so, there could be 
no “To this day”; no “I, John”; no “My dear Theophilus”; no, “Let the reader 
understand”; no, “If only my words could be written down,” and no, “These things are 
written that you may believe.” Were the biblical text an attempt to depict objective 
reality any one of these metaleptic movements or narratological interventions would 
be a failure, and the prodigious quantity of them, a disastrous lapse of editorial 
prowess. I suggest to the contrary that the truth claims of biblical narratives sit 
comfortably with metaleptic movements and contamination between narrative levels. 
This is because biblical narrative is essentially a plea – that God might soon come 
and render time meaningful. Biblical narrators assert an omni-diegetic providence 
that transcends discernible sequence, and they include themselves within this 
framework. From Genesis, through to Job, in each Gospel and in every apocalyptic 
description, biblical narrative offers resistance to the tyranny of time and stakes 
claims regarding the meaningfulness of reality, as is demonstrated in the faith of the 
seer in Revelation:  
I John am he who heard and saw these things. And when I heard and saw them, 
I fell down to worship at the feet of the angel who showed them to me; but he 
said to me, “You must not do that!” (Rev. 22:8-9) 
 
To an extent the very act of biblical narration, including the assertion of divine verdict 
or making any claim to know universal truth, is a failure in logic. Every human voice 
ought to be silent in the face of inexorable epistemological questions, the size of the 
universe and the span of time, humbly deferring to the divine, and acknowledging the 
limitations of the self, as in Job 40:4-5: 
Behold, I am of small account; what shall I answer thee? I lay my hand on my 
mouth. I have spoken once, and I will not answer; twice, but I will proceed no 
further. 
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Yet this humility (“What is man that you are mindful of him?”) does not precipitate 
hopeless concession to the incapacity of the human mind to know anything for 
certain (“What is truth?”). To the contrary, in the face of confusing events, biblical 
narrators such as the Dtr include their own finitude within the scope of the world they 
describe. This is because narrative is essentially a creedal expression: it is the 
assertion that the tyranny of time is not all-consuming. Narrative attempts to liberate 
moments from the meaninglessness of inexorable chronology. Through description 
and interpretation the narrative endeavour declares that time itself is in the service of 
a yet greater master. As Kevin Vanhoozer has suggested,  
The belief that there is something “in” the text, a presence not of the reader’s 
own making, is a belief in transcendence. To read in order to encounter 
something more than the mere play of signs is… a “wager” on transcendence 
and a hope in the possibility of transformation.90 
 
Biblical narrative should not therefore be perceived as an assertion of a mechanism 
whereby the Divine dictates truth; it is rather a visceral and necessary statement of 
resistance against the tyranny of time and the meaninglessness of the past. The 
biblical narrator suggests that the limit of human experience is not the limit of 
knowledge, and that the inexorability of human finiteness in time is not the grandest 
force in the universe, as promised, for example, in Joshua’s final declaration of faith: 
And now I am about to go the way of all the earth, and you know in your hearts 
and souls, all of you, that not one thing has failed of all the good things which the 
LORD your God promised concerning you; all have come to pass. (Joshua 23:14) 
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Chapter Seven:  
The Face of the Other and the 




Moments of metalepsis and narratorial intrusion into the diegetic frameworks of 
biblical narratives illustrate that biblical narrators have adopted a profoundly self-
involved manner of reading the stories and the history of the interactions of God’s 
creatures with each other and with their creator. Through their intrusions in the 
stories that they tell, biblical narrators evince a considerable amount regarding the 
internal hermeneutic of biblical narrative. They suggest that situated subjectivity, 
such as their own, is no barrier to hermeneutics; and moreover, that their narratives 
cannot be properly understood unless readers also involve themselves in the tangle 
of diegetic layers, and that reality represented within the story must be allowed to 
challenge the boundaries of the reader’s own world if it is to be properly understood. 
Through their self-involved responses to the traditions that they have inherited, they 
establish themselves as figures for their readers and assert that the threshold of 
human selfhood is properly established in relation to others. In their roles as self-
involved interpreters, biblical narrators simultaneously disclose their presence but 
hide the fullness of their identity. Whilst never the subject of their stories, through 
apostrophe, frame-breaking and self-reference, narrators’ subjective selves 
supplement the sense of the primary diegesis and amplify the claims of the text upon 
the selfhood and the reality of those who read. The narrative knot that is created by 
the narrators’ inclusion of themselves within the diegesis has the effect of both 
alienating those whose hermeneutics ignore diegetic complexity, and also inviting 
engagement from those who attempt objective, distant or exclusively critical 
readership. In this way narratorial engagement within the framework of biblical 
diegesis balances the self-awareness advocated by Ricoeur and the subjectivity 
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described by Kierkegaard, whilst also displaying elements of the subsuming tyranny 
observed by Auerbach. 
The remarkable subjectivity and self-awareness that is revealed through these 
incursions into the text suggests that biblical narrators have come to see their own 
selves as a legitimate part of, or extension to, their narratives. As they interrupt the 
plotlines to implore a degree of readerly awareness that matches their own 
eschatological urgency, as they enfold their own day within the diegesis, or as they 
joke about their own finitude, they invite a number of theological conclusions:  
1. Through their self-conscious intrusions biblical narrators acknowledge their 
roles as readers of inherited traditions. By doing so they model and legitimate a 
confessing, subjective and self-involved approach to interpretation, thus 
establishing the foundations of an inner-biblical hermeneutic. 
2. They juxtapose admissions of their own spatiotemporal limitations and 
elements of their own context with bold, or even universal, claims about God. As 
they do so they express a compulsion toward storytelling, as though their role as 
creatures necessitates a degree of witness, not despite but because of their 
subjectivity and limitation.  
3. They model the same manner of self-involved reconfiguration that they 
construe in their characters, and they themselves repeat and reiterate the 
relatedness to God that they describe within the lives of these figures. Through 
this process, biblical narrators become extradiegetic figures with the potential for 
powerful effect upon the reader. 
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4. As they textualise their own circumscribed temporality, biblical narrators lose 
themselves within the trajectory of their stories and render their own 
metamorphisised egos dependent on the divine.  In doing so, they place 
themselves in fellowship with their characters and their readers, legitimating a 
range of future responses and inviting future audiences to repeat the kind of 
narrative reconstitution of selfhood that they themselves demonstrate.  
These four observations are drawn from the hermeneutical implications observed in 
the preceding chapters. In the four subsequent sections of this chapter each will be 
developed in reference to the studies of metalepsis in Mark, Job, Luke and the 
Deuteronomistic History (as well as the broader range alluded to in Chapter 1), and 
in dialogue with Ricoeur, Kierkegaard, Auerbach and other theological 
commentators. They open the close readings that have preceded this final chapter to 
a deeper theological anthropology, to a range of ethical considerations, and 
cumulatively, to a detailed consideration of what the blurred boundaries of biblical 
diegesis say about readers as human selves. They suggest that the proper place of 
all creatures, including the narrator and the reader herself, is defined in relation to 
others and, particularly, to the divine Other.  
 
2. Internal Hermeneutics 
What I shall be proposing is that we may have misunderstood the alternatives 
before us. The ‘world of scripture’, so far from being a clear and readily definable 
territory, is an historical world in which meanings are discovered and recovered in 
action and encounter. To challenge the Church to immerse itself in its ‘text’ is to 
encourage it to engage … with those appropriations of biblical narrative on the 
frontiers of the Church and beyond represented by figures such as Kierkegaard 
and Jung. If as has sometimes been said, the Bible is itself a history of the re-
reading of texts, our reading of it should not be so different… Interpretation of the 
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world within the scriptural framework is intrinsic to the Church’s critical self-
discovery.1 
 
Through their incursions into biblical stories, narrators stretch the frame of the 
biblical text and suggest that their own subjectivity, spatiotemporal limitation or 
distance from the events of the primary diegesis do not disqualify them from re-
telling divine drama. Furthermore, narratorial boundary-breaking suggests that 
subjective self-involvement is axiomatic to the meaningfulness of the text. Such 
moments reveal the parameters through which narrators have interpreted the stories 
that they have inherited, and show that the reception history of biblical narratives 
pre-date their textualisation. Additionally, by making the human agency of writers 
and narrators a clear presence within the story world, they challenge models for the 
inspiration of scripture that are founded upon pneumatic dictation alone.  
The self-involvement that is manifest at the tangled diegetic threshold of 
biblical narratives suggests that the Bible’s narrators considered their selfhood to be 
established through the stories of others and within the landscape of God’s 
interactions with his creatures. The manner of the intrusions and metaleptic muddles 
considered in the preceding chapters each hint towards the fact that that the 
narrator’s manner of interpreting the story that they retell is blended with their own 
situatedness, faith and interpretative horizon. Thus the Deuteronomistic Historian 
says “Here I am, in the same world as this heap of stones which still stand in Achor” 
(Joshua 7:26). The ironic Joban narrator subtly suggests, “Here I am as mediator 
between God and a righteous sufferer, recording a testimony to his innocence” (Job 
19:23). John says, “Here I am, in both the reader’s world which has insufficient 
books, and in the shadow of the crucified Christ.” Telling tales of heavenly visions, 
apocalyptic narrators make claims like, “I, John, am here in the world of tribulation 
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and have heard the angels’ trumpets” (Revelation 1:9). Taking this stance, and 
involving themselves within the framework of their stories, narrators invite their 
audiences to occupy the same role that they themselves manifest. To interpret 
faithfully, narrator and reader, as recipients of the divine story, must find themselves 
immersed in and transfigured by it.  
What emerges through the range of these narratorial intrusions and boundary 
transgressions is a cumulative sense of an inner biblical hermeneutic. This is evident 
in the overt interpretative actions which precede the textualisation of the narrative 
and are subsequently alluded to through the narrative stance revealed in the extra-
diegesis. In addition, the intrusion of the narrating situation discloses a distance 
between the temporality, subjectivity and perspective of the narrator and the content 
of the primary diegesis. The juxtaposition of the world within the primary diegesis 
and the world of the narrator implies that the theological scaffolding and the 
structures of biblical narratives are able to accommodate and accept the 
hermeneutical horizons of the narrator. This evidence of inner biblical interpretative 
processes suggests that biblical narrators were self-consciously seeking to 
‘configure’ history (as Ricoeur explained in his model of mimesis) and that they were 
engaged in a process of rendering history meaningful, or “making God present” for 
possible readers, as he had been for them, and as Kierkegaard advocated in his 
model of contemporaneity.2 The presence of the narrating self within the text is 
evidence that biblical narrators embrace the subsummation of their own selves within 
the framework of the story they tell, and that they invite a symmetrical transformation 
of perspective in the lives of their readers. Their position, apropos the world of which 
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H. Hong, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 289. 
343 
 
they tell, suggests that they find the mere depiction of it inadequate, its 
representation insufficient, and the recitation of a preconfigured worldview 
unsatisfactory. It is almost as though, through their self-involvement, biblical 
narrators seek to shepherd interpreters toward a discourse that contemporaneously 
inhabits the reader’s present. They invite a sense of counterpoint between their own 
configural location (Ricoeur’s mimises2) and that of their readers. They seek to 
ensure that their story-telling is always understood to apply to the “now” of the 
reader’s day and not just the “now” of the narrator. 
Narratorial incursions within the diegesis solicit the honest, open and involved 
presence of the reader within the interpretative process, as though availability for 
transformation and openness to the world within the text is a precondition for faithful 
(or felicitous) reading. “Here I Am” should thus be understood as the foundation of 
the inner-biblical hermeneutic, for acknowledgement of relativity and subjectivity is 
the first step towards any authentic sense of relatedness between the human self 
and the divine discourse. Furthermore, locating the self in reference to the other, and 
developing a story of the other as a context for the self, are necessary steps towards 
liberty and away from the solipsistic self-first-ness that often governs the stories 
human tell about themselves and diminishes capacity to love the other. 
The biblical text is rich with the faith-filled hermeneutics of self-aware 
narrators. In the process of self-involvement these narrators hold in tension their own 
situations and the representations of reality that they perpetuate. They demonstrate 
an interior hermeneutic that reflects elements of the availability and subjectivity 
advocated by Kierkegaard and the self-awareness of Ricoeur’s ‘capable’ human 
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being.3 It is the faith of the Deuteronomistic Historian that leads him to interpret the 
stones and cities of his own day as testimony to God’s continued involvement in 
history. The narrative continuum he describes proceeds from the geography, the 
cultic practices and the ethnic relationships he knows. Similarly his depiction of the 
conflicted selfhood of David, the complexity of Jacob’s family bonds and the interior 
monologues of the patriarchs extend from the interior monologue, the complexity, 
conflict and transformation he himself has known. Equally, it is Luke’s confidence 
about Jesus’ lordship in his own world that allows him to liberally transgress the 
boundaries between hypo-diegetic and primary diegetic worlds and between hetero 
and homo-diegetic narrative stances. His sense that Jesus is the master of his own 
context means that he is comfortable blending worlds that ought, in a literary and 
logical sense, to remain distinct. The same hermeneutical processes are also 
present in the self-referential joke of the Joban poet, who suggests that his own 
mortality and his delight in the art of writing both own a place within the story of 
human suffering, and serve a higher purpose through challenging prevenient models 
of theodicy in a lasting, written, vindicating legacy. In other examples such as Mark’s 
appeal to his reader, the subsummation of the identity of the apocalyptic seer within 
his vision or the introduction of anachronistic auto-diegesis (such as those illustrated 
in Chapter 1) equally suggest an approach to prior traditions that demands 
significant signposting or overt management of interpretative horizons. All of these 
transgressed diegetic frames are shaped by the faith of narrators whose 
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understanding of their own selfhood was transformed by an inherited story or 
experience.4  
The interpretive process that is revealed in the transgression of thresholds within 
biblical narrative is thus a model of hermeneutical subjectivity that conveys a depth 
of theologically defined anthropology and invites ethical authenticity. These are 
derived from the narrators’ confessions of their own situatedness, and from their 
understanding that the threshold of their own selfhood is ultimately determined by 
their relation to the face of the Other and the story of the others. As diegetic 
thresholds are transgressed, text-bound examples of the synthesis of horizons 
(Horizontverschmelzung) between distinct diegetic worlds are revealed. These 
moments demonstrate that, before the involvement of any reader, biblical narrative is 
itself already a fused or muddled horizon in which the narrator’s purview and the 
scope of reality encompassed within the story world have coalesced.5 Each strand 
and each layer of biblical diegesis should thus be understood as a muddle of all 
three of Ricoeur’s mimetic stages. Prefigured, inherited stories have shaped the lives 
of the biblical narrators who interpret their own situation, and forge stories that they 
hope will shape similar possibilities through reception. 
 
3. Noisy Creatureliness 
The self-involved narrators of the biblical texts tell of a story that stretches 
prodigiously beyond the stories they themselves tell, a story within whose scope they 
                                            
4
 This chain of reception is therefore a little like Escher’s drawing hands: the stories of God’s 
encounter with his creatures provokes the telling of the stories of God’s encounter with his creatures, 
which shape the reading of the telling of the stories of God’s encounter with his creatures. The 
reception and response that narratorial self-involvement models is fundamental to the text’s reception 
and its capacity to recursively bind subsequent generations into the world of narrative, through 
readership and liturgical repetition, mise en abyme. 
5
 Reading as a ‘fusion of horizons’ is therefore an inadequately mono-dimensional model.  
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have discovered themselves. Their involvement is necessarily personal, subjective, 
liminal and limited, for they know themselves to be immersed in the domain of which 
they tell. Mark’s direct appeal to his readers exhorts them to respond personally and 
urgently, locating them within the same continuum as Jesus’ disciples. His need to 
address ‘the reader’ directly stems from his desire to include his audience within the 
same framework of urgent life-changing response that he himself has known. The 
Deuteronomist’s inclusion of his own ‘day’ is a consequence of his conviction that the 
world he describes is truly contiguous with both his own and that of his reader. He 
connects history and his own context, rendering both as part of the same story about 
Divine agency and providence. Luke’s inconsistent stance and muddled lords speak 
of the permeability he perceives between the world of which he tells and the world in 
which he tells. His description of Jesus’ omni-diegetic Lordship lays claims to the 
reality of the reader, suggesting that every reality and all of time belong to the same 
master. The irreverent joke of the Joban scribe is a consequence of his delight at his 
own capacity to offer sustained personal witness in his own actual world on behalf of 
righteous sufferers. He promises a vindication and a sense of comfort entirely absent 
in the theological traditions of Job’s friends. John’s acknowledgment of his own 
purpose in writing (John 20:31), derives from his sense that the world of which he 
narrates and the world into which he narrates are the same. Likewise, his 
acknowledgement that “the world itself could not contain the books” to describe all 
the things done by Jesus (John 21:25), derives from his certainty that his readers’ 
time and place is part of a spatiotemporal dimension fundamentally shaped by the 
Jesus he has himself experienced. The apocalyptic vision of God’s consuming glory 
and the narratological stance adopted in Revelation make prodigiously present the 
suggestion that Patmos and the world of the text’s reception are subordinate to the 
347 
 
heavenly reality described in the diegesis. In every one of these instances biblical 
narrators demonstrate a determined hermeneutic in which they interpret their own 
present in the light of the past: their own day, their own writing and their own witness 
are subjugated to the supremacy of the divine, and the only future they can envisage 
is one equally encompassed by Him. In faith and in encounter these scribes, story-
tellers, compilers and witnesses have found themselves to be part of the divine story 
so profound that it surpasses their capacity to tell it adequately, yet compels them to 
try. 
The self-involvement of biblical narrators reveals that they see story-telling as 
the beginning of the narrative endeavour and not the end. Through their 
interventions they make prodigiously explicit the fact that their narratives are 
theologically purposeful and orientated towards response. The tangle of selves, 
transgressed thresholds, muddled tenses, imperatives and invitations identified in 
earlier chapters are narratorial attempts to overcome the limitations of textual 
representation, to reduce the risk that the story might loss its purpose once it is 
bequeathed to others, to encourage the “new creation of truth” and to circumvent the 
finitude of the narrator.6 The range of texts covered in chapters 1 and 3 to 6 above 
discount the suggestion that biblical narratives report an exclusively omniscient and 
objective perspective. To the contrary, each text examined exhibits a nuanced self-
awareness of the narrator’s role in the interpretation of preceding traditions. Across a 
full spectrum of narrative styles and approaches, a sense is developed that authors, 
redactors and narrators often perceived very clearly the convergence of their own 
reality and the representational world that they sought to describe in narration.  Their 
infractions within the diegesis are not accidental, they are evidence of the 
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compulsion at the heart of the narrative to ‘make present’ the theological and 
historical truths that they perceived to be of most significance. 
Thus, whilst the frequent presence of metalepsis and diegetic infractions within 
biblical narrative may be surprising from a literary critical perspective, from a 
theological perspective contaminating loops of self-involvement across narrative 
thresholds are entirely to be expected. After all, the development of biblical narrative 
is founded on faith in a God whose glory is so manifest, a Christ whose love is so 
compelling, and a Breath so animated and life-giving that the heavens, the hills, the 
trees and the stones would proclaim witness if those made in his image did not. 
The heavens are telling the glory of God; and the firmament proclaims his 
handiwork. Day to day pours forth speech, and night to night declares knowledge. 
(Psalm 19:1-2) 
 
The mountains and the hills before you shall break forth into singing, and all the 
trees of the field shall clap their hands. (Isaiah 55:12) 
 
I tell you, if these were silent, the very stones would cry out. (Luke 19:40) 
 
Within this context the work of biblical narrators ought, therefore, to be understood 
as an expression of noisy creatureliness. Despite their limitations as witnesses, their 
own subjectivity and the limits of the spatiotemporal horizons, the self-involved 
narrators of the bible text still tell stories, because their work is a compulsive 
response to the story they have inherited and the re-configured way of reading the 
world that that they have arrived at. They narrate as part of the continuum of the 
entire created order, whose very purpose is to “glorify God and enjoy him forever.”7 
Having found themselves configured by the story that they have inherited, or by the 
events they have experienced (just as Ricoeur supposed), biblical narrative is written 
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under the conviction that the selfhood of the storyteller, radically redeemed, 
meaningfully explained or fundamentally re-interpreted in encounter with the divine, 
is a legitimate departure point from which to begin telling the story of God’s 
interactions with his creatures, and through which to invite sustained transformation 
in the lives of the recipients of the narrative. The voices of biblical narrative interpret 
and include their own contexts in, and through, the narratives they tell, 
demonstrating a form of subjective self-conscious realism in which the self need not 
be the ‘blind spot’ described by Terry Eagleton.8 Including themselves within the 
diegesis, they suggest that they are not naïve to the significance of their own 
perspective. To the contrary, whilst it is the story of God’s interactions with others in 
history that occupies the majority of the page, the narrator is unavoidably present 
within the text because the congregation of selves beyond the diegesis, who write 
and read and respond, are of primary significance to the narrative. In their overt 
expressions of relativity and through their engagement within the diegetic world, 
biblical narrators puncture the thresholds that might otherwise keep their stories 
distinct from the world of their readers, they magnify the metamorphic potential of the 
text and enhance its capacity to challenge the threshold of the reader’s self. The 
authoritative claims of scripture are not made despite the liminal, limited and 
subjective status of the storyteller, they are made because of it. 
Moments of narratorial self-awareness, diegetic confusion and metalepsis 
reveal that the biblical narrators are reflective regarding their own interpretations of 
history and of prior tradition. Their story telling includes a significant degree of extra-
diegetic referentiality regarding their own time, place and role, because their 
narratives lay claim to a reality that includes the worlds represented at every diegetic 
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 “The human subject becomes the blind spot at the centre of the picture, the absent cause of the 
world’s coming to presence.” Eagleton, ‘Pork Chops and Pineapples’, p. 17. 
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level, including the ‘earthly’ situatedness of the narrator (so important to Auerbach) 
and, by implication, the context of the reader. Subjectivity is integral to this model of 
reality because the purpose of biblical narrative is the re-configuration of the 
selfhood of the reader in reference to the transfigured faces of other creatures.  
Finding threads of providence or purpose within time, and understanding the 
self through recognising one’s own relation to the world (and others in the world), is 
integral to “capable human beings”.9 Having found precisely this manner of meaning 
and selfhood within the scope of the narratives they tell, biblical narration is a 
response to the certitude, authority and power with which God has acted in the 
events that the narrator now describes in the primary diegesis. It is not that the text 
imperiously obligates response from the reader, rather the sense of inescapable 
meaning and the profound weight of providence found in history itself obliges the 
tale, the telling of the tale and the reading of the telling of the tale, to share a single 
frame within the story of God and humanity. God’s certain goodness, incontrovertible 
power and limitless grace are revealed in threads of providence and in personal 
experience, and demand telling, regardless of the limitations of the interlocutor. The 
finite creature, who finds themselves reconstituted through their interpretation of the 
providential movements in the past and personal encounter in the present, cannot in 
good conscience or honest faith hold this understanding furtively. If the universe is 
created by a benevolent God, if “life itself is grace”, then necessarily every conscious 
creature is called, not just to awareness of this, but to response.10 Biblical narrative is 
not an objective, neutral, re-presentation of sequence. It is a faith filled, urgent, self-
involved response from those who have found that their own situatedness and 
significance makes sense when interpreted through the parameters of the divine 
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story. It is the readerly response of noisy creatures, whose self-involved depictions of 
prior events are at the same time acts of interpretation and of response. It is the 
endeavour of those who have come to understand a context for the constitution of 
their own selfhood, who know that this understanding eclipses their own 
spatiotemporal limits and who feel obliged to use all the traditions, vocabulary, gifts 
and authority in their possession to communicate in a manner that transcends the 
threshold of their own world. 
4. Extra-diegetic Figuralism  
Characters within biblical narrative convey a depth of earthly, evocative realism and 
wealth of rich polyvalent figuralism. The honest internal conflicts, human dilemmas 
and contradictory qualities of the bible’s cast of characters invite the repetition of a 
range of moral, personal and relational qualities in the selfhood of the reader. Close 
readings of moments of metalepsis and instances of narratorial intrusions in the 
biblical text reveal that through their self-involvement within the parameters of the 
diegesis, the personae of many biblical narrators are themselves also textualised as 
figures of faithful and transformed selfhood. The refigured sense of selfhood attested 
to in the self-involved interruptions of the Bible’s narrators therefore merits 
consideration in the same way as the model of selfhood configured within the lives of 
characters in the primary diegesis. 
It is unsurprising that biblical narratives routinely locate the foundational 
identity of scriptural characters in reference primarily to God. From Adam to 
Ones'imus, the primacy of the divine Other as the source of the referentiality for the 
human self is repeated consistently. Jacob wrestles with the divine, finds himself and 
is renamed (Genesis 32:24). Moses is an adoptee left in the reeds by his family and 
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an exile with no assets, who finds himself reconstituted as a law-giving leader, 
prophet and patriarch by the absolute Other who defines himself (ironically perhaps) 
as the “God of your father” (Exodus 3:6).  Samuel, the eldest son sequestered in the 
Temple in an apprenticeship with a visionless priest, is called by name. Though 
named ‘God hears’, he becomes redefined as the hearer of God (I Samuel 3:1-10). 
Isaiah, though grossly aware of his own unrighteousness, when asked, “Whom shall 
I send?”, nevertheless answers as Adam should have. Instead of hiding he says, 
“Here I am!” (Isaiah 6:8) Simon, the fisherman, is made Peter, the “fisher of men” 
(Matthew 4:19). Mary Magdalene, formerly possessed of demons is addressed 
intimately by name, and, as the first to see a renewed vision of the resurrected rabbi, 
becomes the first Christian evangelist (John 20:18). Alongside the fullest imaginable 
collection of other figures, each of these characters is portrayed as discovering their 
sense of self in reference to their creator, redeemer and king.11 In perpetual figural 
function they encourage the constitution of the self through a revised sense of 
referentiality and relationship toward God. 
None of this is unexpected; after all, these characters are chosen for their 
figurative potential and their capacity to illustrate reconfiguration, transformation or 
conversion. The power of these figures is more than adequately addressed in other 
                                            
11
 The value of these figures is not necessarily located in the vividness of the metamorphosis they 
illustrate; rather, as in Auerbach’s model of realism, their significance is found in the visceral, naked, 
concrete, contingent selfhood that they display. As a consequence, amongst the prodigious range of 
characters who function as figures of a transformed and reconstituted selfhood, there are very few 
who do not display significant vulnerability, failure or weakness. Amongst the most potent biblical 
figures are those whose own voice is employed to address their own sense of self Isaiah’s distress in 
the face of God’s glory (Isaiah 6:5), David’s confession of guilt (Psalm 51) and Paul’s 
acknowledgement of false righteousness (Phil. 3:6) all follow and echo the self-conscious fallenness 
expressed by Adam. Within the same pattern, even though he is an undeniably hypo-diegetic and 
fictive figure, the soliloquy of the lost son speaks powerfully of precisely this abased self-constitution. 
“I am no longer worthy to be called your son” (Luke 15:19), he says, provoking a pathos in the reader 
more powerfully than a multitude of finely detailed aesthetically-real figures might. The unresolved 
discourse of selfhood within the heart of the king, the prophet, the apostle, the patriarch and the 
parabolic son are shaped by the irreconcilable and irreducible bundle of contradictions established in 
the actions and character of each. It is this that makes them such rich and realistic figures.  
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studies.12 What is new in my analysis is the suggestion that self-conscious intrusions 
into the diegesis by the narrator are also significant illustrations of biblical selfhood. 
This is not to suggest that the narrator represents a unique figural category, or that 
this model of self-involvement trumps the constitution of selfhood exhibited in his 
characters. Rather, the selfhood of biblical narrators deserves a degree of primacy 
because their self-constitution in relation to the narrative of God’s action in the world 
must, necessarily, have been established before the story that they tell was 
textualised and collected in a canon. The self-involved, self-aware, subjective stance 
of “To this day”, of “If only my words could be written”, of “Let the reader understand” 
and of the story teller who happily muddles diegetic masters, are a consequence of 
what God has already done in the experience and in the world of the narrator. 
Moreover, because such moments situate the narrators in reference to the Divine 
story, they function as figures of self-involvement and reconfiguration that appeal 
directly to other extra-diegetic recipients of the story. They should consequently be 
understood to prefigure the transformative hermeneutic and reconfiguring response 
that biblical narrators expect from their readers. Through their involvement within the 
stories they tell, biblical narrators provide a typology of transformation that is not 
directly, or necessarily, born out of theophanic encounter on Mount Horeb or 
conversation with Jesus in the upper room. Instead they are figures of a 
reconfiguration that is possible beyond the threshold of the biblical stories, and 
thereby, they are of particular significance to others who live outside the text and 
beyond the boundaries of the diegesis. 
Through their intrusions, the identity and selfhood of the Bible’s story-telling 
voices become additional witness to the divine Other’s sustained capacity to 
                                            
12
 Cf. Maren Niehoff, ‘Do biblical characters talk to themselves? Narrative modes of representing inner 
speech in early biblical fiction’, Journal of Biblical Literature 111, no. 4 (1992), pp. 577-595. 
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transfigure and transform. Furthermore, despite the power they possess as 
mediators between traditions received from the past and transmitted for the future, 
these narrators refuse to make their egos central to their narratives, joking about 
their role (as in Job 19:24) or referencing their own context without unveiling their 
faces (as in the Deuteronomistic History). Even when their identity is important to the 
authority of the narrative, such as in apocalyptic texts or where apostolic authority is 
required to legitimate veracity, they still find ways to avoid prominence. In these 
instances they allow their own earthly self to be subsumed (as with John’s context on 
Patmos shrinking into the background behind the hypo-diegetic vision), or talk of 
themselves in a cryptic third person (as with “the beloved disciple” of the Fourth 
Gospel). In this, they are figures of the same humble witness that advocated by the 
Psalmist, who exhorts, “Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to thy name give glory” 
(Psalm 115:1), and that is epitomised in the character of John the Baptist who says, 
“He must increase, but I must decrease” (John 3:30). 
Without taking centre stage Biblical narrators declare “Glotzt nicht so romantisch”, 
and they foreclose undemanding, impersonal interpretations. They model a manner 
of selfhood located in the story of the Other, that is humble, unpretentious and full of 
hope, and they suggest that the same transformative process at work within the 
stories they tell is also at work beyond the threshold of the narrative. I contend that 
Biblical narrators, in their metaleptic intrusions, subjective incursions and self-
involved interventions, offer their own transfigured faces as images of those who 
have already been persuaded by the power of the stories they tell. When Biblical 
narrators speak across diegetic thresholds, self-conscious of the otherness of their 
self to readers of the stories they tell, as extra-diegetic figures, they add their 
personal and perpetually contemporaneous witness to the story of the Other and the 
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others transformed by Him. They do this without upstaging their characters and 
without diluting the authority of the stories that they tell. In a sense they model the 
figural role of the witness as it is articulated by Emmanuel Levinas:  
The witness testifies to what was said by himself. For he has said, "Here am I!" 
before the Other; and from the fact that before the Other he recognizes the 
responsibility which is incumbent on himself, he has manifested what the face of 
the Other signified for him. The glory of the Infinite reveals itself through what it is 
capable of doing in the witness.13 
 
 
5. A Congregation of Readers 
The way in which narrators include and define themselves in relation to the stories 
that they have inherited suggests that their comprehension of their own selfhood is 
constituted through their sense of belonging to a broader narrative. In this they 
model the narrative constitution of selfhood that is propounded by Ricoeur: 
Stories generate a partnership by making our fragmentary stories converge with 
the encompassing story… This convergence [develops] through a challenging 
relationship… to a stage of reconciliation [and] when the story is re-enacted in the 
liturgical celebration, then the story and our story become one and the same.14  
 
Nevertheless, as well as illustrating Ricoeur’s model of narrative identity, biblical 
narrators also invert it. Rather than establishing a story of the self and then locating 
the others, they establish a story of others, and indeed the Other, and in moments of 
narratorial self-involvement and diegetic frame-breaking they demonstrate that they 
locate themselves within this continuum. They evince the inseparability of narrative 
and selfhood, but resist the establishment of a selfhood that is forged through the 
centrality and significance of their own individuality. Refiguring the self within the 
boundary of the story of God’s action and in reference to the divine, they reveal a 
                                            
13
 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Ethics and Infinity’, in CrossCurrents 34, no. 2 (1984), pp. 191-203 (p.198). 
14
 Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, p. 242.  
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radical model of selfhood, which, in its fullest expression is found in the surrender of 
the definition of the self to the story of the other.  
Having arrived at this manner of self-understanding, biblical narrators also 
invite readers to allow their own day, their time, their perspectives and their 
narratives of self-constitution to be subsumed into the story of the other. The witness 
of the transfigured and fully absorbed self of the narrating other should therefore be 
understood as an encouragement toward the sense of convergence identified by 
Ricoeur. Through their self-disclosure (however fleeting or fragmentary), a glimpse of 
themselves is offered which demonstrates a manner of self-conscious reception and 
which solicits a symmetrical response. They encourage readers to reimagine the 
threshold of the self and allow its reconstitution in the convergence of the story of the 
self and of the Other. This form of self-constitution opens the reader to new ethical 
and anthropological possibilities.15  
The text displays or even embodies the reality with which it is concerned simply 
by witness or ‘testimony’ (to use Ricoeur’s favoured word). It displays a ‘possible 
world’, a reality in which my human reality can also find itself: and in inviting me 
into its world, the text breaks open and extends my own possibilities.16 
 
When the reader realises that she is invited to follow the narrator into a model of 
selfhood that is defined by divine story, arguments about genealogy, primogeniture 
or seating priority at the eschatological feast are rendered absurd, and the 
competitive economics of horizontal relativities give way to a non-competitive 
relativity. As Wolfhart Pannenberg suggests, “because selfhood is ultimately 
grounded in relation to God, the person can encounter his social situation in 
                                            
15
 Cf. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 97: “As a reader I find myself losing 
myself… The metamorphosis of the world in play is also the playful metamorphosis of the ego.” What 
Ricoeur identifies in the process of reading seems also to be present in the process of narration. 
16
 Williams, On Christian Theology, p. 133.  
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freedom.”17 Grounding the identity of the self in the story of the Other/others is of 
profound significance, for contemporaneity with Christ means not only face-to-face 
encounter with the omni-diegetic Master, but also a renewed understanding of the 
status of the fragile self in relation to the life of others.  
My contention is that phrases such as “To this day”, “If only my words could be 
written”, “Let the reader understand”, “These things are written that you may 
believe”, “I, John”, or “We have beheld his glory” are not anomalous moments of 
haemorrhage between distinct worlds. Rather, they are the consecration of the 
permeability between the diegetic thresholds of biblical narrative. Indeed, self-
effacing jokes, direct address to the audience, inclusive first person plural narrative 
stance, omni-diegetic claims and interjection of personal testimony all contribute to a 
sense that biblical narrators imagine themselves as part of the chain of their stories’ 
reception, rather than as creators of it. It is noteworthy that when biblical narrators 
include themselves within diegetic frames they place themselves in fellowship with 
the community of transfigured selves about whom they narrate, a community that 
Rowan Williams connects deeply with Kierkegaard’s notion of contemporaneity: 
From the beginnings of Christian discourse, the community around Jesus in his 
ministry – the community of disciples and of others, including those who have 
received from him healing or absolution – was held to be continually present, so 
that to join the community was to become ‘contemporary’ with Jesus… This 
community [is thus] a community of interactive fellowship with Jesus, rather than 
a community founded by a figure in the past.18 
 
As well asserting their connectedness to the life of the characters within the diegesis, 
narrators position themselves as recipients of the story, and by doing so they 
highlight the common ground they share with their readers. Located as recipients of 
                                            
17
 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, Translated by Matthew J. 
O’Connell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), p. 234. 
18
 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology, p. 251. 
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revelation and respondents to the divine voice, the voice of biblical narrators seem to 
belong with the audience.19 Placing themselves in fellowship with their readers, 
biblical narrators therefore mitigate the distance between the reader and the divine, 
allowing the reader to use the faith and perspective of the narrator as a scaffolding 
for her own. In some ways, by making themselves available as ‘we’, by appealing 
intimately through apostrophe and by appearing personally in the witness formula, 
biblical narrators invite readers to feel contemporaneous with themselves as a step 
towards contemporaneity with the action of God in the world. Immersed as they are 
in the world of biblical figures and yet able to address the audience directly, biblical 
narrators show themselves to have already made the “leap” of which Kierkegaard 
spoke:  
The leap is a category of transition. It is itself a break with immanence… If I 
do this, I cannot come back by myself. It is in this moment of decision that the 
individual needs divine assistance… [for] the leap is made easier when the 
distance between where the leaper stands and where the leap is to be made 
[is clear].20 
 
Through their own diegetic self-involvement biblical narrators make very clear the 
nature of the leap of faith they themselves have made. They invite readers to 
accompany them into the world of biblical narrative and, de facto, into the landscape 
inhabited by the divine. Having found themselves included in, and thoroughly 
reinvented by, the texture of the divine story, they show no concerns about dialogue 
contaminated with disclosure of their own subjectivity, diegetic layers affected by 
paradoxical operation or narrative structure muddled by illogical temporal loops. 
These self-involved threshold transgressions ought to be understood as inevitable, 
                                            
19
 Even claims to have been present within the action of the primary diegesis, as is found in John’s 
suggestion that he saw Jesus’ glory, or Luke’s claim to have travelled with Paul, are made in the past 
tense, and therefore add to the sense of distance between the time of story being told or read and the 
time of God’s action in history. This increases the distance between the voice of the narrator and that 
of God whilst also binding reader and narrator closer together. 
20
 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 216, 247 and 307. 
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and entirely legitimate, features of a manner of interpreting prior traditions, 
representing reality and telling stories. Such muddles at a narratological level are an 
imitation of divine discourse: for God, in incarnation, reveals his own capacity for 
subjectivity; in crucifixion he locates himself paradoxically, and in resurrection 
operates in defiance of logic.  
The story-telling self that emerges through intrusions and threshold 
transgressions within the biblical story should be understood as the redefined 
narrator who consistently invites readers to “inhabit the textual world” of the stories 
they tell, as Frei suggested, and to be transformed as Kierkegaard demanded.21 
Ricoeur is particularly explicit here, suggesting that in this movement towards 
appropriation and configuration “I exchange me, the master of itself, for self, the 
disciple of the text.”22 It is not that biblical hermeneutics invite repetition of the lives of 
the story’s characters as though somehow two historically divorced contexts could 
be reconciled into an identical whole. Rather, as Nicholas Wolterstorff comments, 
self-involvement precipitates complex collisions between realities and prohibits a 
homogenous sense of immersion or appropriation:  
We experience a great many points of collision when we come up against the 
biblical narrative. At many of these points of collision, our modern western 
mentality ought to bend and give; otherwise the notion of biblical authority is 
vapid. But not at all these points. We ought not to bend before the social 
patriarachalism so pervasive in the biblical narrative [for example]… It’s too 
simplistic, then, to say: conform your life to the biblical story. At what points 
are we to conform?23 
  
“Inhabiting the textual world” does not encourage a poor simulation of the 
preconfigured world, rather it means appropriating the discourse of the narrative, 
                                            
21
 For full discussion cf. Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Inhabiting the World of the Text’, in Ten Year 
Commemoration to the Life of Hans Frei: 1922-1988, ed. by Giorgy Olegovich (New York: 
Semenenko Foundation, 1999), pp. 66-80.  
22
 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 113. 
23
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine discourse: Philosophical reflections on the claim that God speaks 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 79. 
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constituting the self figurally, and finding an authentic ‘contemporaneity’ in the same 
way that the characters and narrators in the text did in their own situations. The 
invitation of the biblical narrators should therefore be understood according to 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s suggestion that understanding is like “knowing how to go 
on.”24 Biblical narrators invite a manner of ‘going on’ through the interactions they 
describe in the primary diegesis and through their own diegetic boundary breaking 
and narratorial self-involvement. In some sense both represent a determined 
reversal of Adam’s first response to God, and an endeavor to redress his attempt to 
hide. God’s first question of his creatures was, “Where are you?” (Genesis 3:9). This 
question was not asked because God was ignorant, unaware or unable to find 
Adam, but because he was inviting discourse in which creatures locate themselves 
in relation to their creator. Adam’s answer reveals an anthropology that is rooted in 
awareness of his otherness but it also demonstrates the vulnerability and limitation of 
the human rather than the profound capacity of the imago Dei. He said, “I heard the 
sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself” 
(Genesis 3:10). The theological proclamation advanced by self-involved narrators is 
not just that openness and availability are the foundation for hermeneutics, but also 
that “Here I am” is beginning of “going on”. They do not summon the reader back to 
Eden, rather, through their self-involvement, they declare that ‘going on’ 
appropriately means locating one’s own identity in the face of the other even if this 
means allowing the boundary of the self to leach into framework of a narrative. 
Moments of metalepsis within the Bible are textual demonstrations of the 
narrators’ determination not to hide from divine discourse, and they represents the 
consistent invitation that is found at the threshold of biblical narrative, calling readers 
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 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. by P. Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) I, 875. 
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to pursue an equally open stance toward the creator. When a narrator locates herself 
illogically within her own narrative she suggests that the boundaries of the worlds 
within the text and the worlds beyond the text are not immutable or inviolable. 
Biblical metalepsis thus confronts the threshold between reality and representation, 
provoking a sense contemporaneity and relatedness that transcends the tyranny of 
time and the ‘limit-experience’ of the reader. However, before the reader is ever 
asked to adopt their self-involved interpretative stance and the subordination of her 
world view (as observed by Auerbach), and before this subsummation is anticipated 
in reception, it is demonstrable that biblical narrators have themselves fitted their 
own world into the biblical world. Before they anticipated appropriation in a 
congregation of readers, the worlds of the patriarchs and prophets, the prostitutes 
and lepers, the angels and demons have first absorbed the lives and the 
situatedness of their own story-tellers. Within the hermeneutics of the Christian 
Church, the act of narration and the act of reading should therefore be understood to 
share corresponding significance as complementary models of the same movement. 
Narration models the subjective and self-involved response that it also invites in 
reading, and both are fundamentally a relocation or repositioning of the self and a 
reaction to the prior movement of God. In this way the Bible itself holds together the 
fullest imaginable congregation of believers. Those who read, and those about whom 
stories are read, are brought into fellowship together by the story tellers who inhabit 




6. Concluding Remarks 
Through the self-involved narrative stance that they adopt, biblical narrators regularly 
muddle the logically distinct layers of their own narratives. In their willing 
contamination of locutionary and ontological thresholds they invite the reader to 
follow them, and to enter into the divine drama. Metalepsis is one of the most 
significant devices employed to facilitate this fusion of readerly perspectives with the 
interior discourse of the text, for it allows the movement of meaning across the extra-
diegetic, primary diegetic and hypo-diegetic thresholds, so that words can operate 
beyond the constraints of their interior world and gain meaning beyond the frame of 
the text. Nevertheless, few biblical interpreters, commentators or translators have 
employed the concept of metalepsis as an explanation for illogical muddles of 
narrative layers, as though acknowledging irrational narrative structure or 
inconsistent narratorial stance might somehow be perceived as a failing in the text. 
Once this fear is overcome, and diegetic muddles are acknowledged, strange texts 
are elucidated and profound latent capacity within the narrative is discovered. 
Indeed, in some instances, the reader’s willingness to entangle herself within the 
world of the narrative is essential to the development of a meaningful understanding 
of the hermeneutical and ethical demands of the text. 
As figures of self-involvement, biblical narrators frequently include themselves 
within the frame of their narratives. In doing so they often destabilise the boundaries 
between representation and reality; they facilitate the reconfiguration of the reader’s 
world; they promote a sense of readerly relatedness to the truth claims of the 
narrative; they blend previously distinct temporalities; they develop metamorphic 
potential in reception; and they provide an avenue towards a hermeneutic of 
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contemporaneity. Through this self-involved immersion in the stories they tell, 
narrators also (somewhat unexpectedly) circumvent the blind spot of realism. They 
include their own self within the text’s field of vision and confront the boundaries of 
representation. This mode of narration also asks questions about the boundaries of 
the reader’s own world, addressing the reader’s creatureliness and forging 
theological foundations that are located in the unchanging character of God. They 
suggest that God himself transcends the division between representation and reality 
and that he invites disciples to follow him, through Christ, into a revised narrative of 
selfhood that fundamentally reconstitutes the self as an other-orientated creature.25  
Throughout the Bible, narrators juxtapose narratorial relativity and divine 
authority to assert the supremacy of God against the meaninglessness of time and 
the finite subjectivity of the human. In the New Testament they insist that Jesus is 
not a memory, or an object of history, but a living presence who resists efforts to 
understand him any other way. He is to be found in the transfigured selves who 
demonstrate both the potential of the authentic self and its proper position in relation 
to others and the story of the Other. In this domain those who give up their claim to 
self-established selfhood and reconstitute their life according to the finitude and 
subjectivity of the figures within the text, find that God’s eternal presence not only fills 
the dimensions of the biblical diegesis, but also “intersects and constantly pervades 
their [own] time.”26 The “Here I am” of the self-involved reader, who attends to the 
inner-biblical hermeneutics of the self-involved narrator, is met by the self-involved 
                                            
25
 To this end, Rowan Williams suggests that it is impossible to conceive a human identity that is 
primitively and only an object to itself, for there is no self-awareness outside the commerce of agents 
and speakers. “When I think I am imagining myself ‘for myself,’ I am actually taking up the position of 
someone who looks at or speaks to me.” Williams, On Christian Theology, p. 72. 
26
 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the 
Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, ed. by Reider Thomte and Albert B. Anderson (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 89. 
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